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ABSTRACT
The cession of Sarawak by the third Rajah to the British 
Crown finally resolved the ambiguous position of a European-ruled 
Malay state which remained within the British imperial system for 
100 years without being a formal part of it. External pressures, 
principally the Japanese invasion, had made direct British control 
both necessary and irresistible. The problem of the succession 
also helped to ensure that the Rajah’s agreement was not difficult 
to obtain. But it was already apparent in the 1930s that Brooke 
rule had come to the end of the road and could only look backwards. 
The Brooke administration’s failure to re-define native interests 
in the light of economic and social developments had removed the 
rationale upon which the Raj was avowedly based. The legitimization 
of cession was a grubby affair undertaken more for the benefit of 
British domestic opinion than the people of Sarawak. Nevertheless, 
it provided an issue which fostered the political development of 
Sarawak from a loose group of communities linked only by a common 
acceptance of the Rajah’s authority to a multi-racial state with 
its own nationalist tradition. Sarawak nationalism took the form 
of a movement to restore Brooke rule but it envisaged the 
establishment of an independent native state in which power would 
be shared between the Malays and the Ibans.
iPreface
When I undertook my research on Sarawak history I hoped to 
make the anti-cession movement 1946-51 the focus of my study. However, 
a combination of circumstances caused me to concentrate instead on 
the cession proper, together with its background in Brooke rule and 
British colonial policy and its immediate consequences both in Sarawak 
and Britain. To summarize these circumstances briefly, I experienced 
difficulty in obtaining permission to conduct research in Sarawak 
and consequently was unable to carry out all the interviewing which 
I had envisaged. However, my investigations there showed that the 
history of the various anti-cession groups was sparsely documented. 
While I located some material on the Sarawak Dayak Association's 
origins in the United Sea Dayak Co-operative and the Japanese- 
sponsored Perimpun Dayak, no trace could be found of the records of the 
Malay National Union and the Barisan Pemuda Sarawak. One of the 
immediate consequences of the murder of Governor Duncan Stewart at Sibu 
in December 1949 was the confiscation of documents by the police in 
most towns and the destruction of material by Malays who wished to 
remove all traces of their connections with the anti-cession 
organizations.
By the time I began to examine the splendid collection of 
material deposited at Rhodes House, Oxford, by members of the Brooke 
family, Mrs Margaret Noble and a number of former Sarawak officers, I 
was also convinced that it was just as important to explain how 
cession came about. While a good deal has been written about the first 
two Rajahs, the end of Brooke rule has been passed over by historians. 
The Rhodes House material, together with the Colonial Office and War 
Office records and interviews, provided a good basis for reconstructing 
the story. The Rhodes House collection also contained a number of 
letters from members of the Malay National Union and the Sarawak 
Dayak Association during 1946 and early 1947. I have used these in my 
last chapter which describes the first phase of the anti-cession 
movement in the Kuching area. The shape of the thesis has been 
determined by my belief that the cession must be seen both as the 
product of factors arising from Brooke rule and British imperialism 
and as the well-spring of Sarawak's political development. I hope
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that what I have written will help provide a starting-point for 
studies of the anti-cession movement itself, which must be regarded 
as the first expression of Sarawak nationalism.
Perhaps the most disappointing lacuna in the material 
(apart from the anticipated unavailability of key Colonial Office files 
for 1945 and 1946) is the paucity of records for Sarawak during the 
inter-war period, the Japanese occupation and the third Rajah himself. 
Unlike his father and great-uncle, Vyner Brooke does not seem to have 
been a prolific writer - or, if he was, pathetically little of his 
writing has survived. Consequently, I have been obliged to conjecture 
about his personality and his motivations and I am by no means 
confident of the picture which emerges of this central figure. There 
is much more material available on Anthony Brooke and I was fortunate 
enough to have several long interviews with him in London in 1974 and 
1975. However, he raises yet another problem for the student of 
contemporary history. How is one to deal with the contradictions 
inevitably arising between what an individual remembers about events 
thirty years earlier in which he was closely involved, and documentary 
evidence dating from that time? There must also inevitably be some 
discrepancy between the historian’s treatment of the living and the 
dead. I also realize that in the course of my work I have caused a 
number of people to re-live painful experiences which they would prefer 
to have forgotten.
G.T.M. MacBryan raises the separate problem of the 
eminence, the shadowy figure behind the scenes who nevertheless plays 
a crucial role in the drama. Many of the letters and documents 
signed by the Rajah must have been MacBryan’s work, just as some of 
the letters signed by Sir Thomas Blarney were the work of A.A. Conlon 
and others signed by the Datu Patinggi were written by his young 
secretaries. There is no way of demonstrating conclusively that this 
is so, but everything we know about the relationship between the 
characters concerned points in that direction. As for the Colonial 
Office, we know for a fact that Edward Gent and his colleagues drafted 
important letters for the various Secretaries of State for Colonies. 
While personalities are expected to be important in dynastic history, 
their influence is often hidden behind modem bureaucratic structures 
and party systems.
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'Sarawak’, it should be noted, originally referred to 
a dependency of the sultanate of Brunei consisting of the Sarawak, 
Samarahan and Lundu river basins. Although the Sarawak to which I 
refer corresponds with the present political and geographical entity, 
most of the events which I describe took place in Kuching which was 
the focus of changes arising from urban growth as well as being the 
seat of Brooke and colonial rule. It is regretted if the rest of this 
huge but sparsely populated state seems to have a somewhat disembodied 
existence as 'the outstations'. I have used the term 'natives' to 
refer collectively to all the peoples of Sarawak except the Chinese 
and Indians. One of the lasting tributes to Brooke rule is its 
continued use in Sarawak without any suggestion of pejorative colonial 
connotations. The definition used in the Sarawak Constitution, which 
follows Brooke practice, lists Malays, Ibans, Land Dayaks, Kayans, 
Kenyahs, Klemantans, Melanaus and Muruts. I have also used 'Ibans' 
rather than 'Sea Dayaks', although the latter term occasionally 
appears in quotations and names of organizations. 'Dayak' was used 
during the period of this study to refer collectively to all non- 
Muslim natives. I have avoided the use of [sic] when it draws 
unnecessary attention to the occasionally faulty spelling and 
expression of people for whom English was a second language. Unless 
otherwise specified, the currency referred to is the Sarawak dollar 
which, like the Straits dollar, was worth stg. 2s.4d. during the 
inter-war period. Finally, in the belief that early Brooke history 
is familiar to most students of Southeast Asian history, I have 
avoided rehearsing it once more in my introduction.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction: The Brooke Tradition
THE ’WHITE RAJAHS* of Sarawak have stimulated the romantic imagination 
of generations of European readers. It is almost as if the Brookes 
succeeded in fulfilling the archetypal fantasy of isolated white men 
ruling over savages in a tropical setting. The story of how James 
Brooke established his kingdom in a corner of Borneo has been told so 
many times that it has almost become a legend.
The legend is at its best in boys’ adventure stories of 
the early twentieth century when the European imperial system was at 
its zenith. In The Boy 1 s Book of PioneersEric Wood gave James 
Brooke pride of place among his Empire-building heroes:
... he had gone, an unknown Englishman, into Sarawak, 
had found it and its neighbouring States savage and 
unsettled, overriden by pirates, and he had by tact, 
and practically unaided, brought into existence wise 
government, had opened up possibilities of trade 
never dreamt of, had won the devotion of a people, 
and almost freed the country from the pirates, who 
had been grim barriers to trade along the coast ...
What he bequeathed to his successor, ... was a 
prosperous country, justly ruled, where natives^and 
Europeans were fellow-citizens living at peace.
The essential elements are all there: the brave and high-minded
European who brings peace and good government to warring and 
benighted savages, earning their eternal gratitude and at the same 
time enlarging the boundaries of Empire and the possibilities of 
trade. It is part of the mythology of how Europeans came to dominate 
so much of the world in the nineteenth century.
Although the legend hardly bears examination, it will 
doubtless endure as long as the dream of being king of a tropical 
island endures. It has certainly dominated Sarawak historiography 
until recent times. While I am interested in the Brooke legend and 
its relationship to fact, I shall be dealing primarily with the end 
of Brooke rule in the belief that this is as significant as its
1 London n.d., p.100.
2origins. I shall argue that whatever Brooke rule may have been in 
its first conception, by the 1930s the old rationale had almost 
disappeared and Sarawak was facing economic and administrative 
problems of a colonial nature. Until this time the state’s 
geographical remoteness, tiny population and lack of valuable 
resources had allowed the Brookes and their European officers to 
think that Sarawak was ’different’.
Sarawak was within the British imperial system without being 
part of it. The Brookes could not have established their ascendancy 
in north-western Borneo without the assistance of the British navy 
and in 1888 they were guaranteed future protection. Their success in 
keeping economic exploitation to a minimum was assisted by the fact that 
there was very little to exploit, although they depended on Singapore 
and the structure of British mercantilism for survival. While Sarawak 
remained within the tradition of Borneo's Malay sultanates, it was also 
a surrogate British colony.
The Great Depression and preparations for another major 
world conflict spelled the end of Sarawak’s comfortable isolation from 
outside pressures. Colonial Office dissatisfaction with the way 
Sarawak was being administered and inability to do anything about it 
meant that there were powerful bureaucrats awaiting the opportunity 
to tidy up an 'irregular' situation. They could argue that in the 
eyes of the world, Sarawak was to all intents and purposes a British 
colony and therefore a British responsibility. However, responsibility 
could be exercised only if there was power to intervene. Consequently 
there was increasing pressure on the Rajah to accept a Resident, 
completing the pattern of British domination which had begun in the 
Malay States seventy years earlier. It was also important that Sarawak 
should be brought within the network of Imperial defence strategy, a 
pressure which would render its sovereignty little more than a 
technicality.
At the same time, it was increasingly obvious that the 
momentum which had sustained Brooke rule was almost exhausted. While 
many of his European officers identified strongly with the state and 
its people, the last of the Brooke rulers had lost interest in the 
whole idea of Sarawak. Nor could he see the perpetuation of his line
3through his nephew whom he was not disposed to trust. When the 
Japanese had occupied Sarawak and the post-war situation seemed 
highly uncertain, the Rajah was not inclined to stand on what little 
remained of his sovereignty. Renewed pressure from the Colonial 
Office to accept an Adviser and the ultimate legislative power of 
the British government under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act persuaded 
him to call it a day.
Together with North Borneo, Sarawak in 1946 became the last 
colony to be acquired by Great Britain. Far from representing the 
high-water mark of British imperialism, however, its acquisition 
signalled the ebb of British influence in Southeast Asia. Whatever 
the Colonial Office’s reasons for appointing a Resident in Sarawak 
may have been in 1941, the Japanese sweep south and the emergence of 
post-war nationalism brought about a defensive strategy which 
necessitated the consolidation of British imperial interests. This 
factor, together with the long-standing need to rationalize Britain’s 
administrative control of its Far Eastern colonies, made it almost 
inevitable that Sarawak should be drawn beneath the Imperial wing.
That this was brought about by a British Labour government committed 
to the decolonization of India and Africa is one of the ironies of 
history. Sarawak had to be colonized before it could be decolonized.
The Brooke Raj
James Brooke’s 1841 defeat of the Sarawak rebellion against Brunei^ 
created for him a position of power which he spent the rest of his 
life consolidating and defending. With the Sultan of Brunei weak and 
incompetent, and the Dutch anxious to extend their influence along the 
north-west coast of Borneo, Sarawak was a bone of contention among the 
Brunei pengirans (members of the Brunei royal family) who had settled 
there. Having been offered Sarawak's government and revenues as 
his reward for suppressing the rebellion, James decided that a foothold
1 The conventional view has been that the rebellion of the 
Sarawak datus (non-royal chiefs) against Brunei arose 
from the harsh taxation levied by the pengirans. But 
James Brooke at no time suggested this; he believed that 
it had been instigated by the Sultan of Sambas on the 
suggestion of the Dutch.
4i n  Sarawak was p r e f e r a b l e  t o  h i s  o r i g i n a l  n o t i o n  o f  b u i l d i n g  a c h a in  
o f  B r i t i s h  s e t t l e m e n t s  t h r o u g h  t h e  Malay a r c h i p e l a g o  from S in g a p o re  to  
n o r t h e r n  A u s t r a l i a . ^  He b e l i e v e d  t h a t  by e x t e n d i n g  h i s  i n f l u e n c e  to  
B r u n e i  he  c o u ld  r e f o r m  t h e  s u l t a n a t e  as  a v e h i c l e  f o r  B r i t i s h  m e r c a n t i l e  
i n t e r e s t s .  C loaked as  t h e y  were  by h u m a n i t a r i a n  s e n s i b i l i t i e s ,  James '  
f u n d a m e n ta l  i n s t i n c t s  were t h o s e  o f  an i m p e r i a l i s t .
I n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  h i s  i n i t i a l  f a i t h  i n  t h e  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  
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o f  t h e  Malay k ingdoms,  and i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  r e a l i t i e s  o f  h i s  t enuous  
p o s i t i o n ,  James Brooke to o k  t h e  l i n e  o f  l e a s t  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  i n d ig e n o u s  
forms when e s t a b l i s h i n g  h i s  s t a t e .  The p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  Raj 
a d h e re d  c l o s e l y  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  p a t t e r n  o f  t h e  w e s t  Borneo  s u l t a n a t e s :  
an a u t o c r a t i c  R a ja h ;  d e l e g a t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t y  t o  a  Malay e l i t e  who 
m a i n t a i n e d  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  v i s  ä  v i s  t h e  non-Musl im n a t i v e s ;  p i t t i n g  
o f  ' l o y a l '  I b a n s  a g a i n s t  t h o s e  who c h a l l e n g e d  t h e  R a j a h ' s  a u t h o r i t y ;  
and r e l i a n c e  on C h inese  t o  g e n e r a t e  most  o f  t h e  t r a d e  and r e v e n u e .
The Raj o f  Sarawak d e v e lo p e d  i n  t h e  w e s t  Borneo mould,
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  m o d i f i e d  by t h e  l i b e r a l  h u m a n i t a r i a n  s e n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  i t s
E n g l i s h  r u l e r s ,  and depended  i n i t i a l l y  on t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h
navy  and l a t e r  on t h e  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  t h e  R a j a h ' s  a u t h o r i t y  by h i s  s u b j e c t s .
Formal  p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t y ,  o r i g i n a l l y  d e r i v e d  from B r u n e i ,  was embodied
3i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  w i l l s  o f  t h e  f i r s t  two Ra jahs  whose d e l i n e a t i o n  o f  
t h e  s u c c e s s i o n  p r o v i d e d  Sarawak w i t h  i t s  on ly  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  b a s i s  u n t i l  
1941. The Raj c l a im e d  s o v e r e i g n t y  n o t  i n  t h e  form o f  t a x a t i o n  r i g h t s  
o v e r  p a r t i c u l a r  c om m un i t i e s ,  as  had be e n  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  B r u n e i ,  b u t  
i n  t h e  ow nersh ip  o f  c l e a r l y  c i r c u m s c r i b e d  t e r r i t o r y .  The Ra jahs  were 
sworn t o  uphold  t h e  Muslim f a i t h  and adat ( cus tom s)  o f  t h e  Malays ,
I b a n s  and o t h e r  p e o p l e s  u n d e r  t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  b u t  t h e y  a l s o  c l a im e d  
t h e  power t o  s u p p r e s s  cus toms such  as  f o r c e d  t r a d e ,  bondage  and
1 Brooke o u t l i n e d  h i s  scheme i n  t h e  p r o s p e c t u s  he w r o t e  f o r  h i s  
f i r s t  voyage t o  t h e  Malay A r c h i p e l a g o .  I t  was p u b l i s h e d  as 
an a p p e n d ix  to  t h e  f i r s t  volume o f  h i s  f r i e n d  Henry K e p p e l ' s  
The E xped ition  to  Borneo o f  H.M.S. Dido . .._, 2 v o l s . ,  London 
[1847] .
2 For a u s e f u l  s t u d y  o f  James B r o o k e ' s  views and how t h e y  were 
m o d i f i e d  by e x p e r i e n c e ,  s e e  Graham S a u n d e r s ,  ' James  Brooke and 
As ian G overnm en t ' ,  Brunei Museum J o u r n a l V o l . 3 ,  N o . l ,  1973, 
p p . 105-17 .
3 See Appendix I I .
5headhunting. Replacing the Brunei pengirans as head of a Malay hierarchy, 
they transformed the Malay datus (chiefs) from feudal tax-collectors 
into salaried dignitaries (part of whose function was to legitimize 
their position) ajid second-level administrators.
As early as 1841 James Brooke issued a makeshift code of 
laws based on those of Brunei but reflecting his own notions of British 
justice and 'fair play'. He ruled with the assistance of Malay and 
European advisers who from 1855 constituted his 'Supreme Council'.
The general Council or 'Council Negri' established by his nephew and 
successor Charles Brooke in 1867 was a means of extending recognition 
to and cementing support from Iban, Kayan and other native leaders.
Brooke administration depended from the outset on a small group of 
Englishmen who remained in Sarawak more from their sense of adventure 
and 'service' than from any hope of making money, together with the 
perabangan or traditional Malay elite.’*’
At the apex of the Malay traditional system, the Rajahs also
claimed authority over the Ibans, a claim which was strenuously resisted
2and had to be enforced by bloody warfare. The Ibans of the Skrang and 
Saribas who had been 'pacified' during the first decades served as the 
Rajah's soldiers against 'rebel' Ibans well into the twentieth century.
By then, however, they were also becoming increasingly involved in the 
cash economy through rubber smallholding and could afford to educate 
their children at mission schools which had been set up as part of the 
'pacification' programme. The position of the Chinese was similar to 
the west Borneo states and in Malaya. Constituting the only force towards 
economic development, they were the agents of change. Not obliged to 
adopt a subordinate position as in Malaya and confident of protection 
when their economic interests were threatened, they provided Brooke 
government with most of its revenue, its trading community and the 
multiplicity of skills without which the state of Sarawak could not have 
survived.
1 The title 'Abang' was assumed by the sons of datus.
2 The relationship between the Brookes and the Ibans has been 
brilliantly portrayed by Robert Pringle, Rajah and Rebels: 
The Ibans of Sarawak under Brooke Rule3 1841-19413
London 1970.
6The economic basis of the Raj was similar to that of other 
west Borneo sultanates. The Ibans were subsistence farmers and hunters 
who exchanged jungle produce for salt, iron and cloth and remained on the 
periphery of the cash economy; the Malays were subsistence fishermen 
and padi-farmers; the Chinese were miners, pepper-farmers, craftsmen or 
traders. Government revenue was derived largely from taxes imposed on 
the predominantly Chinese vices of gambling and opium-smoking, supplemented 
by export duties on antimony and gold, a nominal head-tax on the Ibans 
and occasional fines for such offences as headhunting or defiance of 
government authority. Government expenditure was largely devoted to 
salaries, the maintenance of up-river forts and the water communication. 
Although James Brooke had hoped that minerals would provide the 'staple’ 
to finance the cost of his administration, he was obliged to dig deeply 
into his own pocket and then to rely on private loans. Unable to 
obtain investment funds from European sources on his own terms, he was 
dependent on the economic productivity of the Chinese.
The nice question is whether there was a common source of 
Brooke authority among the widely-diverging ethnic and cultural groups 
which made up what might be called the Sarawak confederation. For the 
Malays, the Rajah was the titular head of a political system which had 
its origins in their own tradition and preserved their political hegemony 
over the other races. He was not a Muslim, but was sworn to protect 
the Muslim faith and Malay custom."*' It is much more difficult to 
generalize about the non-Muslim natives. For the Land Dayaks and other 
peoples more or less at the mercy of the Ibans in pre-Brooke times, 
he was a saviour and protector. For the Ibans of the lower reaches of 
the Batang Lupar and the Saribas he was their ally against the up­
river Ibans and the Kayans. For the up-river Ibans, he was an intruder 
who thwarted their migration into new areas and forbade the practice 
,of headhunting which constituted a dynamic element in their culture.
The Chinese saw him as a protector against the Ibans and the guarantor 
of conditions conducive to trade and industry.^
1 For Vyner Brooke's Accession Oath, see Appendix II.
2 An extremely useful study could be made of indigenous 
perceptions of the Brookes. I am well aware of the 
limitations of my analysis.
7It is difficult to reduce these different perceptions to a 
simple analysis of Brooke authority, nor is it easy to assess the 
extent to which the Rajah’s prestige was derived from his position as 
representative of the new European master-class of the Malay world.
But an important part of his function was that of final arbiter, not 
only between different ethnic groups, but within them. Content to 
pursue a laissez-faire policy towards indigenous custom except when it 
contravened humanitarian standards, he constituted a court of appeal 
whose authority was generally accepted by all races. It is 
significant that the term used in Sarawak to describe Brooke government 
was perentahdenoting the preservation of civil order, rather than 
kerajaan with its more formal connotations of political authority.
Sarawak 's International Status
It was partly by accident that Sarawak became and remained an independent 
state. From the beginning of his involvement in Borneo, James Brooke 
hoped that Britain would establish a protectorate there and although 
he always professed not to be disappointed if this could not be arranged, 
he expended a good deal of time and energy in the attempt. The need 
for protection had been there from the outset; indeed, he could never 
have succeeded without the assistance of the British navy. The Chinese 
rebellion'*' caused him to renew his diplomatic efforts with the British 
government, but when the offer of a protectorate finally came from Lord 
Palmerston in early 1858, James imposed stiff conditions. He asked 
for compensation for what he had spent on the establishment and 
maintenance of Sarawak, nor would he accept the compromise of a naval 
base which he had earlier suggested.
The next effort to secure a protectorate followed an
1 In 1857 members of the Chinese gold-mining kongsi (co­
operative) from Bau rebelled against the imposition of 
taxes and took temporary control of Kuching. Their 
expulsion by Malays and Ibans supporting the Rajah 
established a tradition in race relations which was 
never forgotten. The rebellion is described in 
Runciman, The White R a j a h s pp. 124-33. See also, Ludvig 
Helms, Pioneering in the Far East3 London 1882, pp.164- 
92.
8abortive Malay rebellion in 1861. That James was then prepared to
approach Holland for protection indicates to what extent the instincts
of the petty ruler had taken over from those of the Dutch-hating patriot
of 1838. The Dutch, after all, had sent him belated assistance during
the Chinese rebellion. However, Holland rejected the proposal out of
hand and James had to call off negotiations with the French when both
his elder nephew, Brooke Brooke,, and his patron, Baroness Burdett-
Coutts, expressed strong disapproval. James subsequently approached
the Duke of Brabant (later King Leopold II of Belgium) but negotiations
were terminated by Brooke Brooke’s unilateral intervention. Indeed,
it was his nephew’s emotional reaction to these efforts which caused
2James to disinherit him and make over Sarawak temporarily to Baroness
Burdett-Coutts whom he then advised to offer it first to the British
3government and then to the French.
Always anticipating that Britain would take over Sarawak,
James had been forced to adopt an independent status towards which 
he was always somewhat ambivalent. He was gratified when his sovereignty 
was recognized by the United States government but did not negotiate 
a treaty of friendship in the belief that it might prejudice his chances 
of obtaining a British protectorate. Nor did Britain's recognition of 
his sovereignty in 1863 and the appointment of a Consul provide a 
satisfactory substitute, although it removed the Foreign Office's objection 
that he was technically subject to the sovereignty of Brunei. In 
retirement in Devon and with his younger nephew and nominated heir,
Charles Brooke, in charge of the government, James decided that 
cession to Britain was the only solution for Sarawak. But his insistence 
that he be repaid all that he had spent and that Charles should be 
given compensation, proved to be unacceptable. Before he died in 1868
1 Generally referred to as ’The Malay Plot’, this has been 
fully dealt with by Pringle, Rajahs and Rebels . ..,
pp.97-134.
2 In a sad rehearsal of events which were to take place 
seventy-five years later, James took quite unnecessary 
precautions to prevent Brooke Brooke from returning to 
Sarawak and deprived him of all his rights.
3 He drew the line at her suggestion that it might go to 
Greece.
9James was still negotiating for a protectorate with the Italian 
government which he hoped would at least provide the capital with which 
to develop Sarawak.
The Second Rajah
Under Charles Brooke, who ruled from 1868 until his death in 1917,
Sarawak was extended to its present boundaries, government administration 
was formalized and some effort made towards economic development and 
technological adaptation. Inheriting the first Rajah’s interest in 
securing the trade of neighbouring river systems and his latter-day 
belief that the Brunei sultanate was irredeemable, Charles wanted to 
annex the Baram river district in 1876 but was only given permission 
by the British government to do so after 1881 when the North Borneo 
Company received its charter. Charles also acquired the Trusan in 1885, 
Limbang in 1890 and Lawas in 1905, all by means of cash payments to 
the Sultan of Brunei and an undertaking to pay annual 'cession money'. 
Charles would have taken over Brunei itself had it not been for the 
intervention of the British government which signed a treaty of protection 
with him in 1888.^ This finally clarified Sarawak's international 
status.
In place of the somewhat amateurish and unsystematic way 
in which James had run Sarawak, Charles developed an administration 
which he supervised in every detail. By 1890 Sarawak was divided into 
four Divisions, corresponding with the major river systems, which were 
in turn subdivided into Districts1 2;
First Division - Sarawak and Sadong river systems 
Second Division - Batang Lupar, Saribas and Kalaka 
Third Division - Rejang, Matu, Oya, Mukah and Bintulu 
Fourth Division - Baram and Trusan.
Each Division was under the charge of a Resident who in turn supervised 
the work of District Officers, Assistant District Officers and Malay
1 A full account of Sarawak's territorial acquisitions from 
Brunei can be found in Nicholas Tarling, Britain^ the 
Brookes and Brunei. Kuala Lumpur 1971.
2 These remained the basic administrative units until recent 
years.
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Native Officers appointed by the Rajah but deriving much of their 
authority by virtue of their descent from the datus who had originally 
ruled in the name of the Sultan of Brunei. State-assisted education, 
such as it was, concentrated on providing this traditional Malay 
elite with elementary skills.
Native Officers assisted the District Officer in general 
administration. In addition, there was until 1932 the para-military 
Sarawak Rangers'*" (mostly Iban) and police (mostly Malay) and a number 
of Malay, Chinese and Iban clerks and other minor functionaries. In 
Kuching there was also a small group of European technical officers in 
such departments as the Treasury and Public Works who were regarded 
by the Rajah as decidely inferior to his Residents and District Officers 
in close contact with the people. The government was organized on 
four separate levels:
Senior Administrative Service
Technical Service 
Native Officer Service
Junior Administrative Service
(Residents, District Officers, 
Assistant District Officers, 
Administrative Cadets).
(Treasury, Public Works,
Marine Department etc.)
(Malays serving directly under 
the Senior Administrative 
Service in outstation posts).
(Chinese, Malay and Iban clerks, 
etc.)
Recruitment for the Sarawak Service in Charles’ reign was conducted 
largely on the basis of family connections and personal recommendations 
from retired officers. The scarcity of suitable men brought about by 
the First World War resulted in a dramatic lowering of standards for 
some years but by the late 1920s the government was recruiting cadets 
through the appointments boards of Oxford and Cambridge universities.
In 1924 the Senior Administrative Service established its own system 
of examination in the Malay language, Sarawak history and administrative 
procedure as a means of improving standards and regulating promotion. 
Although the Administrative Service had not expanded significantly from 
1870 until 1914, the creation of new departments requiring technical
1 These were merged with the police in 1931 but were
subsequently revived in other forms and still constitute 
a number of the battalions of the Malaysian Army. See 
Plate IX.
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officers swelled the total number of Europeans employed by government 
from 37 in 1917 to 79 in 1925.
There was also a government-sponsored system of native 
administration beneath the district level. In coastal areas, every 
Malay or Melanau kampong (village) was under the charge of a tua 
kampong  ^ an influential elder chosen by the Rajah on the advice of the 
District Officer. His official responsibility was limited to the 
collection of taxes and the settling of minor disputes but his position 
as an intermediary for government lent him a certain authority. In 
Iban areas the agent of indirect rule was the penghulu who collected 
the ’door’ tax, tried minor civil and criminal cases and was responsible 
for the raising and leadership of armed men should they be needed by 
the Rajah. Among the Kenyahs and Kayans. the penghulu system was fairly 
successful but in more democratic Iban society it was always an 
artificial imposition. As for the Chinese, indirect rule was exercised 
through the kapitan china (Chinese headman) of each major dialect 
group in every settlement. The principal kapitans also controlled 
gambling, pawnbroking and other monopolies on the government's behalf. 
Apart from the special Chinese Court set up in 1911 to deal with 
Chinese civil cases, there was no government intervention in Chinese 
affairs until a Chinese Secretariat was established in 1929.
During the first forty years of Charles Brooke's reign 
there was little modification of his autocratic power. Some Orders 
were issued 'in Council' but the Supreme Council was an essentially 
advisory body of datus which the Rajah consulted on questions of 
customary law . It ceased to have formal meetings in 1927 and from 
that time until its formal re-establishment under the 1941 Constitution 
its members performed a largely ceremonial role. The General Council, 
or Council Negri, which Charles had initiated in 1867 functioned as 
little more than a triennial assembly of outstation native leaders and 
European officers who came to pay homage to the Rajah and listen to 
his address. The Rajah was the source of legal as well as political 
authority and he legislated by means of Orders, some of which were 
submitted to the datus for advice.
Like his uncle, Charles Brooke encouraged Chinese immigration.
In 1867 he wrote:
12
We are going to reduce the price of the cooked 
opium in the country and ... [it] will be the 
means of bringing many hundreds perhaps 
thousands of people into the country. We 
want population to turn our waste land into 
shape and create bustle and industry I 
never saw the country so ill as it is now 
and this does not agree with me ... [I want] 
to see the jungle falling right and left and 
people settled over what are now lonely 
wastes^and turning them into cultivated 
lands.
He wanted padi (rice) farmers whose efforts could then be imitated 
by the Iban but conditions for planting padi on the lower Rejang river 
were not favourable and the Cantonese and Foochows who arrived in 1900 
found rubber a much more profitable crop. Although there was 
considerable tension between the Chinese and the Ibans at times over 
land, Chinese immigration continued until 1941, only abated by 
downward fluctuations in the price of rubber.
As early as the 1870s Charles encouraged coal mining and it 
was largely due to his efforts that a colliery was finally opened up 
at Sadong. He also purchased the Brooketon colliery on Muara island 
off Brunei with the idea of operating it in opposition to the Labuan 
coal field. He even considered building a railway from the Silantek 
coalfield to Lingga but the project proved too expensive.
Transportation was essential to the development of Sarawak’s natural 
resources and within the limits imposed by a tiny revenue Charles made 
considerable efforts to remedy the situation. In 1912 the Brooke 
Dockyard was opened and in 1915 ten miles of railway were brought into 
use. The Rajah was also anxious that factories should be set up by 
outside capital to process jungle produce. But he was not prepared 
to allow foreign capitalists to ride roughshod over the Chinese.
When a company to whom he had given a monopoly interpreted the agreement 
in such a way as to work against the interests of the Chinese
1 ’Extract from the Diary of Charles Brooke' , cited by 
Pringle, Rajahs and Rebels ..._, p.304n.
2 A kutch (wood oil) factory began operations in the 
late 1890s and another factory designed to process 
jelutong (wild rubber) was built just before the 
First World War.
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middlemen who were the initial buyers, the Rajah pronounced that
’Congo rules cannot be supported in Sarawak to please anyone or
company’ His intervention in support of Chinese traders and small
capitalists against European interests contrasted sharply with the
situation in Malaya where British bureaucrats actively fostered
European investment and protected it from Chinese competition.
The one European-owned industry which functioned freely was the Miri
oilfield. Often described as an ’imperium in imperio f_, Sarawak
Oilfields Ltd did not depend on the government in any significant way.
More importantly, while not impinging on native interests it provided
2a welcome addition to the traditional sources of revenue.
Charles was repelled by naked commercialism and in a 1907
a±
pamphlet spoke out strongly against the new form of exploitive
imperialism which had developed in the latter years of the nineteenth
3century as the major European countries rushed to acquire colonies. 
Perhaps the strongest statement of his revulsion against the new 
imperialism was contained in his will of 1913 which railed against
... these times when the white man comes to the 
fore and the dark coloured is thrust to the wall 
and when capital rules and justice ceases, 
whereas the main consideration should be an 
honest and upright protection afforded to all 
races alike and particularly to the weaker ones.
Adhering to attitudes which pre-dated the great colonial boom, he 
was highly sceptical about the rubber industry which was rapidly 
developed in Malaya and North Borneo during the first decade of the
1 Cited by Pringle, Rajahs and Rebels ...3 p.349n.
2 A trial shipment of oil was made in 1913 and in the year 
of the Rajah’s death (1917) a small refinery and 
submarine offshore pipeline was completed at Lutong. In 
1929 Miri achieved its peak production of 1,000,000 tons 
but ten years later the future of the field did not seem 
particularly bright.
3 Queries; Past3 Present and Future_, London 1907.
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t w e n t i e t h  c e n tu r y .
So c o n c e rn e d  was he  w i th  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  Sarawak b e in g
d escended  upon by European  s p e c u l a t o r s  t h a t  he  i s s u e d  an o r d e r
e x p r e s s l y  f o r b i d d i n g  s m a l lh o l d e r s  o f  a l l  r a c e s  from  s e l l i n g  t h e i r  la n d
to  f o r e i g n  com panies o r  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s .  However, he  had  a l r e a d y
e s t a b l i s h e d  a governm ent r u b b e r  e s t a t e  o u t s i d e  Kuching  and was
e n c o u ra g in g  i t s  c u l t i v a t i o n  among th e  M alays and I b a n s  o f  th e  F i r s t ,
Second and T h i rd  D i v i s i o n s  i n  t h e  hope t h a t  th e y  w ould ’make a ge n u in e
2co n cern  o u t  o f  i t s  s m a l l  p r o f i t s  . . . ’ He a l s o  expended a c o n s i d e r a b l e  
amount o f  money on a t t e m p t s  t o  grow to b a c c o  and t e a  and c o f f e e  in  
t h e  hope t h a t  t h i s  w ould b e n e f i t  s m a l l h o l d e r s ,  a l th o u g h  he was w o r r i e d  
t h a t  t h e  s c ra m b le  t o  p l a n t  r u b b e r  would  be  to  th e  d e t r i m e n t  o f  such  
t r a d i t i o n a l  c ro p s  as p a d i ,  p e p p e r  and s a g o .
IN 1928 C h a r le s  W i l le s  J o h n s o n ,  t h e  R a ja h ’ s nephew and Sarawak Government 
Agent i n  London, d e s c r i b e d  w hat he  saw as  t h e  e le m e n ts  o f  th e  Brooke
1 When h i s  y o u n g e s t  son  H a r ry  p ro p o se d  a l a r g e - s c a l e  r u b b e r ­
p l a n t i n g  e n t e r p r i s e  i n  1910 , t h e  R a ja h ’ s r e p l y  was 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c :
. . .  I  have  had  f r e q u e n t  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  a s i m i l a r  
k in d  from many o t h e r s  w i t h i n  t h e  l a s t  month -  b u t  
n o t  b e l i e v i n g  i n  t h e  perm anence  o f  t h e  Rubber boom 
I  d o n ’ t  w ish  Sarawak to  be  a g r e a t  p r o d u c e r  o f  
t h i s  a r t i c l e  -  e x c e p t  i t  can be  p l a n t e d  by n a t i v e s  
who c o u ld  a f f o r d  to  s e l l  i t  a 2 0 th  p a r t  l e s s  th a n  
E uropean  Com panies, and t h i s  i s  w hat i t  w i l l  come 
to  a n o th e r  and n o t  d i s t a n t  day . I  c a n ’ t  lo o k  a t  
t h i s  M a t t e r  i n  a p r i v a t e  l i g h t  and i f  I  had 
l i s t e n e d  t o  t h e  l u r i n g  p r o p o s a l s  o f  r i c h  m erc h an ts  
I  s h o u ld  have  been  a m i l l i o n a i r e  30 o r  40 y e a r s  
ago -  I  f e e l  s u r e  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  you p ro p o se  
would  g e t  a good h e a r i n g  i n  B r i t i s h  N o r th  B orneo , 
w hich  i s  f u l l  o f  M e r c a n t i l e  E n t e r p r i s e s  and 
a c h ie v e m e n ts .  I  h a t e  t h e  name o f  Rubber and lo o k  
on i t  as a v e ry  g i g a n t i c  gam ble , as  i s  now tu r n e d  
to  a c c o u n t  i n  m aking th e  f o r t u n e s  o f  many and 
a n o th e r  day w i l l  be  t h e  means o f  d e p r i v i n g  th e  
p o o r  and i g n o r a n t  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o f  t h e i r  h a rd  e a rn e d  
s a v i n g s .
C i te d  by P r i n g l e ,  Rajahs and R eb e ls  p .3 6 0 .
2 ’ S a le  o f  Rubber P l a n t a t i o n s ' ,  SG3 1 November 1910.
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tradition:
If we move away from the original and well- 
recognized Brooke policy, now of some 80 years' 
standing, the policy of working for the good of 
the inhabitants, if we countenance the 
extravagant ideas that have been so prevalent 
elsewhere since the war, so, surely as the sun 
rises, we shall fail in our trust. Simplicity 
has been the key-note to the success of Sarawak.
Let us all ... keep it so, and help to see that 
the resources of the country are devoted to the 
best interests of gradual progress, not wasted 
in unremunerative undertakings or in producing 
a false standard of comfort which is unsuitable 
to the circumstances ... Let us not follow all 
western ideas and standards. We may and should 
base ourselves in principle upon British justice 
and British manners but let us adapt them to 
suit our surroundings and beware of importing 
quickly western methods which cannot be 
appreciated or even understood by eastern races.
Do not let us think that only what happens in 
our own time matters. The life of a country is 
a very long one, we who serve it may best do so 
by curbing our impetuosity and by buildings 
slowly and surely.^
Although Johnson had spent little time in Sarawak, it was not a 
difficult task to sum up the ideology which had sustained Brooke 
rule in the past but was now coming under increasing pressure.
The justifying myth of Brooke rule was the idea of trustee­
ship - that Sarawak belonged to the natives and that the Rajah 
exercised authority on their behalf and in their interests. However, 
it is highly unlikely that the Brookes and most of their officers 
ever seriously imagined that Europeans would one day be redundant and 
that the natives would rule themselves. Indeed, the pattern of Brooke 
rule had been progressively to entrench European authority at the 
expense of the traditional Malay leadership. The worst excesses of 
European exploitation were avoided, largely because there was little 
to exploit. Furthermore, the preservation of traditional ways of life 
was self-serving in that it perpetuated the European power-position. 
While the Brookes railed against 'vested interests', their own 
interest was to preserve their position by resisting change. They
1 SG3 1 December 1928.
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were not opposed to economic development but to the social and 
political changes which would inevitably accompany it.
Finally, the Brookes never became integrated as a ruling 
dynasty. While achieving extraordinary rapport with the peoples 
of Sarawak, the Rajahs retained their other role as English gentlemen 
with country houses and interests in literature and horce-racing. 
When they were described as 'White Rajahs' by the rest of the world, 
they were Europeans who happened to be rulers of a native state 
rather than rulers of a native state who happened to be Europeans.^
1 This need not have been so. One idea which might well 
have changed the history of Sarawak had it been taken 
more seriously was Charles Brooke's belief that 'an 
infusion of native blood is essential to the 
continuance of the race (of white administrators)'. 
According to Margaret de Windt whom he married in 1869, 
Charles had a series of Malay gundek (consorts) while 
Resident at Simanggang in the 1860s, one of whom bore 
him a son in 1867. On her first visit to Sarawak,
Ranee Margaret discovered the child who had been 
baptised Esca (Isaka) Brooke and, fearing that he 
might prove to be a 'bore in the country', arranged 
for him to be sent to England and adopted by the 
parson of Burrator where James Brooke had lived 
during his retirement. Esca was subsequently taken to 
Canada where he adopted the name of Daykin from his 
foster-parents and continued to receive a £100 annuity 
from the Brookes in spite of an ill-judged claim to the 
succession in 1927. Although he did not leave any 
further comment on the subject of miscegenation,
Charles might well have wondered if it would not have 
been a good thing to have brought up Esca as his heir. 
To take an obvious parallel, the Clunies-Ross family's 
intermarriage with the Javanese women brought from 
Banjarmasin to the Cocos-Keeling Islands by Alexander 
Hare might well have accounted for their surviving 
the Brookes as the last of the 'White Rajahs'. Ranee 
Margaret to Charles Willes Johnson, 25 June 1927, 29 
June 1927, 10 August 1927 (Hussey Papers); Toronto 
Star3 25 June 1928; South Wales News3 25 June 1927.
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CHAPTER II
The Crisis of Brooke Government
BROOKE government in the 1920s and 1930s was marked by a number of 
contradictions. On the one hand there was the surviving nineteenth 
century structure of District Officers responsible to Divisional 
Residents who were in turn accountable to the Rajah. These 
men possessed substantially autonomous powers and considered 
themselves custodians of ’the interests of the natives’, the 
official rationale of Brooke rule. Resisting change and committed 
to the preservation of indigenous custom, they corresponded to the 
pioneer generation of British officials in the Malay States. On 
the other hand, there was an emerging Kuching bureaucracy of 
technical officers who had little or no outstation experience and 
worshipped at the altar of efficiency and proper accounting. With 
access to the Rajah and the purse-strings, they assumed considerable 
power. As the business of government increased and there was a 
greater need for centralized administration, these bureaucrats 
inevitably came into conflict with the Residents and District 
Officers. There was also a fundamental divergence between notions 
of British justice and the pragmatic application of 'common sense 
justice'. The one serious attempt to re-think Brooke rule and to 
ask how the interests of the natives might best be served in a 
changing world fell victim to financial stringency and indifference. 
The few changes made were in the area of bureaucratic centralization 
rather than fundamental policy although they were still sufficient to 
bring about a trial of strength between the Administrative Service, 
represented temporarily by Anthony Brooke acting on the Rajah’s 
authority, and the bureaucrats of the Committee of Administration.
Rajah Charles ' Constitutional Changes
Between 1912 and 1915 Charles Brooke introduced far-reaching 
constitutional changes. By establishing a number of supervisory 
bodies he attempted to modify the autocratic system which he and his 
uncle had developed. And by dividing ultimate responsibility between 
his two sons Vyner and Bertram he laid the basis for a form of
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tandem rule.
Only a month after the arrival of Vyner and his new bride 
in Sarawak in 1912 the Rajah drew up this Proclamation:
I, Charles Brooke, Rajah of Sarawak, do hereby 
decree that my second son Bertram Brooke, heir 
presumptive to the Raj of Sarawak in the event 
of my eldest son, Charles Vyner Brooke, Rajah 
Muda of Sarawak, failing to have male issue, 
shall be received on his arrival in the State 
of Sarawak with a Royal Salute and honours 
equivalent to his rank. I further decree that 
he shall be recognised in future by all the 
inhabitants of Sarawak as being part of the 
Government of the State and [that] such 
recognition shall be duly registered in the 
records of the Supreme Council of the Raj of 
Sarawak. ^
Later, at the triennial meeting of the Council Negri, he foreshadowed
the establishment in London of a Sarawak State Advisory Council
consisting of Charles Willes Johnson (his nephew and Legal Adviser
to the Raj), two retired officers and Bertram as President. Its
2purpose was to supervise the financial affairs of the state, to act
as trustees in the investment of funds and to represent Sarawak's
interests in any negotiations with the British government. The members
were also appointed trustees of a £100,000 Sarawak State Advisory
Council Trust Fund whose capital would revert to the reigning Rajah
3in the event of cession or annexation of Sarawak. At this point,
4Charles seems to have been contemplating abdication, in which event 
the members of the Council would have acted as virtual trustees of 
the state.
In his political will of 1913, Charles settled the
1 Brooke Papers, Box 9/2,Rhodes House MSS, Pac.s.83.
2 The Council was required to consider the annual draft estimates 
of expenditure supplied by the Sarawak Treasurer, to supervise 
the revenue reports and inform the Rajah of any 'extravagance' 
in the disposal of land to non-natives, the remittance of large 
sums of money from the state and of over-spending within the state 
for private purposes.
3 Boyd, 'The Law and Constitution of Sarawak', typescript [1934?], 
pp. 54-55.
4 Ibid., p. 59.
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question of the succession by formally bequeathing sovereignty to
Vyner. However, he also stipulated that Bertram’s role in government
was to be hardly less important. Believing that 'two heads are
better than one' and that Vyner and his wife Sylvia would not be
able to spend sufficient time in the country, he stipulated that
Bertram should 'carry out the duties of Rajah and administer the
Government of the State during such times as my son Vyner may be in
England or absent from Sarawak . ..'^ During these periods Bertram
was to be Vice-President of the Supreme Council and Council Negri.
He was to have free access to the Astana, and European and native
officers were to 'pay him the same respect as is shown to his
eldest brother'. On Charles' death, Bertram was to be known as
Tuan Besar (although he in fact preferred to use his original title 
2of Tuan Muda). When he was in Sarawak, Bertram's position as 
President of the Advisory Council was to be filled, not by Vyner, 
but by the member who possessed the longest record of service in 
Sarawak. Charles also insisted that Bertram should be consulted 
in all matters involving 'material developments' - public works, 
buildings, estates, railways, waterways and any other extensions of 
government activity. He concluded:
I raise my second son to this position hoping 
that he will by his extended experience be an 
additional safeguard against adventurers and 
speculators who would desire to make profits 
out of the country without regard to its real 
welfare. And I fervently hope that my two 
sons will see the necessity of acting together 
to keep intact and develop the resources of 
the country which has been brought to its 
present state by myself and my faithful 
followers after so many years of devotion to 
it.1 23
Another limitation to autocratic power was the institution
1 [Anthony Brooke], The Facts About Sarawak3 Bombay [1947], p.31.
2 This followed the pattern established by the first Rajah who 
had appointed his elder nephew, Brooke Brooke, as Rajah Muda 
and his younger nephew, Charles Brooke, as Tuan Muda.
3 The Facts About Sarawak_, pp. 31-2.
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of an Orders Committee in 1914, consisting of the Residents and
the Treasurer but with no native representation. All Orders
(except those relating to conditions of service) were henceforth
to be submitted to the Committee before they were finally issued
on the Rajah’s authority. Moreover, during the Rajah's absence the
Committee was empowered to issue Orders as a matter of urgency in
the Rajah's name. This was a development of some constitutional
significance since the Committee was the first step towards the
creation of a wider legislative authority than that of the Rajah's 
1person.
Finally, in 1915 the Committee of Administration was
formally reconstituted by Proclamation as a permanent body
consisting of the three Residents and five other members. No
datus were appointed,although those who were already members of the
Supreme Council could be invited to attend when it was considered
2necessary. The Committee, which effectively replaced the Orders
Committee, was empowered to deal with all matters previously
referred by the Residents to the Resident of the First Division
or to the officer administering the government and 'if invited,
3advise upon any other questions referred to it'. More importantly,
it was to deal with all requisitions and records for new expenditure
and 'all official letters received ... from outside the State and
all important letters concerning companies and commercial concerns
4operating or preparing to operate within the State'. Explaining 
his reasons for re-establishing the Committee on a permanent basis, 
the Rajah wrote that his 'great object' was 'to make more certain 
by more heads than one being consulted' .
Without intending to deprecate the Supreme Council, 
whose prime function he saw as relating to native customary law, 
he regarded it as incapable of conducting important affairs of state
1 SGG, 16 May 1914; Boyd, 'The Law and Constitution of Sarawak', 
pp. 43-4.
2 SGGj 4 October 1915. *
3 Boyd, 'The Law and Constitution of Sarawak', p.45.
4 Ibid., p.45.
5 Ibid., p.47.
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... it can scarcely now stand as a full quantity to 
administer the requirement of such a population as 
Sarawak Territory possesses when educated European 
heads are required to solve and balance so many 
questions that more or less have to do with the 
outside world in correspondence and mutual interests 
or differences. The Edifice may standout it 
requires substantial outside supports.
The Committee method was also preferable since it would mean
permanency and a more businesslike system of operation which would
2call on the opinions of a number of men. Most significant of all,
Charles then saw it as ’the means of altering ... [a] despotism
3into a [government of] mixed administrators'. However, the
4administrators were all to be Europeans.
The Committee of Administration had originated in 1873 
as a temporary measure designed by Charles Brooke to look after 
the administration of the state during his absence. Consisting of 
three Europeans and the Datus Bandar and Imam who were empowered 
'to sit and discuss any affairs of importance which may occur from 
time to time',"* the Committee's duties included responsibility for 
all foreign correspondence, arrangements for visiting officials, the 
checking of outstation cash reports and the supervision of public 
works. Each month it was required to draw up reports and forward 
them to the Rajah in England. When the Rajah returned he reconvened 
the Supreme Council and approved the actions of the Committee before 
dissolving it.
Similar arrangements were made in 1878 and 1883 and
1
2
3
4
Ibid., p.47.
Ibid., p.48.
Ibid., p.48.
Only a short time beforehand, the Rajah had selected A.B. Ward, 
then a District Officer at Simanggang, to serve as Resident 
of the First Division - the most senior post in the administration. 
According to Ward's own account twenty years later, the Rajah, 
anticipating resentment from older officers at the promotion of 
a 34 year old over their heads, attempted to alleviate any bad 
feeling by setting up this permanent Committee and appointing 
them to it. Ward, however, served both as its chairman and 
secretary. A.B. Ward, Rajah’s Servant, Ithaca 1966, p.168.
5 Boyd, 'The Law and Constitution of Sarawak', p.39.
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th e  p r a c t i c e  c o n t i n u e d  u n t i l  1904 when t h e  Rajah  t o l d  t h e  Supreme
C ou n c i l  t h a t  h i s  e l d e s t  s o n ,  Vyner ,  t h e n  t h i r t y  y e a r s  o f  a g e ,  ' w i l l
h e n c e f o r t h  t a k e  a  p o r t i o n  o f  my d u t i e s  and he  w i l l  s i t  and do t h e
r e q u i s i t e  d u t i e s  as  I  ha v e  h e r e t o f o r  done i n  t h e  Government  o f f i c e s
and w i l l  t a k e  my p l a c e  i n  t h e  Supreme and G e n e r a l  C o u n c i l s  when I
am n o t  a b l e  t o  p r e s i d e ' . ^  S h o r t l y  a f t e r w a r d s ,  he i s s u e d  a P r o c l a m a t i o n
d e c l a r i n g  Vyner  h i s  s u c c e s s o r  and a u t h o r i z i n g  him ' t o  c a r r y  on my
2
d u t i e s  i n  t h e  Government  and Coun t ry  d u r i n g  my a b s e n c e ' . The 
Supreme C ounc i l  was t o  r e m a in  i n  e x i s t e n c e  u n d e r  t h e  Rajah Muda's  
p r e s i d e n c y  and t h e r e  a p p e a r e d  t o  be no f u r t h e r  need  f o r  t h e  Committee  
u n t i l  i t  was r e v i v e d  i n  1915.
The new Commit tee o f  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e
e a r l i e r  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  A d v i s o ry  C o u n c i l  i n  London and t h e  
3
O rde rs  Commit tee t o  w a tch  o v e r  t h e  s t a t e ' s  f i n a n c e s  and p r e p a r e  
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  c o n s t i t u t e d  a d r a m a t i c  change i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  
Brooke gove rnm en t .  What i t  r e a l l y  meant was a s u b s t a n t i a l  d i m i n u t i o n  
o f  t h e  a u t o c r a t i c  power o f  t h e  Rajah  by t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h r e e  
s e p a r a t e  and f o r m a l l y  c o n s t i t u t e d  b o d i e s  p o s s e s s i n g  s u p e r v i s o r y  
pow ers ,  a somewhat t o p - h e a v y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  f o r  a s t a t e  w i t h  s u c h  a 
s m a l l  p o p u l a t i o n .  The i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n  i s  why Rajah C h a r l e s ,  
a f t e r  more t h a n  f o r t y  y e a r s  o f  a u t o c r a t i c  and h i g h l y  p e r s o n a l  r u l e  
c a r r i e d  o u t  t h i s  g o v e rn m e n ta l  r e v o l u t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  l a s t  y e a r s  o f  
h i s  r e i g n .
The Dynastic Background
The f i r s t  answer  must  be i n  t e rm s  o f  d y n a s t i c  p o l i t i c s .  Vyner Brooke 
had been  b o r n  i n  1874,  two y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  t r a g i c  d e a t h s  o f  two 
b r o t h e r s  and a s i s t e r  on a voyage home t o  Eng land .  I n  1876 Ranee 
M a rg a r e t  gave b i r t h  t o  a n o t h e r  s o n ,  Ber tr am,who was t o  be known
1 I b i d . ,  p p .4 2 - 3 .
2 I b i d . , p p .43 .
3 The Commit tee o f  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  to o k  o v e r  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  
O rde rs  Commit tee which  c e a s e d  t o  e x i s t .
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familiarly by Vyner all his life as Adeh (younger brother). A
third, Harry, was born in 1878. Although little is known about
the relationship between Charles Brooke and his three sons and the
few descriptions available are strongly biased,^- he seems to have
been a cold and autocratic father against whose ascetic regime
Vyner was inclined to rebel. Vyner's academic career at Winchester
and Cambridge, where he failed to take a degree, was academically
unimpressive although he was popular with his fellow students. His
interests were in race horses, carousing and sport and Rajah
Charles consequently 'seems always to have thought him a little
2easy-going and extravagant, and not quite serious enough'.
Bertram, by contrast, was a serious youth who reflected many of 
his father's values. While not so shrewd and gregarious as Vyner, 
he was able to apply himself more successfully at school and 
university and this, together with his serious and responsible 
manner, endeared him to his parents.
In 1887 Ranee Margaret took Vyner, Bertram and Harry 
to Sarawak together for the first time. Vyner was then twelve years 
of age and Bertram ten. From their tutor, Gerard Fiennes, we have 
an interesting description of how young Vyner reacted to the 
deference automatically paid him by the Kuching Malays:
It is very amusing to walk through the Malay Kampong 
with the boys. The natives turn out in swarms to 
see the "Rajah Muda" and we generally have a swarm 
of urchins, mostly in Nature's garb, following at a 
respectful distance and in wholesome awe. Vyner 
can't make it out at all. The last thing which 
occurs to his mind is that he is the object of 
their attention, and he has to be continually 
prodded to make him return their salutes. He 
always thinks they are salaaming to me. It is very 
nice of him to be so entirely unconscious and free 
from conceit.3
1 Principally in Sylvia Brooke, The Three White R a j a h s London 1939.
2 Sir Steven Runciman, The White R a j a h s Cambridge 1960, pp.221-2.
3 From a transcript in the possession of Mrs Margaret Noble.
Anthony Brooke expressed similar embarrassment during his first 
visit to Sarawak in 1934. See below, p.49.
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Vyner's ambivalent attitude towards his formal status was to remain 
with him for the rest of his life. However, he was enough of a 
Rajah not to tolerate familiarity.
Vyner’s relations with his parents reached their lowest 
ebb in 1911 with his decision to marry Sylvia Brett, the second 
daughter of Lord Esher who was private secretary to George V.
Vyner met Sylvia in about 1903 and there was to be a long and 
desultory courtship before they married in 1911. During this time, 
according to Sylvia, they attempted to elope and their families 
became estranged before 'the barrier of opposition' could be 
overcome.
Neither the Rajah nor the Ranee approved of their
eldest son's choice. Indeed, Sylvia seems to have been regarded by
the Rajah as final proof of Vyner's fecklessness. He 'suspected her
of having a bad influence on the Rajah Muda, encouraging him to be
extravagant and pleasure-seeking and insubordinate'.^" In Sylvia's
words, the Rajah was 'dragged most unwillingly' to the wedding, 'and
2it was with more reluctance still that he attended the reception'. 
Although Charles did his best to prevent her from visiting Sarawak, 
Vyner took Sylvia and her brother, Oliver Brett, to Kuching in 1912, 
thus precipitating a quarrel which was to have far-reaching 
consequences.
From Sylvia's description, the atmosphere at the Astana 
during their visit was tense and Vyner's relations with his father 
were strained from the outset. When the Proclamation of Bertram's
status was issued, Vyner 'could not see anything more in ... [it]
than a direct indication of his own father's distrust in him, and a
definite assumption that he was incapable of bringing into the world
3a future heir'. Ranee Margaret was later to describe it as
1 Runciman, The White Rajahs3 p.222.
2 Sylvia Brooke, Sylvia of Sarawak_, London 1936, p.154.
3 The Three White Rajahs3 p.137.
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'La pierre d'achoppement entre Vyner et moi'3 which suggests that he 
held his mother at least partly responsible.
The Proclamation, together with the establishment of 
the Advisory Council which clearly reflected his father's lack of 
trust in him, so enraged Vyner that he finally threatened public 
action. Responding to a letter from Charles accusing him of 
jealousy of Bertram, he wrote:
... if you choose to persist in giving my brother 
Royal Honours on arrival, and on issuing the 
Proclamation, and on proposing the new Bill, I 
shall be reluctantly obliged to make a public 
protest against your action, and on leaving 
this country until things are more satisfactorily 
arranged.2
More acrimonious correspondence followed with Vyner refusing to
accept his father's scheme and the Rajah directing him to leave
3Sarawak 'as soon as convenient'. But before his departure he wrote 
a letter to Bertram (who by this time was on his way out, quite 
unaware of the drama that was taking place in Kuching) expressing 
his implacable opposition to any scheme which would limit his 
autocratic power on succeeding to the Raj:
I am to do the dirty work whilst you and your 
gang are to say what I am to do and what I am 
not to do ... No, thank you ... I do not 
return to Sarawak again unless with full power.
By full power I mean absolute control over the 
country.^
The quarrel between Vyner and his father was eventually patched up 
but never forgotten.
1 Ranee Margaret's handwritten comments on the 1912 proclamation, 
Brooke Papers, Box 9/2. Further light may be shed on the 1912 
dispute when the embargo is lifted on a volume of Lord Esher's 
papers deposited at Churchill College, Cambridge. This 
includes correspondence between Vyner Brooke and Bertram Brooke, 
Vyner Brooke and Lord Esher, and Oliver Brett and Lord Esher. 
Communication from the Archivist, Churchill College, 24 November 
19 75.
2 Cited by Sylvia Brooke, The Three White Rajahs_, p.142.
3 Charles Brooke to Vyner Brooke, - June 1912, cited by Sylvia 
Brooke, Queen of the Headhunters . .._, New York 1972, p.64.
4 Ibid., p .147.
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Bertram had married Gladys Palmer, heiress to the 
biscuit-manufacturing firm of Huntley and Palmer,^“ and in December 
1912 they had their fourth child, a son, whom they named Anthoni(sic) 
after his delighted grandfather. But to the old Rajah's great 
disappointment Sylvia produced her third daughter and Anthoni's 
presence at his cousin Elizabeth's baptism may well have suggested 
to those present the possibility of a future dynastic conflict.
While the relationship between the two brothers continued to be 
as cordial as ever, there commenced a somewhat destructive rivalry 
between their wives. The Rajah approved of the Dayang Muda (Gladys) 
as much as he disapproved of the Ranee Muda (Sylvia).
In 1913 the Rajah asked Bertram to come to his country 
home in Gloucestershire as soon as he (Bertram) arrived from 
Sarawak. It was not until 1941 that Bertram told Vyner what took 
place at the meeting:
When I got there he told me he had an appointment 
to see the Secretary of State the following day, 
but that instead of making his usual formal "call" 
he intended this time to discuss with him a project 
for curtailing your absolute powers as Rajah on 
your accession, as he was apprehensive of the 
future. He asked me what I thought, and I told 
him that it would be very bad luck. He then said 
he supposed I would not consider over going out 
to Sarawak, as I had a family at home, but that if 
I would promise him that I would go out to 
Sarawak on his death to take a hand in the 
Government, should you ask me to do this, he 
would not^take the step he contemplated. I 
promised.
In January 1917 Vyner wrote to Bertram expressing relief 
that their father had been shipped home after a serious bout of 
illness. At the same time he dreaded the prospect of the old Rajah 
carrying out his sworn object of returning to Sarawak to die:
I cannot go through another illness like the last 
one, so shall hurry back to England when I hear that
1 Gladys Brooke gave an engaging account of her childhood in
Relations and Complications London 1929.
2 Bertram Brooke to Vyner Brooke, 2 February 1942, Brooke Papers, 
Box 6/1.
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he is approaching these shores. It is not good 
enough. After all, the old man can easily remain 
in England and die comfortably without coming all 
the way out here. He is getting very wandering 
in the mind and doddery and^it is hard to 
transact business with him.
An equally unpleasant prospect for Vyner was Ranee Margaret’s 
intention, as reported by Sylvia who had been staying with her, to 
come out to Sarawak. Vyner asked Bertram to assist him by helping 
to frustrate their mother’s plan and by sharing the administration 
of the State on their father’s death:
Ma fully intends coming out here to give instructions 
to all and sundry the way the place must be run.
Needless to say I shall leave for England "instanter”.
If you back me up and we pull together we can 
frustrate her "knavish tricks" but if you don’t I go 
under as I cannot cope with her. Ma as much as I 
admire her is full of schemes and plots and it is 
hard to know what she is working at. If the old 
man pops off I should love you to come out and take 
over while I am on leave, turn and turn about.
You will have full powers and of course a very 
considerable salary. I find that my old liver is 
not the thing it was and I can’t put in very long 
here at a time, perhaps 7 months in the year. If 
you could relieve me during these 5 months it would 
be of greatest benefit to all concerned. It would 
frustrate Ma. She is fully convinced that I wish 
to sell Sarawak, accumulate vast wealth for myself 
and endeavour to get a peerage. Far from it. My 
present title sickens me. Rajah Brooke is quite 
sufficient without all the high fallutin’ 
nonsense of the H.H. part of it ...^
As it happened, however, Charles Brooke was never to return to
Sarawak. On reaching England in May 1917 he suffered a relapse
3and died shortly before his eighty-eighth birthday. Vyner was 
subsequently installed as Rajah at a ceremony in 1918 with Bertram
1 Vyner Brooke to Bertram Brooke, 6 January 1917, Brooke Papers, 
Box 1/3.
2 Ibid.
3 For obituaries, see The Times  ^ 18 May 1917^ . SG3 1 June 1917.
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in attendance.
While Charles’ lack of trust in his eldest son obviously 
influenced the administrative changes which he introduced during 
his last years, it can also be argued that he saw a need to adapt 
the traditional governmental framework to changing circumstances. 
Sarawak had undergone some important economic changes by the eve 
of the First World War: rubber and pepper were being exported in
substantial quantities and there was the prospect of greatly 
increased revenue from the new oilfield being developed at Miri. 
Consequently, Sarawak now appeared to be a much more wealthy 
country than it had seemed. At the same time, the establishment 
of a Foochow Chinese agricultural colony in the Sibu area by the 
American Methodist Mission had prompted hopes that there might 
even be self-sufficiency in food.
All this called for a thorough re-assessment of the role 
of government. Clearly, there were now responsibilities beyond 
collecting taxes, adjudicating disputes and preserving civil 
order. Economic development meant the provision of specialized 
technical services and the improvement of communications and it 
is significant that in 1911 and 1912 Charles took serious account 
of this. New departments of forestry and agriculture were established, 
construction began on a railway linking Kuching with the interior 
and plans were set in motion for a network of wireless stations 
which would enable Kuching to have instant communication with the 
outstations. It seems likely that Charles recognized the increasing 
complexity of administration as being beyond the personal 
resources of one man and saw the Committee of Administration as an 
institution which could cope with the growing volume of government 
business with professional competence. He certainly regarded both 
the Committee and the Advisory Council as providing protection 
against the depredations of foreign capitalists.
Rajah Vyner
Not surprisingly, Vyner Brooke had no wish to perpetuate institutions
1 For Vyner’s Accession Oath, see Appendix II. See also, Plate II.
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which so clearly symbolized his father’s lack of trust in him.
The Committee of Administration met once a month during 1916 and 
1917 but on Charles' death it began to languish and from 1921 until 
1934 its existence was fitful. As senior government officer 
1915-23, A.B. Ward found the Committee a hindrance to decision-making. 
He regarded the arrangement as inefficient and resented its demands 
on his time. More importantly, he believed the Committee to be 
wholly unnecessary in an autocratic system:
... the Committee was conceived under a misapprehension, 
and it was superfluous because the Rajah was, and 
always should be, paramount; besides which, there was 
the Supreme Council of principal Officers of State, 
native and European, to support his policy.1
In 1924 Vyner revoked the 1915 Order which had
established the Committee as a permanent body and resorted to the
old ad hoc arrangement which his father had first used. But in
the following year he reconstituted the Committee as a permanent
body ’for the purpose of administering the Government of the State
during my absence ... and of acting in an advisory capacity at all 
2other times'. The Committee was to consist of six European members
and three 'advisory members' - two datus and a Chinese. A number of
meetings were held before August 1927 when another Order was
passed empowering the Committee to administer the government in the
simultaneous absence of the Rajah and the Tuan Muda and to act
3'in an advisory capacity at all other times'. The Committee was 
required to meet once a month and its powers included authority over 
all matters of general administration and new expenditure. 
Nevertheless, no meetings were actually held until 1934 when the 
Committee was finally established as a permanent institution of 
government. From that time onwards it functioned as the executive 
decision-making body. The Sarawak State Advisory Council had been 
effectively abolished in 1929 although the Fund remained.
Vyner had thus managed to dispose of the devices
1 A.B. Ward, Rajah's Servant_, p.169.
2 Boyd, 'The Law and Constitution of Sarawak', p.50.
3 Ibid. , p.51.
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established by his father as a precaution against his failings 
and in response to the new problems of twentieth century government. 
Having done this, however, he proved incapable either of exercising 
power in the personal style of his father or of delegating power in 
a responsible way. The one hope for change was his appointment of 
J.C. Moulton to the newly-created post of Chief Secretary in 1923, 
replacing Ward as the most senior officer in the administration.
Unlike Ward, Moulton had no outstation experience.
Curator of the Sarawak Museum 1909-15, he was appointed Director of 
the Raffles Museum in Singapore after the war. There he met the 
Rajah who asked him to come back to Sarawak and tackle the 
immensely more difficult task of re-organising the administration of 
the State. Under the old system, the Residents sent monthly 
reports to the Rajah who then replied personally in longhand.
Moulton changed all this:
... there were secretaries, typewriters, typists, 
files, letters to be answered and reasons to be 
given. Outstation officers exploded, some even 
left the service, most of them came down to the 
Kuching races once or twice a year and attacked 
Moulton bitterly, it was^a wonder they did not 
offer physical violence.
Not only did the outstation officers bitterly resent the introduction 
of a Secretariat between the Rajah and themselves, they were 
affronted that Moulton should not have been one of them.
However, those who felt they should have Moulton's job 
soon had a chance to show their mettle: Moulton died of an operation
for appendicitis in 1926 and was succeeded by a series of Chief 
Secretaries with outstation backgrounds, none of whom lasted more 
than two years in office. Apart from their administrative 
inexperience, there was the added problem of jealousy aroused by
1 Personal communication from Mr E. Banks, 14 March 1975. A 
story which typifies the atmosphere of the time concerns a 
telegraph message which Moulton sent to the Resident of the 
Third Division inquiring if the tandas (monsoon season) was 
over so that he could make arrangements for an outstation tour. 
Back came the reply: 'Don’t know. Ask God’. 'God' is what
they called Moulton. Personal communication from Mr E. Banks,
7 August 1974.
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these appointments among men of comparable seniority. The Rajah
pensioned off a number of veteran officers in 1929 in order to keep
the peace.^ Ward’s appointment as Resident of the First Division
in 1915 had aroused similar antagonisms but the personal authority
2of Rajah Charles had been sufficient to ensure its acceptance.
Rajah Vyner did not possess the same authority, nor was he prepared 
to support his Chief Secretaries against the opposition of outstation 
officers. And when Chief Secretaries had to be sacrificed, the 
only recourse was to personal rule by proxy.
In 1928 G.T.M. MacBryan, whose career will be traced
in the following chapter, was appointed Private Secretary to the
Rajah and succeeded in persuading him that on H.B. Crocker's
retirement as Chief Secretary late that year the post should not be
filled and that the Rajah himself should take over Crocker's
responsibilities 'temporarily'. What this meant in fact was that
MacBryan, who exercised considerable influence over the Rajah,
virtually ruled Sarawak until he left for England in early 1930.
The post of Chief Secretary was then revived and occupied successively
by F.F. Boult and J.C. Swayne until Bertram Brooke's appointment
3in September 1932 of another outsider, C.F.C. Macaskie , the Financial 
Secretary of British North Borneo.
Although Macaskie did not receive as much co-operation
1 H.L. Owen, W.F. de V. Skrine, H.H. Kortright and J.R. Barnes all 
retired in 1929, as did the Sarawak Government Agent in London, 
C. Willes Johnson.
2 Ward, Rajah's Servant, p.168.
3 Charles Frederick Cunningham Macaskie (1888-1967) came from 
Yorkshire and travelled in Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
before being called to the Bar. In 1910 he joined the North 
Borneo Civil Service and held the posts of Chief Justice 
and Deputy Governor 1934-45. In 1942 he was appointed head 
of the Borneo Planning Unit in the Colonial Office and with 
the rank of Brigadier commanded the British Borneo Civil 
Affairs Unit during the period of military administration. 
Declining an invitation to become Chief Secretary of the 
Crown Colony of North Borneo in 1946, he acted as 
Commissioner for War Damages Claims, Borneo Territories, 
before retiring to Australia. See Chapter VI.
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from Vyner as he had from Bertram, the Rajah asked him to stay on
for another term. He had no sooner obtained permission from the
Chartered Company, however, than the Rajah changed his mind. Before
leaving Sarawak, Macaskie advised the Rajah to appoint as Chief
Secretary C.D. Le Gros Clark, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs,
whom he regarded as 'the ablest officer in the Sarawak Service
who had sufficient seniority for the post'.^" Instead, he appointed
as Financial Secretary Edward Parnell, 'a particular friend who was
2a diplomatic, pleasant companion and a courtier by instinct'. The 
post of Chief Secretary remained in abeyance.
Vyner's disinclination to renew Macaskie's contract 
was only one of a number of instances in which the system of 
tandem rule foreshadowed in Rajah Charles' will showed itself to 
be a liability rather than a strength. What the system meant in 
effect was that each took a tour of duty of less than half a year, 
spending the remaining months in England. Consequently, not only 
was there a failure to delegate power to the Chief Secretary or 
to the Committee of Administration, there was not even a continuity 
of the Rajah's personal rule. Bertram was extremely discreet in 
his exercise of power, declining to live in the Astana and 
endeavouring not to contradict his brother's earlier actions or 
to institute new policies which might be interpreted as an assertion 
of rival authority. But he became too inhibited to take any
3initiative while Vyner was apparently incapable of doing so.
1 C.F.C. Macaskie, 'End of an Era: Borneo Reminiscences',
unpublished typescript, Rhodes House, p.91.
2 Ibid.
3 The contrast between the two brothers was most succinctly 
expressed by Mrs Margaret Noble who was friendly with both until 
cession cut her links with the Rajah:
... People often say how different the Tuan Muda and 
the Rajah are. But it's the difference, not of two 
separate organisms but of, so to speak, two branches 
of one tree. One has grown perilously and wildly, 
getting cankered and obstructive and dangerous, and 
bearing no fruit. The other, submitting his will to 
the discipline of a fine spirit, has grown to a strong 
and tense and fruitful shape so that no one can fail 
to be richer and a little greater for having known 
him. That deep and true humility of his makes him, I
[contd over]
33
Depression and Reform
Macaskie's appointment had been made necessary by the need to cut 
government expenditure in the face of the drastic reduction in 
revenue brought about by falling prices for rubber and other primary 
exports in the wake of the Depression."^ Government revenue which 
had reached a peak of $6,670,000 in 1929 declined to $4,200,000 in 
1932 and Macaskie’s task was to restore the state’s financial 
balances. This he did by pruning government departments, particularly 
the area of social services. The Education Department which had 
been established in 1928 was abolished and the Medical and Health 
departments were merged with reduced staff. The salaries of all 
government employees were also cut. The Rajah himself reduced his 
annual salary from $120,000 to $96,000- although an arrangement that 
he should be paid the interest on the State Advisory Council Trust 
Fund meant that he was no worse off.
The Depression demonstrated that government spending 
could not continue on the happy assumption that revenue would 
increase. There was a clear need for long-term planning and the 
drastic reduction in government staffing meant that there was now 
a relatively clean slate. This, together with the advice of senior 
bureaucrats, probably explains why the Rajah at last allowed the 
Committee of Administration to be re-established with a measure of
3 [contd from previous page]
think, the most loveable and the purest person I have 
ever known, and everyone who really knows him feels 
this. The two brothers are most oddly alike in some 
ways. They both know that their egos don't matter, 
but whereas the Rajah says to himself, as I'm sure he 
does, "What I am and do can only be of the most trivial 
significance so I may as well amuse myself as much as 
possible" the Tuan Muda says "What happens to me as an 
individual is completely unimportant. Suffering and 
pleasure are equally unimportant except in so far as 
they bring wisdom and understanding and create in me a 
power for service, in however humble a capacity". So 
all that "thwarted life" has increased the gentle 
power of his spirit, and it is through such as him - 
sadly few there are! - that God works ...
Margaret Noble to Jean Halsey, 2 December 1945, Brooke Papers, 
Box 12/1. See Plates XI and IV for her portraits of Vyner and 
Bertram.
1 See Tables I and II.
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Table I  : Sarawak Government Revenue and E xpenditure3
1925-1938
($ Sarawak)
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
Revenue 5 ,0 9 4 ,5 7 9 6 , 3 5 7 ,8 3 5 6 ,2 4 3 ,0 6 5 6 ,1 1 4 ,4 3 7 6 ,6 7 1 ,2 9 1
E x p e n d i t u r e 3 ,9 0 0 ,1 0 5 4 ,6 5 0 ,6 0 6 5 , 7 6 4 ,3 1 7 6 ,7 4 3 ,9 9 5 6 ,5 1 5 ,7 5 7
S u r p lu s 1 ,1 9 4 ,4 7 4 1 ,7 0 7 ,2 2 9 478 ,748 155,534
D e f i c i t 629 ,558
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934
Revenue 5 ,5 6 2 ,0 3 4 4 , 3 4 2 ,9 0 9 4 , 2 1 0 ,5 5 8 3 ,5 5 8 ,5 8 0 4 ,8 2 0 ,5 4 6
E x p e n d i t u r e 7 ,0 8 9 ,9 2 3 5 ,4 6 6 , 3 6 6 3 ,9 7 7 ,2 6 6 3 ,3 0 1 ,2 3 4 3 ,8 2 8 ,8 7 2
S u r p l u s 233,292 257,345
D e f i c i t 1 ,5 2 7 ,8 8 8 1 ,1 2 3 ,4 5 7
1935 1936 1937 1938
Revenue 5 ,0 8 7 ,2 4 4 5 ,4 9 4 ,0 6 9 ' 4 ,8 0 1 ,2 3 6 4 ,2 6 1 ,8 9 9
E x p e n d i t u r e 4 ,2 2 2 ,7 0 2 4 , 4 0 6 ,2 3 0 4 , 1 0 4 ,0 8 2 4 ,2 7 2 ,1 4 0
S u r p l u s
D e f i c i t 10 ,240
Table II : Sarawak’s Balance o f  Trade3 1928- 1938
I m p o r t s
($ Sarawak)
E x p o r t s  and 
R e-E x p o r t s
F a v o u r a b l e  Trade  
Ba la nce
1928 2 1 ,3 9 7 ,7 3 7 5 4 ,5 2 7 ,7 3 1 * 3 3 ,1 2 9 ,9 9 4
1929 2 2 ,7 2 6 ,6 5 7 3 4 ,6 8 9 ,8 9 0 1 1 ,9 6 3 ,2 3 3
1930 1 6 ,4 2 1 ,5 9 2 2 4 ,8 9 4 ,7 6 2 8 ,4 7 3 ,1 7 0
1931 1 0 ,3 8 5 ,0 5 6 1 7 ,4 1 4 ,6 7 2 7 ,0 2 9 ,6 1 6
1932 9 ,6 9 8 , 8 0 8 1 3 ,5 7 3 ,8 7 2 3 ,8 7 5 ,0 6 4
1933 1 1 ,3 4 8 ,6 2 2 1 4 ,3 3 5 ,8 9 8 2 , 9 8 7 ,2 7 6
1934 1 4 , 0 7 8 ,7 6 8 2 1 ,4 7 9 ,9 8 8 7 ,4 0 1 ,2 2 0
19 35 1 6 ,6 6 1 ,0 7 9 2 1 , 1 0 9 ,4 1 0 4 ,4 9 3 , 3 3 1
1936 1 8 ,2 6 1 ,6 8 5 2 4 , 5 5 7 ,3 5 1 6 , 2 9 5 ,6 6 6
1937 2 2 ,9 1 6 ,2 0 2 3 2 ,7 1 5 ,5 3 2 9 ,7 9 9 ,3 3 0
1938 2 2 ,3 7 5 ,4 3 0 2 6 ,1 3 5 ,0 9 5 3 , 7 5 9 ,6 6 7 .
*  T h i s  l a t e r  p roved  t o  be a m i s c a l c u l a t i o n .
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real responsibility. Furthermore, the Iban unrest which arose to 
some extent from the effects of the Depression^ had called into 
question the assumption that Brooke government was premised on ’the 
interests of the natives’.
One of the first initiatives taken by the new Committee
of Administration in 1934 was to ask the Colonial Office to suggest
a suitable man who could make recommendations on the Sarawak Service
2and to commission Le Gros Clark to report on all aspects of the
Sarawak administration. M.J. Breen, a senior administrator from
Hong Kong, subsequently spent three months in Sarawak in early 1937
and made a report which led to certain changes in conditions of
service and incidentally provided the Colonial Office with its first
3comprehensive idea of what was happening in Sarawak. While the 
Breen report had the effect of increasing external pressure for 
change, Le Gros Clark’s recommendations suggested ways by which change 
could be achieved internally. A technical officer with no vested 
interest in preserving the status quo, Le Gros Clark's dispassionate 
intellect allowed him to cut through the accretions of time and custom 
and see the Sarawak administration not as something unique and sacred 
but as just another colonial administration in need of drastic overhaul.
The main burden of the Le Gros Clark Report was its
1 See Chapter V, pp.199-200.
2 Possessing a distinguished war record with service on the Western 
Front and in Palestine, Cyril Le Gros Clark had been on the point 
of trying for the Sudan Political Service when he met the Rajah 
in London. His younger brother Wilfrid (later Professor of 
Palaeontology at Oxford) had signed up as Principal Medical 
Officer in Sarawak two years earlier in order to pursue his 
research. The Rajah suggested that Cyril should specialize in 
Chinese affairs and he spent two years in Amoy studying Chinese 
language, law and customs. In 1929 took up the new position of 
Secretary for Chinese Affairs which he was to hold until May 1941 
when he became Chief Secretary. Interned during the war, he was 
killed by the Japanese at Keningau in North Borneo shortly 
before the surrender. His wife, Averil Mackenzie-Grieve, was a 
talented artist and writer.
3 See Chapter IV, p.144-5.
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recommendations firstly on education and the Junior Administrative 
Service and secondly on the general policy towards the Ibans and other 
non-Muslim natives. ’Education, guided upon sane lines and co­
ordinated with the life and livelihood of the people, should form ... 
the key-note of future administrative policy of Sarawak', he wrote.
’And the District Officer should continue to be regarded as the pivotal 
unit of the administrative framework’.^  His recommendations were 
made on the basis of wide consultations with other Sarawak officers 
and his own general knowledge of British colonial policy in Malaya, 
India and Africa. He suggested the appointment of a Director of 
Education and an educational board ’composed of representatives of 
the people and of the Missions'. They would have control over all 
except Chinese schools and the introduction of a system emphasizing 
agricultural and technical education at the village level and in the 
relevant indigenous language throughout the state. At the same time, 
he recommended that the Maderasah Melayu, Kuching's newly-established
Malay-medium government school, be up-graded to provide for the
2education of village schoolteachers and Native Officers.
Underlying Le Gros Clark's remarks on Native Officers 
and indigenous headmen was the important assumption that the 
administration of the country would ultimately be transferred to them. 
Most administrative officers, he wrote hopefully, realized that they 
were there 'not only to administer the Government on behalf of the 
natives, but also to educate the natives up to a standard sufficiently 
high to enable them eventually to take over a greater share in the 
government of the country'. From his tour of the state, however,
Le Gros Clark was not impressed with the members of the Junior 
Administrative Service, almost all of whom at that time were Malays:
I doubt whether, with few exceptions, we could trust 
these native officers to undertake these duties [i.e. 
the duties of European officers] without the closest 
supervision. Not only is their standard of education 
low, but many of them seem to suffer from an 
inferiority complex due, in great part, to
1 C.D. Le Gros Clark, Blue Report_, Kuching 1935, p.2.
Subsequent quotations from this source.
2 See Chapter V, p.200.
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psychological reasons. Their reluctance to undertake 
responsibilities, to make decisions, their apparent 
lack of initiative, all these may ... be traced largely 
to the fact that they are ignorant of the laws of the 
country, are unable to read the regulations, and as a 
result are entirely in the hands of the court writer.
The fact, too, that a great majority of them have 
never left the State and, in some cases, not even 
their own district, must inevitably place them in a 
position wherein they feel inferior to the most junior 
member of the Junior Service.
Those few who were capable of assuming greater 
responsibility, he suggested, could perhaps take charge of constabulary 
work and prison labour and the issue of gunpowder and cartridges.
They could be even more useful in the supervision of government 
works, upkeep of government stations, inspections of barracks, 
control of exemption tax register and issue of inland passes. Le 
Gros Clark believed that a concerted effort should be made to recruit 
Ibans and other natives into the Native Officer Service. He was 
convinced that there were already a number of Ibans in the Junior 
Service who were 'perfectly capable' of taking over such duties.
Another question which concerned Le Gros Clark was 
economic development. In the past there had been no real economic 
or social planning but new factors were now at work which rendered 
this unavoidable. Not only were there increasingly insistent 
noises from the Colonial Office about the need for improved social 
services, particularly in the areas of health and education, but the 
Committee of Administration recognized the need for planning. The 
Depression had shown that it was not possible to operate on a year- 
to-year basis on the assumption that revenue would gradually increase 
in concert with increased expenditure. Oil, the one long-term 
prospect for increased prosperity, had not fulfilled its earlier 
promise and Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. now estimated that economic 
production would probably cease by 1947 unless substantial new 
deposits were located. However, money had somehow to be found to 
finance the education programme which Le Gros Clark envisaged and he 
suggested a development expenditure for the period 1935-41 amounting 
to $5,000,000.
If Macaskie had remained as Chief Secretary, more of Le
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Gros Clark’s recommendations might have been heeded. But the 
Rajah's appointment of Edward Parnell as Financial Secretary in 1934 
and Chief Secretary in 1937 meant that bureaucratic considerations 
became paramount. R.W. Hammond was subsequently asked to make more 
detailed recommendations on education'*' but financial stringencies 
prevented their implementation and all that had been achieved by 
1941 was the appointment of a Director of Education and the opening 
of a teachers’ college for Malays. No changes were made to the 
Native Office Service and the Junior Administrative Service beyond the 
appointment of a few Ibans as probationary Native Officers and police 
officers. The idea of an administrative training college lapsed.
Apart from financial considerations, there seems to have been no 
support for Le Gros Clark's vital assumption that policy should be 
directed towards the gradual transfer of the administration to the 
natives. As far as the Administrative Service was concerned, it 
was 'in the interests of the natives' that the status quo should be 
maintained. However, the government did take Le Gros Clark's advice 
that punitive expeditions against restive Ibans should be replaced 
by more government posts in remote areas.
The Parnell-Calvert Regime
Unlike previous Chief Secretaries (with the conspicuous exception of 
Moulton), Parnell was not an outs tation man. Although he joined the 
Sarawak Service as a clerk in 1905 and later became Controller 
of Government Monopolies, he resigned in 1927 and joined the Sarawak 
Steamship Company as Managing Director. But in 1934 the Rajah brought 
him back into government service as Treasurer and three years later 
appointed him Chief Secretary. Succeeding him as Financial 
Secretary, was H.M. Calvert, a dour and ascetic man who knew the 
power of the purse-strings. Parnell and Calvert represented more 
efficient and business-like government from the centre. This was 
to be based on proper records, proper accounting procedures and 
adherence to set forms. Above all, it meant the direct accountability 
of outstation officers to the Kuching Secretariat. The semi-autonomous
1 R.W. Hammond, 'Report on Education in Sarawak', 1937. 
Sarawak Museum.
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position of the Residents was consequently threatened. At the same 
time, Calvert took steps to tighten up accounting procedures in the 
outstations, including the detailed documentation of District 
Officers’ and Native Officers’ travelling expenses. This aroused 
tremendous resentment^ and probably sealed the fate of the two senior 
bureaucrats.
It is clear that Parnell and Calvert wanted to abolish 
the Residential system by stages and centralize power in Kuching 
where all senior administrative officers would in future be stationed. 
District Officers would thus operate independent of direct supervision 
by Residents and would instead be responsible direct to Kuching.
The first step towards this reorganization was taken in 1934 when the 
Fifth Division was abolished through incorporation with the Fourth 
Division. This did not involve any dramatic change because there was 
no Resident of the Fifth Division at the time. Nor did the merger, 
for which there were some practical reasons, ever fully take place 
because of the Japanese invasion. But in the words of a technical 
officer of the time,
The significance of the decision lay in the fact 
that the disposition of administration officers 
and offices was on the orders of non-administrative 
officers, and this became [Anthony] Brooke’s 
pretext to bring the confrontation [between 
outstation officers and the Committee of 
Administration] to a head.^
While the official reason given by Parnell and Calvert was economy, 
outstation officers were under no illusion as to what was happening.
It seemed that there would be no further promotions within the 
Administrative Service to the position of Resident and that when the 
existing Residents retired they would not be replaced.
3By August 1937, the Chief Justice, Stirling Boyd, was 
expressing dissatisfaction with the Pamell-Calvert regime in his 
letters to Hammond:
1 Personal communication from Mr E. Banks, 25 November 1975.
2 Personal communication from Mr J.L. Noakes, 3 August 1975.
3 See below, p.45.
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Calvert is becoming more objectionable every day 
and his manners are often beyond belief and his 
methods of dialectic are those of the coster.
Success has gone to his head and the sooner his 
successor is appointed the better. After months 
of Parnell I don’t think he is really fit for the 
job. His outlook is too limited jnd he has no real 
grasp of administrative problems.
Boyd was also bitter about what he regarded as Parnell and Calvert's
self-promotion at the expense of the State. While accepting the
increases in cadets' pay, the abolition of distinctions between
pensionable and non-pensionable officers and other changes based
on the recommendations of the Breen report, he had serious doubts
2whether the 'large increases upstairs' were warranted.
Boyd was thinking not only of the problem of the increased
costs of administration, but the effects on the outstation officers
in a situation where expenditure on essential services seemed to be
so grudging. A request for a dresser at Kapit or Kanowit, for
example, had been refused on the grounds that no money was available;
and expenditure on mosquito control for the whole of the State was
less than that for Labuan. Boyd was also concerned about the fate
of Hammond's report on the education system which was awaiting
consideration. It seemed to him that since money had been found
for the salary increases, it could be found for social services.
'If not', he told Hammond, 'it will be a disgusting exhibition of the
3selfish abuse of power'.
The reaction of outstation officers to the reforms, 
particularly the requirement to account for travelling expenses, was 
more dramatic. Many District Officers were in a state of open 
hostility towards Kuching and were supported by the Residents. However, 
there was no open conflict until late 1938 when William Dick,
Resident of the Third Division, became involved in a personal dispute
1 Boyd to Hammond, 22 August 1937, Boyd Papers, Rhodes House, MSS Pac.s.86.
2 In particular, there was the elevation of Parnell and Calvert 
to positions which gave them very substantial pay increases.
Calvert, for example, was to receive a rise of $300 which 
brought his salary up to $1,200 per month. Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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with Calvert. Dick resented Calvert’s insistence on proper accounting
procedures and used strong langugage in his official correspondence.
When he refused to withdraw his most outspoken remarks, the Rajah
supported Calvert and Dick had to resign. In Boyd’s words, he
'made an ass of himself, chiefly because he called on an entirely
inadequate hand, and having called, played it abominably’.^  But
this victory of the Kuching bureaucracy caused something of a
sensation among the outstation officers and a number of resignations
2were penned by junior officers as a result. Calvert was now
’universally hated’ and Boyd thought that there could be no harmony
3until he left. 'If Calvert does trip,’ he wrote to Noel Hudson,
the former Bishop of Labuan, ’there won't be many hands willing to
4help him to get up ...'
In the meantime, Parnell was anxious to find out what 
reaction there had been to the gradual changes being made. In early 
1939 he prepared a series of questions on the ’old' and ’new' 
systems of government which were circulated within the administrative 
service for comment. While the circular itself has not survived, the 
replies of two administrative officers - one newly arrived and attached 
to the Secretariat and the other a veteran District Officer - provide 
some indication of what was at stake. A.J.N. Richards examined James 
Brooke’s writings for the original rationale of Brooke rule, taking 
as his theme the first Rajah's dictum: ’We must progress or
retrograde'. He saw two major faults in the old Residential system: 
firstly, that it encouraged the growth of different policies, 'in so 
far as there were any at all', in different areas; secondly, that 
there was no means, short of a change of regime, of ’ensuring any kind 
of progression within those territories, distinct as they were, and 
jealous of each other and of "interference"'.^ Altogether, it was
1 Boyd to Wilson, 19 February 1939, ibid.
2 Interview with Sir Dennis White, 22 January 1975.
3 Boyd to Edward Boyd, 4 December 1938, Boyd Papers.
4 Boyd to Bishop Hudson, 6 December 1938, ibid.
5 A.J.N. Richards, memorandum of March 1939, Rhodes House MSS Ind. 
Ocn. s. 213. Subsequent quotations from this source.
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static and inward-looking, ’outpaced in the course of progress', 
and therefore best ’left for dead'. Reversion to this system 
as it had operated was 'ridiculous'. The new system, on the 
other hand, lacked adequate staff, the delegation of power from 
Kuching and a definite plan of implementation so that while the 
old system was being destroyed there was created 'a hiatus of 
uncertainty and disbelief’. Contrasting the two, he described the 
old system as being forced into centralized execution but lacking 
centralized policy and control, while the new system wrongly 
attempted ’centralised execution of a scrappy and non-existent 
policy’. He hopefully proposed a centralized policy with strong 
centralized control but decentralized execution.
If the principle of trusteeship on behalf of the natives 
was still the basis of Brooke rule, he argued, the recommendations 
of the Le Gros Clark Report should be vigorously implemented. The 
spread of education would mean that responsibility could be 
increasingly borne by the natives and expansion could thus take place 
without further expenditure and dependence on European officers.
’It is time’, he concluded, 'that Sarawak treated itself as one 
state among many, and not as an isolated Utopia: it is time that
she began to look upon other states and gain by considering their 
experience'. He predicted that the absence of a strong policy 
would force Sarawak to follow Malaya and consequently to lose some of 
her internal independence.
The outstation view was predictably conservative. 
Responding to Parnell’s first circular, the District Officer at 
Lubok Antu in the Second Division, H.E. Cutfield, wrote that he 
could not see how the new system would be an improvement on the 
old one:
In the old way, junior, sometimes very junior, 
officers were in charge of [a] district but 
they had their Divisional Resident above them 
who had both experience and a knowledge of his 
Division to check their work and see that 
they did not make too many blunders ...
Under the new scheme we would have independent 
district officers, some very junior indeed 
with no Divisional Resident to keep an eye on
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their work. Senior officers (who would under the old 
scheme have been Divisional Residents) would be 
stationed in Kuching and be expected to do the same 
work of supervision ... This I think would be 
impossible ... they would very soon lose touch after 
being in Kuching for a short time and would become 
incapable of deciding sympathetically of the ou^station 
ideas unless they were very exceptional men ...
In addition to these practical objections, there was a strong
suspicion that the new scheme was entirely initiated by the Committee
of Administration, ’... a body of men ignorant of conditions in
general throughout the country and who found the criticism of Senior
2Divisonal Residents inconvenient1 2, in order to monopolize power.
Writing shortly after the departure of Dick and the confrontation 
between Anthony Brooke and the Committee of Administration, Cutfield 
no doubt thought that the new scheme would be abandoned.
What the Rajah himself thought about the revitalized and 
power-accumulating Committee of Administration is difficult to say but 
it seems clear that by the late 1930s his earlier unwillingness to 
delegate power beyond a Chief Secretary or a Private Secretary had 
been overtaken by weariness and even indifference. Nor did it seem 
likely that Bertram, only two years younger and in poor health, would 
be available in future to share or take over responsibility. Under 
these circumstances the transfer of a measure of power to the Committee 
must have appeared to Vyner as inevitable and perhaps even attractive, 
although it was anathema to Bertram. In a memorandum to Parnell 
penned in late 1936 before ending what was to be his last tour of duty 
in Sarawak, he left no doubt about his determination to uphold the 
autocratic principle against what he regarded as the Committee’s 
arrogation of power to itself:
I know there is an idea that once the Committee 
of Administration has discussed a matter and 
given its recommendation, it should be regarded 
as final. I quite see the members' point of 
view. It means a lot of time is wasted otherwise.
But we are not a country with a court system
1 Cutfield to Parnell, 26 April 1939, Bayang Papers.
2 Ibid.
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like Great Britain. If we were, the Committee of 
Administration would not be a body of officials.
So long as the Rajah has the actual powers of originating 
or vetoing anything he pleases he cannot screen himself 
behind any decision of [the] Committee of Administration.
He must take the personal responsibility for the 
approval of any recommendation, and, being Rajah, cannot 
well refuse to listen to anyone who considers that any 
recommendation does not correspond with a decision which 
the Rajah himself would have made had he personally 
considered the facts without Committee of Administration's 
advice.1
Bertram gave as an example the Committee's involvement
in the question of government doctors being authorized to conduct
private practice in their own time. The majority of the Committee
had recommended that this be discontinued and Bertram had decided to
defer to the Rajah's personal decision on his return. Bertram was
concerned not so much because he disapproved of the recommendation,
but because the Chief Secretary 'was the only member who regarded
the question from what he thought would be the Rajah's point of
view had he handled it himself'. In Bertram's view the Committee's
function was to anticipate the wishes of the Rajah. And it could
be performed by a much smaller body: 'even a couple of people,
with powers to summon advisers on various departmental and other
matters would be quite sufficient in a Raj. "Quot homines tot 
2sententiae"'. The one weak link in Bertram's traditional view of 
Brooke government was the Rajah himself. Vyner had approved all the 
financial and administrative changes introduced by Calvert and 
Parnell but was unwilling to support them against the opposition of the 
Administrative Service.
The Administration of Justice
Another major problem which crystallized in the 1930s was the 
contradiction between the unsystematic and pragmatic mode of justice 
traditionally practised in Sarawak and the more conventional notions 
of British justice. In response to pressure from the British 
government the Rajah had in 1928 appointed Thomas Stirling Boyd, 
a Scots barrister formerly of Lincoln's Inn, to the post of Judicial
1 Undated memorandum [1936], Boyd Papers.
2 Ibid.
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Commissioner. Promoted to Chief Justice in 1930, Boyd saw it as
his great task to bring system and efficiency to the administration of
justice in Sarawak. Consequently he was responsible for the first
codification of the various Orders issued by the Rajahs which
2collectively constituted the state's body of formal law, and for 
the modification of the Indian Penal Code which had been introduced in 
1922. At the same time, Boyd was concerned to establish a formal 
procedure for the hearings conducted by Residents and District 
Officers in the outstation. It was Boyd's reforming zeal, together 
with the administrative changes attempted by Parnell after 1935, 
which constituted the first real challenge to the authority of the 
Administrative Service since Moulton. Boyd also brought into focus 
what might be called the contradiction between the rule of man and 
the rule of law. Both issues were temporarily settled in favour of 
the traditionalists by Anthony Brooke in early 1939.
Boyd sympathized with Le Gros Clark's plan to reform 
methods of government but regarded the establishment of the rule of 
law as much more important. In a memorandum of May 1935 he 
raised an issue which was vitally relevant to the tradition of Brooke 
rule:
... there is an antecedent matter which requires 
examination and this is the fundamental question 
whether the country is or is not to be governed 
by law, i.e. whether it is to be governed on 
fixed principles which have been laid down 
beforehand or is to be subject merely to rough 
and ready empirical rules, called by some the 
rules of commonsense, and made up as and when
1 Thomas J.L. Stirling Boyd (1886-1973) was the grandson of the 
Lord Provost of Edinburgh and the Professor of Medicine at 
Edinburgh University. After taking a degree at Trinity College, 
Oxford, he served in the 1914-18 war and later worked for the 
Air Ministry. He was admitted to the Inner Temple as a 
barrister in 1919 and practised in London until taking up the 
position of Judicial Commissioner. After his resignation in 
March 1939 (see below) he returned to the Air Ministry for
some years. Boyd was interested in drama and wrote a number 
of plays.
2 State Orders Issued by His Highness the Rajah of Sarawak or with 
His Sanction3 Kuching 1933.
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occasion requires.
He found it disquieting that not only was there inconsistency 
of policy in areas where Government Orders had not been formulated, 
but even Orders were ignored by the Rajah if and when it suited him.
The Committee of Administration, for example, which was required 
under the 1927 Order to meet at least twice a month, had not met at 
all from the enactment of the Order until 1933.
The Chief Justice proceeded to question the whole basis 
of autocratic government:
Whatever may be the disadvantages of the rule of law 
... the rule of caprice, which is the only alternative, 
cannot be considered as a substitute as the disasters 
which it brings in its train are incalculable. If the 
principle of the rule of caprice is admitted there 
must necessarily be an end of good government as the 
subject can rely on nothing ...
He saw good government as being necessarily based on the exercise 
of statutory authority. Without this there could be no discipline, 
no efficiency. And without the firm and consistent administration of 
the law, how could trade prosper? The first step towards the 
establishment of the rule of law was, in Boyd’s view, the re-constitution 
of the Committee of Administration in such a way that all matters 
of importance would be referred to it for advice and ’certain 
matters, e.g., all proposed Orders and proposed expenditure, must 
have its consent before they became legal'. This could provide 
some protection against caprice, but 'full security could hardly 
be obtained unless at the same time steps were taken to provide for 
judicial independence ...'
Boyd was also anxious to reorganize the legal department 
and to place the entire administration of justice on a more secure 
and formal footing, the limitations of the 'common sense' system 
of legal administration practised by Residents and District Officers 
being increasingly obvious to him.
In 1930, a Eurasian schoolmaster was accused of
1 [T. Stirling Boyd], 'The Sarawak Crisis', typescript [1939],
Appendix A. Subsequent quotations from this source.
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carnal knowledge of the daughter of a Singhalese clerk but the 
case was dismissed by Boyd when he learnt that the girl had consented 
and was of age under the Indian Penal Code. When the mother 
complained about Boyd's decision another official, probably the 
Resident of the First Division, made this observation:
I quite see that accused is rightly dismissed 
according to the section under which he was 
prosecuted - but I am afraid I am of the 
opinion that this is one of the cases which 
would have been far more effectively dealt 
with under the old non-technical system, where 
the actual item and the charge sheet didn't 
much matter.^
He felt that since the accused was guilty of grossly immoral conduct
and had precipitated a family break-up, he should not be let off scot-
free. Boyd had some sympathy for this point of view and conceded that
in a small and primitive society it could work, but he felt that it
overlooked 'a vital and fundamental principle of liberty that a
man can only be punished for conduct which the law has declared to 
2be a crime ...' The schoolmaster's conviction, he believed, would 
have meant the application of a vague moral standard impossible of 
definition.
Boyd's request for reports of all Resident's Court cases 
could be quietly ignored, but when he began overturning the judgments 
of these courts and upholding appeals there was a predictably hostile 
reaction. Particularly significant was Boyd's decision to uphold the 
appeal of Dunggaw and Unjar, two Ibans from Song who had been 
convicted for 'depredation on the Territories of a foreign power 
at peace with His Majesty': they had crossed the border to Kanto in
Dutch Borneo in July 1932 and taken some heads. Dunggaw was 
arrested in Sarawak when news of his expedition became known and 
after he had been held illegally in prison for five months it was 
proposed to hand him over to the Dutch authorities for trial.
However, there was a further proposal for a peace-making and Dunggaw 
continued to be held until the arrest of Unjar. In August 1933 the
1 Boyd, 'The Law and Constitution of Sarawak', p.81.
2 Ibid., p.82.
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C h i e f  S e c r e t a r y  w r o t e  t o  t h e  R e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  T h i r d  D i v i s i o n  d i r e c t i n g  
t h a t  t h e  a c c u s e d  men were t o  be s e n t e n c e d  t o  seven  y e a r s  im pr isonm en t  
and t h e n  r e l e a s e d  a f t e r  s e r v i n g  s i x  mon ths .  The t r i a l  was d e l a y e d  
b e c a u s e  t h e  pea ce -m a k in g  was n o t  h e l d  u n t i l  November 1933. An 
I b an  headman t h e n  came t o  Kuching and a d e f i n i t e  o f f e r  was made 
t o  him on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  C h ie f  S e c r e t a r y ’s l e t t e r .  However ,  
t h e  t r i a l  when i t  was h e l d  was n o t  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
a f u l l  b o a r d  o f  Iban  a s s e s s o r s  was n o t  u sed  and t h e  men were c ha rge d  
u n d e r  S e c t i o n  126 o f  t h e  I n d i a n  P e n a l  Code.
Boyd o b j e c t e d  s t r o n g l y  t o  t h e  l e t t e r  which  he d e s c r i b e d  
as  p r e j u d g i n g  t h e  c a se  and a p p o i n t i n g  a p u r e l y  nom ina l  s e n t e n c e  f o r  
what  a p p e a r e d  t o  be  m urde r .  No doub t  a n t i c i p a t i n g  t h e s e  o b j e c t i o n s ,  
t h e  R e s i d e n t  a t  f i r s t  r e f u s e d  to  p r o v i d e  r e c o r d s  o f  t h e  c a se  
on t h e  grounds  t h a t  ' i t  was c o n s i d e r e d  u n n e c e s s a r y ' .  For  t h e  C h ie f  
J u s t i c e  t h i s  was an e x t r a o r d i n a r y  a f f r o n t :
As t h e  r e c o r d  was c a l l e d  f o r  u n d e r  a s t a t u t o r y  
power t h e  R e s i d e n t  had c l e a r l y  no a u t h o r i t y  
t o  r e f u s e  t o  send  i t  and h i s  a c t i o n  b e s i d e s  
b e i n g  im p r o p e r  was a l s o  i l l - a d v i s e d  as  no 
good p u r p o s e  can be s e r v e d  by c o n c e a l i n g  what  
was done .  In  any c a se  t h e  p r o c e e d i n g s ^ w e r e , 
o r  ough t  t o  have  b e e n ,  h e l d  i n  p u b l i c .
Boyd quashed  t h e  c o n v i c t i o n s  on t h e  g rounds  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  t h e  I n d i a n  
P e n a l  Code had been  i n s t i t u t e d  i n  Sarawak i n  1922,  t h e  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
O rde r  o f  1933 r e n d e r e d  i n a p p l i c a b l e  t h e  s e c t i o n  u n d e r  which  they  
had  been  c h a rg e d .  However , he d i r e c t e d  t h e  R e s i d e n t ' s  Court  t o  t r y  
them f o r  t h e  common law o f f e n c e  o f  h e a d - h u n t i n g  and s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  
t h e r e  s h o u l d  be a p a n e l  o f  a s s e s s o r s .  C on c lu d in g  h i s  j u d g m e n t ,
Boyd r e t u r n e d  to  h i s  f a v o u r i t e  theme:
They ca nno t  be  e x p e c t e d  to  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  
fu n d am e n ta l  im p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  p o i n t  i n v o l v e d ,  
b u t  t h i s  does n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  i s s u e .  I t  i s  
e s s e n t i a l  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  a 
p e r s o n  can on ly  be p u n i s h e d  f o r  c onduc t  which 
i s  made c r i m i n a l  by t h e  l aw ,  w h e t h e r  s t a t u t e  
law o r  common law.  On any o t h e r  v iew r u l e  by
1 H.H. The Rajah  v .  1. Dunggaw, Sarawak Supreme Court Reports
2. U n ja r
1928- 41 , 1946- 51 , Kuching [ 1 9 5 2 ? ] ,  p p . 39-40 .
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law i s  r e p l a c e d  by c a p r i c e ,  and t h e  f u n d a m e n ta l  r i g h t  
o f  t h e  l i b e r t y  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t  i s  d e s t r o y e d . ^
The C h ie f  S e c r e t a r y  had n o t  s e e n  f i t  t o  have t h e  c o n v i c t i o n s  
d e fe n d e d  i n  c o u r t ,  b u t  Boyd had p u b l i c l y  r apped  some i m p o r t a n t  
k n u c k l e s  and h i s  a c t i o n  was s e e n  by t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  S e r v i c e  as  
g r o s s  i n t e r f e r e n c e .
Anthony Brooke and the 'Sarawak C risis ' o f  1939
As we have  a l r e a d y  s e e n ,  A n thon i  W a l t e r  D a y r e l l  ( ' P e t e r ’ ) Brooke 
was b o r n  a t  t h e  h e i g h t  o f  t h e  d i s p u t e  be tw een  C h a r l e s  Brooke and 
Vyner Brooke .  So s e n s i t i v e  was B e r t r a m  t o  t h e  p rob lem  o f  t h e  
s u c c e s s i o n  and so d e t e r m i n e d  was Ranee S y l v i a  t h a t  he  s h o u l d  be 
k e p t  o u t  o f  t h e  way t h a t  i t  was n o t  u n t i l  1934 t h a t  Anthony v i s i t e d  
Sarawak.  A f t e r  E ton  (1926-31)  and a y e a r  a t  T r i n i t y  C o l l e g e ,  
Cambridge,  Anthony moved t o  t h e  Schoo l  o f  O r i e n t a l  S t u d i e s  i n  London 
t o  s t u d y  t h e  Malay l a n g u a g e  and Muslim law.  Having  become 
p r o f i c i e n t  i n  Malay,  he a r r i v e d  i n  Sarawak i n  June  1934 a t  t h e  
b e g i n n i n g  o f  one o f  h i s  f a t h e r ' s  t o u r s  o f  du ty  and s p e n t  t h e  n e x t  
few months t r a v e l l i n g  a round  t h e  c o u n t r y  w i t h  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  f o r  N a t iv e  
A f f a i r s  who i n t r o d u c e d  him t o  t h e  members o f  t h e  S e r v i c e .  I n  June  
he v i s i t e d  San tubong ,  a Malay v i l l a g e  a t  t h e  mouth o f  t h e  Sarawak 
R i v e r ,  and i t  was h e r e  t h a t  he  e x p e r i e n c e d  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t im e  t h e  
s a l u t a t i o n s  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  h i s  p o s i t i o n  as  l i k e l y  h e i r  t o  t h e  R a j . 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y  enough ,  h i s  r e a c t i o n s  were  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  o f  h i s  
u n c l e  f i f t y  y e a r s  e a r l i e r :
Everybody i s  b e w i l d e r i n g l y  e m b a r r a s s i n g  h e r e  -  
t h e y  w i l l  i n s i s t  on showing me th ro u g h  doors  
f i r s t ,  and g e t t i n g  up when I  come i n t o  t h e  
room and a l t o g e t h e r  seem to  do a l l  t h e y  can 
t o  make me f e e l  d i f f e r e n t  -  and I ' m  n o t  
q u i t e  s u r e  t h a t  I  l i k e  f e e l i n g  " d i f f e r e n t " !
However ,  eve rybody  i s  t e r r i b l y  n i c e  and I  
d a r e  say  I ' l l  g e t  used  t o  i t ,  as  w i t h  any 
l u c k  I  may be i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y  f o r  a n o t h e r  50 
y e a r s  o r  so!  ( I f  God and t h e  J a p a n e s e  a r e  
w i l l i n g ) 2
1 I b i d . , p .40 .
2 Anthony Brooke t o  J e a n  H a l s e y ,  28 Ju n e  [1 9 3 4 ] ,  Brooke P a p e r s ,
Box 1 0 / 2 .
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It had been decided earlier by Bertram Brooke, 
possibly on the advice of Sir Andrew Caldecott, a veteran 
of the MCS, that Anthony should be seconded to Malaya for two 
years before taking up a post in Sarawak. Accordingly, he spent 
the period from September 1934 to September 1936 attached to the 
Secretariats in Kuala Pilah, Alor Star, Kuala Trengganu and Kuala 
Lumpur and acted as a magistrate for minor offences. It is difficult 
to say to what extent Anthony was influenced by his Malayan 
experience. There is nothing in his private letters of the time 
to indicate that he was concerned about the political impotence of the 
Malay rulers and the possibility that the Malayan Resident system 
might be introduced in Sarawak through British pressure. In 
August 1935, however, when posted at Alor Star, he took charge of 
the Secretariat during the Assistant Adviser’s absence and gained 
his first real taste of power. '... An "Adviser" in an unfederated 
State’, he told his sister, Jean Halsey, ’corresponds with a 
"Resident" except that he is really only meant to Advise though in 
reality it means a great deal more than that'.^  Although he was 
only carrying out routine work, he evidently enjoyed the position.
'... If the A.A. doesn’t come back soon', he quipped, 'he'll regret 
that he ever went away'.^
At the end of September 1936 he went back to Sarawak 
and joined Andrew Macpherson at the newly-established post of 
Meluan in the Third Division. After another short term with Donald 
Hudden, District Officer of the Baram, he served for some months 
in Kuching at the Secretariat and in May 1938 went to England on 
leave to take a course in colonial administration at Oxford under 
Margery Perham. It was also during this time that he met the sister 
of Donald Hudden, Kathleen, whom he was later to marry.
In March 1939 Anthony initiated an inquiry which brought 
about the resignation of five senior members of the Sarawak 
government. While the occasion of the inquiry - the dismissal of a 
young European officer - was in itself unimportant, the confrontation
1 Anthony Brooke to Jean Halsey, 23 August 1935, Brooke Papers,
Box 10/2.
2 Ibid.
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between the Rajah’s nephew and the senior bureaucrats brought to a 
head some of the problems of Brooke government in the immediate pre­
war period. While Sarawak remained an autocracy, the third Rajah’s 
flagging interest in the business of government had resulted in a 
progressive assumption of executive power by the Kuching bureaucracy. 
The crisis of 1939 stemmed from Anthony Brooke's attempt to restore 
this power to the Administrative Service and to ensure that it was 
exercised in accordance with the traditions of Brooke rule. It also 
revealed the Rajah in a most unflattering light.
Among the junior officers alleged by Dick to have been
'persecuted' by Calvert was F.L. Crossley, whose career in Sarawak
began in 1930 when he arrived as an administrative cadet. From
most accounts he performed creditably enough and was regarded even
1by Stirling Boyd as a good magistrate. But like most of his
fellow officers he got into debt. With liabilities amounting to
about $2,600, Crossley applied to the government in 1938 for a loan
to cover medical expenses. In so doing, however, he grossly
understated his indebtedness and Parnell recommended after
consultations with Boyd, Calvert and others that he should be
dismissed from the service. The Rajah gave his approval and in late
January 1939 Crossley, who was then serving as an Assistant
District Officer at Oya in the Third Division, received a letter
2from Parnell conveying the decision.
Crossley's petition to the Rajah was unsuccessful and he 
could not even obtain details of the terms of his dismissal until 
8 March when he was told that a passage had been booked for him from 
Singapore two weeks hence. In the meantime, Anthony Brooke had 
returned from leave to take up the post of District Officer, Mukah, 
of which Oya was a sub-district. Crossley told Anthony his story,
1 Boyd to Pollard, 12 March 1939, Boyd Papers.
2 Most of the details in this account have been taken from 
documentation provided by Boyd in 'The Sarawak Crisis', a 
typescript dossier which he completed on his return to 
England and circulated widely among M.P.s. and newspaper 
editors. Boyd Papers.
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emphasizing that although he had been dismissed, the government 
expected him to continue his duties as a magistrate for two months 
before giving the terms of his dismissal and notice of his virtual 
deportation.
This provided the opportunity which Anthony might well 
have been waiting for. Filled with indignation at Crossley's 
treatment and determined to beard Calvert and Parnell, Anthony 
left immediately for Kuching. Soon after his arrival he called at 
the Astana and, in the Rajah’s own words, 'shot in a sheaf of 
letters on me' concerning Crossley’s dismissal.^ He told the Rajah 
that Crossley had been harshly treated and that there should be an 
investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal which was 
otherwise likely to bring the entire service into disrepute.
Parnell and Calvert then received a note from the Rajah asking them 
to give Anthony all the files on Crossley and later that day, 
after another meeting with his nephew, Vyner informed Parnell that 
he had ’allowed’ Anthony to hold an inquiry the following Monday. 
'Peter is fully aware', the Rajah added, 'that if his enquiry is 
abortive and merely mischievous that he will have to resign the 
service'
There followed a most extraordinary exchange of messages 
across the river between the Chief Secretary's office and the 
Astana. Parnell and his colleagues objected vigorously to the idea 
that a junior officer should conduct an inquiry into their actions. 
They pointed out that not only had there been no alternative to 
dismissing Crossley, and that the Rajah's approval had been given 
at every step, but that Anthony had left his official post without 
permission and had appointed Crossley, whose dismissal from the 
service was now effective, in his place. Vyner admitted that it was 
'unusual for a junior officer to hold an enquiry regarding conduct 
of his seniors in service', but the inquiry was to go ahead.^
1 Vyner Brooke to Parnell, 24 March 1939, Appendix I, ibid.
2 Vyner Brooke to Parnell, 24 March 1939, Appendix 6, ibid.
3 Vyner Brooke to Parnell, 24 March 1939, Appendix 4, ibid.
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At about the same time there arrived from the Astana 
an official letter empowering Anthony to hold the inquiry, the 
procedure of which was to be 'laid down by Mr. Brooke, who has my 
full authority to conduct it as he thinks fit'.^ In a covering note, 
Anthony asked Parnell to inform all members of the Committee that he 
required them to attend. He also told Parnell that he was not 
disputing the decision that Crossley should go:
I am, however, much concerned with the way in which 
he goes, and the terms he receives for his past 
services. And this is why I wish to hold an^enquiry - 
and, I may add, I have every right to do so.
This 'right' stemmed not from his position in the Sarawak government
service, it emerged, but from his status as Rajah Muda which had
been conferred upon him by the Rajah that very day in order to
3facilitate the inquiry.
It had become increasingly obvious to members of the
Committee of Administration that the real purpose of Anthony's
inquiry was the removal of Parnell and Calvert. Parnell told a
hurriedly-called meeting of the Committee that in his view the
whole thing was nonsense and that the best solution was for him to
see the Rajah and offer to go over the facts of the case with the
Rajah Muda. There was full agreement on this, but before any action
would be taken another note arrived from the Rajah saying that he
would not see anyone about the inquiry until after it had taken4
place. According to Boyd, this finally convinced the meeting 'that 
there was definitely something behind the decision to hold the 
enquiry'.“* Parnell and the other members of the Committee - 
Calvert, Boyd, J.B. Archer, N.A. Middlemas and J.H. Bowyer - thenß
produced a joint memorandum in which they pointed out that the real 
issue of the inquiry appeared to be not the dismissal of Crossley
1 Vyner Brooke to Parnell, 24 March 1939, Appendix 3, ibid.
2 Anthony Brooke to Parnell, 25 March 1939, Appendix 8, ibid.
3 Vyner Brooke to Parnell, 25 March 1939, Appendix 2, ibid.
4 Vyner Brooke to Parnell, 25 March 1939, Appendix 5, 'The 
Sarawak Crisis'.
5 Ibid., p .4.
6 Appendix 9, ibid. This was probably drafted by Boyd himself.
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but the 'propriety and otherwise of such of Your Highness' officers 
who were responsible for advising Your Highness what terms should be 
given to Mr. Crossley'. They felt that although no charges had 
been made, the position of the Chief Secretary was that of a 
defendant. Even if the inquiry were restricted to the grounds of 
dismissal (which seemed unlikely), the Rajah Muda's own position 
as advocate clearly rendered him ineligible to judge the case, 
particularly since a decision that there had been no impropriety 
would automatically bring about his resignation. The Committee 
finally requested that in the absence of any impartial person 'of 
the requisite standing' in Sarawak, the Rajah should ask Sir Shenton 
Thomas, the Governor of the Straits Settlements who was also the 
British Agent for Borneo, to appoint one or more judges or senior 
officers from his own service to conduct the investigation.
While their argument was unexceptionable from a legal 
point of view, the signatories had erred politically in reacting 
so strongly to the projected inquiry and in recommending the 
appointment of outside adjudicators. The Rajah told Parnell he 
regarded the minute as 'puerile and farcical' and declined to 
acknowledge it formally:
To think of six grown men - senior men - in the 
Government, who have sat and deliberated 
together for many years not having the courage 
to face a single boy who only three years ago 
was a junior officer, without asking help from 
judges from Singapore and other paraphernalia.
The whole situation is too ridiculous. I don't 
quite see how Singapore judges - learned men 
though they may be - can adjudicate on the 
future policy of Sarawak.
The Inquiry and its outcome
From the outset the inquiry was a confrontation between Anthony 
and the Committee. Having recited the facts of the case as he saw 
them, Anthony announced that Crossley had been 'savagely' treated.
1 Vyner Brooke to Parnell, undated, Appendix 10, ibid. This 
letter was received by Parnell on the morning of the inquiry.
He was to  be p e r m i t t e d  t o  r e t i r e  and t o  r e c e i v e  s i x  m on th ’ s pay 
i n  l i e u  o f  n o t i c e  as  w e l l  as  t h e  l e a v e  t o  which  he was n o r m a l ly  
e n t i t l e d .
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The r e s t  o f  t h e  i n q u i r y  c o n s i s t e d  o f  s p e e c h e s  by members 
o f  t h e  Commit tee o f  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and A n th o n y ' s  r e p l i e s .  One o f  
t h e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  o f  t h e s e  was A n t h o n y ' s  r e s p o n s e  to  Dr Bowyer ' s  
p o i n t  t h a t  t h e  te rms  o r i g i n a l l y  g i v e n  t o  C r o s s l e y  were t h e  maximum 
p e r m i t t e d  u n d e r  G e n e ra l  O r d e r s :
I  s h o u ld  l i k e  t o  s a y  t h a t  so  l o n g  as  I  have  any 
i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  t h e  way t h e  laws o f  Sarawak a r e  
t o  be  a p p l i e d  I  s h a l l  n e v e r  recommend t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h o s e  laws l i t e r a l l y  where  I 
c o n s i d e r  t h a t  my own good judgm en t  f i t s  t h e  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  b e t t e r ,  and i n  s p e a k i n g  t h u s  I  
know I  e x p r e s s  t h e  unspoken  p o l i c y  o f  His  
H igh n e s s  t h e  Rajah  i n  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  t h e  laws o f  t h e  S t a t e .
When i t  came t o  an end on t h e  a f t e r n o o n  o f  t h e  s econd  day ,  P a r n e l l  
r e s i g n e d  and was i m m e d ia te ly  r e p l a c e d  as  C h ie f  S e c r e t a r y  by J . B .  Arche r
1 I b i d . ,  p .9 .
2 John  B e v i l l e  A rc he r  (1893-1948)  j o i n e d  t h e  Sarawak S e r v i c e  a t  19 
and s p e n t  h i s  e a r l y  y e a r s  among t h e  Melanau p e o p l e  i n  t h e  c o a s t a l  
a r e a s  o f  t h e  T h i r d  D i v i s i o n .  A keen  w r i t e r ,  he  c o n t r i b u t e d  
numerous a r t i c l e s  t o  t h e  Sarawak G azette  unde r  t h e  s o b r i q u e t  o f  
' O p t i m i s t i c  F i d d l e r '  and was e d i t o r  d u r i n g  t h e  1920s .  In  1939 
A r c h e r  was a member o f  t h e  Commit tee o f  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and 
r e p l a c e d  P a r n e l l  as  C h ie f  S e c r e t a r y  when t h e  l a t t e r  r e s i g n e d .  
A r c h e r  h i m s e l f  was f o r c e d  t o  r e s i g n  i n  May 1941,  p a r t l y  f o r  h i s  
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  new c o n s t i t u t i o n ' s  l i m i t a t i o n s  on t h e  
R a j a h ' s  powers .  Spend ing  t h e  war  i n  Batu  L i n t a n g ,  he r e f u s e d  
r e c u p e r a t i o n  l e a v e  and was a p p o i n t e d  P o l i t i c a l  A d v i s e r  to  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  S u p p o r t i n g  c e s s i o n  as  t h e  R a j a h ' s  w i s h ,  
A r c h e r  was i n s t r u m e n t a l  i n  s e e i n g  t h a t  i t  went  t h ro u g h  t h e  
C o u n c i l  N e g r i  o f  w h ic h ,  as  A c t i n g  C h ie f  S e c r e t a r y ,  he  was ex 
o f f i c i o  P r e s i d e n t .  He was a l s o  O f f i c e r  A d m i n i s t e r i n g  t h e  
Government  f rom t h e  R a j a h ' s  d e p a r t u r e  u n t i l  t h e  f o r m a l i z a t i o n  o f  
c e s s i o n  i n  J u l y .  G r e a t l y  t r o u b l e d  by t h e  c e s s i o n  a f f a i r ,  he  
took  h i s  own l i f e  a t  t h e  age o f  55.  An a r d e n t  Brooke r o y a l i s t  
who would n o t  t o l e r a t e  any d i m i n u t i o n  o f  t h e  R a j a h ' s  a u t h o r i t y ,  
A rc h e r  had f a l l e n  ou t  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  members o f  t h e  Commit tee o f  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  1941. C e s s io n  was a h i g h l y  t r a u m a t i c  e x p e r i e n c e  
f o r  him.  His  f i r s t  l o y a l t y  was t o  t h e  R a j a h ,  b u t  t h e  Rajah  was 
comm it ted  to  t e r m i n a t e  Brooke r u l e .  One o f  t h e  f i e r c e s t  oppone n ts  
o f  B r i t i s h  i n t e r v e n t i o n  b e f o r e  t h e  w ar ,  A rche r  found h i m s e l f  i n  
1946 w ork ing  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  c o l o n i a l  governm en t .  His  m a n u s c r i p t  
a u t o b i o g r a p h y  has  been  p u b l i s h e d  i n  p a r t  i n  t h e  Sarawak Tribune.
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who had retracted his earlier support for the memorandum. Calvert, 
Middlemas and Bowyer also resigned although Anthony tried to 
persuade the latter two to stay.
Boyd was told that although the Rajah wished him to 
resign as Chief Justice, he could stay on as Judicial Commissioner. 
Boyd was not prepared to accept such a demotion. Even if he had 
been able to remain Chief Justice, he wrote, there would still have 
been the formidable problem of maintaining the independence of the 
judiciary. Anthony’s declaration that he proposed to substitute his 
own 'good judgment’ for the written law when need be had been 
sufficient to persuade Boyd that his position would become impossible. 
Indeed, he saw the situation as resembling the dispute between 
James I and Sir Edward Coke in 1605 when the Lord Chief Justice 
was dismissed for challenging the King’s claim to be above the 
Law. While this appeal to the rule of law was consistent with his 
earlier position, it was ironic that Boyd should have given equal 
emphasis to his fear that if he returned as Judicial Commissioner,
’the Asiatic population would undoubtedly conclude that the Rajah had 
lost confidence in me which would weaken the authority of the Court 
and make the administration of Justice extremely difficult’.^"
This appeal to the ’rule of man’ was something to which the Rajah 
would have been more responsive.
At about the same time, the Rajah wrote to Parnell 
indicating his regret at what had happened:
No one is more sorry than I am for what has 
taken place as I am just as responsible as 
any member of the C. of A. - I attach no 
blame or stigma on anyone and as for yourself 
you have always been loyal and done your duty 
as a conscientious and high-minded officer 
... in spite of all that has taken place2l 
am sure that we shall always be friends.
And later, in a brief note to Sir Shenton Thomas, he told the 
Governor that his nephew was fully authorized to give a resume of 
all that had happened and that he (the Rajah) accepted responsibility
1 Ibid., p.10A.
2 Vyner Brooke to Calvert, 30 March 1939, Appendix 19, ibid.
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for the ’purge’ of his most senior officers:
As far as organisation, redtape and office methods 
are concerned I have nothing against these three 
officials except that the Government so formed is 
drifting away from native interests and I think 
you will agree with me that a native state cannot 
be governed from an office table. Having the 
welfare of the native community so much at heart 
this gradual cleavage of interests has been very 
disturbing to me for some years past.
All native communities and the Chinese and also 
Government officials who live and work among the 
natives very warmly welcome this change
All he wanted now, he concluded, was some encouragement from the
Governor and with this ’everything will go swimmingly and all
2Sarawak ... will heave a sigh of relief'. In another note, he
added that he had appointed Anthony as Rajah Muda and Officer
Administering the Government during his absence. Expressing full
confidence in his nephew's ability to look after things, he then
left for his annual holiday in England. The general significance
of Anthony's discussions with Sir Shenton Thomas in Singapore will
3be dealt with below. It will suffice to say at this point that 
Anthony obtained the Governor's support.
On his way back to Kuching, Anthony wrote to his sister,
Jean Halsey, that he was about to assume the responsibilities of
Officer Administering the Government 'with the full powers of the
Rajah'. It even seemed doubtful that his uncle would actually return
to Sarawak. 'Oddly enough I don't feel a bit alarmed', he wrote.
'On the contrary I am glad the time has come when I can at last do
4something worthwhile ... ' He later remarked on the favourable 
reaction there had been locally to his victory over Parnell and 
Calvert:
1 Vyner Brooke to Shenton Thomas, 28 March 1939, CO 531/29 
[53011/1].
2 Ibid.
3 See Chapter IV.
4 Anthony Brooke to Jean Halsey [c.ll April 1939], Brooke Papers, 
Box 12/11.
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... the general feeling is one of great relief 
at the departure of the two ’'Dictators''. Parnell 
and Calvert were openly referred to as "Mussolini 
and Hitler" by the Chinese in the bazaar!! The 
Chinese wanted to give Parnell a "send-off" with 
crackers ... and all the rest, but we managed to 
dissuade them! What the Malays - and the old 
Datu Patinggi - thought of P. had best be left 
unsaid. Everyone is sincerely "relieved"
- and let us pray most fervently that their departure 
see the beginning of a new and better era of 
administration for the country. The C.of. A. 
has used all the power that it had designated to 
itself during the past 20 years - and more 
expecially the last 10. The whole business was 
very sudden and I do not think it would be an 
exaggeration to say that never since the days of 
the second Rajah has the country been so much in 
the power of one man. The C. of A. is a mere name  ^
and nothing else - and I think it should remain so!
But the feeling of relief was by no means general, particularly
among the technical officers. Indeed, there were those who
regarded the loss of Parnell, Calvert, and Middlemas as the end
of any hope of administrative reform. There was a good deal of
resentment towards Anthony and his outstation supporters 'for
what had amounted to a coup with the consequential loss of
2three outstanding officers (no one worried about Boyd)'. A.J.N. 
Richards, a young cadet who had come straight from Oxford to the 
Secretariat in September 1938, was at the wharf for Parnell's departure 
and recorded his private feelings about the whole affair in a 
letter to his mother:
I saw Mr. Parnell suddenly go red as fire - it 
must have been a moving sight to see the wharf 
crowded with people, only a murmur of talk and all 
sorry to see him go - after 34 years in the place 
to be "forced" out by a commotion of royal 
prerogatives! And I think everyone was genuine - 
from old Ong Tiang Swee who had seen Parnell come 
out as a young man, to the 4 companions of the C. 
of A., sound men, down to myself who wonder how I 
shall fare in 20 or 30 years time!^
1 Anthony Brooke to Jean Halsey, 24 April 1939, Brooke Papers, 
Box 12/11.
2 Personal communication from Mr J.L. Noakes, 3 August 1975.
3 Richards to Mrs Richards, 22 April 1939, Richards Papers.
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Thinking of the three more farewells to come, he suggested that by
June he and his fellow officers would have ’built up a very sorry
feeling' and would be 'more "anti" than ever'Anthony's
intentions were the object of some suspicion and his suitability
2as the next Rajah was questioned.
Some months later, in response to the publicity which
the dismissal of the officers had been given in the Singapore and
London newspapers, Anthony sent the Defence Secretary, Nigel Hughes,
to Singapore to meet newspaper editors and publicize his version
of the event. While it was a somewhat idealized interpretation
designed to win maximum support, The Straits Times editorial of 6 July
31939 also reflected Anthony's own views on Brooke government.
For his part, Boyd, emphasized that the 'new policy' to
which Anthony was objecting 'had been approved by the Rajah at every
step and was carried out by the Chief Secretary and the Financial4Secretary at the Rajah's direction'. The inquiry, he said, had not 
been in any sense a 'meeting' of the Committee of Administration 
and at no point was the policy of the Government questioned, the 
proceedings being given over completely to discussion of the 
Crossley case. Boyd admitted, however, that the article had stated 
the real grounds of complaint - financial policy. In a letter to 
Calvert some months later he was rather more blunt:
I have little doubt that the finance business was 
the real reason for the row and of course H.H. 
should have taken the matter up and looked into 
it himself. I imagine that he did not do so 
because he knew if you and Parnell opposed 
any changes he would get the worst of any 
argument and wouldn't have the guts to 
overrule you if necessary, and secondly because 
he preferred the back door to the front.^
1 Ibid.
2 Noakes, op. cit.
3 See Appendix III.
4 Boyd, 'The Sarawak Crisis', pp.31-2.
5 Boyd to Calvert, 26 October 1939, Boyd Papers.
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Anthony Brooke as Rayah Muda
The period of Anthony Brooke's administration of Sarawak from April 
until September 1939 is of some importance. The problem, however, 
is that there are very few records and those which have survived 
consist largely of complaints made about him by his critics. 
Consequently it is only possible to provide the most general outline 
of his administrative policy.
A few days after the inquiry, Anthony called a meeting
of all available administrative officers in Archer's office. He
told them that four senior men were leaving but that there was no
stigma attached and the service would be in no way impaired as
long as everyone co-operated. After his departure, Archer addressed
them on the subject of the 'new system' of centralized administration
initiated by Parnell and Calvert, suggesting that it might not be
feasible. Those supporting Archer' s highly conservative views spoke
up strongly and he concluded that 'the general opinion was that the
new scheme would not work'.^ However, Richards noted, if Macpherson,
Selous and others 'capable of th'ink'ing' had spoken frankly they
would have been unpopular. '... We must be cleverly diplomatic',
2he wrote, 'or shut up and suffer gladly'.
One of Anthony's preoccupations which emerged from the 
inquiry was the administration of justice. On the last day he 
announced that the post of Chief Justice was to be reduced to
3Judicial Commissioner and that this was to take effect from 1 April.
This may have seemed somewhat precipitate to the Rajah because
Anthony subsequently told Boyd that the Rajah no longer intended
4fixing a date. However, the demotion was something on which uncle 
and nephew could agree. Boyd's fussy insistence on the letter of the 
law and his refusal to take account of Sarawak's 'special conditions' 
had made him something of a nuisance. Vyner seems to have come to
1 Minute by Archer addressed to Rajah Muda, 4 April 1939, Richards 
Papers.
2 Richards' note on Archer's minute, ibid.
3 Boyd, 'The Sarawak Crisis', p.10.
4 Anthony Brooke to Boyd, 30 March 1939, Appendix 11, ibid.
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an agreement with Anthony that Boyd's successor need not be of top 
calibre and that it would be a short-term appointment on a salary 
substantially less than Boyd's.^
Although we have only Boyd's word for it, Anthony 
also appears to have planned the abolition of the Committee of 
Administration, only to find that 'owing to certain difficulties' 
it could not be done. Nevertheless, the Committee's meetings during 
Anthony's period of responsibility were little more than a 
formality and he did not make any appointments to replace the five 
members who had resigned. This, together with a number of other 
changes, convinced Boyd that Anthony's policies were 'definitely, 2reactionary and attended with considerable danger to the country .
The initiatives subsequently taken by Anthony were not
so much changes as reversals of the tentative efforts which had been
made since 1934 to centralize the administration. One of his
first announcements was that the Fifth Division was to be restored
3from 1 June with F.H. Pollard as Acting Resident and a number of 
other administrative officers were also promoted, subject to 
confirmation on the Rajah's return. The financial and other
1 Archer to Sarawak Government Agent, 20 April 1939, ibid., p.25.
2 Ibid., p .19.
3 Frederick Hubert Pollard (1903-55), one of the most active 
supporters of Sarawak's independence, was persuaded to join
the Sarawak Service in 1923 by his uncle, Charles Willes Johnson, 
who had been in charge of the Sarawak Government Office in 
London since 1912. Pollard had served at various stations 
before being appointed to Limbang and in late 1941 was promoted 
to Secretary of Native Affairs. In Australia when the 
Japanese invaded Sarawak, he joined the Australian Army and 
served in the Allied Intelligence Bureau. Returning to England 
in October 1943, he was appointed by the Rajah to head the 
Sarawak section of the Borneo Planning Unit but resigned in 
protest against the Colonial Office's plans for post-war 
Sarawak. He was appointed a member of the Provisional 
Government in early 1945 and was dismissed with Anthony Brooke 
by the Rajah in October. In May 1946 he accompanied Bertram 
Brooke on his visit to Sarawak. See Chapter VI, pp. 268-71 
and Chapter VII, pp. 361-2.
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departmental controls introduced by Parnell and Calvert were relaxed, 
as were Boyd's strictures on magisterial procedure, so that 
Residents and District Officers could once more be free from the 
'interference' of Kuching bureaucrats. Furthermore, they were 
encouraged by Anthony to give their frank views on government 
policy as part of what he saw as a move towards decentralization.^
Andrew Macpherson, whom Anthony promoted to Secretary 
for Native Affairs, seemed to be the only person who could provide 
a reasoned defence of traditional Brooke policy. Macpherson's 
essential argument proceeded from the premise that Sarawak was an 
exception to the normal policy in British colonies of rapid development 
by means of foreign capital. Consequently, the social improvements 
possible in British colonies could only be paid for in Sarawak by 
means of loans, the exploitation of natural resources by foreign 
capital and the transfer of land from the natives for the benefit 
of foreign concessionaires who would then employ them as wage- 
labourers. In Macpherson's view, loans would create obligations 
threatening Sarawak's independence. Furthermore, natural resources 
should be conserved 'until they can be exploited for Sarawak's benefit 
and not for the benefit of shareholders sitting in England'. He 
believed that Sarawak's real strength lay with its smallholders.
It could not be said that the industrialization of peasant populations 
had been sufficiently successful anywhere to justify the introduction 
of a similar system in Sarawak.^
DURING his six months as Rajah Muda and Officer Administering the 
Government, Anthony Brooke had an opportunity to demonstrate how 
he would go about solving the problems facing the Brooke Raj. On 
the whole, his solutions were backwards-looking. His intervention 
in the Crossley case had been an opportunity to re-assert the 
traditional supremacy of the Administrative Service over the new 
power-accumulating bureaucracy and this policy was further pursued in 
his reversal of the few changes which had been made towards
1 Interview with Anthony Brooke, 25 February 1975.
2 MacphersonTs memorandum on Sir Shenton Thomas' notes, April 
1939, Brooke Papers, Box 13/1.
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administrative centralization. Another important initiative was 
the reduction of the post of Chief Justice to Judicial Commissioner 
and the reaffirmation of pragmatic standards of justice. These 
changes were in accordance with an almost romantically traditional 
view of Brooke government. 'The interests of the natives' were 
invoked without any real attempt to take account of international 
pressures for colonial reform and the opportunities for economic 
development. In early 1939 Anthony had seemed likely to become 
the fourth Rajah but there were few signs that he represented 
anything more than a re-assertion of Brooke authority. Brooke 
rule had run its course.
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CHAPTER III
MacBryan, the Brooke Succession and the 1941 Constitution
NOT only were the Brookes unable to respond positively to the 
administrative problems of the 1930s, they could not even resolve the 
question of the succession. Like so many other dynasties possessing 
autocratic power, schemes to limit the power of a successor or to 
disinherit him constitute a major theme in Brooke history.
The first Rajah had disinherited Brooke Brooke when his nephew 
objected to Sarawak being made the protectorate of a European power.
The second Rajah had wanted to disinherit Vyner but instead introduced 
a number of constitutional changes designed to keep him in check.
When Bertram, but not Vyner, fathered a male heir, dispute over the 
succession became almost inevitable. Vyner's own indecisiveness 
and unwillingness to do anything which would make enemies also helped 
to create a political vacuum within the autocratic system. Anthony 
Brooke had seemed certain to fill this vacuum eventually but his 
failure to win his uncle's confidence blighted his chances.
In a situation like this a rank outsider can often make 
a strong run. Such a dark horse was Gerard MacBryan, Vyner's talented 
Private Secretary, who vied with the senior bureaucrats of the 
Committee of Administration to manipulate the Rajah. While MacBryan 
and Sylvia Brooke conspired to alter the succession, the bureaucrats 
were anxious to trim the Rajah's powers and avoid a Colonial Office 
takeover. The Rajah himself wanted both to tie Anthony's hands 
should he succeed and to make long-term financial provision for 
himself and his family. The net result was the 1941 Constitution 
which established a limited monarchy.
1The Baron '
Gerard Truman Magill MacBryan was a key figure in the drama which 
brought an end to Brooke rule. The son of an eminent neurologist, 
MacBryan was born in 1901 and brought up at Kingsdown House, the private 
mental home which his father had purchased at Box, six miles outside
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Bath. His mother died in childbirth and when the doctor remarried,
Gerard formed a close relationship with his stepmother, a link which
was to isolate him from his two elder brothers. His father, a
2gentle autocrat, allowed him free reign around the home. Educated
at St Christopher's School (Bath) and Naish House (Burnham-on-Sea) he
entered Dartmouth Naval College in 1918 as naval cadet. Discharged
3after deliberately failing his test in navigation, he worked for a
shipping firm until the oppressive conditions of office life moved him
4to throw the manager's morning cup of tea in his face. He was then 
without any real career prospects and it was in these circumstances that 
an acquaintance of his father's suggested he should go to Sarawak.
Henry Deshon was a member of the Bath and Country Club to which 
Dr MacBryan also belonged and, like other retired Sarawak officers, 
was always on the look-out for likely young men who might do well in 
the Service. His sense of adventure aroused, Gerard travelled to London 
and succeeded in persuading an interviewing panel headed by Bertram 
Brooke that he would be 'good Sarawak material'. Thus it was that in 
July 1920 the nineteen year old MacBryan found himself on a tiny 
government steamer crawling around the Sarawak coast towards Limbang.
One of his shipboard companions was Mrs Nellie Boult, the wife of 
District Officer F.F. Boult whom MacBryan had been appointed to assist 
at Limbang after a few days' initial familiarization in Kuching. She 
found him a charming and exquisitely mannered young man, but very 
highly-strung. Indeed, she believed he was quite unbalanced: he had
told her of seeing 'an enormous ghost rise from the sea as he was taking 
his "watch" . . .' ~* Although he had expressed pleasure in being posted 
to a remote outstation and described himself as 'a bit of a naturalist',
1 Kingsdown House was one of the first privately licensed mental 
hospitals in England with fees which, in the first decade of 
this century, could not be afforded by the rich. It came into 
MacBryan's possession in 1937 and was closed before he sold it 
ten years later.
2 J.C.V. MacBryan to Margaret Noble, 2 March 1965, Brooke Papers, 
Box 12/9.
3 Interview with Mr J.C.W. MacBryan, November 1974.
4 Owen Rutter, Triumphant Pilgrimage_, London 1937, p.24.
5 Extracts from a diary kept by Mrs Boult, cited in her letter to 
Anne Bryant of 2 January 1938, Brooke Papers, Box 11/1.
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MacBryan's nervous temperament found the loneliness and isolation 
difficult to bear. 'We are rather worried about him', Nellie 
Boult wrote in her diary, 'he is a mass of nerves, sleeps with 
with windows and doors hermetically sealed and jumps at insects 
etc ...'^ Unable to sleep but afraid of missing his watches, he 
began taking bromide sedatives. The sympathetic Boults invited 
him to sleep in their own bungalow but were disillusioned to 
find later that he had said harsh things about them to the manager 
of the Brooketon colliery. By this time MacBryan had contracted 
both malaria and dysentery, necessitating visits to Labuan for 
treatment.
In March 1921 there occurred an event which was to have
a profound influence on the young cadet. A Malay prison escapee
called Junit bin Ongee murdered two Chinese at Lubok Pisang near
Limbang and was duly captured, sentenced to death and executed by
firing squad - the first execution which had taken place during
2Limbang's 31 years under Brooke rule. MacBryan was fearful of 
Junit escaping from the lock-up but at the same time he envied the 
peace of mind which the Islamic religion seemed to inspire in the 
murderer and the extraordinary influence which his claims to 
invulnerability and other superhuman powers gave him over the 
natives. He was also shocked by the crude nature of the public 
execution in which a chalk circle was described on the victim's 
chest for the benefit of the police marksmen.
Before the execution MacBryan announced that he could 
stand it no longer and asked Boult to have him transferred somewhere 
else. Mrs Boult noted in her diary:
... he is just a mass of nerves and full up with 
superstition. I believe he half believes the 
yams of the 'spirits' and supernatural things 
the natives tell him. This land is the worst of 
places for such a temperament I fear, unless he 
grows out of it but most boys don't fear anything;
1 Ibid.
2 SG3 1 June 1921; 1 July 1921; 1 September 1921. Until 1889
all official executions in Sarawak had been performed with the 
kris (Malay dagger) which was thrust down behind the victim's 
collar bone into the heart. 'Pieces from the Brooke Past - I', 
SG, 31 May 1964.
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it's men, after years, get nerves out here as a rule.^
Afterwards he was 'very wild and mad in his talk and manner' and it was 
a considerable relief to the Boults when he was appointed in July to 
Sibu.
Although MacBryan's nervousness had made him a difficult
subordinate, there was no doubt about his exceptional talents. A
brilliant linguist, he picked up Malay and other languages very quickly
and was to develop a wide knowledge of the customs of the various
2native peoples of Sarawak. However, the Junit affair caused him to 
identify more closely with the Malays with whom he spent much of his 
time. One of the accusations levelled against him by his fellow 
officers was that he preferred the company of Malays to that of 
Europeans and he would probably not have disputed this. In the late 
1920s, moreover, he took up with Sa'erah, an extremely attractive young 
Melanau divorcee who had earlier been involved with another European 
officer.^
In August 1922 MacBryan was appointed to Kapit and it was 
during his time there that the young cadet first came to the Rajah's 
notice. For a long time there had been bloody feuds between the 
Kayans, Kenyahs and Kajangs of the Apoi Kayan and Baloi Rivers and the 
Ibans of the Batang Rejang and Batang Ai. This trouble had broken 
out afresh in 1921 with the murder of 15 Ibans on the Iwan River and 
MacBryan conceived the ambitious notion of bringing the feud to an 
end by means of a peacemaking ceremony similar to the one held at 
Simanggang in 1920 between the Ibans of the upper Batang Lupar and those
1 Mrs Boult's diary, op. cit.
2 MacBryan also displayed a keen interest in Borneo history, something 
that may have been sparked off by the discovery during his time at 
Limbang of a Hindu ganesan figure suggesting early Indian contacts 
with the area. In late 1940 MacBryan returned to Limbang to carry 
out further excavations and it was during this time that he also 
obtained from Brunei a number of historical Malay documents in 
Arabic script which were deposited in the Sarawak Museum.
3 MacBryan told Rutter that he first met Sa'erah when she was helping 
her father weed the Rajah's rubber garden, then under MacBryan's 
supervision. Rutter, Triumphant Pilgrimage_, p.55. Sa'erah's 
mother was Melanau but there is some doubt as to whether her father 
was Iban or Malay.
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of the Skrang, Lemanak and Saribas rivers. Accordingly, he made the
gruelling 350 mile journey by paddled canoe to Long Nawang in Dutch
Borneo where with Dutch assistance he brought about an agreement.
When this was later upset by arguments over the arrangements he was
obliged to make another journey to Long Nawang, this time accompanied
by a number of Iban leaders. A preliminary peacemaking was made there
and the impressive final ceremony was held at Kapit in November 1924
2in the presence of the Rajah and Dutch officials. MacBryan's
diplomatic and linguistic skills had been largely responsible for the
3peacemaking and the Rajah appears to have been greatly impressed.
The young officer was subsequently transferred as Acting District 
Officer to Kuching where he acquired his first taste of court politics.
It may be useful at this point to provide some indication of 
how people outside the Sarawak Service saw MacBryan. Owen Rutter, a 
professional writer who later spent some time with him preparing a 
book on his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1936, was not the keenest judge 
of character but his descriptions reflect something of the man:
There is nothing particularly remarkable about him at 
first sight. He is tall and lean and rather shabby.
Dark-haired and pale, with long fingers, and a nose I 
always associate with King's Counsel: clear-cut and
pointed, not easy to deter. But those glittering blue 
eyes of his are the features that hold you: narrow
but very bright, restless but resolute, and curiously 
compelling. The eyes of a man who, once he knows what 
he wants, goes on until he gets it, no matter how much 
it costs him - or other people.1 234^
Like Nellie Boult, Rutter thought him 'an unsatisfied, jumpy creature'. 
He had the irritating effect of someone 'rummaging about in the 
drawers of a writing-table for a letter he had mislaid'.^ At the same
1 'The Peacemaking at Simanggang', SG3 1 September 1920.
2 G.T.M. MacBryan, 'Peacemaking at Kapit', SG3 1 December 1924. It 
must be emphasized that these peacemaking ceremonies were a Brooke 
invention with no basis in traditional Iban culture. Pringle,
Rajahs and Rebels3 p.239. Penghulu Gerinang of the Balleh who 
attended the 1924 Kapit ceremony told Pringle in 1965 that 'before 
the Rajah came there were no peacemakings'. p.32n.
3 Col. C.M. Lane, 'Report on Mr. G.T. McBryan', Brooke Papers, Box 2/3. 
For MacBryan's first introduction to the Rajah and the Ranee, see 
Sylvia Brooke, Queen of the Headhunters ...3 pp.124-5.
4 Rutter, Triumphant Pilgrimage3 p.ll.
Ibid., pp.11-12.5
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time, however, he possessed an easy diffidence and a disarming laugh 
which many people found extremely charming.
MacBryan took his first leave in England in 1926 and it was 
during this time that he decided to resign and join the British and 
American Tobacco Company in their Singapore office. But the new job was 
not to his liking and in 1927 he was back in Kuching hoping to rejoin 
the Service. The Rajah agreed and MacBryan went to work in the 
Secretariat where one of his first tasks was to edit the Sarawak 
Gazette and the Sarawak Government Gazette. From this point, MacBryan's 
rise within the Administrative Service was meteoric. By August of that 
year he was Acting Assistant Secretary and a year later the Rajah 
appointed him Private Secretary and Secretary for Native Affairs.
As we have already seen, the period of• MacBryan's rapid rise to power 
coincided with the 'purge' of a number of senior officers including the 
Chief Secretary, H.B. Crocker.'*' When it was announced by the Rajah 
on Crocker's departure that he would himself assume the Chief 
Secretary's duties, the general belief within the Service was that 
the administration was now effectively in MacBryan's hands. There is no 
evidence to demonstrate that he had masterminded the 'purge' but in 
the light of his position of power and aptitude for intrigue it seems 
extremely likely that he did.
It was widely believed within the Administrative Service 
that MacBryan's enormous influence over the Rajah was the result of 
some kind of blackmail. Some spoke of him as if he were the Sarawak 
equivalent of Rasputin and others called him 'Jew Suss' after a character 
in a popular novel of the day. Certainly, the Rajah was reputed to 
have conducted affairs with two or three of his officers' wives. But 
he made no attempt to disguise this and to those who knew him well it 
was inconceivable that he could be blackmailed on such an account. He 
simply didn't care. The new Private Secretary's influence must rather 
be seen in terms of his exceptional qualities and the Rajah's fundamental 
weaknesses as a ruler.
MacBryan was a man of considerable talent with an intelligence
1 Chapter II, p.31.
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superior to that of most other officers and he was bound to have been 
successful within any bureaucratic system. More importantly, he was a 
skilful politician and a shrewd judge of character. He seems to have 
had the knack of knowing how the Rajah’s mind worked and of suggesting 
courses of action in such a way that the Rajah could think of them as 
stemming from his own initiative. Furthermore, he was decisive enough 
to act upon them. In other words, MacBryan was capable of doing the 
Rajah's thinking and decision making for him, a quality which Vyner 
Brooke found extremely useful at times. But there were other qualities 
which are important if we are to have any deeper understanding of the 
relationship between the two men. In her autobiography, Mrs Averil Le 
Gros Clark provided an important clue to the Rajah's character. In 
order to explain his sometimes 'baffling' behaviour she recalled 
Disraeli's Lord Monmouth who
... saw through everybody and everything; and when 
he had detected their purpose, discovered their 
weakness or their vileness, he calculated whether 
they could contribute to his pleasure or his 
convenience in a degree which counter-balanced 
the objections which might be urged against their 
intentions, or their less pleasing and profitable 
qualities. To be pleased was always a principal object 
with Lord Monmouth.^-
MacBryan's devious cunning fascinated the Rajah. He was
diverted by the effort of following the twists and turns of a man who
was ultimately limited by the length of rope allowed him. Furthermore,
promoting MacBryan to a high position in the Secretariat was like setting
a cat among pigeons - an entertainment dear to the Rajah's heart. 'I
know MacBryan is a complete crook', he once told a friend, 'but he
amuses me. I enjoy watching him and trying to work out his next 
2move'. A skilful raconteur and cruel wit, the Private Secretary also 
filled the role of court jester and was known to the Rajah and Ranee 
as 'The Baron' after the legendary German story-teller, Baron Von 
Munchausen. Altogether he was an entertaining companion for the
1 Averil Mackenzie-Grieve, Time and Chance_, London 1970, p.98.
2 [Margaret Noble], 'Some Notes on Sarawak (for Mr Drewe, in 
confidence)', Brooke Papers, Box 12/13. This document was 
prepared under parliamentary privilege.
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Rajah who was easily bored with Sarawak and the responsibilities of 
everyday administration.
MacBryan's whole style was that of the born intriguer: 
his instinct was to reach the desired objective by the most circuitous 
route possible. It was even said that at parties he would disappear 
through one door, walk around the house, and reappear at another 
door in order to create an effect. To the Tuan Muda, who could 
never forget that he had been on the interviewing panel which had 
originally accepted him as a cadet, MacBryan was a compulsive 
schemer. 'I hold no feelings of personal animosity towards MacBryan’, 
he told the Rajah in 1943, 'who can't help indulging in scheming 
and meddling and political jugglery any more than people can help 
having a clubfoot or arthritis, or some other disability'."*"
MacBryan was a complex character who will inevitably interest the 
student of Sarawak history. The fundamental point, however, is that 
in an autocractic system someone more or less like MacBryan was 
bound to appear, particularly when the autocrat declined 
responsibility. In Malay courts there had been a well-established 
tradition of saudagar raja (King's merchants) of Armenian, Indian or 
Portuguese mestico origin and possessing linguistic and business 
skills.^
It was during his years in Kuching that MacBryan became
involved in a plan to alter the succession in favour of the female
line. His malicious wit and exaggerated manner, together with his
genius for conspiracy, endeared him to the Ranee who enlisted his
assistance in her scheme to have her eldest daughter, Leonora,
declared the Rajah's successor. MacBryan even hoped to marry into
3the Brooke family as a means of securing power for himself - not 
necessarily as Rajah but as the power behind the throne. At any rate, 
he made some effort to persuade the datus to agree to a female 
ruler. Female succession was not unknown in Brunei history. There
1 Bertram Brooke to Vyner Brooke, 26 January 1943, Brooke Papers, 
Box 2/3.
2 I am indebted to Dr Leonard Andaya for information on this 
point.
3 See below, p.78.
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was a tradition that an Arab, Sharif Ali Bilfakih, had become
the third Sultan of Brunei by marrying the second Sultan’s daughter^
and that when another Sultan died in the late sixteenth century
2without a male heir, he was succeeded by his daughter. The problem
3for MacBryan was that Abang Haji Abdillah, the Datu Bandar and head 
of Sarawak’s Malay community, was adamantly opposed to the idea and 
the only solution was to 'pack' the Supreme Council so that his 
influence could be overcome.
In 1928 MacBryan recommended that the Rajah should appoint 
a number of new datus, at the same time promoting the Datu Bandar 
to Datu Shahbandar and conferring some form of honour on Ong
1 Amin Sweeney, 'Silsilah Raja-raja Berunai', JMBRAS_, Vol.41, Pt.2 
(December 1968), p.45.
2 Ming Shih, Book 325, in W.P. Groenveldt, Historical Notes on 
Indonesia and Malaya comp, from Chinese Sources, Jakarta 1960, p.114. 
However, Professor Hsu yun-ts’iao, the principal authority on 
Chinese texts on southeast Asia, believes that this is almost 
certainly a reference to Patani, mistakenly attributed to Brunei
by the compilers of the Ming Shih. Personal communication from 
Mr Robert Nicholl, 29 September 1976. There were also precedents 
in Aceh (north Sumatra) where there had been four female rulers 
during the seventeenth century and in Perak where only a daughter 
was left to succeed and her husband became the ruler. I am grateful 
to Dr Leonard Andaya for information on this point.
3 Abang Haji Abdillah was the son of the Datu Bandar, Abang Mohd. 
Kassim, who died in 1921. Born in 1862, he was the first Malay 
to study English at St Thomas’ School and later taught at his 
father's school at Kampong Jawa. He then worked as a surveyor for 
the Lands Department and as an overseer of the Public Works 
Department quarry before joining the police. Appointed Datu Bandar 
Muda in 1921, he was made Datu Bandar in 1924 at the age of 62
and Datu Shahbandar in 1968. In 1937 the title of Datu Patinggi was 
revived and conferred on him. After serving as a figurehead 
for the first phase of the anti-cession movement, he died on 21 
November 1946 at the age of 83. See Chapters VII, VIII and Plates IV 
and XIII.
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Tiang Swee, the head of the Hokkien community and senior kapitan
china of Sarawak since 1889. Accordingly, on the Rajah’s birthday
2that year Abang Haji Suleiman was appointed Datu Amar and Mohd.
Zin became Datu Menteri. At the same time, Ong Tiang Swee became 
the first Companion of the Most Excellent Order of the Star of
3Sarawak (devised by Stirling Boyd) and Abang Haji Abdillah became 
Datu Shahbandar. In the following year, Haji Hashim was appointed to 
the new position of Datu Bentara.
All this spelled a radical departure from the Brooke 
practice of appointing Malay aristocrats descended from the datus 
whom James Brooke had rehabilitated after their rebellion against Brunei. 
Haji Hashim was not a member of the perabangan. In fact he 
belonged to the old nakhoda (merchant) class which had almost 
disappeared by the first decade of the century due to Chinese
4competition and the Brookes’ policy of discouraging Malays from trade.
His fleet of schooners shipped rubber and other produce to 
Singapore and his building company had won a number of government 
contracts. One of the wealthiest Malays in Kuching, he was
1 Born in Kuching in 1864, Ong Tiang Swee entered his father's 
firm (Ong Ewe Hai and Co) in 1882. He became a director
of the Sarawak and Singapore Steamship Co in 1887 and 
chairman in 1919. Ong was a member of the Chinese Chambers 
of Commerce from 1887 and was later elected chairman. From 
1914 he was chairman of the Sarawak Farms Syndicate which 
held the monopoly of opium and gambling. He also headed the 
special Chinese Court established in 1911 and was a member 
of the Board of Trade. During the First World War he was a 
member of the Food Control Committee and collected money 
for various war charities. He died in 1950. See A.M. 
Cooper, Men of Sarawak3 Kuala Lumpur 1968, pp.59-64.
2 Abang Suleiman bin Haji Taha became an apprentice in the 
Lands Office in 1891 and was later transferred to the 
Public Works Department and the Municipal Department, 
returning to the Lands Office in 1920. In 1924 he was made 
Assistant Land Officer and in 1933 retired on pension.
3 Boyd to Mrs Boyd, 24 September 1928, Boyd Papers, Box 2/1.
4 C.A. Lockard, The Southeast Asian Town in Perspective: A 
Social History of Kuchina, Malaysia, 1820-1970, Ann Arbor 
1974, pp,130-42, 176-7.
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also illiterate and lacked the respectability traditionally
associated with the office.^- Abang Suleiman had for many years been
a clerk in the Lands Office and Enche Mohd. Zin was a commoner who
would never have aspired to a datuship, although he had been a
2member of the Supreme Council since 1907.
It appears that MacBryan’s real purpose in securing the new
appointments was to get up a petition asking the Rajah to alter the
3succession in favour of Leonora and her descendants, thinking that
he could count on the support of the new datus who owed their
positions to his influence with the Rajah. But the Datu Shahbandar's
opposition proved to be too powerful and the petition had to be dropped
before it could even be put to the Rajah. The antagonisms which had
been created were to divide the Kuching datus as long as the main
protagonists remained alive, but while the Rajah later blamed MacBryan
for this it seems quite likely that he was playing his own game.
Abang Haji Abdillah's prestige and influence was substantial and it
probably suited the Rajah to create new datus who could be played off
against him. Abang Suleiman had eloped with Abang Haji Abdillah's
sister some years earlier and to appoint him Datu Amar was, in the4words of one officer, 'to divide and rule'.
MacBryan went to London with the Rajah in March 1930 and 
in June he attended the Colonial Office conference as Sarawak's 
official observer. It was at this meeting that he announced the 
Rajah's decision to give £25,000 towards the Imperial Forestry Institute 
and a further £75,000 towards a scheme which would provide scholarships 
for children of members of the Colonial Service, later to be known
1 He was often referred to as 'Datu Babi' because of his liking 
for pork. Haji Hashim and Mohd. Zin were both tua kampong.
2 Mohd. Zin joined government service as a schoolteacher in 1890 
and taught at the Kampong Gersik school until 1907 when he was 
made tuah kampong and appointed to the Supreme Council. He 
also became a member of the Council Negri in 1909. His beautiful 
daughter, Dayang Haji Renayah, had found favour with MacBryan who 
was responsible for her receiving land and jewels. Mohd. Zin and 
Abang Suleiman were friendly with MacBryan.
3 Notes by Bertram Brooke on Vyner Brooke's letter to Shenton Thomas, 
19 February 1937, Brooke Papers, Box 10/1; Interview with Sir 
Dennis White, 22 January 1975.
4 Personal communication from Mr E. Banks, 7 July 1975.
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as the Rajah of Sarawak Fund. In August MacBryan resigned from 
his position as Secretary for Native Affairs and was transferred to 
the staff of the Sarawak Government Office as Private Secretary to 
the Rajah. Shortly afterwards he left the Service.
Why he should have resigned after such a meteoric rise is
not absolutely clear but there are three possible explanations.
In the first place, he had aroused a great deal of resentment among
other senior members of the Administrative Service who were also
somewhat fearful of his influence over Vyner. There even appears
to have been an informal petition to the Rajah not to allow him 
2to return. Secondly, he had passionately courted the Tuan Muda's
daughter, Anne, even threatening to commit suicide unless she agreed
3to marry him secretly. Bertram had no sooner learnt of this than 
he was approached by a deputation of datus, headed by the Datu 
Shahbandar, complaining about MacBryan's interference in native
4affairs and requesting that he should not be allowed to return.
When the Rajah came to know about MacBryan's intrigues he decided 
not to allow him back. Such at least was his official explanation 
to the British Agent for deporting MacBryan in 1936."*
1 Originally the Rajah had informed the Governor in Singapore 
that he wished to give £100,000 to Imperial Funds. When it was 
suggested that the money could be spent on the Singapore naval 
base, he was concerned about what the Labour government might 
think and asked the Governor for his advice. Stirling Boyd believed 
that the Rajah possessed ulterior motives and suspected that he
was angling for an earldom. Given the Rajah's attitude to such 
honours, however, it seems unlikely. He probably saw the 
£100,000 as a guarantee of the British government's goodwill. 
Stirling Boyd to Mrs Boyd, 3 October 1929, Boyd Papers, Box 2/1.
For the subsequent history of the Fund, see Chapter VI, p.
2 'Report on Mr. G.T. McBryan'.
3 Mrs A.H. Noble, 'Some Notes on Sarawak ...' In a 1947 memorandum 
Eva MacBryan noted that MacBryan had imagined himself to be in 
love with Anne Brooke, but later decided that 'ambition was at 
all times at the root of his desire for that lady'.
4 Notes by Lady Anne Bryant, November 1976. Personal communication.
5 Vyner Brooke to Shenton Thomas, 19 February 1937, CO 531/27 
[53034].
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In  e a r l y  1931 MacBryan a r r i v e d  i n  A u s t r a l i a  i n t e n t  on
making h i s  f o r t u n e  from m in ing  i n  t h e  N o r t h e r n  T e r r i t o r y .  For  abou t
t w e lv e  months he p r o s p e c t e d  i n  t h e  A l i c e  S p r in g s  a r e a  b u t  canno t
have had  much s u c c e s s  b e c a u s e  by e a r l y  1932 he  was i n  Melbourne ,
d e s t i t u t e .  However ,  i n  A d e l a i d e  i n  Sep tem ber  1931 he had met Eva
C o l l i n s ,  t h e  d a u g h t e r  o f  a w e a l t h y  s q u a t t i n g  f a m i l y ,  and he w r o t e
a s k i n g  h e r  to  mar ry  him.  S h o r t l y  a f t e r w a r d s  she  was i n fo rm e d  t h a t
he was i l l  and a r r i v i n g  i n  Melbourne  found him i n  ’ a p i t i a b l e  s t a t e ’ .
He had s u f f e r e d  a n e r v o u s  breakdown.  Eva to o k  him ba c k  t o  South
A u s t r a l i a  t o  c o n v a l e s c e  and t h e y  were  m a r r i e d  a t  B a l l a r a t  i n  V i c t o r i a  
2
i n  May 1932.  I m m e d ia te ly  a f t e r w a r d s  t h e y  l e f t  f o r  Eng land  where
MacBryan worked f o r  h i s  s t o c k b r o k e r  b r o t h e r  on a commission b a s i s ,
a t  t h e  same t im e  k e e p in g  a b r e a s t  o f  Sarawak a f f a i r s  t h r o u g h  l e t t e r s .
In  1935 Eva had t o  v i s i t  A u s t r a l i a  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  h e r  f a t h e r ’ s
e s t a t e  and two weeks b e f o r e  h e r  d e p a r t u r e  G era rd  a t t e n d e d  a p a r t y  f o r
th e  Ra jah and Ranee who were  a b o u t  t o  l e a v e  f o r  Sarawak.  The Rajah
d e c l i n e d  h i s  r e q u e s t  t o  r e j o i n  t h e  S e r v i c e  b u t  i n v i t e d  him to
s t a y  w i t h  them i n  Sarawak and he  a g r e e d  t o  accompany t h e  Ranee on h e r
f i r s t  j o u r n e y  t o  S i n g a p o r e  by a i r .  A c c o r d in g  t o  t h e  R a j a h ,n o  s o o n e r
had MacBryan a r r i v e d  i n  Kuching t h a n  he renewed h i s  r e q u e s t  t o  r e j o i n
t h e  S e r v i c e  and when t h i s  was r e f u s e d  began  r e v i v i n g  t h e  i n t r i g u e s
3
i n  wh ich  he had been  i n v o l v e d  e a r l i e r .  A few days b e f o r e  he was 
due t o  l e a v e  f o r  A u s t r a l i a  he announced  t o  t h e  s u r p r i s e d  and 
d i s b e l i e v i n g  g u e s t s  a t  a Sarawak Club f a r e w e l l  t h a t  he was a bou t  
t o  be  c o n v e r t e d  t o  I s l a m  and would make t h e  h a j  ( p i l g r i m a g e  t o  Mecca) 
w i t h  S a ’e r a h  whom he  i n t e n d e d  t o  marry  i n  S i n g a p o r e .  B e fo re  l e a v i n g  
Sarawak he gave t h e  Ranee a w r i t t e n  p ro m is e  t h a t  he would n e v e r  
r e t u r n . ^
The s t o r y  o f  MacBryan ' s  h a j  i s  n o t  t h e  concern  o f  t h i s  
s t u d y ,  b u t  i t  s h o u l d  be n o t e d  t h a t  i n  1935 i t  was e x t r e m e l y  u n u s u a l  
f o r  a European  t o  embrace I s l a m  and t h e  j o u r n e y  t o  Mecca was an 
e n t e r p r i s e  f r a u g h t  w i t h  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and d a n g e r s .  MacBryan ' s  own
1 Eva MacBryan, op .  c i t .
2 SG3 1 August  1932.
3 Vyner  Brooke t o  Shen ton  Thomas, 19 F e b r u a r y  1937,  CO 531/27  
[53034] .
4 I b i d .
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account, as told to the author Owen Rutter in Triumphant Pilgrimage 
is no doubt a romanticized and dramatized version of what happened 
and one eminent English Muslim scholar even suggested in a review 
that MacBryan did not reach Mecca.^ Beyond the genuine desire for 
adventure, however, there were more serious motives. MacBryan, as 
we have seen, had been interested in Islam ever since his arrival 
in Sarawak. And the idea that conversion to Islam might enable him 
to build up a political empire reaching out from Borneo seems always 
to have attracted him. The problem of the succession to the Raj 
was still unsolved and he seems to have envisaged the possibility 
of establishing himself as a Muslim Rajah with the support of the 
datus. In April 1936 MacBryan was back in Singapore announcing that 
he intended returning to Sarawak to organize a company for the 
promotion of pilgrimages.
Vyner refused to allow him into Sarawak and invoked the
recently enacted Undesirable Persons Order to prevent him from 
2landing. A warning was conveyed to MacBryan through Sir Shenton 
Thomas but on 4 May he arrived at Pending aboard the 'Rajah Brooke' 
and was immediately arrested and detained. Two days later when he 
was interviewed by the Assistant Chief Secretary, Nigel Hughes, 
MacBryan gave him a letter to the Rajah revealing that his reason 
for returning was to re-join the Service:
If only I could get "back to the fold" I would 
willingly be prepared to accept a salary of $200 
a month and would happily go to anywhere at all 
you might send me and do exactly and precisely 
what I am told.^
1 Personal communication from Mrs Margaret Noble, 22 September 1976. 
Triumphant Pilgrimage was also subjected to a caustic review in 
the Sarawak Gazette of 1 September 1937 and MacBryan for some 
time threatened to sue for libel. David Chale, the central 
character in Rutter's book, is clearly MacBryan, while his female 
companion Munirah is Sa'erah.
2 Order No. U-l (Undesirable Persons), 1935. Anthony Brooke was 
banned from Sarawak by the colonial government in December 1946 
under the same Order.
3 MacBryan to Vyner Brooke, 6 May 1936, CO 531/27 
[53034].
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But Vyner remained adamant, partly no doubt on the insistence of 
his senior officers, and when the two men met again in London a 
month later MacBryan promised once more that he would never attempt 
to return:
I enter into this solemn and binding obligation of 
my own freewill and accord and furthermore I undertake to 
refrain from conducting correspondence with everybody 
living in Sarawak, either Native or European, which 
relates to affairs of other than a strictly personal 
character. And further I also undertake to refrain 
from writing in books, journals or letter anything which 
is in any way detrimental to the interests of yourself 
or Sarawak and which is calculated to disturb or  ^
confound the public policy of the Raj of Sarawak.
In return, Vyner undertook to clear MacBryan's name of any stigma
2in Sarawak and Singapore and agreed that MacBryan could make 
arrangements for Sa’erah to leave Sarawak and join him wherever he 
happened tobe. This concession was significant because MacBryan 
saw in Sa'erah his passport to Sarawak at some future time.
In a letter to MacBryan from Kuching in December 1936 the 
Ranee indicated very clearly that it was his extraordinary political 
ambition which had resulted in the Rajah's tough line:
If you had played your cards my way you might 
be here now living at Bedil. As it is, you 
trusted the Malays a little too much. You 
believed they wanted a leader other than the 
Rajah. You wanted a Mahommedan country with a 
Mahommedan ruler. The Malays might have followed 
you Baron had you been fabulously rich. As it 
is they sit on their hams and see what happens.
Unfortunately for you they did not wait silently - 
they talked. And their talk hasn't helped you 
towards your ultimate desire. Besides, you 
yourself in all that you have written and signed 
have made it impossible for you to^come out here 
again during the Rajah's lifetime.
Unfortunately Sylvia did not reveal what her advice to him had been 
but presumably she had warned him earlier that he should postpone
1 MacBryan to Vyner Brooke, 24 June 1936, ibid.
2 Vyner Brooke to MacBryan, 26 June 1936, ibid.
3 Sylvia Brooke to MacBryan, 29 December 1936, ibid. 'Bedil' was 
the fine house which MacBryan had built across the river not 
far from the Astana.
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any plan until the Rajah was out of the way. She may have been 
thinking that it was still possible to set up Leonora as regent for 
her young grandson with MacBryan as a guiding eminence who would 
also have the support of the Malays.
Shortly after this, MacBryan wrote to the Colonial Office“*“ 
complaining about his banning and seeking an interview. He later 
forwarded a copy of the Ranee’s letter as evidence of his claim 
that she was the source of his difficulty and asked that it be 
shown to the Secretary of State:
My friends in Sarawak, including Government officials, 
and I myself cannot but feel that the underlying cause 
... is the influence of the Ranee whose treatment of me 
has been most capricious, alternating between 
affection and abuse. Among her obsessions is that I 
am too intimate with the Malays and am in some way 
plotting against her interests. This idea is not only 
a fallacy but is quite fantastic to the knowledge of 
all responsible officials in Sarawak.^
The question was referred to Sir Shenton Thomas who in turn informed
3the Rajah and an official report was made by the Sarawak government. 
In a covering letter to the Governor, the Rajah stressed that he 
did not feel obliged to justify his action, but apart from all the 
other reasons
... it would be quite impossible in a small place 
like Kuching to have a European ex-Government 
officer recently converted to Islam cohabiting 
openly with a Malay woman of known bad character.
In 1935 MacBryan was still married, and since both 
he and the Malay woman were Hajis, to have 
tolerated such a state of affairs would have been 
to run a grave risk of outraging local Mohammedan 
opinion.^
Although the Colonial Office found the case intriguing, there
was clearly no possibility of the Secretary of State intervening and
in May 1937 MacBryan withdrew his complaint.
1 MacBryan to Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 6 January 1937, 
ibid.
2 MacBryan to H.R. Cowell, 25 January 1937, ibid.
3 [W.F. Dick], 'Memorandum on Mr G.T.M. MacBryan’s letter to
the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated January 6th, 1937’, 
ibid.
4 Vyner Brooke to Shenton Thomas, 19 February 1937, ibid.
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The problem of the succession had remained quietly in 
the background from MacBryan's departure in early 1930 until 1933 
when Leonora Brooke married Kenneth Mackay, the second Earl of 
Inchcape. It was about this time that the Ranee told a London 
newspaper that the Rajah had disinherited the Tuan Muda in favour 
of Leonora and a reporter was sent to question Ranee Margaret who 
was then living in retirement in Cornwall. Although the grand old 
lady was able to brush off the story as so much nonsense at that 
time, it assumed a different complexion when Leonora became pregnant 
and there was a prospect of her producing a rival heir. A week 
before Leonora gave birth to Simon Brooke Mackay, Ranee Margaret 
became so concerned that she wrote to Sir Frederick Ponsonby, 
private secretary to Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald. As well as 
the incident with the newspaper, she recalled a conversation between 
King George V and Vyner when the former conferred on him the GCMG 
in 1927. 'The King asked the Rajah if he had any heirs. "Only 
daughters, Sir", my son said. "Never mind", His Majesty replied, 
half in joke, I suppose, "I will make her Begum!"'^ Ranee Margaret 
told Ponsonby that this had raised Sylvia's ambitions to 'boiling 
point' and that she had become absolutely determined to influence the 
succession in favour of Leonora. For example, she had even succeeded 
in persuading Vyner not to allow Anthony, who was already 22, to go 
out to Sarawak.
It is not clear whether Ranee Margaret was offered any 
reassurance that the British government would insist on observance 
of the succession as laid down in the wills of the first two Rajahs, 
but the matter had been raised in the previous year at official 
level - no doubt in response to what Sylvia had told the newspaper.
In a letter dated 1 March 1933 the Secretary of State for Colonies, 
Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, told the Rajah that he had heard he 
was contemplating some changes in the succession. He pointed out 
that under the terms of the 1888 Treaty, 'the question as to 
the right of succession must be referred to H.M. Government for 
decision' and expressed the hope that the Rajah would consult him
1 Margaret Brooke to Ponsonby, 21 March 1934, Brooke Papers, 
Box 12/1.
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fully before there was any public discussion on the subject. 
Although the Rajah replied through the Sarawak Government Office 
that the story was ’absolutely false', the Colonial Office no 
doubt remained suspicious.
The demotion of Anthony Brooke
Ranee Sylvia's hopes of Leonora or her son succeeding the Rajah were
raised to new heights by her nephew's dramatic demotion in January
1940 after six months as Rajah Muda and Officer Administering the
Government. Ten days after the Rajah's return to Sarawak in October
1939 Anthony left for Singapore, and it was there, en route for his
wedding in Rangoon, that he received a cable from the Rajah asking
for information about the furniture which had been ordered for
Pepys' residence. A second cable stated that neither the Chief
Secretary nor the Committee of Administration knew anything about
2the furniture and that the order was to be cancelled. The importance 
which the Rajah attached to the matter can be seen from a letter which 
he wrote to Anthony shortly afterwards:
I have read your letter in the file to Pepys 
regarding furniture ... and again, I notice, 
you have been extraordinarily generous where 
Government money is concerned. This is the 
second time. As you have already given your 
assurance in writing that you will not meddle 
in Treasury matters again ... and that the 
furniture on order is now countermanded, I 
will say no more.^
On 7 November he cabled Anthony that special leave had been granted 
for him to return to England for his honeymoon and although Bertram 
advised that this was undesirable, the Rajah was insistent. He 
evidently hoped that Anthony would take the opportunity while in 
England to enlist.
1 Copy of an anonymous, undated Colonial Office minute, ref. no. 
53066/41, Brooke Papers, Box 2/3.
2 Vyner Brooke to Anthony Brooke 29 and 30 October 1939, Enclosures 
1 and 2, Appendix, 'The Abolition of the Title of Rajah Muda ...', 
Brooke Papers, Box 2/2.
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I n  a  l e t t e r  t o  B e r t r a m  w r i t t e n  s h o r t l y  a f t e r  A n th o n y ' s  
d e p a r t u r e ,  Vyner  e x p r e s s e d  h i s  d i s a p p o i n t m e n t  w i t h  what  had 
happened .  He had  l e f t  Sarawak ,  he  s a i d ,  h o p in g  t h a t  a l l  t h e  
t e n s i o n s  o f  p r e v i o u s  y e a r s  had  been  ended and t h a t  Anthony had 
' g o t  t h e  S e r v i c e  b e h i n d  him t o  a man'  t h r o u g h  h i s  cou ra g e o u s  a c t i o n  
a g a i n s t  t h e  Committee  o f  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  'Noone c o u ld  have  s t a r t e d  
o f f  u n d e r  f a i r e r  a u s p i c e s  t h a n  P e t e r  d i d ' , t h e  Ra jah  w r o t e ,  ' b u t  
I  come ba c k  t o  f i n d  e v e r y t h i n g  c h a n g e d ' . ^ He blamed h i m s e l f  f o r  
p u t t i n g  too  much power i n  h i s  n e p h e w 's  i n e x p e r i e n c e d  hands  and 
l a t e r  t o l d  Anthony t h a t  wha t  he now e n v i s a g e d  was a t a k e o v e r  by t h e  
B r i t i s h  go v e rn m e n t .^
By 11 J a n u a r y  t h e  R a j a h ,  a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i t h
A r c h e r ,  had d e c i d e d  t o  remove A n t h o n y ' s  t i t l e  and i t  was p r o b a b l y
Arche r  who d r a f t e d  t h e  P r o c l a m a t i o n  o f  17 J a n u a r y  which s t a t e d  t h a t
Anthony was ' n o t  y e t  f i t t e d  t o  e x e r c i s e  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f
3
t h i s  h i g h  p o s i t i o n ' . The ' y e t '  was a p p a r e n t l y  a f a c e - s a v e r
i n s i s t e d  upon by H. T h a c k w e l l  Lewis ,  who had s u c c e e d e d  S t i r l i n g
Boyd as  J u d i c i a l  Commiss ioner  , and was t h e n  s e n t  t o  S i n g a p o re  to
e x p l a i n  to  t h e  Governor  a s  b e s t  he c o u ld  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  R a j a h ' s
a c t i o n .  I n  t h e  m ean t im e ,  A r c h e r  w r o t e  t o  t h e  f i v e  R e s i d e n t s
i n f o r m i n g  them o f  t h e  P r o c l a m a t i o n  and s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e y  s h o u ld
d i s p e l l  any m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  among t h e  C h i n e s e ,  t h a t
4
A n t h o n y ' s  t i t l e  had  made him h e i r  t o  t h e  R a j .
Anthony had t o l d  h i s  u n c l e  i n  December t h a t  he would 
spend  C h r i s tm a s  i n  E u rope .  On 29 J a n u a r y  he and K a t h l e e n  a r r i v e d  
i n  Athens where  Gladys Brooke  had been  l i v i n g  f o r  some t ime  and i t  
was t h e r e  t h a t  he  l e a r n e d  from a bevy  o f  a w a i t i n g  new spape r  r e p o r t e r s  
o f  t h e  P r o c l a m a t i o n  o f  17 J a n u a r y .  H is  im m edia te  r e s p o n s e  was
1 C i t e d  by B e r t r a m  Brooke i n  h i s  l e t t e r  t o  Gladys Brooke ,
31 J a n u a r y  1940,  E n c l o s u r e  7a ,  i b i d .
2 Vyner  Brooke t o  Anthony Brooke ,  21 December 1939,  c i t e d  by 
Anthony Brooke i n  h i s  l e t t e r  t o  Vyner  Brooke ,  23 F e b r u a r y  1940,  
E n c l o s u r e  16 ,  i b i d .  See C h a p te r  IV,  p . 1 6 7 .
3 E n c l o s u r e  10c ,  i b i d ;  MacBryan t o  B e r t r a m  B rooke ,  14 J u l y  1943,  
Brooke P a p e r s ,  Box 2 / 3 .
4 A r c h e r  t o  M acpherson,  C u t f i e l d ,  Aikman, Daubeny and P o l l a r d ,
11 J a n u a r y  1940,  E n c l o s u r e  10b ,  'The  A b o l i t i o n  o f  t h e  T i t l e  of  
Raj ah Muda . . . '
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to cable the Rajah for an official explanation, only to be told in 
reply that ’your Daddy will explain everything'.  ^ But in a later 
letter the Rajah repeated the judgement which he had made public 
in the Proclamation:
What it all comes down to, Peter, is that you 
are not fitted for the position. I don't say 
this from any feeling of jealousy, vidictiveness 
[sic], or anything of that kind, as I was quite 
ready to resign, at no distant date, and give 
over to you. But this would now be impossible.
Rumours of my impending resignation have got 
about the place and I have stacks of petitions from 
everyone asking me to stay as long as I possibly 
can, to which I have consented.2
He told Anthony that although Sir Shenton Thomas regarded the
Proclamation as 'libellous', he had the support of the entire
Service and the Chinese. He regretted the publicity caused by the
Proclamation but felt that the phrase 'as yet unfitted to rule' to
which Anthony had taken such strong exception 'exactly hits the
nail on the head'. Finally, he hoped that Anthony would return to
Sarawak, work his way up in the Service and 'regain the position
3of trust and honour you once held'.
Explaining the Rajah's action to Gladys Brooke,
Bertram was inclined to sympathize with him:
... He hasn't done it just for fun. He is 
fearfully perturbed by the idea that Peter, 
with what amounts to a Dictator's powers, 
even temporarily, might suddenly see fit to 
use them as a Dictator in some way (with the 
best intentions) which might be injurious to 
the State, or antagonise those with whom he 
is working ...^
Bertram's advice to his son was 'least said, best mended' but 
Anthony had been deeply wounded by the Proclamation and subsequent
1 Vyner Brooke to Anthony Brooke, 2 February 1940, Enclosure 4, ibid.
2 Vyner Brooke to Anthony Brooke, 2 February 1940, Enclosure 15, ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Bertram Brooke to Gladys Brooke, 31 January 1940,
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newspaper headlines and was determined to have the matter thrashed
out, particularly in view of the fact that the Rajah was due to
make his triennial speech to the Council Negri in late March. From
his mother’s apartment in Athens he poured out a veritable stream of
letters to his father, the Rajah, the Chief Secretary and Sir
Shenton Thomas. Since he could not return to Sarawak until the
matter had been cleared up, he hoped that it would be possible to
fly to Singapore to receive from Sir Shenton 'an authorised
explanation for the Rajah's action'.^ The Governor discouraged
him from this, explaining that he regarded the matter as a personal
2one between Anthony and his uncle. But he had already taken the
initiative of writing a strong letter to the Rajah protesting at
the wording of the Proclamation and vigorously defending Anthony
against the insubstantial charges which had been conveyed to him
3through Thackwell Lewis.
Eventually, however, Bertram was able to bring about
a kind of truce between uncle and nephew. He apparently advised
Anthony to write to Vyner asking about the conditions on which he
would be allowed to return to Sarawak and Vyner expressed his
willingness to meet him in England in June where they could
4discuss the whole question. Although they did not in fact meet, 
it was agreed that Anthony would return to Sarawak in early 1941 as 
a District Officer. While he was pleased with this arrangement, the 
Rajah made it clear in his own idiosyncratic way that Anthony 
would have to be more careful in future. 'There's an Indian proverb', 
he told Bertram, 'that says "when one lives in a tank it's just as 
well to keep on good terms with the crocodile". There's a good 
deal in this'.^ For his part, Anthony still remained puzzled by
1 Anthony Brooke to Shenton Thomas, 24 February 1940, Enclosure 
17, ibid.
2 Shenton Thomas to Anthony Brooke, 29 February 1940, Enclosure 
19, ibid.
3 Sir Shenton Thomas to Vyner Brooke, 18 January 1940, Brooke 
Papers, Box 11/2.
4 Vyner Brooke to Anthony Brooke, 1 April 1940, Enclosure 30, 
'The Abolition of the Title of Rajah Muda ...'
5 Cited by Bertram Brooke in his letter to Margaret Noble,
21 August 1940, Brooke Papers, Box 12/3.
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Vyner's behaviour. f... There is no sense in rigidly maintaining 
an unconstructive attitude, even within myself’, he wrote to Gent 
explaining why he was returning to Sarawak, 'towards an uncle who, 
contrary to all unwritten laws effecting [sic] 20th Century human 
relationships (except perhaps those propagated by M. Gandhi) 
invariably and consistently turns the other cheek'.^
Just what it was that had turned some members of the 
Administrative Service and the Rajah against Anthony after such a 
promising beginning is difficult to say. Clearly, there was much 
more involved than the carte blanche which Anthony had given to 
Pepys in the furnishing of his house. Vyner Brooke's lack of 
confidence in his nephew was a crucial factor during the final years 
of Brooke rule and the events which led up to cession. However, it 
is a question which is best dealt with separately.^
MacBryan's Return
The news of Anthony's demotion had been greeted with unconcealed 
delight by the Ranee who was visiting New York at the time. In her 
element amongst newspaper reporters, she made a number of extra­
ordinary statements which were subsequently republished around the 
world. She felt 'pretty sure' that her daughter, Lady Inchcape, 
would now become Crown Princess of Sarawak and succeed to the Raj.
And she expressed relief that in view of his dismissal and 
of his marriage with a person of no social consequence, Anthony 
would not become Rajah. 'My nephew married the sister of a government 
official', she told the Hearst reporters. 'I don't like to be
snobbish, but the native is most particular about these things. It
3was rather an unfortunate marriage'.
At about the same time that the Rajah invited Anthony 
to return to Sarawak, he also gave permission for MacBryan to visit 
the state. In an attempt to allay the suspicions which the Tuan 
Muda must no doubt have felt about this and her own statements to
1 Anthony Brooke to Gent, 27 September 1940, CO 531/29 [53011/1].
2 See Appendix II.
3 Daily Eccpress_, 24 January 1940.
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the press, the Ranee wrote to him that there were some officers in 
Sarawak who for selfish reasons of their own wanted Simon Mackay 
declared heir to the Raj. Unconvinced by this, Bertram sent her what 
must have been an extremely searching reply and it was in response 
to this that the Ranee made her final attempt to persuade him that 
she had not been plotting against him and Anthony. Since this 
letter constitutes about the most explicit documentation of the 
succession ’plot’, it will be useful to quote from it at length:
I never imagined in my wildest dreams that you 
could believe such a thing of me. Now. I happen 
to know more about the MacBryan plot than anyone.
It began with MacBryan making violent love to 
Didi [Elizabeth]. I don’t think that Didi was 
more than fourteen at the time ... But as you know 
MacBryan was determined to get into the family 
somehow. Then .. [deleted passage] ... , and it was 
during this time that he started his petition 
which I may as well inform you NEVER got any 
further than his own crazy mind. MacBryan went to 
Inchcape and tried to get him to write to Vyner 
for permission to put Simon’s name down as a 
possible successor. This Inchcape was tempted to 
do, but as far as I know he never actually wrote.
I once wrote to Vyner and asked him if anything 
happened to Peter was Simon the next of kin, but 
I don’t think he answered. The whole thing has really 
grown from the evil seeds in MacBryan's brain, and why 
I wrote to you was that Vyner has been foolish enough 
to allow MacBryan to return to Sarawak, and as Peter 
is supposedly on his way ther[e], I thought trouble 
might spring into the arena again ...^
As the Ranee indicated, MacBryan's interest in the succession had
not abated. After his return from the abortive visit to Sarawak in
mid-1936 he advised the Earl of Inchcape 'on questions of succession
and inheritance in Sarawak' and although he claimed that this was
in response to Mackay's request, it is more than likely that the
2initiative was his own.
In mid-1940 MacBryan had cabled the Rajah for permission 
to bring Sa'erah back to her family in Kuching, at the same time 
offering his services to the Sarawak government. He was given
1 Sylvia Brooke to Bertram Brooke, 8 July 1940, Brooke Papers, Box 2/3.
2 MacBryan to H.R. Cowell, 25 January 1937, CO 531/27 [53034].
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approval to enter the State on the strict condition that he resided
there as a private individual, not taking part in political affairs
or holding any official post. But on his arrival in August he
pleaded poverty and the sympathetic Rajah arranged a temporary post
as Assistant Curator of the museum at $200 a month. This time,
however, MacBryan was travelling on a British passport endorsed with
the requirement that he should return to Britain before the end of
the year in case he was needed for military service.'*' Soon after
his arrival he lost his passport (the rumour was that he did so
deliberately) and was given a Sarawak passport without the
2inconvenient endorsement. However, by January 1941 the police were
inquiring about MacBryan at the Sarawak Government Office in London and
during a visit to Singapore with the Rajah in late February, Singapore
immigration officals noted that ’trickery' had taken place over the
passport. The military authorities insisted that he be arrested
and deported to England and it was only on the Rajah's personal
representations to Sir Shenton Thomas that MacBryan's services
were indispensable for the completion of Sarawak's centenary
arrangements that he was able to obtain permission to remain until
3the end of September 1941. The Colonial Office later acceded to
the Rajah's request that the condition that MacBryan should return
to England after the celebrations would be waived as long as he
4remained in the Rajah's service.
The Brunei Negotiations
MacBryan soon resumed his old grip on the affairs of State. In 
November 1940 he accompanied the Rajah on a tour of the Fourth and 
Fifth Divisions which took them to Brunei and it was during this
1 'Report on Mr. G.T. McBryan'.
2 Bertram Brooke's notes on 'Report on Mr. G.T. McBryan'.
3 Ibid.
4 Bertram Brooke's notes on extract of letter from Vyner Brooke to 
Shenton Thomas, 19 February 1937, Brooke Papers, Box 10/1.
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time that MacBryan suggested to the Rajah that they should tidy
up the problems still remaining from the annexation of Limbang in
1890^ and make some financial provision for the descendants of
Rajah Muda Hassim about whom the Brookes always had an uneasy
conscience. The Brunei sultans had previously refused to accept
payment for Limbang, claiming that there had never been a cession,
2but a number of Brunei pengirans who claimed tulin rights in the 
area were made annual payments which were termed 'cession money' 
by the Sarawak government. The British Resident of Brunei, E.E. 
Pengilley, apparently indicated that he would have no objections 
to such a settlement.
In January 1941, by which time he had been appointed
Political Adviser, MacBryan persuaded the Rajah to send him on a
special mission to Brunei in order to negotiate a final settlement
in keeping with the spirit of Sarawak's centenary year. Accompanied
by Sa'erah and a number of metal trunks of documents, MacBryan took
the royal yachtMaimuna to Brunei where in spite of the protests
3of the Resident he anchored upstream opposite the Astana. Within 
a matter of hours he had completed negotiations with the Sultan 
and immediately set out for Limbang where he came to an arrangement 
with the pengirans and the descendants of Raja Muda Hassim.
During all these meetings he wore the Arab clothing brought back 
from the haj.
According to the agreements finally negotiated, and 
apparently approved by the Resident, a cash payment of $20,000 
was to be made to the Sultan for Sarawak's enjoyment of sovereign
I
rights over Limbang for the previous fifty years and $1,000 per 
annum in perpetuity. In addition, a lump payment of $60,000 and 
$6,000 per annum in perpetuity was to go to certain pengirans for
1 The annexation and its background are fully treated in Tarling, 
Britain_, The Brookes and Brunei. See also, Colin Crisswell, 'The 
Origins of the Limbang Claim', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies3 
Vol.ll, No.2 (September 1971), pp.218-229.
2 Under the Brunei sultanate, certain pengirans possessed rights 
of taxation over river systems.
3 Interview with Mrs Gina Field, 8-9 January 1975. Mrs Field was a 
passenger on board the Mairrruna at the time.
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their surrender of tulin rights, and pensions totalling about 
$4,000 per annum to the descendants of Raja Muda Hassim. Finally 
there was a wedding present for the Pangeran Muda Omar Ali, the 
Sultan’s younger brother.^
There was a more intriguing side to the Brunei negotiations 
which Anthony Brooke suggested to Gent eighteen months later without 
disclosing his source. Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin who was crowned in 
March 1940 after a long minority was without a male heir but was 
determined that his daughter and only legitimate child, Tuanku 
Ehsan, should succeed him rather than Omar Ali. Although he had been 
told by the British Resident that it was not possible to transfer 
the succession to the female line, he had pressured his Waziv
2(ministers) to sign a document to this effect in about 1937.
According to Anthony’s source, the Limbang discussions were really a
’cloak’ for a secret agreement between MacBryan and the Sultan
whereby the latter, in return for the payments, would emphasize
to the British government that Sarawak originally belonged to
Brunei, that under Brunei law the succession could pass to the
eldest daughter if there was no male heir, and that therefore the
3Sarawak succession should pass to the Rajah’s eldest daughter.
Altogether, MacBryan paid out about $56,000 in cash and
the payments were duly approved by the Committee of Administration
4after MacBryan had addressed them on his diplomatic victory. The 
Rajah was so pleased with MacBryan that he decided to take him 
into the Service again as a Class I Officer and to designate him 
’Political Secretary’. Although the Brunei negotiations had at first 
seemed something of a coup for MacBryan, the Resident’s report 
brought a stormy reaction when it reached Singapore. Sir Shenton 
Thomas apparently informed the Secretary of State, Lord Moyne, that 
in his opinion, by authorizing the negotiations the Rajah had infringed 
the 1888 Treaty. And in the ensuing exchanges Moyne told the Rajah
1 'Extract from Minutes of Committee of Administration concerning 
approved payments to Brunei in connection with the annexation of 
Limbang’, CO 531/30 [53066].
2 A.M. Grier, 'Funeral of the Sultan of Brunei', Rhodes House MSS 
Pac. s. 77. See Chapter VI , p-303.
3 Anthony Brooke to Gent, 4 August 1942, CO 531/30 [53066].
4 Ibid.
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that Sarawak’s response was 'what might be expected from an
unfriendly Foreign Power',^  rather than one which was tied to
Britain in a treaty of dependence. Sir Shenton Thomas insisted
2that all payments be deferred until Moyne had been consulted
and he also charged that MacBryan had broken British military
regulations by transmitting wireless messages from Brunei to 
3Kuching. He demanded a full explanation of the whole incident and
it was in response to this pressure that the Rajah visited Singapore
with MacBryan in late February for personal discussions with the 
4Governor. While there is no record of the talks, the Rajah's only 
defence was the somewhat feeble argument that it had been a 
personal matter between himself and the Sultan^ and he was obliged 
to agree to the cancellation of all the agreements. He also had to 
press the Governor to agree that MacBryan should be allowed to 
remain in Sarawak until the end of September so that he could assist 
with the centenary celebrations. However, the Singapore authorities 
remained intensely suspicious of the Political Secretary and an 
intelligence officer was sent to Brunei to prepare a full report 
on the whole affair. The fact that he was withdrawn before 
completing his investigations may have been fortunate for MacBryan, 
although the Sarawak government was later unable to find any 
incriminating evidence. In Sarawak, the Committee of Administration 
had been fearful that the British government might use the Brunei 
affair as an excuse to intervene and they naturally blamed 
MacBryan for bringing the state into such danger. Le Gros Clark 
had already threatened to resign over his appointment as Political 
Secretary^ and there was a general feeling among the senior bureaucrats
1 Note by Anthony Brooke on his cable to Le Gros Clark, 8 September 
1941, Enclosure 51, 'The First Constitution of Sarawak ...'
2 Minute by Gent, 18 March 1941, CO 531/30 [53066].
3 'Report on Mr G.T. MacBryan'.
4 Diary of Sir Shenton Thomas, 1 March 1941, Rhodes House 
uncat. MSS.
5 Bertram Brooke to Vyner Brooke, 24 November 1941, Brooke Papers, 
Box 11/2.
6 Archer to Anthony Brooke, 22 March 1941, Enclosure 7, 'The First 
Constitution of Sarawak ...'; 'Notes by C. Pitt Hardacre - Acting 
Treasurer of SarawakEnclosure No.14, ibid.
7 Mackenzie-Grieve, Time and Chance3 p.98.
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t h a t  he would have  to  be  o u s te d  b e f o r e  any f u r t h e r  damage was done.
I t  was a l s o  rum oured t h a t  MacBryan had  made a l o t  o f  money o u t  o f  
t h e  B ru n e i  n e g o t i a t i o n s :  w h i l e  i t  was w e l l  known t h a t  he  had
a r r i v e d  p e n n i l e s s  i n  A ugust 1940, he was b e l i e v e d  to  be w o r th  th o u sa n d s  
by th e  end o f  t h e  y e a r . “'"
The Turtle Islands
A n o th e r  o f  M acBryan’s e x e r c i s e s  i n  d ip lom acy  among th e  M alays was
to  have im p o r t a n t  r e p e r c u s s i o n s .  On 1 August 1941 th e  Sarawak Gazette
announced  t h a t  t h e  R ajah  had  d e c id e d  to  r e p o s s e s s  h i m s e l f  o f  th e
r i g h t s  to  c o l l e c t  t u r t l e  eggs  a t  t h e  T a la n g  T a la n g  and S a ta n g  i s l a n d s
( o th e r w i s e  known as  t h e  T u r t l e  I s l a n d s )  to  th e  w e s t  o f  S an tubong  and
to  e n t r u s t  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  i n  f u t u r e  to  t h e  C u r a to r  o f  t h e  Sarawak
Museum. Three  months l a t e r  i t  was r e v e a l e d  t h a t  a T u r t l e  T r u s t  had
b een  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  R.G. Aikman, Abang H a j i  M ohidin (D atu
Hakim ), Abang H a j i  M ustapha (D atu  P a h la w a n ) , t h e  m u f t i  o f  t h e
2
K uching mosque and G.T.M. MacBryan.
A lthough  t h i s  was n o t  made p u b l i c ,  MacBryan had  su c ce e d e d
i n  p e r s u a d in g  th e  R ajah  t h a t  t h e  t h r e e  d a tu s  p r e v i o u s l y  i n v o lv e d ,
P a t i n g g i  (p rom oted  from S hahbandar  i n  1 9 3 7 ) ,  Amar and M e n te r i ,
s h o u ld  be  g iv e n  s u b s t a n t i a l  ca sh  paym ents i n  co m p e n sa t io n  f o r  th e
3
s u r r e n d e r  o f  t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  r i g h t s .  The o r i g i n  o f  th e  a rra n g e m e n t
i s  n o t  c l e a r ,  b u t  when James Brooke c a l l e d  a t  T a la n g  T a lan g  B e sa r
i n  August 1839 on h i s  f i r s t  voyage  to  Sarawak he found  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r o l
o f  egg c o l l e c t i o n  and e x p o r t  to  K uching was i n  t h e  hands o f  t h e  Datu
4
Bandar Daud u n d e r  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  R a jah  Muda H assim . He a l s o  
d i s c o v e r e d  on a l a t e r  v i s i t  t h a t  t h e  Datu B andar t a x e d  f i s h i n g  s t a k e s  
and prawn n e t s  i n  t h e  a r e a  and t h a t  t h e  t u r t l e  eggs were s e n t  to
1 'R e p o r t  on Mr. G.T. M c B ry a n '.
2 SG, 15 November 1941.
3 P e r s o n a l  com m uncia tion  from  Mr E. B anks , 7 August 1974. Com pensation
was as f o l l o w s :  Datu P a t i n g g i  -  $ 1 5 ,0 0 0 ;  Datu M e n te r i  -  $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 ;
Datu Amar -  $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 .  P e r s o n a l  i n f o r m a t io n .
4 K e p p e l ,  Expedition to Borneo3 V ol. I I ,  p .2 0 .
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Sambas, Pontianak and elsewhere in Borneo. A system was subsequently
established whereby the profits from the trade were given to the
Bait aZ Mat and the Bait aZ UZZah (Islamic institutions corresponding
to 'charity' and 'piety') with a commission to each of the senior
2datus entrusted with the collection. This was a semi-feudal
privilege which brought both prestige and profit and was particularly
valued by the Datu Patinggi who claimed ownership of one of the
3islands, Satang Besar. More importantly, perhaps, the islands were
the scene of the semah, an annual ceremony of pre-Islamic origin
concerned with placating the spirits of the sea and ensuring good 
4fishing. At Satang Besar the semah was conducted under the 
auspices of the datus and was more clearly Islamic in character 
than the similar ceremony practised at Talang Talang. A marked 
fluctuation in the number of eggs collected each year brought the 
datus under suspicion but when the Museum Curator, E. Banks, persuaded 
them to keep monthly records it became clear that these were 
natural variations.^ Consequently it was not on the grounds of 
mismanagement that the Rajah withdrew the privilege. Rather, it 
was a means of bringing to an end the quarrel which had been 
simmering for years between Patinggi and Amar and which focussed on 
the turtle egg profits as a point of dispute.
The Datu Patinggi later made a number of efforts to regain 
the rights but there is no indication that he objected to the 
1941 settlement at the time. Indeed, it was even suggested at the 
time that the payment was really MacBryan's means of winning his 
support for yet another scheme concerning the succession. When 
Pepys visited Kuching in late June 1941, W.G. Tait the Postmaster
1 Mundy, Narrative of Events, Vol. II, pp.304-5.
2 Personal communication from Mr. E. Banks, 7 July 1975; 7 August 1974.
3 Ibid.
4 Tom Harrisson, 'The Sarawak Turtle Islands' "Semah", JMBRAS,
Vol. XXIII, Pt.3 (1950), pp. 105-126. No semah or similar ritual 
has been conducted at the islands since 1965 but the occasion 
continues to be marked by a makam seZamat or annual feast for 
members of the Turtle Trust and various dignitaries.
5 E. Banks, The Green Desert, Williton (Somerset) n.d., p. 36.
See also, Harrison, op. cit., p.126.
6 See Chapter V,p.237-8 and Chapter VII, p.350.
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General told him it was likely that MacBryan hoped to see Abang Haji 
Abdillah become Rajah with himself as menteri (chief adviser). It is 
certainly significant that in its final form the 1941 Constitution 
included a provision that a Malay could become Rajah.
The 1941 Constitution
One of the Rajah's main worries since the late 1930s had been the
increasing financial demands on him from the Ranee and their daughters
Elizabeth and Valerie. The two girls had made spectacularly
unsuccessful marriages and the Rajah was faced with the prospect of
having to provide for them on a permanent basis. As we shall see
later, temptation to make a financial settlement with the British
government was very strong indeed and it was only last-minute
nervousness on the Rajah's part which prevented serious negotiations 
2in 1938. Sylvia's initiative in arranging the abortive meeting with
Gent is clear and it seems likely that she was influenced both by a
concern for her own material future and by a certain boredom with
Sarawak. In the following year the Rajah's inability to cope with
the Ranee's financial entanglements led him to ask Jack Golden, a
Miami Jew whom the Ranee had met on one of her visits to New York,
3to manage her financial affairs for a payment of £500 per annum.
Golden agreed, but he was no more successful than the Rajah had been 
in curbing her spending. By 1942 the Ranee owed about US$7,000 in 
the United States, most of which had apparently been advanced by 
Golden.
There was thus a pressing need by the end of 1940 for the 
Rajah to make a financial settlement on his dependants and it was 
at this time that MacBryan was once again available to convert the 
Rajah's vague intentions into concrete plans. Furthermore, the 
repercussions of the Limbang affair apparently startled the Rajah 
and this, together with his earlier embarrassment over the Scott
1 Pepys report, July 1941, CO 531/30 [53011/4].
2 See Chapter IV, p.148-9.
3 R.A.B. Mynors (Treasury) to A.E. Forrest (Colonial Office),
11 March 1942, CO 531/30 [53006].
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c a s e  and th e  s c a r e  o f  a J a p a n e s e  i n v a s i o n  i n  F e b ru a ry  1941 must have
made i t  e a sy  f o r  MacBryan to  p e r s u a d e  him to  l a y  h i s  hands  on a
2
s u b s t a n t i a l  sum w h i l e  t h e r e  was s t i l l  an o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  do so .  
MacBryan was p r o b a b ly  c o n v in c e d  o f  t h e  i n e v i t a b i l i t y  o f  a J a p a n e s e  
a t t a c k .
A n o th e r  p ro b lem  e x e r c i s i n g  th e  R a ja h ’s mind was th e
s u c c e s s i o n .  Now s i x t y - s e v e n  y e a r s  o f  a g e ,  Vyner Brooke was t i r e d  o f
Sarawak and lo o k ed  fo rw a rd  t o  s p e n d in g  h i s  d e c l i n i n g  y e a r s  i n  a
more s a l u b r i o u s  c l i m a t e .  The Ranee , who had  become t i r e d  o f
Sarawak much e a r l i e r ,  was a l s o  p u t t i n g  p r e s s u r e  on him to  g iv e  up.
He h a d ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  s p e n t  t h e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  h i s  l i f e  t h e r e  and
d id  n o t  s h a r e  h i s  f a t h e r ’ s a m b i t io n  to  ’d i e  i n  h a r n e s s ' .  Who c o u ld
t a k e  h i s  p l a c e ?  B e r t ra m , who was o n ly  two y e a r s  y o u n g e r ,  had
3
s u f f e r e d  a s e r i o u s  n e rv o u s  breakdow n i n  1937 and i t  seemed h i g h ly  
u n l i k e l y  t h a t  he  w ould  e v e r  r e t u r n  to  Saraw ak.
A lthough  S y l v i a  Brooke had  lo n g  c h e r i s h e d  t h e  hope t h a t  
t h e i r  e l d e s t  d a u g h te r  m ig h t  a c t  as r e g e n t  u n t i l  h e r  son  Simon came 
o f  ag e ,  and MacBryan had b een  p r e p a r e d  to  a s s i s t  i n  su c h  a schem e, 
t h e r e  i s  no e v id e n c e  t h a t  t h e  R ajah  f o r  one moment c o n s id e r e d  i t  
as a r e a l  p o s s i b i l i t y .  I n d e e d ,  from  a l l  t h a t  we know o f  him  i t  
seems l i k e l y  t h a t  he  would have  s e e n  i t  as n o t h in g  more th a n  a good 
j o k e .  The o n ly  s e r i o u s  p r o s p e c t  f o r  t h e  s u c c e s s i o n  was h i s  nephew, 
a b o u t  whom he had s e r i o u s  d o u b t s .
We have  a l r e a d y  s e e n  t h a t  A n thony ’s b r i e f  c a r e e r  as 
R a jah  Muda and O f f i c e r  A d m in i s t e r in g  th e  Government h a d ,  r i g h t l y  
o r  w ro n g ly ,  p e r s u a d e d  t h e  R a jah  t h a t  he  was ' a s  y e t  u n f i t t e d '  to  
r u l e .  The e m b a r r a s s in g  p r o c l a m a t io n  o f  J a n u a r y  1940 and A n th o n y 's  
s u b s e q u e n t  f i r e w o r k s  had b e e n  sm oothed o v e r  somewhat by B e r t r a m ’ s 
d ip lom acy . Vyner had  a g re e d  t h a t  h i s  nephew s h o u ld  r e t u r n  to  th e  
S e r v ic e  as a D i s t r i c t  O f f i c e r  and he  no d o u b t  hoped t h a t  w i th  f u r t h e r  
e x p e r i e n c e  Anthony would im p ro v e .  But who would lo o k  a f t e r  t h e  
c o u n try  i n  th e  meantim e? And c o u ld  t h e  R a jah  be c o n f i d e n t
1 See C h ap te r  IV, p p . 1 5 0 -7 .
2 P e p y s '  r e p o r t ,  J u ly  1941 , CO 531 /30  [ 5 3 0 1 1 /4 ] .
3 P e r s o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n .
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that Anthony would turn out satisfactorily in the end?
The only alternative was to make King George VI his heir, 
to hand Sarawak over to the British government and a form of colonial 
rule which Vyner had always looked down upon. The idea of selling 
out their interests had long appealed to Sylvia and at one point 
in 1938 she had almost manoeuvred Vyner into serious negotiations.^ 
But when it came to the point, Vyner was not prepared to dispose of 
Sarawak and may still have been convinced that Brooke rule was the 
best thing for its people. He may not have felt it as a sacred 
duty but he cannot have been completely unresponsive to the Brooke 
tradition and its responsibilities.
As a solution to the financial problem, MacBryan evidently
advised the Rajah to withdraw capital from the state reserves and
to deposit it in England as a trust fund whose interest would be
sufficient to provide generous allowances for the Ranee and their
daughters. Thus it was that in January 1941 MacBryan went to the
Treasury with a note from the Rajah authorizing the transfer of
£200,000. However, the Acting Treasurer at the time, Cecil Pitt
2Hardacre, refused the request and when MacBryan then conveyed to
him that he would be permitted to resign on full pension Hardacre
replied that if he resigned or was dismissed, he would take the
3keys of the Treasury to Singapore with him. It was precisely the 
kind of thing that the senior bureaucrats had been fearing ever 
since MacBryan’s reinstalment and Pitt Hardacre was strongly 
supported by Le Gros Clark and other members of the Committee of 
Administration.
In a subsequent conversation with MacBryan, Pitt Hardacre 
agreed that some provision should be made for the Rajah and his 
family but that it should be done in a proper manner and not on the 
basis of ad hoc demands for large sums of money. When asked what 
kind of guarantee he required that no further demands would be made, 
Pitt Hardacre suggested a constitutional guarantee. MacBryan
1 See Chapter IV, p.148-9.
2 Note by Anthony Brooke, Enclosure 14, ’The First Constitution of 
Sarawak ... ’
3 H. Thackwell Lewis to Anthony Brooke, 27 February 1946, Brooke 
Papers, Box 2/3.
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then consulted the Rajah and returned the same day with a note 
'saying something like "Dear Pitt, - you can have your 
Constitution"’.'*' Such were the origins of constitutional monarchy 
in Sarawak.
In the middle of March 1941 Anthony Brooke, who was then 
District Officer at Sarikei, received an important memorandum signed 
by the Rajah but almost certainly drafted by MacBryan. In this 
document the Rajah explained that in view of the uncertainty 
surrounding his future intentions, he had made a number of decisions 
which would be revealed publicly at a meeting of the Supreme Council 
in April. Firstly, Anthony was to be appointed ’Heir, on probation’ 
for a period of five years during which he would serve in various 
parts of Sarawak. If it seemed to the Rajah and a majority of 
the Supreme Council during this time that Anthony was 'unfitted, 
for some good reason’ to succeed to the Raj, he would have the right 
to set him aside. However, if a title was conferred on Anthony 
during the probationary period, it could be assumed that he was 
'irrevocably confirmed as Heir' from that moment. If the five 
years expired without any declaration, or the Rajah died,
Anthony would be automatically proclaimed Rajah by the Supreme 
Council.
Secondly, the Rajah would appoint a commission to make 
recommendations on a constitution enabling a form of democratic 
government. The autocratic power of the Rajah would be eliminated 
by the creation of an Advisory Council or some similar body with 
whose majority opinion he would have to conform. Provision would 
also be made for the representation of different ethnic groups and 
for the preservation of the Rajah's personal rights and privileges 
for the rest of his lifetime. 'By voluntarily abrogating certain 
powers hitherto vested solely in the person of the Rajah', 
he stated, fl am hopeful that I shall be making a worthy 
contribution in the public interest and for the future happiness
1 Personal communication from Mr C. Pitt Hardacre, 3 October 
1976.
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and well being of the people of Sarawak'.
Thirdly, the Treasurer would be required to pay the 
Rajah $2,000,000 in cash from state reserves on 15 April in 
consideration of the Rajah's undertaking full financial responsibility 
for the Ranee and their daughters who could then make no future 
claim on the state. The Rajah's annual salary would be reduced 
from $120,000 to $84,000 but he would continue to receive the 
interest from the Sarawak State Advisory Council Trust Fund in London.
Finally, Anthony would be required to swear an 
oath of allegiance to the Rajah and to accept his position before 
the Supreme Council where he would also undertake to maintain on 
the Rajah's death all the allowances, pensions and other special 
payments authorized during the Rajah's lifetime. A copy of the 
memorandum had also been sent to the Chief Secretary with instructions 
that it should be circulated to members of the Committee of 
Administration whom the Rajah hoped would facilitate the measures 
'with as little disturbance as possible'. The document was for 
their information and was not intended 'to invite discussion or 
criticism of a matter which is naturally somewhat painful to him'.^
Anthony might well have been tempted by the arrangement
but loyalty to his father obliged him to suggest that the matter
should be left 'in abeyance' unless the Tuan Muda had surrendered
his rights as Heir Presumptive without Anthony's knowledge. He
must also have seen that the entire arrangement was contingent
on the Treasury paying the Rajah £200,000, a fact which would not
impress anyone when it was inevitably made public. More importantly,
the scheme bore MacBryan's stamp and in a separate letter to the
Rajah, Anthony pointed out that the continued presence of his
Political Adviser in Sarawak was 'certain to cause unrest throughout 
3the whole State'. He emphasized that an example of the advice
1 Enclosure 3, 16 March 1941, 'The First Constitution of 
Sarawak ... '
2 MacBryan to Archer, 17 March 1941, Enclosure 2, ibid.
3 Anthony Brooke to Vyner Brooke, 19 March 1941, Enclosure 5, 
ibid.
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which members of the projected Advisory Council were likely to 
give the Rajah was that MacBryan should be removed as soon as 
possible and arrangements made with the immigration authorities in 
Singapore to receive him. As he explained to Archer to whom he sent 
copies of his two letters, this was 'designed to bring things to a head 
immediately He thought it was best that it should happen
while Sarawak was still at peace and better able to stand the 
subsequent shock.
Anthony's stand had the support of the entire Committee
of Administration. R.G. Aikman, the Resident of his Division and
his immediate superior, supported Anthony's effort to force the 
2issue and Archer wrote that he was in 'entire agreement'. The
Rajah, he said, was entirely in MacBryan's hands and all attempts
to prevent this had failed. When Archer had tried to prevent him
from re-entering the Service, the Rajah had 'simply kept him over
3at the Astana and did all his business through him'. However, the 
Rajah's memorandum had stirred the Committee to action and a 
secret meeting had prepared papers which would be presented to the 
Rajah on 25 March.
Indeed, the Committee of Administration had been meeting
almost constantly since receiving the Rajah's memorandum and there
4was general concern about MacBryan's influence on the Rajah and the 
need to introduce financial controls. The two most determined 
advocates were Pitt Hardacre and Le Gros Clark who 'insisted that 
if H.H.'s request was complied with there must be some guarantee to 
prevent any further raids on the State funds'.^ The other cause 
for concern was the authorship of the projected constitution. The 
Committee feared that the Commission which the Rajah intended 
making responsible for its drafting would be dominated by MacBryan 
(who had just been appointed secretary to the Supreme Council)
1 Anthony Brooke to Archer, 19 March 1941, Enclosure 6, ibid.
2 Aikman to Anthony Brooke, 21 March 1941, Enclosure 8, ibid.
3 Archer to Anthony Brooke, 22 March 1941, Enclosure 7, ibid.
4 Le Gros Clark to Anthony Brooke, 24 March 1941, Enclosure 9, ibid.
5 L.D. Kennedy to Boyd, 26 February 1967, Boyd Papers, Box 4/4.
6 Straits Times3 29 March 1941. Archer and Ong Tiang Swee were also 
appointed to the Supreme Council at this time.
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and were  a n x io u s  t h a t  i t  s h o u l d  be  t h e i r  t a s k .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  two 
documents  were drawn up:  a s e c r e t  a g re e m e n t  be tw een  t h e  Commit tee
and t h e  Ra jah  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  a f i n a n c i a l  s e t t l e m e n t ,  and an o f f i c i a l  
O rde r  t r a n s f e r r i n g  most  o f  t h e  R a j a h ' s  powers  t o  t h e  Committee  
u n t i l  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  was e n a c t e d .
In  t h e  s e c r e t  a g reem en t  which was s i g n e d  by t h e  R a ja h ,  
P i t t  H a r d a c r e ,  Le Gros C l a r k ,  Thomas Corson and J . G .  Anderson on 
31 March^ t h e  Ra jah  u n d e r t o o k  t o  i s s u e  an O rde r  a u t h o r i z i n g  ' t h e  
t r a n s f e r  o f  c e r t a i n  l e g i s l a t i v e  powers  f rom H im se l f  t o  t h e  Ch ie f  
S e c r e t a r y ,  i n  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  O f f i c e r  A d m i n i s t e r i n g  t h e  Government ,  
as  a d v i s e d  from t im e  t o  t im e  by t h e  Committee  [o f  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ] ' .  
He a l s o  p ro m is ed  t h a t  n e i t h e r  he  n o r  any o t h e r  member o f  h i s  f a m i ly  
c o u ld  make any f u r t h e r  c l a i m  on S t a t e  funds  t h a n  t h o s e  s e t  ou t  i n  
t h e  a g r e e m e n t .  I n  r e t u r n ,  t h e  members o f  t h e  Commit tee a c c e p t e d  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  c o n d i t i o n s :
1 The Ra jah  was t o  r e c e i v e  a c a sh  payment o f  $ 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  from 
Sarawak funds  w i t h i n  two weeks and a l o a n  o f  $32,000 
to wards  h i s  Cameron H i g h l a n d s  house  was to  be  w r i t t e n  o f f .
2 P r o v i s i o n  was t o  b e  made i n  t h e  new c o n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  t h e  
payment  t o  t h e  Ra jah  o f :
(a)  $60 ,000  p e r  annum f o r  t h e  upkeep o f  t h e  A s tana
(b) $21 ,000  p e r  annum f o r  c h a r i t a b l e  p u r p o s e s
(c)  t h e  i n t e r e s t  on t h e  Sarawak A d v i s o ry  C o u n c i l  T r u s t  Fund
(d) $7 ,000  p e r  month by way o f  s a l a r y
and h i s  r i g h t :
(a)  t o  t h e  s o l e  p o s s e s s i o n  and u s e  o f  t h e  A s t a n a  and t h e  y a c h t
Maimuna
(b) to  d i s p o s e  o f  a l l  h i s  p e r s o n a l  l a n d s  i n  Sarawak
(c)  t o  c o n f e r  o r  r e f u s e  t i t l e s  on members o f  h i s  own f a m i ly  
and a l l  o t h e r  t i t l e s  and d e c o r a t i o n s
(d) t o  v i s i t  any p a r t  o f  Sarawak and ' t o  e x e r c i s e  h i s  cu s tom a ry  
p r e r o g a t i v e s  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  a d v i c e  o f  His  r e s p o n s i b l e  
a d v i s e r s ' .
(e)  t o  m a i n t a i n  e x i s t i n g  a n n u a l  payments  f rom Sarawak funds
1 The Facts about Sarawak_, p p . 3 5 - 8 .  Subse que n t  q u o t a t i o n s  from t h i s
s o u r c e .
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to members of his family and to Datus then in office.
In the event of the Tuan Muda dying before the constitution was 
enacted, the Committee undertook to appoint, 'after due consideration 
and circumspection', an heir to the Raj.
Another unwritten condition insisted upon by the Committee 
of Administration was that MacBryan should no longer remain in 
the Sarawak Service. MacBryan's resignation was duly gazetted 
as being effective from 31 March but the Rajah simultaneously 
appointed him Private Secretary, a position which MacBryan had 
previously held (and been dismissed from) in 1929. There seemed to 
be no way of loosening his hold on the Rajah.
The constitutional Order signed by the Rajah on 31 March 
was designed largely to safeguard the Committee's position while 
the constitution was being drafted. For a period of twelve months 
the sole power of legislating by means of Orders was delegated to the 
Chief Secretary in his new position as Officer Administering the 
Government, 'acting by and with the advice of the Committee of 
Administration'. As a further insurance against MacBryan or the 
Colonial Office intervening to change the Rajah's mind, the Order 
provided that all appointments to and dismissals from the Committee 
should be made by the Office Administering the Government on the 
advice of the Committee and that all appointments, promotions and 
dismissals of officers in the Senior Service should be made by the 
Committee. The one concession to the Rajah was the right to 
disallow any Order which infringed his obligations to the British 
government under the terms of the 1888 Treaty.^
A Proclamation was also issued announcing that Sarawak was 
to have a written constitution which would be enacted during the 
Brooke centenary celebrations planned for September that year.
The effect of these constitutional reforms would be to 'replace
1 Order No. C-18 (Constitutional Reform Provisional Measure) 1941,
SGG, 31 March 1941. The Order also empowered the Rajah to disallow 
any legislation which repealed or amended the sections dealing 
with 1888 Treaty and altered the term of validity of the Order 
itself. There was thus a safeguard against the power of bureaucratic 
oligarchy being perpetuated.
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Our Absolute Rule by a Form of Government on a Broader Basis and
Facilitate the Gradual Development of Representative Government on
Democratic Principles ...’ and the Committee of Administration was
charged with the responsibility of drawing up the necessary
legislation."^ The constitution would provide for a representative
legislature with whose advice the Rajah would henceforth rule and
as a first step towards surrendering absolute power he had already
signed an Order which vested legislative power in the Committee for a
year. Reminding its members that they were temporarily in the
position of ’Custodians of the Rights of the People of Sarawak',
he directed them to devise 'a really liberal constitution which will
2have fair regard to the claims of Everybody ...'
Turning to the question of the succession, he proclaimed 
the Tuan Muda as his heir to the Raj on his decease . But if the 
Tuan Muda should die first, the Rajah's advisers were charged with 
the task of deciding without reference to him who the heir should be. 
If there was any dispute, the advisers should refer the matter with 
their comments to the British government. In his Address Vyner also 
explained why he was changing the succession formula and setting in 
train a process which would lead to self-government:
I have always been positive, as was my Father, that it 
was never the intention of Sir James Brooke to establish 
a line of Absolute Rulers. What he set out to do was 
to protect the Natives of Sarawak, the real but backward 
owners of this land, from exploitation and oppression, 
until such time as they could govern themselves ...
And now I am taking a step forward towards the ultimate 
aim, laid down by the Rajah as the basis of his^Policy, 
that of a self-governing community and country.
It was assumed by the Committee that payment of the 
$2,000,000 would be made at the Treasury's convenience, and on the 
day after the agreement was signed and the Proclamation issued 
Pitt Hardacre left for Sibu on a short visit. However, the same 
afternoon Vyner sent Archer a request for cash and when the Chief
1 SG3 1 April 1941.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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S e c r e t a r y  t o l d  him  t h a t  t h i s  would  c a u se  c o n s i d e r a b l e  f i n a n c i a l
e m b a r ra s s m e n t ,  t h e  R a jah  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  he o r d e r  t h e  o f f i c e r
t e m p o r a r i l y  i n  c h a rg e  o f  t h e  T r e a s u r y  to  make th e  payment."^ S in c e
t h e r e  w ere  i n s u f f i c i e n t  governm ent fu n d s  and t im e  would be needed  to
i n s t r u c t  t h e  b r o k e r s  i n  London to  s e l l  i n v e s t m e n t s ,  A rche r  demanded
t h a t  t h e  money be p a id  from  t h e  C u rren cy  Fund d e p o s i t e d  w i th  th e
2
C h a r te r e d  Bank i n  K uching . When P i t t  H a rd a c re  r e t u r n e d ,  he
'p r o t e s t e d  i n  t h e  m ost e m p h a t ic  m anner a t  t h i s  h ig h  handed  a c t i o n '
3
b u t  to  no e f f e c t .  In  T h ack w e ll  L e w is '  v ie w ,  t h e  R a j a h ' s  ' i n d e c e n t
h a s t e '  i n  o b t a i n i n g  th e  money was h i s  f e a r  t h a t  t h e  te rm s  o f  th e
s e c r e t  ag reem en t  and t h e  c o n te n t s  o f  h i s  p r o c l a m a t io n  m igh t  'p r o v e
d i s a g r e e a b l e  to  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  S in g a p o r e '  who would  p r e v e n t  t h e
4
scheme from g o ing  th ro u g h .  At t h e  same t im e  Vyner began  h a s t i l y  
to  d i s p o s e  o f  m ost o f  h i s  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y  i n  Saraw ak . The S y lv ia  
cinem a w hich  he  had  b u i l t  i n  1934 was s o l d  t o  a C h in e s e ,  even  
though  a p r i o r  o p t i o n  a t  an a g re e d  p r i c e  had  been  e a r l i e r  g iv en  to  
th e  Borneo Company.^ S u b s e q u e n t ly  a l a r g e  sum o f  money was 
t r a n s f e r r e d  i n  t h e  R a j a h 's  name t o  S in g a p o re  w here  an u n s u c c e s s f u l  
a t t e m p t  was made to  c o n v e r t  i t  i n t o  A m erican d o l l a r s .
In  t h e  m eantim e th e  Committee was a d d r e s s in g  i t s e l f  to  
th e  n o v e l  and somewhat d a u n t i n g  t a s k  o f  d e v i s i n g  a c o n s t i t u t i o n .
The b u lk  o f  th e  d r a f t i n g  seems to  have  been  g iv en  o v e r  to  th e  L eg a l
1 H. T hackw ell  L ew is ,  'A S h o r t  n o t e  on c e r t a i n  a s p e c t s  o f  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  Sarawak b e tw een  August 1939
and th e  o u tb r e a k  o f  t h e  w ar w i th  J a p an  . . . ' ,  Brooke P a p e r s ,  Box 6 /1 .
2 P e r s o n a l  com m unica tion  from Mr C. P i t t  H a r d a c r e ,  3 O c to b e r  1976.
3 T hackw e ll  L ew is ,  'A S h o r t  n o t e  . . . ' .
4 T hackw e ll  Lewis to  Anthony B rooke , 27 F e b ru a ry  1946 , Brooke 
P a p e r s ,  Box 2 / 3 .
5 I b i d .
6 I b i d .
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Adviser, K.H. Digby, but Thackwell Lewis was also consulted from 
time to time. Altogether, the document went through three drafts 
and although Vyner was unwilling to attend discussions with the 
Committee, he made a number of attempts to overrule their 
decisions by means of minutes sent through MacBryan. The nature of 
these objections is not altogether clear but from Vyner’s later 
comments it seems that they were largely concerned with his wish to 
surrender all of his prerogative powers.
One casualty of the constitutional agreement was Archer. 
During the weeks prior to the Proclamation the Chief Secretary had 
played a double game by keeping the Rajah informed of the Committee 
of Administration's ’plot’ against him. Much as he feared MacBryan’s 
influence, Archer was an old-fashioned Brooke royalist whose personal 
loyalty to the Rajah outweighed all other considerations. The very 
idea of a constitution was anathema although his membership of the
1 Kenelm Hubert Digby came from an old Catholic West Country family 
and achieved early distinction at Oxford where he seconded 
the famous Oxford Union motion on ’King and Country’.
Qualifying as a barrister at Middle Temple in 1934, he defended 
socialists prosecuted under the vagrancy laws. In the same 
year he was appointed a Cadet in the Sarawak Service and served 
in the Fourth and First Divisions before becoming a magistrate 
in 1937. In August 1940 he was made Acting Legal Adviser 
and Registrar of the Supreme Court and in January 1941 was 
confirmed in these positions. After internment in Batu 
Lintang during the war, Digby continued as Legal Adviser and 
then Attorney-General when the position was renamed in February 
1947. From 1948 until his retirement in December 1951 he was a 
Circuit Judge. Digby was editor of the Sarawak Gazette 
September 1946 - February 1948 during the height of the anti­
cession campaign and was commissioned by the Malayan Union 
government to write a series of articles for the Sarawak Tribune 
answering the arguments put forward by Anthony Brooke through the 
Singapore press. For the subsequent libel suit, see Chapter VIII, 
p. . In a manuscript autobiography, ’Lawyer in the Wilderness’, 
which he wrote on his way back to England in late 1951, Digby 
explained that the Sarawak government’s decision to send Iban 
trackers to assist in the Malayan ’Emergency’ had precipitated 
his resignation. However, his frankly expressed socialist 
views had probably made him a marked man some time before this. 
Digby migrated to New Zealand in 1955 where he was admitted 
as a barrister and solicitor in 1956.
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Committee obliged him to pay it lip service. It was his vanity
that caught him out. As a somewhat wry piece of revenge on his
opponents, MacBryan had persuaded Vyner to award the Star of Sarawak
to Archer and to those members of the Committee of Administration
who had been chiefly responsible for the secret agreement and the
constitutional Order. This was duly arranged but at the last
moment the Rajah and all of the designated recipients except Archer
developed cold feet. In Digby's words, they 'unanimously agreed
that acceptance of the honour would make them the laughing-stock
of their colleagues in the service . ..'^ When they asked Archer
to intercede with the Rajah so that the whole affair could be
called off, he told them angrily that it would be impossible - the
Rajah would be insulted. When Vyner indicated his own misgivings,
Archer told him that the Committee would be mortally offended if
the proceedings were cancelled. The decoration meant a great deal
to him personally. Thus it was that in a somewhat unceremonious
ceremony on 31 March an embarrassed Rajah thrust the awards into
2the hands of the equally embarrassed recipients. The consequence
was that Archer’s duplicity was increasingly clear to both sides.
However, it was the complaints to the Rajah from Le Gros Clark and
Pitt Hardacre about his irresponsibility over the Currency Fund
3which obliged him to seek 'early retirement’. He was replaced 
in early May by Le Gros Clark, perhaps the most able officer in the 
government, who had been recommended by Macaskie for the post almost 
ten years earlier.
A first draft of the constitution was ready by the middle 
of June and was immediately distributed among the Residents,
District Officers and heads of departments. Translations into jawi 
(Arabic script) and romanized Malay were later prepared so that
1 Digby, 'Lawyer in the Wilderness', pp.87-88 and personal 
communication of 2 September 1974.
2 SG, 1 April 1941; Interview with Mrs B. Pitt-Hardacre,
4 March 1975.
3 Personal communication from Mr C. Pitt Hardacre, 3 October 
19 76.
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Native Officers could also submit their remarks through the
Residents. Ong Tiang Swee gave his comments as Advisory Member of
the Committee of Administration. A month later after the incorporation
of amendments arising from these reactions and from discussions
2with Sir Shenton Thomas who had also been sent a copy, a second 
draft was circulated in like fashion and on 31 July a meeting of 
the Committee of Administration considered further changes. Three 
major criticisms of the second draft which were discussed were:
1 inclusion in the oaths of the two Councils of a section 
prohibiting fundamental amendments for 25 years
2 introduction of a self-perpetuating oligarchy by merging the
Committee of Administration with the Supreme Council
33 failure of the Rajah to retain the power of veto.
The first of these was dealt with easily by expunging the relevant 
clause and it was also agreed to recommend to the Rajah that he 
retain the power of veto, subject to its finally being overruled by 
the Council Negri. The second objection raised more difficulties.
Le Gros Clark pointed out that if the Rajah retained the right to 
appoint the members of the Supreme Council, there would have to be 
adequate safeguards against irresponsible appointments to the
4Council and wrongful dismissal from the Administrative Service.
The only member of the Committee to question the circumstances 
surrounding the origin of the constitution at this meeting was 
Thackwell Lewis who, as we have seen, was excluded from the 
consultations leading up to the secret agreement of 31 March. It 
appeared, he said, that the constitution was to be introduced ’not 
because the people of this country wanted it, but because the Ruler 
of this country was in need of money and could not obtain it by any 
other means'Consequently it was important to clear up any doubt
1 Circular memorandum from Le Gros Clark, 18 June 1941, Enclosure 3, 
'The First Constitution of Sarawak ...'
2 See Chapter IV, p.180.
3 Minutes of meeting of the Committee of Administration, 31 July 
1941, Brooke Papers, Box 10/4.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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as to the ’pure motive’ of the proposed fundamental change in 
government.
The secret agreement had already been the source of some
embarrassment. A reference to it in the first draft had been
deleted and replaced by a private requirement that each new member
of the Supreme Council should sign an undertaking to observe the
provisions of the document.^ However, Le Gros Clark now insisted
that the secret agreement was an entirely separate matter between
the Rajah and the government and had no bearing at all on the
proposed constitution. The Rajah, he said, had offered the
constitution of his own initiative 'solely because he ... considered
that this would be in the best interests of the State and its 
2peoples'. The Chief Secretary went on to give some further details 
about the circumstances leading to the Rajah's decision which were 
not recorded in the official minutes. Finally he stressed that if 
the meeting rejected the constitution, the British government would 
probably take over complete control of Sarawak since they could 
not tolerate a crisis during the current world situation. On the 
day that Hitler marched on Russia, he told the members, 'the 
independence of the State of Sarawak, despite the Treaty of 1888,
3virtually disappeared'. Sir Shenton Thomas' insistence on a 
modification of the Treaty to allow the appointment of a 'British 
Representative' was a sign of the times. Thackwell Lewis was now 
prepared to admit that the government could not 'go back on what had 
already been done' but he thought that unless the draft constitution 
was properly amended there would be the difficulty of choosing
4between a 'puppet' Rajah and an oligarchy.
The other serious critic within the Committee was Archer 
who disagreed entirely with the draft, believing that the opinions 
of the people should first be obtained through the Residents and 
the Secretaries for Chinese and Native Affairs before any decision
1 Extract from minutes of Committee of Administration meeting, 
3 June 1941, ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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was made. Le Gros Clark could only reply that the people would not
have wanted any change and it was up to the meeting to decide on their
behalf if a constitution should be introduced as requested by the
Rayah. The constitutional Order had apparently been published without
2Archer's knowledge.
Another special meeting was held on 3 August to consider
the native membership of the new Supreme Council. According to the
Datu Pahlawan, the datus were pleased with the decision to maintain
the native members of the two existing councils but they felt
that the proportion of native members of the new Council Negri
should be higher. However, he was obliged to accept that natives
should not be represented only by Malays. In this major departure
from Brooke tradition, suitability was to be the main criterion of
representation. The other objection made by the datus concerned the
Rajah's refusal to retain the right of veto but they were reassured
when Le Gros Clark told them that the Rajah had since changed his
mind. They were also prepared to accept that English should be
the language of proceedings in both new councils, although less
3than half of them spoke the language well. With the amendments 
to the second draft completed, the constitution was now ready for 
submission to Sir Shenton Thomas for approval.
The invitation from Le Gros Clark for members of the
Service to comment frankly and freely on the draft constitution
seems to have been received rather sceptically in some quarters,
particularly when the story of the secret agreement became known.
The most explicit criticisms were made by a number of senior 
4officers to Anthony Brooke in response to his own memoranda.
1 Ibid.
2 'A selection of recorded comments on the draft Constitution by 
certain Officers of the Service', Enclosure 47, 'The First 
Constitution of Sarawak ...'
3 Minutes of Committee of Administration meeting, 3 August 1941, 
ibid.
4 'A selection of recorded comments on the draft Constitution by 
certain Officers of the Service', Enclosure 47, 'The First 
Constitution of Sarawak ...' Subsequent quotations are from 
this source.
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The general reaction was that the motives behind the constitution 
had very little to do with ’Democracy' and that the Committee of 
Administration had no right to assume that they were the 'chosen 
representatives of the people'. It was pointed out by one 
District Officer that outstation Residents would seldom be able 
to attend the Council Negri, that native members would say 
'mana kata Tuan' (as Sir thinks best) to proposals put forward by 
the Treasurer, Chief Secretary and Resident of the First Division 
who would also dominate the Supreme Council. In short, it meant 
a return to the bad old days of Parnell and Calvert: 'both councils
will be a mere farce and the Country will be ruled by two men, 
without even the Rajah's power of veto. The 1939 scandal all over 
again'.
The significance of 1939, in another District Officer's 
view, was that both the Service and the natives saw it as the 
restoration of the Rajah as 'supreme head of the Government' and 
'a feeling of confidence was restored'. He believed that the 
natives could not understand the new adat and had always 'looked to 
the Rajah as their Supreme Chief'. Instead, they were going to 
have an irresponsible and frequently changing oligarchy which 
could never have their interests at heart. Thackwell Lewis' view 
was that talk of democracy and liberal institutions in Sarawak 
was 'the most dishonest humbug' and that there would be serious 
unrest among the people once it became known that the Rajah had become 
a 'mere puppet'. It would be impossible to govern, another 
District Officer added, without being able to play the trump card 
'These are His Highness' Orders':
This authority has existed for 100 years, the Natives 
and Chinese are used to it, it has been used with 
complete equity and the State and people have 
thrived under it. Lastly, but primarily, the people 
themselves like it and have asked for no other kind 
of rule.
One head of department summed up their position this way:
We are, I think, in agreement over the essentials ...
In my opinion, what the country needs is a Rajah who has 
the power of veto and, ideally, the power to appoint his 
ministers but who has no control over revenue and 
is not an absentee. In other words, we want a Rajah
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literally in Council. This sounds simple enough, but 
when one tries to make rules to ensure the observance 
of all these conditions one finds that it is not so 
easy.
In its final form, the constitution consolidated the 
position of power which the Committee had assumed by means of the 
constitutional Order of 31 March. Under the new bi-cameral system, 
all of the Rajah’s prerogative powers were henceforth to be 
exercised by ’the Rajah-in-Council' - the Rajah acting on the advice 
and consent of the Supreme Council - while the sole power of 
legislating (by the enactment of Orders) was vested in the Rajah 
acting with the advice and consent of the Council Negri.
Membership of the two Councils was also arranged in such a way 
that European officers would have the decisive voice. Fourteen of 
the Council Negri’s twenty-five members were to be appointed from the 
Sarawak Civil Service, nine of them ex officio and five by the 
Rajah-in-Council. Within the Council Negri, officers who were also 
members of the Council Negri were to constitute a majority, the 
Chief Secretary and the Treasurer being appointed ex officio and 
members of the old Supreme Council remaining members of the new 
Council during their lifetimes. The only significant prerogative 
now possessed by the Rajah was that which had been insisted upon 
by the Committee of Administration against his initial inclinations: 
the power of appointing other members of the Supreme Council.
During his absence from the state, the Officer Administering the 
Government would assume all of his powers. In accordance with 
Anthony’s recommendation based on the Johore system, he was empowered 
to refuse bills passed by the Council Negri but this could be 
overcome if the legislation were passed on three successive 
occasions.
Most importantly, perhaps, the power of the purse-strings 
was now firmly in the hands of the bureaucracy. As from 1 January 
1941 no public money was to be expended without the authority of 
the Council Negri. One question which the constitution failed to 
clarify was the succession, providing only that if the Rajah died, 
'the person who shall have been proclaimed Heir' would be proclaimed
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Rajah by the Supreme Council, subject to the provision of the 1888 
Treaty. However, the possibility of a Malay Rajah was anticipated 
in the stipulation that ’No person who is not a British subject 
or a native of Sarawak shall be competent to be or become Rajah
Significantly enough, the Preamble, which had more impact 
ultimately than any other part of the constitution, received no 
attention during the deliberations. The nine ’Cardinal Principles' 
were supposed to embody the essence of Brooke rule and consequently 
deserve to be quoted at length:
1 That Sarawak is the heritage of Our Subjects and 
is held in trust by Ourselves for them.
2 That social and educational services shall be 
developed and improved and the standard of living 
of the people of Sarawak shall steadily be raised.
3 That never shall any person or persons be 
granted rights inconsistent with those of the 
people of this country or be in any way permitted 
to exploit Our Subjects or those who have sought 
Our protection and care.
4 That justice shall be easily obtainable and that 
the Rajah and every public servant shall be 
freely accessible to the public.
5 That freedom of: expression both in speech and 
writing shall be permitted and encouraged and 
that everyone shall be entitled to worship as 
he pleases.
6 That public servants shall ever remember that 
they are but the servants of the people on whose 
goodwill and co-operation they are entirely 
dependent.
7 That so far as may be Our Subjects of whatever 
race or creed shall be freely and impartially 
admitted to offices in Our Service, the duties
of which they may be qualified by their education, 
ability and integrity duly to discharge.
8 That the goal of self-government shall always 
be kept in mind, that the people of Sarawak 
shall be entrusted in due course with the 
governance of themselves, and that continuous 
efforts shall be made to hasten the reaching 
of this goal by educating them in the 
obligations, the responsibilities, and the 
privileges of citizenship.
9 That the general policy of Our predecessors 
and Ourselves whereby the various races of 
the State have been enabled to live in
Ill
happiness and harmony together shall! be 
adhered to by Our successors and Our 
servants and all who may follow them 
hereafter.
Although the promise of self-government implicit in (8) was probably 
intended more as democratic 'window-dressing' for outside 
consumption than anything else, it was to provide the more 
politically conscious Malays and Ibans of the immediate post-war 
years with a political charter.
The other irony, however, was that the constitution also 
provided the British government in 1946 with a legal framework 
which could be used almost indefinitely to facilitate colonial 
bureaucratic rule. As one Australian lawyer practising in Singapore 
observed in later years:
... this Constitution enabled power to be exercised 
by the Colonial Administration clothed in 
representation but so absolute in operation that 
it could when desired be directed tyrannically ... 
whilst in form it appeared to grant power to the 
people its provisions were such as to enable the 
executive to carry through any measures required 
without opposition or to ignore whatever slight 
opposition could arise ...
While the idea of a constitution appears to have
originated from Pitt Hardacre as a quid pro quo for the $2,000,000,
concern about the future of the State and the way in which his
nephew was likely to conduct himself as Rajah may have led Vyner
Brooke or MacBryan to see it as a means of limiting Anthony's scope
for action. This was certainly the impression held by Digby who
told a friend in the Colonial Office in May 1941 that the Rajah,
'seeing death gradually approaching, decided to tie his nephew in
such a way that he could not avenge himself for the various slights
2he had suffered from the Rajah's friends and relations!' If this 
was indeed one of the main considerations influencing the Rajah,
1 Mark Morrison Papers, ML MSS 863, Item 3. Mark Morrison practised 
in Malaya c.1928-42 and established the first legal firm in 
Sarawak after the war.
2 Extract of a letter from Digby to A.R. Thomas, 14 May 1941,
CO 531/30 [53011/4].
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his unwillingness to retain any prerogative rights may be more 
easily understood.
In many ways the Rajah’s action had provided the Committee 
with the opportunity for which they had been waiting. The Rajah's 
advancing age and the uncertainty of the succession suggested to 
the Committee’s members that they would become increasingly responsible 
for the affairs of State. The constitution, however, was only 
intended as a temporary measure. As Digby explained at the time, it 
'merely handed over the Rajah's powers to the C. of A. until a more 
permanent arrangement could be agreed upon'.'*’ Many years later 
Digby was more specific:
It was a stop-gap arrangement, and by no means 
satisfactory as the permanent solution, because 
in the absence of any sort of elective system, 
its substantial effect was to conver the 
Committee of Administration into a self-
Operpetuating oligarchy.
At the same time, the constitution was seen as a means of
forestalling anticipated British pressure for governmental reform.
Although there was no overt British pressure for constitutional change,
the appointment of Pepys as General Adviser had been a sign of the
3times. The arrival of British Punjabi troops in early 1941 suggested 
to some senior bureaucrats that Sarawak's sovereignty was now only 
technical and that constitutional reforms should be made in order to 
pre-empt the otherwise inevitable British intervention in Sarawak's 
internal affairs. As far as these men were concerned, British 
intervention could only be for the worse. From the small pond of 
the Sarawak Service where they could be their own masters, they 
would be flung willy-nilly into the much larger, more competitive and 
altogether less comfortable pond of the British Colonial Service.
Reactions to the Constitution
It is difficult to gauge the reactions of the people of Sarawak to 
these radical constitutional changes. Due to the absence of 
documentary evidence we cannot discount the possibility that
1 Ibid.
2 Personal communication from Mr K.H. Digby, 11 August 1974.
3 See ChapterlV , p.192.
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they went largely unnoticed, except by Ong Tiang Swee who had been
present at the Committee of Administration discussions and by those
Native Officers who were asked for their reactions to the draft.
However, a number of penghulus from the Baram district were
sufficiently concerned about the Proclamation to travel 500 miles to
Kuching in order to obtain a reassurance from the Rajah that he and
his successors would continue to maintain personal responsibility
for their welfare. The District Officer at Marudi, Donald Hudden,
would have been out of sympathy with the Rajah’s announcement but
the penghulus apparently consulted neither him nor the Resident
before making their long journey."^ The only other recorded response
was an official petition from Malays of the Bintulu district which
was delivered at the height of Anthony Brooke's paper war with the
2Secretariat in August and may well have been inspired by him. The
Committee of Administration certainly treated it with considerable
scepticism, pointing out that nothing similar had issued from any
3other part of the state.
It must have seemed incredible that the Rajah should wish 
to surrender his powers to a committee of bureaucrats whose 
predecessors he had dismissed only two years earlier. European 
officers beyond the charmed circle of Committee of Administration 
members and their friends were roused to hostility by the 31 March 
announcement. G.E. Bettison, a newly-arrived customs officer, wrote in 
his diary that some of his colleagues had become 'violently anti- 
Sarawak as a result'. His own reactions were those of a man who had 
been attracted to Sarawak by its unique political system:
... "constitutional" my foot! I came out here 
because it was an autocracy - to me, romantic Sarawak 
is dead from now on - in fact, apart from it's not 
yet being run by the chaotic collection of idiots 
known as the Colonial Service, it has just about 
degenerated in one fatal step to the level of a colony
1 Anthony Brooke, 'Note on Political Reform in Sarawak', Enclosure 
31, 'The First Constitution of Sarawak ...'
2 Anthony Brooke was at pains to discount this possibility at the 
time, and to emphasize that he had in fact opposed the idea of 
a petition. But in an interview in London on 21 February 1975 
he admitted it was likely that he had had some influence.
3 Le Gros Clark to Resident, Miri, 8 September 1941, Enclosure 
54, 'The First Constitution of Sarawak ...'
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instead of being independent - I don’t say that it 
may not lead to the State being governed in a better 
way, but it is nevertheless the end of a piece of 
history - it has just sunk to the common standard 
of the rest of the world .. .
The only public comment in Sarawak on the constitutional 
proposal was from the Sarawak Gazette whose editor applied a highly 
flattering gloss to what he must have known was an exceedingly 
grubby affair:
At this time, when Democracy is engaged in a life and 
death struggle with Dictatorship, this re-affirmation 
by His Highness of his belief in the Democratic ideal 
is of a great significance. Democracy is not, as 
Hitler would have the world believe, a state system.
It is a living organism, subject to growth and change.
Here, in Sarawak, we have seen its principles at work, 
the present moving from the past, the future implicit 
in the present.
Apart from the Colonial Office, whose reactions will be 
discussed in another chapter, the two most interested observers in 
Britain were Stirling Boyd and Bertram Brooke. Dismissing the 
provision for native representation as 'purely rhetorical', Boyd 
was much more interested in the Order which, instead of vesting 
legislative power in the Rajah with the advice and consent of the 
Committee of Administration, had entrusted it to the Officer 
Administering the Government. 'It would be interesting to know on 
what theory of government this proposal is based,' he wrote. 'It
3seems to partake of the nature of a partial and temporary abdication'. 
Boyd doubted whether the Rajah could legally or ethically divest 
himself of his responsibility as ruler and still remain Rajah. He 
also thought it 'clearly anomalous' and 'indefensible in principle' 
that the Officer Administering the Government should have the duty 
of assenting to or disallowing Orders which had been discussed by a 
Committee in which he had already had a voice. Others like Parnell 
who had known him for a long time were highly sceptical of the 
Rajah actually surrendering administrative responsibility and were 
more concerned about the implications of Le Gros Clark, 'a Tuan
1 G.E. Bettison, 'Sarawak Diary 1939-41', Rhodes House MSS Pac.s.56.
2 SG3 1 April 1941.
3 Memorandum entitled 'Constitutional Changes', Boyd Papers, Box 5/2.
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Muda-ite', being made Chief Secretary in Archer's place.
Bertram Brooke could not imagine for a moment that the
constitution was the Rajah's own initiative. He believed that it was
MacBryan's idea and that MacBryan had written the 31 March address
with its important provisions relating to the succession. In a
letter to the Rajah of 2 May he expressed this suspicion and insisted
there was no basis for the Rajah's claim that he was carrying out
the wishes of his predecessors. The address had been delivered
without sufficient consideration of the issues involved and the
projected constitution would be nothing more than 'a fertile field
2for political intrigue'. In his first detailed critique completed
shortly afterwards he was at some pains to emphasize that he was
not motivated by any personal interest in the succession. He believed,
however, that the scheme was not the Rajah's own and had been 'put
before him in an attractive guise as a wonderful gesture which will3put the crowning touch on his long and honourable career ...'
As for the Preamble's statement that the Rajah was merely honouring 
the pledge of his predecessors, he believed it to be an historical 
fact that 'neither of them ever contemplated the day when Sarawak 
would become a self-governing community'. There was no evidence 
that the people themselves wanted a change and he regarded it as a 
'dangerous experiment' which was almost certain to destroy the good 
relations between the races which had been successfully fostered by 
the Brookes. He believed that the loyalty shown towards the Brooke 
Raj grew from the people's faith in the Rajah's paternal capacity 
to right wrongs. If the Rajah divested himself of this power he 
would cease to be Rajah in their eyes. Indeed, he would be forced 
to abandon the state to chaos unless the constitution idea was 
scrapped:
1 Parnell to Boyd, 16 August 1941, Boyd Papers, Box 5, unfoliated.
2 Cited by Bertram Brooke in 'Events prior to and following 
inception of Constitution, especially bearing on the question 
of succession', Brooke Papers, Box 2/3.
3 Bertram Brooke, 'Self-Government For Sarawak', 10 May 1941, 
Brooke Papers, Box 11/2. Subsequent quotations from this
source.
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Because the present system has been carefully built 
up throughout the course of 100 years to suit a 
paternal autocratic regime, it would be inviting 
disaster to try and tinker with it and make it 
suit something radically different. The present 
machine would have to be scrapped, and a new one 
designed. Some of the present parts might be used 
after suitable reshaping and adjustment, but the 
mainspring, the Rajah himself, would be entirely 
out of place in any such structure. It is 
impossible to design an effective machine with a 
mainspring which has the power of altering its 
course, and going round in the opposite direction, 
as the whole thing would be wrecked should this 
take place, however unlikely it may be.
The whole notion of representative government in Sarawak, 
he argued, was quite impractical anyway. The Ibans would inevitably 
be represented by people like Kana and Asun^ who ’would have their 
own ways of assuring that they obtained a majority’, and the Malays 
by those 'most capable of intrigue’. The datus would have to be 
scrapped and the Treasury fundamentally reorganized. This did not 
mean, he concluded, that the Committee of Administration was not 
capable of drawing up 'a sort of hotchpot [sic] of regulations, 
combining the old with the new, which might look alright in a blue­
print' , but there was no chance of creating a system of self- 
government which would make the people of Sarawak happier and more 
prosperous.
Referring to the constitutional structure of Tonga, he 
thought it would be tragic if the centenary of Brooke rule was marked 
by the inception of a scheme which future historians would refer to 
as 'a Protected State enjoying a sort of comic opera self-government'.
Anthony Brooke and the Constitution
The most dramatic reaction to the constitution in its various drafts 
came from Anthony Brooke who at the time of the 31 March proclamation 
was District Officer at Sarikei. While we have seen that he did not 
express opposition to the idea of a constitution in his reply to the 
Rajah's memorandum of 17 March, he was alarmed at the latitude
1 See Chapter V, p.199-200.
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which the proclamation gave to the Committee of Administration. 
Consequently he asked for the proclamation to be amended so that 
the Committee would be obliged to submit the ’required legislative 
measures' to the Rajah before any action was taken to put them into 
effect. Otherwise, he said, the Rajah's action would be open to 
misinterpretation not only in Sarawak but in the foreign press.^
The Rajah agreed to make this amendment although it was not 
incorporated in the subsequent Sarawak Government Gazette.
Anthony's attitude changed quickly when he talked to
Pitt Hardacre who had been sent specially by the Committee of
Administration to Sarikei to explain to him the circumstances of
the secret agreement. Anthony was prepared to support the Committee's
action on condition that there was a determined effort to get rid
of MacBryan whom be lieved to have 'engineered the whole arrangement'
and volunteered to return with Hardacre to Kuching to address the 
2Committee. Hardacre also had strong views about MacBryan. After 
long talks with Anthony and Native Officer Abang Openg, he wrote:
I have given this matter a lot of thought and I 
hate the idea of what might appear to be taking 
a hefty kick at a lame dog. But MacBryan is NOT 
lame - he is waiting for the crash, so we must strike 
first and HARD. It is in the best interests of the 
State and of the British Empire that he should be 
removed immediately (this week end) from Sarawak, as 
a Defence Measure.
Anthony had also offered to cable Sir Shenton Thomas seeking his 
support and to accompany Le Gros Clark to Singapore if necessary to 
have discussions with him.
On 4 April Anthony addressed the Committee, obtaining 
unanimous support from them for his plan to tell the Rajah on their 
behalf that MacBryan 'constituted a danger to the internal security 
of the State and therefore to Imperial interests ...' and should be
1 Anthony Brooke to Vyner Brooke, 31 March 1941, Enclosure 11, 
'The First Constitution of Sarawak ...'
2 'Notes by Mr C. Pitt Hardacre ... for the consideration of 
Committee of Administration', Enclosure 14, Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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deported. However, Vyner became extremely flustered at the
suggestion. ’You can get rid of me but you can’t get rid of
2MacBryan’ he told an astonished Anthony. Having failed in this
first attempt to get rid of MacBryan, Anthony obtained permission
from the Committee and the Rajah to visit Singapore where he put
3his views to Sir Shenton Thomas on 7 April. However, the Governor 
had earlier that day received another account of events from Le 
Gros Clark whose opinion he seems to have been more prepared to 
trus t.
Anthony's precipitate action had important repercussions.
Not only was Vyner 'seriously displeased', insisting on a full
explanation for Anthony's visit and suggesting to Archer that he
4should be disciplined, but MacBryan was threatening to sue him for 
libel. All this placed the Committee in a very awkward position. 
They had originally agreed to Anthony's plan to interview the 
Rajah but were now under pressure to take action against him for 
leaving his post without proper permission. Moreover, if MacBryan 
took his case to court, the details of the secret agreement 
would be publicly revealed with the consequent risk of British 
intervention. They succeeded in persuading MacBryan not to go ahead 
with his action but it was a more difficult task to reduce Anthony 
to quiescence. When Archer wrote on 12 April delivering an official 
reprimand on behalf of the Committee,“* Anthony suggested in stinging 
language that the Chief Secretary's inconsistent behaviour was 
'indirectly the result of extreme pressure from an unofficial 
source ...', which it was his duty to resist. One result of 
Anthony's reply was that Vyner decided there would no longer be any 
relationship between them and would henceforth regard him as 'merely 
a junior Government Officer'.^ Another was the Committee's
1 Ibid.
2 Interview with Anthony Brooke, 6 November 1974.
3 Diary of Sir Shenton Thomas, 7 April 1941, Rhodes House uncat. MSS.
4 Vyner Brooke to Archer, 7 April 1941, Enclosure 18, 'The First 
Constitution of Sarawak ...'
5 Archer to Anthony Brooke, 12 April 1941, Enclosure 19, ibid.
6 Anthony Brooke to Archer, 17 April 1941, Enclosure 20, ibid.
7 Archer to Anthony Brooke, 21 April 1941, Enclosure 25, ibid.
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decision to transfer him to Bintulu where he would not find it so 
easy to make quick visits to Kuching or to meet other officers.
What had upset the Rajah and Archer perhaps more than 
anything else was the tone of Anthony's replies which they regarded 
as most inappropriate to a junior officer. But Anthony was completely 
unrepentant and his letter to Archer of 23 April carried the full 
weight of his conviction that history would justify him:
... it might help you to understand the tone of these 
letters if I were to remind you that, apart from being 
a 'junior District Officer', my name is Anthony Brooke, 
and ... the outcome of this matter may have important 
repercussions on the Sarawak history. It is therefore 
essential that this affair should receive the 
consideration it deserves, and that the true and complete 
story of this matter should be placed on the files for 
purposes of future record.^
For several months peace reigned over Bintulu but receipt of the draft
constitution aroused Anthony to new heights of moral indignation.
Describing the document as an 'impersonal and revolutionary
monstrosity', he proclaimed his intention of opposing it by all 
2legitimate means. He accordingly circulated two memoranda within 
the Administrative Service in the hope of gaining support. These 
were important not only because they had some influence on the 
final form of the constitution but because they constituted one 
of the rare efforts to see Sarawak in the wider context of British 
colonies and their constitutional systems.
In his 'Note on Political Reform in Sarawak' written before 
he had seen the first draft of the constitution, Anthony accepted 
the principle that autocratic rule should be limited in some way 
by political machinery which would eventually enable the people of 
Sarawak to express their views and play an increasing part in the 
administration of the country. The Rajah's power could be 
'constitutionalized' or modified by the establishment of an advisory 
council which would provide the best advice available, but it was 
'imperative' that the Rajah should retain the legal right to reject 
this advice:
1 Anthony Brooke to Archer, 23 April 1941, Enclosure 26, ibid.
2 Anthony Brooke to Le Gros Clark, 8 July 1941, Enclosure 29, ibid.
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... it is only by the retention of this prerogative that 
he can keep the pledge which he has given to his people 
and shoulder the responsibilities of the Sacred Trust 
which no impersonal Council can fulfil. It is ... only  ^
thus that he can remain Rajah in the eyes of his people.
Furthermore, he added, the constitution should not be introduced in
such a way as to suggest that a radical change was taking place.
The people wanted and expected the Rajah to act as an autocrat and
it was essential to avoid any impression that his position was being
weakened. ’ ... The Rajah's power and authority’, he concluded
hopefully, 'will presumably be upheld and strengthened by the 
2Constitution'.
To support his comments, Anthony cited Archer's own 
reference to Iban conservatism in his Administration Report for 1940 
and a number of statements from the Le Gros Clark Report of 1935 
which, he emphasized, represented the views of most Administrative 
Officers at that time. The burden of all this was while the natives 
looked to the Rajah for everything, any system of government designed 
to fulfil the moral responsibilities of indirect rule still needed 
'the sanction of traditional usage' and the acquiescence of the 
people.
3In his second commentary, Anthony was not so much concerned 
with the details of the draft constitution which were now known to 
him as with the fundamental principles of native administration which 
he believed it transgressed. In an oblique reference to the secret 
agreement, he described the constitution as an emergency measure 
introduced for a specific purpose as yet unknown to the public and 
that under these circumstances it was premature to prepare a 
permanent Order laying down Sarawak's constitutional structure. He 
also pointed to the irony of the situation in which the Rajah was 
'being made to act ... far more autocratically than he has every 
done before'. The Rajah, he said, possessed the legal right to 
shelve his responsibility. The question, however, was whether it was
1 Enclosure 31, ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 'The Constitution of Sarawak', Enclosure 32, ibid. Subsequent 
quotations from this source.
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morally right that he should be advised or allowed to do so. If the 
Rajah signed the constitution in its existing form he would be
signing away to an ever-changing impersonal body the 
sacred trust which he and his forebears have held on 
behalf of the people since 1841; he will be vesting 
this trust in a small oligarchy comprising a majority 
of European Officials, to whom the people themselves 
have expressed no desire that the trust should be 
transferred, and who may lose confidence in their 
Rajah when they discover that this transfer has been 
effected.
He would appear to them as a 'guardian who has broken his sacred 
pledge', and their perception was much more important than that of 
Europeans in the state.
Anthony invoked three principles from the experience of 
British administrators in Africa to support his case against the 
constitution: the people themselves should be consulted and their
consent obtained before any important change was undertaken; 
political institutions and methods should be deeply rooted in the 
traditions of the people; and successful democratic institutions 
could only develop through a process of gradual evolution as they had 
in Europe. Citing Sir Donald Cameron's dictum that the 'essence of true 
indirect administration is the allegiance of a people to a tribal 
head', Anthony believed that the allegiance accorded the Rajah was no 
different from that accorded tribal heads in East Africa. The fact 
that the Rajah was a white man, he added, was irrelevant to the 
maintenance of his prestige and authority, 'the cardinal principle 
is that his authority must on no account be weakened'. Under the 
proposed constitution, however, the Rajah and his successors would 
not retain the legal authority to exercise the responsibilities still 
expected of them by the people. 'This glaring fact', he commented, 
'should be sufficient to condemn the present form of Constitution as 
wholly unpracticable'.
The constitutional model towards which Anthony turned for 
guidance was the Unfederated State of Johore where executive authority 
was vested in the Sultan in his Executive Council and legislative 
authority in the Sultan in his State Council. The Sultan appointed 
the Executive Council and could act against its advice as long as he
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recorded in writing the grounds for his disagreement. Likewise he 
retained a veto power over legislation which could only be overcome 
by the passing of the same enactment in three successive State 
Council meetings and again after the lapse of a year, in which case 
the Sultan's moral responsibility for the legislation ceased.
Sarawak's system of government was more autocratic than Johore’s 
and was not limited by the effective power of the General Adviser. 
Consequently there was an even closer parallel with the position of 
colonial governors who exercised substantially autocratic power 
subject only to the advice of their councils. This advice could be 
rejected but in that event the case had to be reported to the Secretary 
of State in detail and council members were entitled to enter their 
opinions in the minutes.
Anthony agreed that there should be a brake on the autocratic 
authority of the Rajah but his solution was to adopt the same 
procedure followed by Sir Shenton Thomas in the event of his 
disagreeing with his own councils. This would only necessitate a 
slight modification of the 1888 Treaty and the internal independence 
of Sarawak 'would not, save in the case of the exceptional and probably 
theoretical circumstances provided for, be in the least affected'.
On further consideration, he told his father, it would not even be 
necessary to amend the Treaty:
... the required limitation ... could ... be ensured 
by means of a separate unilateral agreement with 
His Majesty's Government, whereby the Rajah would 
undertake to record his reasons in writing in the 
event of his decision not to accept the advice of 
the Councils on any point, and would forward a full 
report, containing the views expressed by each member, 
to His Excellency the British Agent.
He also suggested that as in Johore there should be a provision in the 
new constitution allowing the Rajah to refuse a bill on three 
successive occasions so that it could only be passed after the 
lapse of a year. This would provide a 'double brake on autocratic 
action'.^
1 Anthony Brooke to Bertram Brooke, 19 August 1941, Enclosure 46, 
'The First Constitution of Sarawak ...'
2 Ibid.
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Copies of the two memoranda were sent by Le Gros Clark to
Sir Shenton Thomas in Singapore who wrote to Anthony reproaching him
for what he regarded as hasty and ill-considered action.^ The
Governor had already approved the second draft subject to certain
amendments and was impatient with Anthony’s criticisms. Sir
Shenton’s poor opinion of Vyner and his confidence in Le Gros Clark
and the other members of the Committee of Administration, together
with his belief that the constitution would facilitate British
intervention, provided strong reasons for seeing that it was duly
enacted. Anthony's response, however, was a determined effort to
upset the constitution at all costs. He was furious with the Governor
for approving the draft and tried to embarrass Le Gros Clark by
asking him for a definite assurance that the 1888 Treaty had not been
broken. In the absence of such an assurance, he added, 'it must be
assumed that His Majesty's Government is already actively concerned
2in the internal administration of this State'. When the Chief 
Secretary was loath to reply to this and other messages from Bintulu, 
Anthony sent a telegram designed to bring matters to a head:
I would like to be instructed by Government to 
negotiate with His Majesty's Government for an 
enduring peace on our terms, not an Armistice 
nor a compromise. I would take to Singapore an 
olive branch protruding in my left hand and a 
very heavy sledge hammer concealed in my right.
I know exactly what I am talking about. These 
German methods are intolerable and are 
inconsistent with the dignity of His Majesty's 
Government. Strength must be shown now or never.
If anyone gets tough remember that the will of 
the people and the law of God are more important 
than the whims of rulers and the law of man.
If necessary rebel ...^
But the Committee of Administration was unwilling to allow Anthony 
to come to Kuching to present his views in spite of the recommendation
1 Shenton Thomas to Anthony Brooke, 16 July 1941, Enclosure 38, 
ibid.
2 Anthony Brooke to Le Gros Clark, 22 July 1941, Enclosure 43, ibid.
3 Anthony Brooke to Le Gros Clark, 8 September 1941, Enclosure 51, 
ibid.
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of the Resident at Miri, R.L. Daubeny, who was told instead to 
suspend him from duty."*" At this point Anthony decided to burn all 
his bridges and go to Kuching to seek a hearing. Before leaving 
Miri he fired off a cable to Sir Shenton Thomas which he must have 
known was bound to secure his dismissal:
The proposed constitution has a background of intrigue, 
treachery, humbug and bad faith, sufficient to 
condemn the people of this stricken land to hang 
their heads in shame and misery for years to come.
This background must be entirely forgotten before 
any form of Constitution can again be considered.
It exceeds in sheer horror all the lowest depths to 
which Humanity can sink. I do not blame this 
Government which has been blackmailed for the past 
6 months and once in the clutch of an unprincipled 
Atheist [MacBryan] holding a position of power 
there is no easy withdrawal. For the Constitution 
to be forced on the people of Sarawak in the 
present circumstances would rival the blackest 
political crime since the dawn of enlightened 
Government. The British Commonwealth is at war 
but the cause for which we are fighting means 
nothing ^f this outrageous measure is allowed to 
triumph.
When the ship on which Anthony was travelling reached Kuching he
was handed a letter announcing his dismissal on the grounds of
insubordination and advising him to go on to Singapore. On arriving
there he declined Sir Shenton Thomas’ suggestion that he should
withdraw his most outspoken statements and consequently be allowed
3to resign instead. Before leaving, however, he wrote to Le Gros
Clark that the telegrams which he had sent before leaving Sarawak
and the decision itself were in his capacity as a member of the
Brooke family, not as a District Officer. 'I would also like to
say’, he told him, ’how sorry I am for any confusion which may
have arisen from any failure on my part to make it quite clear to
Government when I was acting as a member of the Sarawak Civil
4Service and when as a member of the Brooke family. To the Chief
1 Note by Anthony Brooke on his cable to Jones, 11 September 1941, 
Enclosure 56, ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Note by Anthony Brooke, op. cit.
4 Anthony Brooke to Le Gros Clark, - September 1941, Enclosure 57, 
'The First Constitution of Sarawak ...'
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Secretary and the other members of the Committee of Administration 
it must by then have seemed a somewhat artificial distinction.
In the meantime, elaborate preparations were under way
for the celebration of one hundred years of Brooke rule. But
Vyner was profoundly uninterested in the Centenary celebrations.^
One or two brandies and a good deal of persuasion were needed to get
2him out of bed on the morning of 24 September and he declined to
attend either the Centenary Memorial Service at St Thomas'
Cathedral or the two race meetings where he was supposed to present 
3the cups. Indeed, he left Kuching for Singapore and the Cameron
Highlands as soon as it was decently possible, refusing in no uncertain
terms to open the first meeting of the newly constituted Council
Negri in November, in spite of Sir Shenton Thomas' pointed suggestion
4that he should be present. However, the Governor had also 
persuaded him of Singapore's invulnerability in the event of a 
Japanese attack and it was in this confidence that he sailed for 
Australia with MacBryan on 25 November 1941.
The Constitution and the Succession
As late as August, Bertram Brooke had still not received a copy of the 
draft constitution but he knew that the Colonial Office was 
'interested' and wished to study it before final approval was given 
by the Rajah. Writing to Vyner, he recalled the Secretary of State's 
reaction in 1933 to rumours about the succession and warned that the 
section of his 31 March address dealing with the succession was 
probably causing similar concern:
Had this been worded so as to empower the C. of A. 
to consult the BG with a view to entering into 
a fresh Treaty if convinced that this would best serve 
the interests of the State, it would have been 
another matter, but the charge upon the C. of A. 
to actually select your successor and only consult 
them if their selection lies outside the line laid
1 For an account of the centenary celebrations, see Sarawak Gazette 
Centenary Number, 20 October 1941.
2 Interview with Mr E.H. Elam, February 1975.
3 Thackwell Lewis, 'A short note ...'
4 Ibid.
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down in the Treaty, and disputes arise in consequence 
... is all wrong.1 23456
Attempting to look at the situation as might an outsider, he was 
highly sceptical that the Committee would deliberate and choose a 
successor without considering the Rajah’s views. ’If I had your 
standing in the country’, he wrote, 'with rights of appointment to 
the Supreme Council and of veto, I would guarantee to get any 
successor I wanted appointed by them, as being the country's choice.’'
A month later, having received a copy at last from the
colonial office, Bertram cabled Vyner that he hoped to find in it
something which would dispell his fear that formal acceptance of the
provision that he should be Heir apparent during Vyner's lifetime
3would cause dispute and embarrassment. Two days later he received
a cable from Vyner asking him to ’telegraph immediately do you wish
4to continue to be my heir or not'. Vyner pointed out that Bertram 
had never indicated acceptance of his position as heir and this was 
something that the Supreme Council wished to have clarified before 
the constitution, now approved by the British government, was finally 
enacted.“* Bertram replied, however, that no such declaration on 
his part was necessary since the line of succession was clearly laid 
down in the political wills of the first two Rajahs and confirmed in 
the 1888 Treaty.^
On 23 September, Le Gros Clark asked the Rajah for a 
written expression of his views on the succession and this was 
included in the agenda of the first meeting of the newly-constituted 
Supreme Council two days later. Vyner thought that if he predeceased 
Bertram, his brother should succeed him - but only on condition
1 Bertram Brooke to Vyner Brooke, 16 August 1941, Brooke Papers,
Box 2/3.
2 Ibid.
3 Bertram Brooke to Le Gros Clark, 17 September 1941, Brooke Papers, 
Box 2/3.
4 Vyner Brooke to Bertram Brooke, 19 September 1941, Brooke Papers, 
Box 2/3.
5 Vyner Brooke to Bertram Brooke, 19 September 1941, 'Events ...', 
Brooke Papers, Box 2/3.
6 Bertram Brooke to Vyner Brooke, 22 September 1941, ibid.
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that he publicly accepted the position of heir and agreed to the 
constitution. Moreover, an Act of Succession should be passed 
stipulating that in the event of his own and Bertram’s death during 
the minority of Simon Brooke Mackay, Leonora should be proclaimed 
Regent until his grandson came of age and was proclaimed Rajah.
If Simon came of age while either one of them was alive, he would 
still be proclaimed Rajah. By now Vyner was absolutely determined 
to exclude Anthony from any possibility of succeeding to the Raj:
I consider that these measures are necessary because 
of the opinion I have formed that my nephew Peter 
Brooke, given two great opportunities by my good­
will, has proved himself irresponsible and unfitted 
to become Rajah of Sarawak. And I feel it to be my 
foremost duty to Sarawak and its People to prevent 
the possibility of there ever being a Rajah who is 
unprepared and unwilling to defer to the opinion of  ^
a majority of his Advisers and to accept discipline.
Summing up the position, Le Gros Clark pointed out that under the new 
constitution the nomination of an heir was the responsibility of the 
Rajah in Council, unless the Council decided that the question should 
be left entirely to the Rajah’s own discretion. Faced with this 
difficult task, the Council decided that its Malay members should 
examine the question in the light of Malay custom before any decision 
was made.
At the next meeting on 29 September, the Datu Pahlawan 
reported the Malay members’ agreement with the proposal that Bertram 
should remain the heir on condition that he publicly accepted the 
position and that an Act of Succession be passed. Questioned on 
Malay custom, he said that the right of selecting an heir belonged 
only to the reigning Rajah, subject to the agreement of his ministers 
and the stipulation that he could not bind his heir in the nomination 
of future heirs. The reason for this, he added, was that it was 
not always possible to judge the suitability of future heirs, 
particularly if they were minors. The most important factor was 
the suitability of the nominee. The Malay members believed that 
unless the Tuan Muda declared his acceptance of the position of Heir
1 ’Minutes of Meeting of the Supreme Council ... 25th September 
1941 ...', Brooke Papers, Box 10/4.
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Presumptive in the light of the constitution he should be disinherited. 
There would be no opposition from the people to the nomination of 
another member of the Brooke family, including the Rajah's daughters, 
as heir. Once again, however, the Council could not agree on a 
course of action and the question was referred once more to the Malay 
members for further consideration.'*'
On 1 October the Malay members submitted their final
views, the only difference being their desire that legislation should
be enacted empowering a reigning Rajah to nominate his heir subject
to the agreement of his ministers. A letter from the Rajah was also
read in which he expressed disinclination to 'dry-nurse' a successor
in whom he had 'not the slightest interest'. 'As far as Anthony
Brooke is concerned in the future of Sarawak', he added, 'this does
not interest me at all except that he and I are perfect starngers
[sic] and that he knows he cannot presume on his relationship with 
2me'. The Council then decided to embody the Malay members' 
findings in four formal resolutions, the last of which required the 
Tuan Muda to accept the position of Heir Presumptive under the 
constitution. It was also agreed that the succession bill should 
be forwarded to the British government for approval before it was 
introduced in the Council Negri. The letter calling upon the Tuan Muda 
to declare his acceptance was to be drawn up by the Supreme Council 
and signed by the Rajah.
The Rajah, however, was not content with this measured
procedure:
I do not wish to have any more delay about this 
matter of the succession and accordingly I must 
ask that the fullest particulars of all that has 
occurred be immediately telegraphed to H.H. and 
that he be asked to indicate his intentions 
by telegraph forthwith. I want the question of 
the succession to be settled at once so that I 
may be able to leave the State for my holiday
1 'Minutes of Meeting of the Supreme Council ... 29th September 
[1941] . ..', Brooke Papers, Box 10/4.
2 'Minutes of Meeting of the Supreme Council ... 1st October, 
1941 . ..', Brooke Papers, Box 10/4.
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without the feeling that yet another crisis may 
arise upon this subject ...1
The next meeting of the Council on 10 October accordingly considered
a draft telegram to Bertram incorporating the contents of the letter
and although it was decided to despatch this in deference to the
Rajah's wishes, the members recorded their feeling that a letter
2would have been preferable. When Bertram was subsequently asked 
to indicate his formal acceptance of the position of heir, he 
replied that acceptance of the position of heir-apparent by the
3heir presumptive during the Rajah's reign might cause difficulties. 
Impatient to leave Sarawak and no doubt infuriated by his brother's 
stonewalling, the Rajah insisted that he should indicate immediately 
if he wanted to be heir, otherwise the Council would settle the matter 
themselves.^
At this point Bertram decided to make a stand. In a long 
cable to Vyner he spelled out his position in some detail:
I took an oath of loyalty to you when on your 
accession you swore to uphold the methods of 
Government laid down by your predecessors. My 
loyalty to you precludes me from criticising 
your own motives in rejecting this obligation 
or suggesting that it is done otherwise than in 
good faith or attempting to interfere in the 
course you are pursuing except by giving you my 
own candid views as instructed. You know that 
these views are that much might be said for 
closer colaboration [sic] with British Government 
to guard against possible abuse of his position 
by some future Rajah but that I consider 
innovation increases possibility of such abuse 
under guise of constitutional reform. I have 
struggled to keep out of it but as you now 
force me to choose between my own conception of 
loyalty to the dead as well as to the living, 
and actively participating in a measure which
1 Cited in minutes of Supreme Council meeting, 10 October 1941, 
Brooke Papers, Box 2/3.
2 Ibid.
3 Bertram Brooke to Le Gros Clark, 17 October 1941, 'Events ... ', 
Brooke Papers Box 2/3.
4 Vyner Brooke to Bertram Brooke, 20 October 1941, ibid.
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I am convinced can only lead to disaster sooner or 
later in order to preserve my own position I could  ^
only earn your contempt by taking the latter course.
He asked the Rajah to explain his attitude to the officers in the 
Service. For the datus, timpa dautat would suffice. This terse 
formula would convey to them his belief that if they agreed to the 
current proposal, their betrayal of trust would invite revenge from 
the spirits of the first two Rajahs. At the same time, he informed 
the Colonial Office that he could not comply with the new terms 
governing the succession and in a later interview he told Gent that 
the Rajah had broken his accession oath. If he, the Tuan Muda, 
predeceased the Rajah and the Rajah’s advisers followed the Rajah’s 
instruction in choosing a successor outside the line of succession 
laid down by the first Rajah, then the Colonial Office was bound to 
invoke Article II of the 1888 Treaty.^
Unwilling to press his brother any further, Vyner indicated
he would act on the basis that he had abandoned his title and claim
3to the succession. The matter was not closed however. He still
4wanted Bertram to be his successor and to accept the Constitution. 
Before leaving Sarawak, he placed the matter in the Council’s hands 
and the Chief Secretary informed Bertram that the question of heirship 
would be held in abeyance“* until legislation was prepared. A 
proposal, the details of which are unavailable, was subsequently 
produced but Bertram's attitude remained inflexible: the constitution,
'however well intended’, was still a violation of the Rajah’s 
accession oath and address of July 1918. 'I still feel bound in 
honour to respect my father's wishes', he replied on 20 November, 
'whatever may be the present attitude of officers and others towards 
his Will, and feel certain that older generation Malays share this
1 Bertram Brooke to Vyner Brooke, 22 October 1941, Brooke Papers, 
Box 10/1.
2 Bertram Brooke to Vyner Brooke, 24 November 1941, Brooke Papers, 
Box 11/2.
3 Vyner Brooke to Bertram Brooke, 24 and 29 October 1941, ’Events 
... ', Brooke Papers, Box 2/3.
4 Vyner Brooke to Bertram Brooke, 29 October 1941, ibid.
Le Gros Clark to Bertram Brooke, 29 October 1941, ibid.5
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view but dare not express feelings in the present circumstances’.
Four days later, he wrote a long letter to his brother giving his 
personal analysis of what had brought about 'this awful muddle':
I think I know pretty well what happened. It was 
put to you that the Constitution would be a 
splendid thing for the country, and it would be a 
wonderful gesture for you to end the autocratic 
powers of the Rajahs, but as you would be giving 
the country this immense benefit, there was every 
reason why you should get something out of it in 
return. You had a perfect right to the money, and 
it would be no business of anyone else's except you 
and the C. of A. And you, with the curious childlike 
strain in you that old age has been unable to 
eliminate, fell for this, just as you fell for the 
nonsensical explanation that the Brunei business 
was a matter between you and the Sultan ...
And what would the impartial critic say?
He would say that on the 31st March you told your 
people a lie in saying that you were voluntarily 
relinquishing autocratic powers for yourself and 
your successors.
Because on the same day you had entered into an 
agreement selling these powers as consideration for 
a very large sum of money out of the public purse.
That the C of A for some reason, took it upon 
themselves to spend this public money in purchasing 
these rights on behalf of people who had never 
shown signs of wanting them, and would not know 
what to do with them. And so the C of A had to 
see that your Officers should be instructed to 
persuade the people whose money had been spent 
in this extraordinary transaction that they would 
derive immense benefit from it. And that the C of 
A was pledged by this agreement to push the 
Constitution through ...^
What puzzled Bertram was the Committee of Administration's readiness 
to enter into such an agreement when no one really wanted a constitution. 
He could only conclude that there had been another alternative which 
had forced them to agree, and was naturally inclined to see MacBryan
1 Bertram Brooke to Le Gros Clark, 20 November 1941, Brooke Papers, 
Box 10/1.
2 Bertram Brooke to Vyner Brooke, 24 November 1941, Brooke Papers, 
Box 11/2. It is significant that Bertram addressed his brother 
in this letter as 'Dear Rajah' instead of his customary 'Dear 
Vyner'.
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as the author of the scheme. He also saw the constitution as 
inevitably bringing about British intervention:
... I have the conviction that personalities 
live on, and that we will all meet again in 
the hereafter, and I am certain I am right. 
That is one of the reasons why I can’t just 
join in this general game of make-believe, 
even if it does mean me and my 'line' being 
ousted under the Constitution. The old man 
trusted me and would have preferred me to take 
this course. The Constitution can't go on 
with Sarawak continuing as an independent 
State. It merely means that it will blow up 
and the B.G. will have to intervene. Rather 
a pity that you couldn’t have saved a lot of 
trouble and disorder by entering into a 
fresh agreement straight away ... ^
In the meantime, the Ranee had got wind of the succession
problem and there were persistent reports that she was about to leave
America for England to break the news that Simon Mackay had been
nominated by the Rajah as his successor. 'My daughter is unaware
of the purpose of my trip', the Ranee was quoted as saying under the
headline 'Nine Year-old Boy Heir to Sarawak', 'and I'm afraid it
will be a great shock to her. It means that her son will soon have
2to prepare himself for the day when he will rule Sarawak'. It was
indeed a great shock to Lady Inchcape when she read the report and
she behaved with extreme caution, waiting to hear from the Rajah
3and the Sarawak Government Office. This prompted Bertram to 
comment that the succession was not a matter of nomination. 'I am
the next Rajah', he told newspaper reporters on 9 December, 'as 4indeed the present Rajah announced in the Supreme Council this year'. 
An official denial of the rumour was also authorized by the Chief 
Secretary and Supreme Council in the Rajah's absence.“*
It is tempting to suggest that Bertram Brooke's stubborn
1 Ibid.
2 Daily Mirror3 3 December 1941.
3 The Star3 4 December 1941.
4 Straits Times3 8 December 1941.
5 Straits Times3 10 December 1941, quoting Reuter report datelined 
London, 9 December.
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adherence to the succession formula laid down by the first two 
Rajahs was simply a means of sabotaging the constitution and 
safeguarding the rights of his son. He was adamantly opposed to 
the proposal from the outset, suspecting that its real purpose was 
to alter the succession. But from all that we know about him it 
is clear that he was not primarily motivated by personal interest.
He regarded the succession as the most fundamental and immutable 
principle of Brooke rule and in retrospect it is difficult to 
dispute his stand.
Only one meeting of the newly constituted Council Negri 
was held before the Japanese invasion rendered the 1941 Constitution 
and the succession somewhat irrelevant. Nevertheless, the fact 
that the constitution was drafted and enacted was remarkable 
enough and the history of its origins provides an important comment 
on Brooke rule. Furthermore, its existence later provided both 
an embarrassing legal obstacle to cession and a convenient rallying 
point for the anti-cession movement which seized on the 'Nine 
Cardinal Principles' as its political charter.
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CHAPTER IV
Sarawak’s Relations with Britain, 1934-1941
SARAWAK owed its continued independence to a variety of factors. When, 
after a long period of resistance, the British government was finally 
ready to acquire the state as a colony, Rajah James lost the 
opportunity by insisting on full financial compensation for his 
personal expenditure. Another opportunity presented itself during 
Rajah Charles’ last years when it seemed that Vyner Brooke might be 
prepared to sell out on his father's death. However, for twenty years 
he was as tenaciously proprietorial as his father had been. Nor was 
there any pressing need for the Colonial Office to resolve what was 
clearly an anachronistic situation. Apart from oil, Sarawak did not 
seem to possess valuable economic resources. Nor did its tiny 
population constitute a significant market. Had Sarawak possessed 
tin or other valuable minerals in large quantities, British inter­
vention could not have been postponed.
As it was, the relationship between protected state and 
protecting power remained in a limbo of unresolved imperialism or 
pre-imperialism. The fact that the Brookes were an English family 
with some standing in English society was also very important in 
ensuring their survival as a Southeast Asian dynasty. The Colonial 
Office could not use the methods which it had employed with such 
states as Trengganu without causing a great deal of embarrassing 
publicity about the 'rights of Englishmen’. And the stakes were 
simply not high enough. The initiative for change had to be seen 
to come from the Brookes, and when it was not forthcoming the Colonial 
Office just had to wait until conditions changed. By the late 1930s 
change was on its way.
The Colonial Office Background
From 1888 until October 1941 Sarawak's relations with Britain were 
regulated by a formal treaty which gave the British government 
responsibility for Sarawak’s foreign relations and defence while
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allowing its government full internal sovereignty. A protected 
state rather than a protectorate, Sarawak possessed the further 
distinction of a wholly autonomous judicial system. Although the 
1888 Treaty authorised the appointment of a Consul-General to 
represent British interests, the post remained vacant after the 
departure of the first Consul-General and the British government 
remained without official representation. Britain's responsibilities 
were exercised by the Governor of the Straits Settlements in Singapore 
who, as British Agent for Borneo, was supposed to keep an eye on 
Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. In London, Borneo affairs were 
originally handled by the Foreign Office but in 1907 responsibility 
was passed to the Colonial Office in spite of Rajah Charles' belief 
that this signified a different view of Sarawak's international 
legal status.
British interest in Borneo had been somewhat quickened in
the 1880s by the great race for colonies and the prospect that Charles
Brooke and the Chartered Company would between them eat up what was
left of Brunei. The appointment of a British Resident at Brunei in
1906 ensured its survival but the three Borneo territories continued
to pose something of a dilemma. As early as the 1890s a senior
official of the Foreign Office, C.P. Lucas, had recommended first
the appointment of British Residents in Sarawak and North Borneo
under a Resident-General in Labuan who would in turn be under the
Governor of the Straits Settlements, and then their unification with
2Brunei as a Crown colony. The easiest course, however, was to do 
nothing. Britain's interest in the three territories was regarded 
as sufficient to dissuade any other power from becoming involved and 
there were no compelling economic reasons to undertake more direct 
control.
That Colonial Office officials were sceptical about the 
quality of the Sarawak administration is clear from R.E. Stubbs'
1 'Agreement between Her Majesty's Government and Charles Brooke, 
Second Rajah of Sarawak' . See Appendix I.
2 Nicholas Tarling, 'Britain and Sarawak in the Twentieth Century: 
Raja Charles, Raja Vyner and the Colonial Office', JMBRASj Vol. 
XLII, Pt. II (1970), p. 28.
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scathing minute of 1906 and the 'general opinion' (as reported by Sir
John Anderson, Governor of the Straits Settlements) that the only man
who was any good as an administrator was the Rajah's illegitimate
son.’*' Nevertheless, it was recognized that Charles Brooke exercised
considerable authority over his polyglot subjects and there was an
unwillingness to resolve the situation until he died. His stature
in English society and the romantic image of Sarawak inhibited
intervention, nor was it clear how intervention could be arranged
before he left the scene. It was fairly confidently anticipated that
when Vyner Brooke succeeded to the Raj he would be willing to sell
out his rights and the initiative could be seen to come from the
2Brookes rather than the British government.
However, the old Rajah did not die until 1917 and Vyner 
seemed determined not to part with his inheritance after all. Further­
more, partly out of shyness and partly out of natural cunning, he 
offered no opportunities for serious discussions. Consequently, from 
the Colonial Office's point of view the situation remained unresolved 
although there was still no great need to do anything about it. Nor 
was there sufficient public or commercial interest in Britain for the 
Colonial Office to use as an excuse for intervening. Two Labour 
M.P.s, Thomas Griffiths and T.W. Grundy,kvisited Kuching in 1920 and 
subsequently raised the need for appeal beyond the Sarawak judicial 
system. Griffiths also believed that Sarawak should be developed
3more rapidly and not simply be used to make the Brooke family rich.
But their isolated criticisms failed to spark further comment in 
Parliament or the press and Sarawak continued to go its own isolated 
way. Although Kuching was accessible from Singapore by means of a 
weekly steamer service, there was no hotel accommodation. Casual 
visitors were not encouraged and the Singapore newspapers do not seem
1 Cited by Pringle, Rajahs and Rebels_, Appendix A, pp. 358-360. 
Anderson’s reference to the Rajah's illegitimate son is 
mystifying. See Chapter I, p.16.
2 Tarling, 'Britain and Sarawak...', pp. 31-2, 34.
3 Hansard^ 24 February 1921; SG} 1 March 1921.
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to have sent reporters to Sarawak. Somerset Maugham’s notes and
short stories provide a rare outside view of life there between the 
1wars.
The first serious initiative for change came in 1931 when
the new Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Cecil Clementi,
revived Lucas' earlier idea of linking the three Borneo states in a
Resident system controlled from Singapore. However, his ultimate
plan seems to have been to form a Crown colony of British Borneo, and
having reached a purchase agreement with the Chartered Company he was
anxious to have talks with the Rajah. When Clementi visited Sarawak
in August 1930 it was during one of Bertram Brooke's tours of duty
and he seems to have made it very clear to the Governor that there
could be no question of varying the relationship laid down in the 
21888 Treaty. Undeterred, Clementi pursued his plan to purchase
North Borneo, no doubt hoping that the Rajah would come around. How-
3ever, Cabinet rejected his proposal in 1933 on grounds of cost and
Sarawak weathered what amounted to the one serious attempt before
1941 to centralize Britain's control of its Southeast Asian dependencies.
dementi's successor, Sir Shenton Thomas, adopted a compara­
tively laissez-faire attitude towards Borneo but Bertram Brooke still 
thought it necessary to remind him during his official visit in 
August 1935 of the treaty relationship between the two countries.
After the Governor had been accorded a full 21 gun salute on his 
arrival, the Tuan Muda made a speech emphasising that this was not 
to be regarded as a signal that a Governor was visiting Sarawak in 
the course of an official tour 'but as His Highness the Rajah's 
welcome to Your Excellency as the personal representative throughout
Malayan territories of the King-Emperor, and therefore as a living
4link between Sarawak and the protecting power'.
1 Maugham's Sarawak stories were: 'Before the Party', 'The Yellow
Streak', 'The Force of Circumstance', 'The End of The Flight', 
'The Outstation', 'Neil MacAdam'. Most were published in The 
Casuarina Tree, London 1926. See Yusoff Peter Heaton, 'W. 
Somerset Maugham and Sarawak', SG, 30 June 1974.
2 Anthony Brooke to C.E.J. Gent, 24 July 1942, CO 531/30 [53011/4].
3 Memorandum by J.M. Martin, 'The Future of the British Territories 
in Borneo', 14 February 1940, CO 531/29 [53011/4].
SGj 2 September 1935.4
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The only occasions when the Colonial Office applied pressure 
on the Sarawak government involved the rights of British citizens 
resident in Sarawak who were unable to seek legal redress outside the 
state. This eventually led to the Rajah appointing a Judicial 
Commissioner, Thomas Stirling Boyd, in 1928 but it was clear from the 
outset that the Rajah regarded this as a tactical concession to the 
Colonial Office and his relationship with Stirling Boyd seems to have 
reflected a certain amount of resentment. Otherwise, the only cause 
for concern was a letter written to the Colonial Office in 1927 by 
the anthropologist William McDougall. In one official’s view, 'the 
composite picture’ provided by McDougall was ’rather disquieting',^ 
but the absence of information from impartial sources made it very 
difficult to assess the Sarawak situation. The consequent tendency 
was to adopt the old position that it was in British interests that 
the state should remain under the control of Englishmen whose loyalty 
to the Crown was unquestioned and who guaranteed the loyalty of their 
subjects at no cost to the British government.
Nevertheless, the tide of international opinion was moving
against the survival of the Brooke Raj by the late 1930s. Trouble
2in the West Indies and Lord Hailey's reports on the African 
3colonies, together with increasing international interest in the
social and economic condition of Britain’s colonial subjects produced
a greater degree of sensitivity within the Colonial Office. The
passing of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940 (which
replaced the Colonial Development Fund established by an Act of 1929)4did little to improve the real situation but it was a measure of the 
British government's responsiveness to a new international awareness
1 Minute by W. Ellis, 14 August 1927, CO 531/20 [31728] cited by 
Tarling, 'Britain and Sarawak...', p. 43.
2 See W.M. MacMillan, Warning from the West Indies...3 London [1936]. 
A West Indies Royal Commission was appointed in 1938 and reported 
in 1945.
3 ... Wative Administration and Political Development in British 
Tropical Africa: Report^ 1940-42. London 1942.
4 Under the 1940 Act, a colonial government could receive assistance 
of up to £5,000,000 a year for ten years. The 1945 Act which 
replaced this was more generous, allowing a maximum of £120,000,000 
over ten years.
139
of 'the colonial problem'. Another source of British interest in 
Sarawak was the question of imperial defence and the strategic 
importance of the northern Borneo coast to the British navy. The 
Miri and Seria (Brunei) oilfields seemed an obvious target for an 
expansionist Japan and reports of Japanese activities in North Borneo 
began to worry the Admiralty.
During the years immediately prior to the Japanese invasion
of Sarawak the responsibility for colonial affairs was in the hands
of Malcolm MacDonald, Lord Lloyd and Lord Moyne successively.^ None
of these men showed any particular interest in what was happening in
Sarawak, although Lord Lloyd knew Bertram Brooke well (they had rowed
in the same boat at Cambridge) and Lord Moyne had visited Sarawak
2briefly during a world cruise in the mid-1930s. Of the three, Lord 
Lloyd was the least inclined to make any change to the relationship 
between the two countries as laid down in the 1888 Treaty. Moyne, 
however, had been chairman of the West Indies Royal Commission of
1 The following is a full list of the Secretaries of State for 
Colonies for the period covered in this study:
9 November 1931
7 June 1935
27 November 1935 
29 May 1936 
16 May 1938 
13 May 1940
8 February 1941
23 February 1942
24 November 1942 
3 August 1945
7 October 1946
Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister (Viscount Swinton) 
Malcolm MacDonald 
J.H. Thomas
W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore (Lord Harlech)
Malcolm MacDonald 
G.A.L. Lloyd (Lord Lloyd)
W.E. Guinness (Lord Moyne)
Robert Cecil (Viscount Cranborne)
Oliver Stanley 
George Hall 
Arthur Creech-Jones
2 Lord Moyne, Walkabout: A Journey In Lands Between The Pacific 
And Indian Oceans3 London 1936. At this time Lord Moyne was 
content to repeat the conventional wisdom about Brooke rule:
The small number of white population is explained by 
the fact that this State has been ruled by three 
generations of Brooke Rajahs whose policy has been to 
give the first place to native interests and to prevent 
any undue replacement of their ancient ways of life in 
the interest of commercial exploitation of the great 
natural resources of the country. In Sarawak, there­
fore, there is no clash between the interests of white 
and native, and the European population are mainly 
officials. p. 236 .
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1938 and was more alive to the need for colonial reform. Of the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretaries of State and Permanent Under-Secretaries 
of State who served during the period, only Sir Cosmo Parkinson and 
Lord Dufferin emerge as significant figures. The person who exercised 
the most important continuous influence on Borneo policy until early 
1946 was C.E.J. Gent.
After a distinguished army career, Edward Gent joined the 
Colonial Office in 1920 as an Assistant Principal Secretary and after 
serving as Private Secretary to Lord Harlech, was made a Principal 
Secretary in 1926. By 1939 he had become Assistant Secretary and from 
1942 until his appointment as Governor of the Malayan Union in early 
1946 he was Permanent Under-Secretary of State. As head of the 
Colonial Office’s Eastern Department, Gent was responsible for 
Malayan and Borneo affairs until 1946 when it was split into two 
sections, Sarawak then coming under N.L. Mayle and his assistant 
J.J. Paskin.
The absence of a biography of Gent is an unfortunate gap in 
the historiography for the period and it is not possible to throw 
very much light on his actions. There can be no doubt that he 
exercised a powerful and consistent influence on policy towards the 
Malay States and Borneo through the various Permanent Under­
secretaries and Secretaries of State who came and went during his 
time. He seems to have been more responsible than any other person 
for the important policy changes of 1944 which envisaged the Malayan 
Union and the annexation of Sarawak and North Borneo and for the 
decisions to send Sir Harold MacMichael and MacBryan on their 
respective missions to obtain the necessary legal authority. However, 
the only records of his thinking are his elegant minutes on Colonial 
Office files. Like so many bureaucrats in sensitive policy areas, a 
great deal of his work was done through conversation. He was a 
subtle diplomat, a consummate tactician and, if necessary, a ruthless 
politician.
Gent was also a bureaucratic imperialist. Convinced of the 
benefits which British rule brought the peoples of the Empire, but 
anxious that these should be improved in the areas of social services, 
his main preoccupation was with properly organized administrative
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systems which ran cheaply and efficiently with a minimum of duplication. 
His criticism of any administration which did not satisfy his 
standards of bureaucratic efficiency was usually conveyed in such 
arch phrases as ’a lack of regular procedure here’. Needless to say, 
the situation in the Malay States and Borneo during the 1930s met 
with his disapproval. The proliferation of administrative structures 
within the Federated Malay States, the Unfederated Malay States, the 
Straits Settlements and the three separate Borneo governments must 
have been anathema to him. Visiting Malaya with Sir Samuel Wilson 
in 1932 he was unimpressed with the Malay rulers whose powers Sir 
Samuel was anxious to increase.^ Whatever Gent may have been, he was 
no romantic traditionalist and could see that the rulers were a major 
block to real progress in Malaya.
The Popular Image of Sarawak
The way in which Gent and his colleagues viewed Sarawak was inevitably 
influenced by the popular image of Sarawak in the 1930s. Strictly 
speaking, it was more the image of the Brookes than of the 
country itself which formed little more than a romantic backdrop for 
an eccentric English family. People knew of the headhunters of Borneo 
whom the Brookes had supposedly tamed and of course there was the 
orang utan or ’wild man of Borneo' of household fable. Beyond that, 
there was only the schoolboy’s vision of ’white rajahs' ruling over 
black men under the swaying coconut palms. To do him justice, the 
Rajah was a socially retiring man who detested publicity and was 
dedicated to leading a quiet life. However, the Ranee and her two 
younger daughters more than compensated for his reticence. Mixing 
with the Mayfair set, Sylvia exploited to the utmost her exotic role 
as ’the Ranee of Sarawak'. She often wore Malay dress, although in 
a style which would have surprised the wives of the Kuching datus.
She was also fond of wearing masses of jewellery and was once 
photographed with a snake skin headband. She was famous as a source
1 Allen, The Malayan Union, p. 5.
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of scandalous stories about members of the aristocracy and other 
notables. She adored publicity and was entertaining in a sometimes 
malicious way.
Elizabeth and Valerie Brooke were exceptionally beautiful 
and photogenic young women. Liberated from schooling in their mid­
teens, they joined their mother at the fashionable Mayfair nightclubs 
and were soon appearing in the social pages of the afternoon news­
papers as ?Princess Pearl' and 'Princess Baba'. At one point the 
Rajah even wrote to a newspaper pointing out that his daughters were 
not entitled to the honorific of 'princess'. In 1935 Elizabeth 
married Harry Roy, a well-known dance-band leader at the Savoy who 
had composed 'The Sarawaki' foxtrot in the Ranee's honour. Two years 
later, Valerie married Bob Gregory, an all-in wrestler from Puerto 
Rico. However, both marriages were short-lived and dissolved in a 
flurry of publicity in the social columns. Elizabeth then revived 
her earlier idea of going into films and during the late 1930s she 
and the Ranee spent much time in Hollywood where the Ranee was 
engaged with a filmscript called 'The White Rajah'. For people like 
Gent, the Ranee epitomized the noxious American influence which was 
pervading English society.
Gladys Brooke had also received her share of newspaper 
publicity. Separated from Bertram at the end of the war, she 
established something of a salon for artists and writers as her 
mother had done in the 1890s, although not with the same success.
She also went through a number of religious conversions, first to 
Christian Science, and then Roman Catholicism which involved a 
personal audience with the Pope at which she wore Malay dress. In 
1932 she became a convert to Islam, the ceremony taking place on an 
aircraft between London and Paris. Although this well-publicized 
event produced an unfavourable reaction from the leaders of Britain s 
Islamic community, she went ahead with her project of displaying as 
a religious relic a robe said to have belonged to the Prophet 
Mohammed»and certainly of great antiquity. She had recently published
1 Straits Times, 19 February 1932; 9 March 1932.
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Relations and Complications^ an outspoken book about her childhood 
and was engaged on The Mystic Legends of Islam, based on the work of 
the painter Paltov.
2Sylvia, who had already dabbled in popular journalism, was 
spurred by the appearance in 1934 of Ranee Margaret's charming memoir 
Good Morning and Good Right to write her own autobiography, Sylvia of 
Sarawakj which was published in 1936 and The Three White Rayahs in
31939. But while Sylvia was happy to exploit the exotic appeal of 
Sarawak in her social and literary activities, she was increasingly 
bored with the place. During the period from 1930 until 1936 her 
total time spent there was less than two years. And when she returned 
to Sarawak in September 1941 for the centenary celebrations, it was 
her first visit for two and a half yeärs.
During the publicity following the Rajah's removal of 
Anthony Brooke's title of Rajah Muda in early 1940 the Ranee's remarks 
were noted by Gent, as were her later statements criticizing Sarawak's 
defences and the Children's Overseas Reception Scheme. '... Her 
tongue style is thoughtless and sensational', he noted in April 1942 
when she offered to make a lecture tour of England explaining the Far 
East, 'and her inclination is towards an unruled and malicious form 
of snobbishness'.^ He was openly sarcastic about the Ranee's 
references to events of late 1941 in Sarawak:
Her extravagant misuse of language appears repeatedly... 
e.g. her "escape" from Sarawak - she visited the State 
in August last year for the Centenary celebrations and 
left at the beginning of October for Australia. The 
Rajah himself "escaped" in accordance with his longstand­
ing plan for a holiday after these celebrations...
1 London 1929.
2 Some examples were 'Why Did You Marry?', Daily Express> 22 March 
1929; 'Why Shouldn't We Gossip?', Sunday G r a p h i c 7 April 1929.
3 Yet another autobiography, Queen of the Headhunters...} was 
published in 1970. Although Sylvia Brooke possessed a 'talent 
to amuse', the book is highly unreliable and virtually useless 
as an historical source. Sylvia was accustomed to writing for 
an audience which knew little or nothing about Sarawak.
4 Minute by Gent, 3 April 1942, CO 531 30 [53006].
5 Ibid.
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Two further developments hardly improved the Eastern
Department’s opinion of the Ranee. The first was a debt of US$7,000
run up in America and claimed by Jack Golden who had been appointed
by the Rajah in October 1939 to manage her financial affairs. The
second was the Ranee's contact with Captain Roy Kendall's Brisbane-
based 'cloak and dagger' operation in 1942.^ It is difficult to say
how much she knew about Kendall's plan to land two Brooke officers
by submarine to gather information about occupied Sarawak, but she
saw herself master-minding a plan to foment a rebellion against the
Japanese. While the 'plan' was kept from the Rajah and everyone in
England, she wrote to Golden hinting that something momentous was
afoot. Extracts from these letters eventually made their way to the
2Eastern Department and while the 'cracked-brained exploit' was not 
taken very seriously, it was regarded as yet another example of the
3Ranee's irresponsibility. Her actions can only have helped persuade 
the Colonial Office of the undesirability of allowing the Brookes 
to remain as rulers in Sarawak.
The Breen Report and the Question of Secondment
The Colonial Office's doubts about Sarawak were revived by the Breen 
4reports which provided the Colonial Office with its first real 
information on the inside workings and standards of the administration. 
On returning from Sarawak, Breen told Gent that there was 'only a 
crude form of administration' and that the financial system was 
'rudimentary and uninformed'.“* The general picture of poor standards
1 Secret Intelligence Australia (SIA) was one of a number of 
special intelligence units operating within the Allied 
Intelligence Bureau (AIB) in Australia and, like the better- 
known Survey and Reconnaissance Department (SRD), under 
ultimately British control. SIA was involved in long-range 
penetrations into Japanese-occupied territory using trained 
Indonesian agents. Personal communication from Mr H.P.K. Jacks,
5 June 1976.
2 Sylvia Brooke to Golden, 15 June 1942; 4 July 1942; CO 531/30 [53006].
3 Minutes by Monson and Gent, 21 July 1942, ibid.
4 See Chapter II, p.35.
5 Minute by Gent, 5 July 1937, CO 531/27 [53029].
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which emerged from Breen's official report persuaded Gent that 'sooner 
or later we shall have to bring pressure on the Rajah to accept his 
responsibilities'.’*' Breen was subsequently asked to prepare a 
confidential memorandum spelling out his detailed criticisms of the
2Sarawak administration and although a copy of this is not available, 
it was clearly important in stiffening the Eastern Department's 
attitude towards intervention. To the bureaucrats of the Colonial 
Office the two reports provided concrete evidence supporting their 
earlier suspicions that the Sarawak administration was not up to the 
level of British colonial administration and it was inevitable that 
they should begin to seek to rectify this 'irregular' situation. 
However, Sarawak's internal sovereignty and the Rajah's elusiveness 
meant that there was no easy means available.
One possible means was the secondment of officers from the 
Colonial Service to the Sarawak government for limited periods. In 
February 1937 the Rajah had written to Sir Shenton Thomas asking for 
the extension of the Malayan Medical Service to Sarawak. The 
Committee of Administration had conducted an investigation into the 
private practice of government doctors which resulted in two resig­
nations and the whole question of medical services was thereby thrown 
into the melting pot. Besides, the Medical and Health departments 
were drastically pruned by Macaskie as part of his economy campaign 
in 1931 and had never really recovered. The head of the Malayan 
Medical Service subsequently reported that public health standards 
in Sarawak were very bad and the proposal was then considered and 
approved by the Eastern Department. Apart from improving health 
standards in Sarawak, the arrangement was regarded as 'opening up
3
the channels of information as to conditions in Sarawak generally'.
It was hoped that all Sarawak departments might eventually be staffed 
from Malaya and that Sarawak would be in a similar position to the 
Unfederated Malay States. Gent regarded Sarawak as 'sheltering under
1 Ibid.
2 CO 531/27 [53029/2]. Closed until 2037.
3 Minute by E.B. Beetham, 4 May 1938, CO 531/28 [53045].
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the skirts of the Straits Setts.',^ but he was agreeable as long as
the Principal Medical Officer was from Malaya. The one problem was
ultimate authority, particularly in view of Breen's findings that
security of tenure in Sarawak largely depended on the personal
wishes of the Rajah. Formally authorizing the arrangement, Malcolm
MacDonald incorporated Gent's condition and specified that all matters
of discipline would be in the hands of the Governor and not the 
2Rajah. Subsequent to this Dr J.H. Bowyer took up his duties as 
Principal Medical Officer in Kuching in 1938.
When the Sarawak Government Agent raised the possibility of 
obtaining assistance from the Crown Agents in selecting administrative 
and technical officers, Gent told him that since the Secretary of 
State had no control over conditions of service in Sarawak, the 
Colonial Office could not participate formally in selection processes. 
Instead, names of applicants for the Colonial Service could be passed 
on to the Sarawak Government Office. Although it was suggested that 
even this limited assistance should only be given on condition that 
the Sarawak government undertook the reorganization proposed by 
Breen, Sir Henry Moore felt that in view of the low standards revealed 
in the confidential report, there was an overriding need to improve 
the quality of technical officers. The compromise he suggested was 
that the Crown Agents should select two or three provisional 
candidates for each appointment and the Sarawak Agent would be left 
to make the final selection from these. Nor did Sir John Shuckburgh 
and Sir Cosmo Parkinson see any difficulty in making it clear to 
candidates that Sarawak was 'not a Colony but an independent princi­
pality' . They probably regarded secondment not only as a means of 
improving Sarawak's standards of government but of providing.a 
reliable source of information on internal affairs and a bargaining 
counter to be used when necessary with the Rajah.
In the meantime, Stirling Boyd renewed his bid to have his 
successor brought in from the Colonial Legal Service. In a letter 
to an acquaintance in the Colonial Office's Legal Department, which
1 Minute by Gent, 5 May 1938, ibid.
2 Malcolm MacDonald to Shenton Thomas, 19 May 1938, ibid.
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he hoped would be handed on to the Legal Adviser,Sir Grattan Bushe, 
the Chief Justice pointed out that the Sarawak government would find 
it difficult to replace him and might even ask the Secretary of State 
for assistance. This would also create an opportunity to ensure 
that the judiciary would in future be independent, with a Chief 
Justice or equivalent who was not a member of the Committee of 
Administration and an Attorney-General responsible for legal policy 
and administration. There was even a precedent for the appointment 
of someone from the Colonial Legal Service in the earlier secondment 
of medical staff from Malaya. However, as Boyd acknowledged, there 
were difficulties:
The snag is that H.H. and the Powers-that-Be won’t like 
it as the dangers, from their point of view, are obvious.
E.g. if you came here as C.J. for 3 years and anything 
happened of which you didn’t approve, you would only have 
to apply to the S. of S. with reasons, for a transfer.
Your position in every way would be infinitely stronger 
than mine, and the S. of S. would be in a position to say 
what must and what must not be done.1
Boyd’s friend forwarded an extract from the letter to Bushe
and it eventually reached the Eastern Department. One official
supported Boyd’s proposals as a ’step forward in the direction of
bringing in Sarawak as a party to the Malayan Establishment' but was
not at all sure how they could be implemented. There was a precedent
in the virtual extension of the Malayan Medical Service to Sarawak
but this had been done on the Rajah's own initiative. The Colonial
Office's strict policy had been to refrain from offering any
facilities unless they were explicitly requested by the Rajah and a
2direct approach to him was 'out of the question'. All that Boyd 
could be told was that if the proposal was put forward by the Sarawak 
government it would be favourably considered: a good bureaucratic 
formula which made negotiations possible without compromising anyone. 
Sir Shenton Thomas was subsequently informed of the position but he 
could not provide any information about the Rajah’s intentions
1 Extract from an undated letter from Boyd to Adrian Clark,
CO 531/28 [53029/3].
2 Minute by A.N. Galsworthy, 1 January 1939, CO 531/28 [53020].
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regarding Boyd's successor. And as long as the Colonial Office 
adhered to its position of strict non-intervention there was very 
little that could be done. Furthermore, when Boyd and his three 
colleagues were 'purged' in March 1939 and Pepys' appointment as 
General Adviser was announced, the importance attached to the latter 
development diverted attention from Boyd’s replacement by a Judicial 
Commissioner. Judicial reform was not seen at this point as being 
particularly pressing.'*'
Lunch at Leicester Square
The long-awaited initiative from the Rajah came at last in early 1938.
When it became clear that the Tuan Muda was no longer physically able
to bear his share of the responsibility of ruling Sarawak, the Rajah,
and more particularly the Ranee, began to think very seriously of
selling out to Britain. In July L.F. Burgis, a former private
secretary to Lord Esher who was then working for Sir Maurice Sankey
in the Cabinet Office, was asked by the Rajah and Ranee to make
discreet inquiries as to whether the British government would be
interested in such a proposal. Burgis saw Gent and explained to him
that the Rajah was too shy to make an official approach but was
'desirous of divesting himself from the burden', subject to a
2satisfactory financial settlement. The Rajah, he added, would
himself look after any question of compensating the Tuan Muda as
heir presumptive while a place would hopefully be found for Anthony
in the new colonial administration. According to Sir Shenton Thomas
3two years later, a figure of £5,000,000 had been mentioned. Gent 
must have found it difficult to suppress his excitement at this news 
but his response was suitably circumspect. He told Burgis that 
while the government had not hitherto considered taking over Sarawak, 
the Eastern Department believed that defence matters and standards 
of social welfare and general administration would sooner or later 
raise the question. He was not prepared to commit himself on what
1 Minute by ? Andrews, 22 September 1939, ibid.
2 Minute by Gent, 20 July 1938, CO 531/28 [53029/3].
3 Thackwell Lewis to Anthony Brooke, 27 February 1946, Brooke 
Papers, Box 2/3.
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the government's attitude would be to such a proposal. But he 
suggested that a private meeting might be arranged at which the Rajah 
could unburden his feelings and that a conversation might subsequently 
take place with the Secretary of State, Malcolm MacDonald.
It soon emerged, however, that there was a significant
difference of opinion between the Rajah and the Ranee. The Ranee
apparently made no bones about her belief that the 'white rajah'
system should be brought to an end and a satisfactory financial
settlement made. But the Rajah was unable to decide between such a
complete break and the 'far less revolutionary step' of entrusting
the administration to a British Adviser while remaining in England
as an absentee sovereign.^ According to Burgis, the Rajah had only
the 'haziest ideas' of what this would involve and he doubted whether
he could make any clear preference without considerable guidance:
'He is only set on making a change, either greater or lesser, which
2will relieve him of his burden of autocracy'. At the same time,
the Rajah was anxious that the natives should not have the impression
that he had 'cleared out under irresistible pressure from H.M.G.'.
With Lord Dufferin's approval, a lunch appointment was arranged for
the Rajah, Burgis and Gent at a restaurant in Leicester Square but
at the last moment the Rajah telephoned Burgis to say that he could
not come. 'Even the prospect of such an informal beginning as this
3was too much for the Rajah...', noted a disappointed Gent. However, 
the Eastern Department was anxious to pursue the idea which, 'however 
watered down', could lead to some improvement in the Sarawak 
situation. Sir Shenton Thomas was accordingly told that the Rajah
4might still want to approach him when he passed through Singapore. 
Sarawak's future was now an open question and the Rajah's position in 
relation to the Colonial Office had weakened considerably.
1 Minute by Gent, 21 July 1938, CO 531/28 [53029/3].
2 Ibid.
3 Minute by Gent, 28 July 1938, ibid.
4 H.R. Cowell to Shenton Thomas, 15 August 1938, ibid; Shenton 
Thomas to Cowell, 28 February 1939, ibid.
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The Scott Case
Stirling Boyd left Sarawak in July 1939 but there was another 
tenacious Scot who was more successful in bringing the judicial 
problem to London's notice. James Scott had come out to Sarawak as 
an engineer with the Borneo Company early in the century and after 
many vicissitudes had gone into business with a Chinese partner. The 
business was valued at $30,000 when the partner died but he was found 
to be indebted to the firm by more than $8,000 for goods and over­
drawn profits. Appointed executor to the estate, Scott continued to 
manage the remaining capital with the consent of his partner's two 
sons but they were obliged to take him to court in 1938 to obtain 
their share of the interest.'*' Subsequent to this, Scott was charged 
in the First Division Resident's Court with having made a false 
statement of the firm's accounts and was found guilty under a section 
of the penal code. Although he was fined $5,000, this was in fact 
illegal as the offence carried a mandatory prison term. Scott 
immediately lodged a petition through a firm of Singapore lawyers, 
claiming that there had been improper practice and requesting that 
an appeal be heard in the Supreme Court. His complaint was based on 
the fact that the Judicial Commissioner, H. Thackwell Lewis, had 
handed a note to the magistrate before the trial indicating the 
course that the prosecution should take, although a copy had also 
been given to Scott himself. When he refused to amend the unflattering 
language of his appeal, he was informed by the Registrar of the 
Supreme Court that since he had impugned the integrity of the 
Judicial Commissioner, the appeal could not be heard and his only 
recourse was to the Rajah. Asked by the Rajah to investigate the 
case, Pepys felt that although Thackwell Lewis' action had been taken 
in good faith, it prevented the Judicial Commissioner from hearing 
the appeal even if he had been prepared to do so. Furthermore, the 
Chief Secretary, Archer, had sat on the civil case in 1938 and was 
therefore ineligible. At the same time, however, Pepys had no doubt 
that Scott, whom he described as 'no ignorant bumpkin but a shrewd
1 Scott v. Ng Siak Ngee and Ng Siak Kong, 13 September 1938, 
Sarawak Supreme Court Reports 1928-19413 1946-19513 Kuching 
1955, pp. 70-72.
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businessman’, had indeed made a false declaration and been properly
convicted. In a tactful appreciation of commercial practice in
Sarawak, he observed that Scott had 'for so many years engaged in
trading and business ventures with a not too scrupulous assortment
of Chinese associates that his sense of moral values has become
blunted and... he is not acting a part when he indignantly disclaims
having done anything wrong'.^ Digby's comment, made some years after
Scott's death on release from a Japanese prison camp, was even more
pointed. 'He had all the qualities which are admired in the world
of capitalist enterprise', observed the former Legal Adviser, 'and
he was reputed to be the only European who had ever got the better
2of a Chinese at that particular game.' Pepys' advice to the Rajah 
was that Scott should be asked to withdraw his imputation against 
the courts, after which there might be a reduction of the fine which 
Thackwell Lewis privately admitted to have been excessive. But Scott 
was adamant: he demanded a complete vindication and reversal of the
court's decision and when this was not forthcoming he gave the 
General Adviser a petition for despatch to the Secretary of State,
Lord Lloyd. Pepys passed this on to Archer whose response summed up 
the prevailing attitude of the Sarawak Service to outside intervention. 
'I have the honour to inform you', he told Scott loftily, 'that the
1 Pepys' report to Shenton Thomas, dated 3 May 1940, enclosed 
with the Governor's despatch to Lloyd, 28 August 1940, CO 
531/29 [53063].
2 Digby, 'Lawyer in the Wilderness', p. 89. According to Digby, 
Scott's agricultural and engineering skills were extremely 
valuable during internment. However, he was extremely jealous 
of the tools which he had acquired by various means and only 
those who 'adopted the proper obsequious approach and disclosed 
an intention to pursue solid industry' were able to borrow them. 
When two prisoners who had obtained a dartboard, nail and string 
required Scott's hammer to put it up on the wall, the following 
conversation ensued:
"Mr. S.", they said, cap metaphorically in hand,
"could you lend us your hammer, please?"
"And wha' d'ye wan' ma wee hummer for", asked S.
They duly explained.
"Nae, nae, nae", exploded S., "ah niver len' a 
tule for the pairrposes of plairsure".
Ibid., p. 90.
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State of Sarawak does not recognise any appellate jurisdiction outside
of its boundaries...'.^ Scott was not prepared to let matters rest
there, however, and the petition finally made its way to Sir Shenton
Thomas in Singapore and from there to the Colonial Office. Enclosing
a copy of Pepys' report on the case together with the petition, Sir
Shenton did not make any comment. He only asked that if he was
requested to call for an official report from the Sarawak government,
he should be able to say that it was on the Secretary of State's
2explicit instructions. One Eastern Department official suggested
that although the petition threw a 'disquieting' light on the
administration of justice in Sarawak, under the strict terms of the
1888 Treaty there was no power of intervention: it was a case of
3
non possumus. The Colonial Office's legal advisers were not so 
temperate, however, 'It is seldom one meets a clear and unblushing 
violation of the express terms of Magna Carta', noted one, 'but here 
we have it...'.^ Rehearsing the essential elements of the case, he 
delivered some trenchant comments on the procedures that had been 
adopted, concluding that non possumus could not possibly be accepted 
in this situation. The Treaty, he conceded, provided no explicit 
assistance but it might still be possible to use Article V which gave 
British subjects the same rights as those of Sarawak. 'Be that as it 
may', he added, 'the case is surely one which, if it had happened in 
a foreign country, H.M.G. would be prepared to make diplomatic 
representations, and a fortiori, the Secretary of State can do like­
wise to the Government of Sarawak...'.^
Sir Grattan Bushe did not think that there was any need to 
invoke the Treaty when it was a clear case of a British subject being 
denied justice:
1 Archer to Scott, 11 July 1940, enclosed with Shenton Thomas' 
despatch to Lloyd of 28 August 1940, CO 531/29 [53063].
2 Shenton Thomas to Lloyd, 28 August 1940, ibid.
3 Minute by Monson, 17 October 1940, ibid.
4 Minute by F.W. Roberts-Wray, 20 October 1940, ibid.
5 Ibid.
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Suppose that the Rajah, instead of refusing Mr. Scott 
access to the court and extracting a fine from him 
illegally, had had him boiled in oil. Should we then 
be discovered carefully studying the Treaty to see 
whether, in a State under H.M.’s protection, British 
subjects may be murdered without protest? 1
Now inclined to think that there was more truth in Boyd’s ’appalling
description’ of affairs in Sarawak than he had first believed, he
thought that the Secretary of State was bound to intervene 'formally
and unequivocally’, pressing for redress if there was no satisfactory
explanation. Gent agreed that the Treaty did not restrict their
right to take the matter up, but he pointed out that it did not give
them jurisdiction in Sarawak or the power to instruct the Rajah. It
was, he said, the kind of thing which came up from time to time and
was important ’from every point of view' to pursue if there seemed
2to be a prima facie case to do so. The Under-Secretary of State 
accordingly authorized a cable to Sir Shenton Thomas on 21 December 
1939 asking him for a report from the Sarawak government on the Scott 
case:
As a British subject he is entitled to seek the protection 
of H.M. Government if he considers that he has suffered 
injustice and has exhausted the legal remedies provided 
in the local law, and it is no less than the duty of H.M. 
Government in such circumstances to make representations 
to the Government concerned with a view to ascertaining 
the facts and to considering any further steps which may 
appear to be justified. 3
On receipt of this, the Governor's secretary wrote to Archer passing 
on the request for a report and offering the services of a Malayan 
judge if the Rajah should decide to appoint a deputy.
There can be little doubt that the Rajah was extremely 
irritated by this reminder of the Colonial Office’s earlier inter­
vention in the appointment of a Judicial Commissioner. Archer told 
the secretary that in view of the ’independent and autonomous' 
position of Sarawak, the Rajah was unable to accept the offer of
1 Minute by Bushe, 1 November 1940, ibid.
2 Minute by Gent, 29 November 1940, ibid.
3 Lloyd to Shenton Thomas, 21 December 1940, ibid.
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assistance; while Scott's petition did not provide all the facts, 
the Rajah did not feel under any obligation to defend the action of 
the Sarawak courts and he was ’fully satisfied' that Scott was 
guilty of the offence.^ This prompted a personal letter from Sir 
Shenton Thomas carrying the polite threat that if the Secretary of 
State was unable to consider the petition because of the Sarawak 
government's failure to comment on it, then Scott might take his case 
to Parliament and the subsequent questions might not show the Sarawak 
government in too favourable a light. The issue, he insisted, was 
not the independent and autonomous position of Sarawak but whether a
2British subject with a grievance should receive proper consideration. 
But the Rajah (or his adviser) was not prepared to give an inch. 
Writing from his bungalow in the Cameron Highlands, he told the 
Governor that he saw the issue not so much in terms of the rights of 
a British subject as the propriety of the Secretary of State consider­
ing an appeal:
I cannot agree that a British Subject who elects of his 
own freewill to live in Sarawak should be subjected to 
different treatment or have consideration, by reason of 
a grievance, other than what is accorded by the Law and 
Courts of the State to all dwellers in Sarawak of what­
ever nationality. Indeed, if I were to agree to a 
contrary interpretation of the position it would be 
tantamount to singling out the nationals of one group 
of countries for special and preferential treatment as 
compared with others... 3
It was not a matter of whether the Sarawak government had a good case 
or a bad case, he emphasized, but whether the judgments of Sarawak 
courts should be subject to the consideration of the Secretary of 
State and consequently to his jurisdiction.
If the Governor detected a defiant note in this, he must 
have been even more sensitive to the second paragraph of the letter 
in which the Rajah asserted his status as an independent sovereign 
ruler:
1 Archer to Ward, 16 January 1941, enclosed with Shenton Thomas' 
despatch to Moyne, 8 March 1941, ibid.
2 Shenton Thomas to Vyner Brooke, 6 February 1941, ibid.
3 Vyner Brooke to Shenton Thomas, 24 February 1941, ibid.
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Your assurance that the "independent and autonomous 
position of Sarawak" is not in question at all is 
particularly welcome and gratifying as it comes at a 
time when several circumstances and also the tenor of 
some letters that I have received have led me to wonder 
if this independent position was, in fact, being 
questioned. 1
When Sir Shenton later questioned the Rajah about how he had formed
such an impression, neither he nor MacBryan could provide an answer."
But in view of the fact that MacBryan was the only Sarawak officer
with the Rajah at the Cameron Highlands when the letter was written,
the former's response was disingenuous. He had almost certainly
used the letter as a means of expressing his pique at the Governor's
3frustration of his Brunei negotiations.
The Eastern Department regarded the Rajah's letter as a 
serious affront. 'Even from an unfriendly and strictly foreign 
Government such as Japan', Gent complained, 'we are accustomed to 
the courtesy of a report on the facts and an opinion on the merits
4
of any case of a British subject which we may have to take up.'
With Lord Moyne's approval he sent a cable to the Governor 
instructing him to tell the Rajah that he was not satisfied with 
this response which amounted to no more than would be expected 'from 
even an unfriendly foreign government in a similar case...'."* The 
message was duly conveyed to the Rajah who, after advice from Digby 
that he should insist on the principle of Sarawak's internal 
autonomy, sent copies of the original civil judgment to Singapore 
with a letter expressing concern at the tone of the Governor's 
message. The Rajah stressed that he intended only to resist the 
principle implicit in the Colonial Office's cable of 21 December 
which seemed to claim the right to revise the case or to order a new
1 Ibid.
2 Shenton Thomas to Moyne, 8 March 1941, ibid.
3 See Chapter III, pp. 89, 90.
4 Minute by Gent, 6 March 1941, CO 531/29 [53063].
5 Moyne to Shenton Thomas, 10 March 1941, ibid.
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hearing. When the Governor again asked him if he would comply with
the Secretary of State's request, the Rajah indicated that he would
send Digby to Singapore to discuss the matter. In response to a
protest that the delay would bring 'most unfavourable comment' and
2that Scott was about to petition the King, the Rajah replied that
3he could not understand the need for such haste.
From the Colonial Office's point of view the Governor's 
constant pressure had had the desired effect. It was noted that by 
agreeing to discuss the matter through his Legal Adviser, the Rajah 
was 'weakening ground'.^ But as far as Digby was concerned, no 
ground had been yielded:
My instructions were to tell Sir Shenton that we could 
not accept this proposal [that a Malayan judge be appointed], 
to emphasise that His Majesty's Government had overstepped 
all reasonable limits by poking its collective nose into 
the internal affairs of an independent State, but, if it 
appeared to me to be necessary, to agree that an appeal 
should be heard by two Sarawak officers appointed to be 
judges of the Supreme Court for this purpose only, and 
finally, to attempt to extract from Sir Shenton some kindly 
acknowledgement of the reasonable and accommodating spirit 
which we had shown. 5
The compromise suggested by Digby was eventually accepted by Sir 
Shenton Thomas, although he refused to acknowledge that the Rajah 
and his advisers had behaved at all reasonably.
Although the Rajah had made the only concession possible 
within Sarawak's own legal framework, the Eastern Department's blood 
was up. 'We cannot let the Rajah trifle with us in this way', 
protested Gent^ and the Governor was duly informed by the Secretary 
of State that the agreement to appoint two judges from Sarawak was
1 Vyner Brooke to Shenton Thomas, 17 March 1941, cited in Shenton 
Thomas' cable to Moyne, 31 March 1941, ibid.
2 Shenton Thomas to Vyner Brooke, 29 March 1941, cited in Shenton 
Thomas' cable to Moyne, 31 March 1941, ibid.
3 Vyner Brooke to Shenton Thomas, 30 March 1941, ibid.
4 Minute by Monson, 2 April 1941, ibid.
5 Digby, 'Lawyer in the Wilderness', p. 92.
6 Minute by Gent, 10 April 1941, CO 531/29 [53063].
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’unsatisfactory and unwise'. If Scott withdrew his petition, the
matter would not be pursued, but otherwise the Rajah's action would
be regarded as 'further trifling with matters of principle' and the
Secretary of State would press for a proper procedure to be made
available in this and all future cases involving British and foreign
nationals.^ The officials of the Eastern Department were clearly
nettled by the Rajah's stubbornness. One referred somewhat sarcastic
ally to his Cameron Highlands letter as containing a 'certain amount
of "official dignity" and a lack of comprehension of principles on
2which H.M.G. has taken its stand'. When Scott's conviction was
conveniently reversed by a court consisting of Digby and Aikman, the
outcome was greeted with considerable satisfaction in London. 'You
see that our intervention has in fact, resulted in a complete quashing
of Mr. Scott's conviction - in spite of the views attributed to the
3Rajah...', commented the same official. The days of non possumus 
were fast coming to an end.
The Appointment of a General Adviser
The March 1939 'purge' of Sarawak's five senior bureaucrats had 
provided Sir Shenton Thomas and the Colonial Office with a long- 
awaited opportunity of obtaining access to Sarawak's internal affairs 
The Rajah left to Anthony Brooke the whole task of explaining the 
background of what had happened and it was during his subsequent 
meeting with the Rajah Muda that the Governor raised a number of 
suggestions about future administrative arrangements. The Imperial 
government did not wish 'unduly to interfere' in Sarawak's domestic 
affairs, he told Anthony, but it still had 'necessarily [to] take 
into strict account the need for safeguarding native interests and 
defence'.^ While he felt that native interests had not been 
prejudiced by the resignations, there was a case for greater inter­
change between the Sarawak Service and the Colonial Service.^ He
1 Moyne to Shenton Thomas, 15 April 1941, ibid.
2 Minute by Monson, 8 May 1941, ibid.
3 Minute by Monson, 17 May 1941, ibid.
4 Shenton Thomas to MacDonald, 19 April 1939, CO 531/29 [53011/1].
5 Shenton Thomas' notes of 12 April 1939, Brooke Papers, Box 13/1.
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recommended that in future the positions of Chief Secretary, Financial
Secretary, Chief Justice and Legal Adviser might sometimes be filled
by officers seconded from the Colonial Service to which they could
return if they were found unsatisfactory. The Sarawak Service, on
the other hand, provided no prospects of promotion or transfer and
it was consequently necessary 'either to offer unduly high pay so as
to attract good men or to be content with men who lack ambition or
are unable to obtain a Colonial appointment^ He was particularly
anxious that the office of Legal Adviser should be quite separate
from the judiciary so that government could receive independent
advice. This would remove the existing anomaly of one officer
serving as Registrar of the Supreme Court, Official Assignee and
Legal Adviser. His most important suggestion, however, was that a
'General Adviser' should be appointed to the Sarawak government and
2he recommended the services of W.E. Pepys, the retiring General 
Adviser to the government of Johore whose wide experience in 
administration would be extremely useful. The General Adviser's 
function does not seem to have been spelled out in any detail but 
Sir Shenton no doubt saw Pepys both as a source of information and 
as the thin end of a wedge of influence likely to open up Sarawak's 
internal affairs. Now that Sarawak had lost its most senior officers, 
Pepys might even fill the position of Chief Secretary and, during 
the Rajah's absence, Officer Administering the Government. Such, 
no doubt, were the Governor's hopes.
Anthony Brooke conceded that the offices of Chief Justice 
and Legal Adviser should be kept separate and expressed his intention 
of making this change. More importantly, he was prepared to accept 
the proposal that there should be a General Adviser, although it
1 Shenton Thomas to MacDonald, 19 April 1939, op. cit.
2 Walter Pepys joined the MCS as a cadet in 1908 and after 
serving in Pahang and Perak was appointed District Officer 
at Jelebu. He spent the period 1914-18 in Kelantan and 
became Acting British Adviser, Trengganu, in 1919. Promoted 
to Class II in 1925, he served as Assistant Secretary to 
Government, FMS, Superintendent of Government Monopolies, SS, 
Commissioner for Trade and Customs, FMS,and Commissioner of 
Customs and Excise, SS and FMS. He was awarded the C.M.G. in 
1930 when he was promoted to Class 1A and took up his position 
as General Adviser, Johore, in 1935.
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would be surprising if he did not have some private reservations 
about the authority to be wielded by Pepys. Indeed, he may well 
have agreed as a means of humouring the Governor after the latter 
had indicated his approval of the 'purge'. It seems doubtful that 
he seriously envisaged Pepys occupying the post of Chief Secretary, 
or any other position of real power. Nor can he have been 
particularly enthusiastic about Sir Shenton's scheme for seconding 
officers of the Colonial Service to senior positions in Sarawak, 
a question which was deferred after agreement that the position of 
General Adviser should first be settled. But he was happy that 
Pepys should assist with any arrangements concerning defence, the 
second area of British interest which the Governor had indicated.
On his return to Sarawak, Anthony passed on the Governor's 
suggestions on secondment to Andrew Macpherson, then Secretary for 
Native Affairs, whose views provide a valuable insight into the 
attitudes and values of the Sarawak service.
Macpherson's point was that the hardships and discomforts 
of service had been sufficient to weed out all except those 'who 
truly love Sarawak'. The Sarawak officer, he maintained, felt a 
special loyalty to the Rajah and the country which no seconded 
officer could ever feel, nor was he able to leave his mistakes 
behind by being transferred somewhere else: 'He is not an alien
"jingo" but part of this country whether he likes it or not, and 
after some years he develops a sense of belonging which I think must 
be unique'. There was no place in Sarawak for the selfishly 
ambitious man who would not work for the people. The better the man, 
the more Sarawak needed him. Rather than secondment to Sarawak, 
Macpherson suggested that transfer was more desirable. ’... There 
must be many men in other Services', he concluded, 'who are 
sufficiently idealistic to prefer Sarawak and a good conscience to 
high honours and a guilty one'.^
No doubt there was some resistance from Macpherson and 
others to the idea of a General Adviser. However, Anthony had made
1 Memorandum by Macpherson, 19 April 1939, on Shenton Thomas' 
notes of 12 April 1939, Brooke Papers, Box 13/1.
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a commitment to the Governor and the Rajah gave his approval after 
reaching London in late May. Accordingly, an agreement was made 
whereby Pepys would spend six months in Sarawak before going on 
leave, after which it would be decided whether he would return for 
further duty. Anthony hoped that the new General Adviser would be 
able to take up his appointment in October before the Rajah’s return.
One important consequence of Anthony’s discussions with 
Sir Shenton Thomas was that the Governor formed a very favourable 
impression of the Rajah Muda’s capacity and enthusiasm to carry out 
his new responsibilities. Anthony had 'developed considerably’, he 
told Malcolm MacDonald, partly as a result of attending Margery 
Perham’s course in colonial administration at Oxford, and seemed 
determined to make Sarawak a 'model state'. Altogether, his prospects 
as the future Rajah seemed highly favourable both for Sarawak and 
the British government:
I feel that, whatever may happen, he starts well: the
native population is of course very pleased at his 
appointment and his colleagues in the Service are, I 
suspect, by no means unappreciative of the manner in 
which he has taken up the cudgels on behalf of one of 
their number against officers much older and more senior 
than he. 1
Although both Anthony and the Rajah had been insistent that his 
appointment as Rajah Muda in no way affected the succession, the 
Governor had no ’misgivings’ on the question. He clearly believed 
that Anthony would be the next in line and that his regime would be 
more amenable to British influence. It was also thought, no doubt, 
that his two years' secondment to the MCS had inculcated attitudes 
which were less parochial and more in line with modern developments 
in colonial administration than those of his uncle.
In London, Lord Dufferin expressed considerable pleasure
that the Rajah had at last nominated Anthony as his successor but
2Gent quickly disabused him of this impression. He also advised the 
Secretary of State that if the Rajah was pressed on this point it
1 Shenton Thomas to MacDonald, 19 April 1939, CO 531/29 [53011/1].
2 Minutes by Dufferin and Gent, 15 May 1939, ibid.
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'would stir up great opposition from the Ranee and might wreck the
great opportunity now offered to us of getting a foothold in Sarawak'.^
Lord Dufferin accepted this assessment. The Ranee is a dangerous
woman', he noted, 'and I think that if we let matters take their
course Peter Brooke will almost automatically step into his uncle's 
2shoes'. Together with the appointment of Pepys, this would provide 
the 'foothold' which the Colonial Office had been seeking for such a 
long time.
There was general approval in the Colonial Office for
Anthony's 'resolute action' in securing the resignations of Parnell,
Calvert and Boyd. In a memorandum based on Sir Shenton Thomas'
report, one official suggested that the Crossley affair had been
badly handled and that Anthony had 'acted firmly' in calling into
question the procedure that had been adopted. Furthermore, the little
that was known about the trio suggested that they would be no great
loss. Sarawak would 'hardly feel the draught' when they left. It
was pointed out that secondment of officers from the Colonial Service
presented no problems, an arrangement for secondment from the Malayan
Medical Service having already been concluded. Boyd's suggestion
that his successor should be seconded from the Colonial Legal Service
could also be taken up: 'The advantages would be to establish closer
contact between H.M.G. and Sarawak, to open up fresh sources of
information concerning the State, and generally to improve its 
3administration.' Gent was even more frank in his comments:
Sarawak is a territory of very great economic possibilities 
and of defence importance and it is essential to keep this 
iron hot and not to lose the opportunity... to ensure an 
orderly introduction of modern ideas of progress (in its 
better sense) including progressive improvement of native 
society, which the Rajah himself has views on - but views 
which distrust any departure from the most conservative 
policy of protecting the natives against "progress" in its 
worse sense. 4
1 Minute by Dufferin, 26 May 1939, ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Minute by A.N. Galsworthy, 22 May 1939, ibid.
4 Minute by Gent, 23 May 1939, ibid.
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He had evidently become convinced that there were no prospects for 
social reform as long as Parnell and Boyd were in office but that 
there was much more hope with Anthony as Officer Administering the 
Government. He was disappointed, however, that more definite steps 
had not been taken to ensure the appointment of a General Adviser. 
Since the Rajah was now in England, there could be a case for 
offering him 'discreet assistance' in making up his mind on the issue
Lord Dufferin agreed it was important that the Rajah should
be persuaded to appoint an Adviser, but he was so 'shy and suspicious
that any approach would be a 'delicate matter'. The Secretary of
State suggested that if he met the Rajah, the matter could be raised
in an informal way. But if nothing had happened by July they would
have to take the risk of opening more formal discussions.^ The Rajah
was due to meet Sir Cosmo Parkinson to discuss defence matters and
this would provide a suitable occasion. Sir Shenton was subsequently
advised of the importance of taking the opportunity to influence the
Sarawak administration. He was told that the first holder of the
post of General Adviser should be the best man available - and that
something should also be done about the appointment of a new
Financial Secretary. Finally, the Secretary of State sought his
advice on whether it would be a good idea to raise the subject
2privately with the Rajah when he came to London.
Sir Shenton did not feel that there would be any point in
opening formal discussions with the Rajah who had already agreed to
Pepys' appointment. Nor did he think that the appointment of a
Financial Secretary from outside was justified at this stage. The
Rajah, he told the Secretary of State, 'would not demur to any views
that you might express, but I fear that he would promptly forget
3
them or go back on them if he found them inconvenient'. Besides, 
the Rajah would be spending less and less time in Sarawak and would 
probably be prepared to leave government in the hands of the Tuan
1 Minute by Dufferin, 26 May 1939, ibid.
2 Dufferin to Shenton Thomas, 30 May 1939, ibid.
3 Shenton Thomas to MacDonald, 1 June 1939, ibid.
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Muda and Rajah Muda as long as there was an experienced and sympathetic 
officer to advise them. The Governor believed that the British 
government would be in a strong position to influence the Sarawak 
government by emphasizing its genuine concern for native welfare. 
Finally, he attached no importance to the Rajah’s insistence that 
Anthony’s appointment had no bearing on the succession. He obviously 
believed that it did and that it was for the best.
The Governor's optimism was supported by Major W.F.N. Bridges
at a meeting with Lord Dufferin. Bridges, who had seen a great deal
of Sarawak while working on the rubber assessment scheme some years
earlier,^- confirmed Gent’s belief that Parnell, Calvert and Boyd had
no experience of outstation conditions and knew very little about
the country. When compared with the Straits Settlements where medical
and agricultural services, education and public works had reached a
high degree of development, Sarawak was certainly in a 'very primitive’
state. Bridges found, however, that the people were contented and
that their conditions of life were not inferior to the more remote
Malay states such as Trengganu. He believed, furthermore, that with
his 'current and valuable experience', Anthony Brooke would both
maintain the Brooke family's traditional policy of protecting native
2interests and make useful reforms within the Kuching bureaucracy.
When the appointment of Pepys was first confirmed in early 
3July 1939, it was interpreted in many quarters as signifying that 
the Colonial Office was at last intervening in Sarawak's internal 
affairs, an intervention thought to have been prompted by the 
'resignation' of senior officers in March. However, the Rajah who 
was in London at the time went to some pains to emphasize that it 
did not constitute any alteration in Sarawak's relations with the 
British government. A statement issued by the Sarawak Government 
Office and authorized by the Rajah explained that the increasing
1 See Chapter V, pp.196, 198.
2 Minute by Gent, 6 July 1939 on Bridges' meeting with Dufferin, 
CO 531/29 [53011/1].
3 Singapore Free Press3 5 July 1939, quoting a Reuter report 
datelined London, 4 July 1939.
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volume of administrative work had diverted senior officers from their 
principal task of caring for the interests of the natives. It was 
in order to avail himself once again of their advice on native affairs 
and to ensure that external matters were efficiently handled that 
the Rajah had 'received the sympathetic co-operation of the Colonial 
Office in making this appointment'.^ At the same time, it was denied 
that the appointment was connected in any way with the March 
resignations.
In Kuching, the news raised a flutter of anxiety within the
Administrative Service. There was stern comment privately about
'interference', particularly from Archer who was concerned about the
position of the Chief Secretaryship to which he had only recently 
2been appointed. Pepys was seen as representing the long arm of the 
British government which had until then been successfully kept out 
of Sarawak affairs. An official circular was subsequently issued 
explaining that Pepys would not be coming to Sarawak in any official 
capacity but as 'Personal Adviser' to the Rajah and this had a 
palliative effect. However, during the six months from Pepys' 
appointment until his arrival in Kuching there was a great deal of 
discussion about how best to ensure that the General Adviser could 
be kept at arm's length.
The Colonial Office's Reaction to the Events of 1939
As might have been expected, Boyd visited the Colonial Office shortly 
after reaching London in July 1939. The former Chief Justice 
suggested to Sir John Shuckburgh that since he had been appointed 
on the recommendation of the Colonial Office, there might well be 
an inquiry into the circumstances of his forced resignation. He 
also felt that the Secretary of State should ask Sir Shenton Thomas 
for copies of all the documents relating to Anthony's 'inquiry', 
particularly the minutes which the Governor had not sent on to
1 Singapore Free Press3 6 July 1939, quoting a Reuter report 
datelined London, 5 July 1939.
2 Personal communication from Mrs M.E. Bowyer, 9 April 1976.
3 Ibid.
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London at the time. But Shuckburgh had a somewhat jaundiced view 
of Boyd who had come to him on several earlier occasions with 
complaints about the Rajah and the whole system of administration 
in Sarawak. He did not think that the Chief Justice’s complaints 
were unfounded but he could not be sympathetic towards a man whose 
’one topic of conversation is complaint against the ruler whom he is 
serving’.1 In his view, Boyd was not only disloyal - he had become 
obsessive and was therefore ’almost impossible to deal with . Nor 
did he approve of Boyd's desire to remain anonymous. 'If he really 
wants to make heavy weather over the whole business', he noted, we 
have a right to expect him to come out into the open and deliver his 
attack without any reservation'. But Boyd, as he correctly assessed, 
was not prepared to do anything which.might risk his comfortable 
pension and Shuckburgh was not about to 'take the chestnuts out of 
the fire for him’.2 It was decided accordingly that no action would 
be taken over Boyd's dismissal.
At the same time, the dossier1 which Boyd brought with him 
to the Colonial Office and which was subsequently circulated among 
a number of M.P.s and newspaper editors provided further evidence of 
the 'irregularities' which Gent and his colleagues suspected were 
being practised in Sarawak. One official commented that the inquiry 
'was not exactly a model of judicial procedure'. The Rajah s own 
behaviour had been inconsistent, he felt, while Anthony had opened 
the inquiry with the deliberate intention of forcing resignations 
and had been obliged to withdraw 'some of his most hot-headed 
statements'.^ Gent observed that there had been 'a lack of regular 
procedure on both sides', but that it had not resulted in serious 
unfairness,1 while Sir Cosmo Parkinson believed that the purge, 
'however administered, will prove to have been for the benefit of 
Sarawak'.^ Boyd was consequently told that no action could be taken
1 Minute by Shuckburgh, 26 July 1939, ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 'The Sarawak Crisis'.
4 Minute by Andrews, 1 September 1939, CO 531/29 [53011/1].
5 Minute by Gent, 3 September 1939, ibid.
6 Minute by Parkinson, undated, ibid.
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on the basis of his dossier and if he wished to pursue his complaints 
against the Sarawak government, he would have to make a formal 
approach to the Secretary of State.'*' Under other circumstances, 
something might have been made of the Chief Justice's complaints but 
the prospects for effective influence through the General Adviser 
and a co-operative Rajah Muda now seemed extremely hopeful. Under 
these circumstances, the 'curious condition of affairs' in Sarawak 
could be tolerated.
When news was received in January 1940 of Anthony's demotion,
Lord Dufferin was furious. 'This is intolerable', he exclaimed,
2'where is the Rajah & more important the Ranee?' Nor was the
information later supplied by Sir Shenton Thomas at all reassuring.
The Governor reported that Anthony's misdeeds as described by
Thackwell Lewis for the Rajah's action were 'trivial and none of
them... dishonourable' and that the origins of the proclamation were
clearly unsatisfactory. There was even the possibility that the
Rajah had signed it 'as he signs most documents, without reading it'.
Nevertheless, the proclamation was a 'scandalous document' and the
Rajah had no right to brand an officer publicly on the grounds which
3had been volunteered. The Governor had sent a telegram protesting 
against its publication but this had not arrived in time. 'The
4Rajah gave and the Rajah hath taken away', commented J.J. Paskin, 
although the general reaction in the Colonial Office was not so 
philosophical. To Sir Arthur Burns and Lord Dufferin it was yet 
another example of the Rajah's capricious and unpredictable behaviour 
which also damaged the prospects of setting Sarawak's house in order. 
There was a good deal of hostility towards the Ranee whose excited 
comments to the Hearst press were faithfully reproduced by the 
London newspapers. '... The Ranee is still in the U.S.A. (her 
spiritual home)’,Gent observed archly, '& generally her material 
place of lodging is at Hollywood'.^ In spite of its sympathy for
1 Gent to Stirling Boyd, 14 September 1939, ibid.
2 Minute by Dufferin, 19 January 1940, ibid.
3 Shenton Thomas to MacDonald, 19 January 1940, ibid.
4 Minute by Paskin, 20 January 1940, ibid.
5 Minute by Gent, 23 January 1940, ibid.
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Anthony, however, the Colonial Office was determined to prevent the 
Sarawak affair from blowing up into an international incident which 
might bruise British prestige and create pressure for direct inter­
vention. When it was reported from Athens that Gladys Brooke was 
intent on raising a clamour on her son’s behalf and that the Greek 
government had nobly offered to suppress all mention in local 
publications and outgoing telegrams from foreign correspondents, 
the Foreign Office was not unappreciative. It was concerned that 
there should be no allegation of suppression arranged at the request 
of the British government, but publicity would be undesirable and 
embarrassing to the Rajah and his government. If there was any 
protest about the succession, it should be made to the Secretary of
State for Colonies, a procedure ’more in keeping with British prestige
2which she [Gladys Brooke] professes to study'.
The Eastern Department’s view of Anthony’s demotion shifted 
significantly on receipt of his correspondence with the Rajah. Gent 
was particularly interested in a quotation taken from the Rajah's 
letter to Anthony of 19 December 1939:
Being as old as I am I can't become a Methuselah out 
here and prefer to spend most of my remaining years 
in a more salubrious climate. Pepys will be a kind 
of stepping stone towards intervention by the British 
Government. Sarawak would be absolutely safe under 
the B.G. and I see no alternative. Nothing has been 
arranged yet, but I am letting the idea get about and 
I think it is being well received... I shall have to 
make a definite statement at Council Negri next year 
and want to have everything arranged before hand. 3
Gent conceded that this may have been nothing more than 'an 
expression of the Rajah's weariness of the flesh' consequent on his 
return from holiday to Sarawak and its problems, together with the 
outbreak of war. But he also noted the Rajah's hope that Anthony 
would regain his former position and the indication that he might 
still inherit the Raj. This was a less than pleasing prospect unless
1 Sir M. Palairet (British Ambassador in Athens) to MacDonald, 
29 January 1940, ibid.
2 MacDonald to Palairet, 30 January 1940, ibid.
3 Cited by Gent in his minute of 12 March 1940, ibid.
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British influence was somehow strengthened:
We are all I think sympathetic with the Rajah's nephew 
in the treatment which he has received at the hands of 
His Highness, but I cannot think that it would be wise 
for His Majesty's Government to favour, or contribute 
towards, a complete restoration of a situation in which 
we would have to contemplate the lifetime of another 
Rajah with ourselves powerless to intervene in the 
administration of the State, beyond the very narrow 
limits contemplated in the 1888 Agreement.1
Gent stressed that there was no real reason to think that the nephew
would be any more progressive than the uncle, although Anthony had
certainly raised such hopes earlier. In Gent's view, the first
object of British policy should be to 'strengthen the effective
influence of British authority in the Sarawak regime' by means of a
new treaty which would make the Sarawak government amenable if need
be to the British government's 'advice' on any issue. Sir Shenton
Thomas was accordingly instructed to do all he could to strengthen
Pepys' position, particularly in view of the report that the Rajah
was considering the possibility of appointing the General Adviser
as Officer Administering the Government during his next visit to
England. 'Perhaps Rajah himself would not be averse to considering
new agreement providing residential advisory system', the Secretary
of State cabled the Governor, 'which would give effective authority
to British Government representative, and which might give him
satisfactory assurance of maintenance of policy of native interests
2... whoever his successor may be.' The actual proposal was not to 
be put at this stage but the Governor's advice on a general policy 
towards Sarawak was requested.
In mid-April Anthony gave his own version of events to
Gent and Sir Alan Burns, bringing with him a dossier of correspondence
3relating to his demotion. This did not alter the general attitude 
of the Eastern Department, however, and Gent hoped that after 
consultations with Sir Shenton Thomas it would be possible to conclude
1 Minute by Gent, 12 March 1940, ibid.
2 MacDonald to Shenton Thomas, 15 March 1940, ibid.
3 'The abolition of the Title of Rajah Muda of Sarawak by 
Proclamation, Dated 17th January, 1940', Brooke Papers, Box 2/2.
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a new treaty with the Rajah which would give the General Adviser 
’effective advisory powers'. When, in spite of all his earlier 
demands for an 'explanation' from the Rajah, Anthony finally accepted 
his suggestion of returning to Sarawak, Gent was clearly disappointed. 
'Well, well!', he wrote, 'I think there is a lack of resolution about 
him [Anthony] which will complicate his life rather than simplify it.'^
Pepys took up his new post in Kuching in early 1940 and at 
first his reports were encouraging. Accompanying the Rajah on his 
outstation tours, the General Adviser was impressed with the genuinely 
warm welcome the former received everywhere he went. Sympathizing 
with the outlook of outstation officers from his own experience in 
Malaya, he also deprecated the earlier attempts to dismantle the 
Residential system and centralize all government in Kuching. With 
Archer and Macpherson now at the helm, however, he thought it unlikely 
that this would ever happen again. Pepys thought that the Adminis­
trative Service had exerted a beneficial influence out of all 
proportion to its size:
When one considers the number of European officials that 
have been employed in Sarawak relatively to its area, 
the wonder is that so much has been achieved. If little 
spectacular has been done in the way of material "progress" 
and "development", peace and security have been given to 
the inhabitants of huge tracts of country where within 
living memory anarchy prevailed and heads were cheap. 2
This was all the more impressive when viewed against conditions across 
the Dutch border where garrisons of native troops were maintained at 
all government posts. Pepys also noted the Rajah's interest in 
improving social conditions. In recent months he had instituted a 
scheme for travelling medical dispensaries to visit remote areas and 
was also concerning himself with education and the supply of water 
to larger centres of population.
At this stage, Pepys felt inclined to stay in Sarawak for 
a second term of service. The Rajah had been most hospitable and 
there was no indication of resentment or opposition to his being there
1 Minute by Gent, 2 July 1940, CO 531/29 [53011/1].
2 Pepys to Shenton Thomas, 2 April 1940, CO 531/29 [53011/4].
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although he suspected that there would have been more towards a younger
serving officer from Malaya. If the post were to become permanent
he thought it should be always filled by a retired man like himself.
But once the novelty of the outstation tours had faded and he was
endeavouring to establish an office routine, the General Adviser
encountered a wall of indifference. The Rajah’s reforming zeal
quickly evaporated and the senior Administrative officers began to
ignore him. Although he did not vent his frustration in correspondence
with the Governor, all the indications suggest that he was for the
most part regarded as less than useful or was ignored.'*' According to
one senior officer, when Pepys’ advice was sought on particular points
he could only refer the questioner to certain of his former colleagues
2now in Trengganu, or Perlis, or Selangor. Boyd, who was himself 
somewhat isolated socially, befriended him but the General Adviser 
was almost ostracized by the other members of the Administrative 
Service.
Pepys was seen by most Sarawak officers as an alien inter­
loper, the epitome of that bureaucratic bogey, the MCS. The general 
policy was to keep him as far as possible from the everyday business 
of government; indeed, if one can risk the metaphor in a tropical 
climate, he was frozen out. Nevertheless, he was able to gather 
sufficient information about the political situation to assist Sir 
Shenton Thomas and the Colonial Office in their plans for Sarawak’s 
future. This represented a considerable improvement on the previous 
situation where the Governor was obliged to depend on intermittent 
reports of varying reliability.
The Crystallization of a Policy on Sarawak
Although Boyd’s dossier had not aroused great interest within the 
Colonial Office, there was more response in political circles. In 
particular, R.H. Etherton, M.P. for Stretford in Lancashire, and Sir
1 Interview with Sir Dennis White, 22 January 1975.
2 Interview with Mr B.A. Trechman, 4 March 1975.
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John Graham Kerr, M.P. for the Scottish universities, were concerned
enough to make official inquiries as to the situation in Sarawak.
Boyd had almost certainly met Kerr at the Athenaeum Club to which he
had recently been nominated and may have known Etherton through his
time at Inner Temple in the 1920s so that their inquiries were
probably inspired by him. In early February 1940 Etherton wrote to
Malcolm MacDonald asking for an explanation of Anthony Brooke’s recent
demotion and the earlier resignations of senior officers. ’It all
sounds very ominous', he told the Secretary of State, ’and it appears
2that the administration of Sarawak is far from satisfactory.' He 
thought it ’extraordinary' that a young man of twenty six should have 
been left in a position of absolute autocratic power, particularly 
when he was deprived of the advice of senior officers and when the 
European situation was creating administrative problems. Nor, in 
view of Anthony's demotion, had his administration been very successful. 
Etherton was aware of the 1888 Treaty and its limitations on British 
action but he felt that ’for practical purposes’ Sarawak was a 
British possession and any unfavourable criticism would involve 
Britain. The British government, therefore, had a responsibility to 
see that it was administered with ’reasonable efficiency’, that the 
judicial system was 'reasonable', and that the rights of British 
subjects were protected. The oil field at Miri and Sarawak's member­
ship of the International Rubber Agreement he regarded as further 
exemplifying British interests.
Gent suspected that Etherton had 'succumbed to a whispering
(something really louder) campaign' by Boyd for whom he had no great 
3regard. However, he was prepared to let Etherton read Sir Shenton 
Thomas' 19 April 1939 despatch reporting on the resignations and a 
subordinate, J.M. Martin, was moved enough to write a general 
memorandum on the future government of the Borneo territories. 'The
1 Kerr had an earlier introduction to Sarawak through Dr Charles 
Hose who had donated a number of rare specimens to the Depart­
ment of Zoology at the University of Glasgow which he headed 
1902-1936.
2 Etherton to MacDonald, 8 -February 1940, CO 531/29 [53011/4]. 
Minute by Gent, 15 February 1940, ibid.3
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time seems to be approaching when this question should be brought to 
a head', he noted, while admitting that North Borneo should be 
tackled first. In the memorandum,'*' Martin summarized the arguments 
which had been used to justify Sir Cecil dementi's earlier proposal 
for the unification of the Borneo territories and the way in which 
it had been defeated. Clementi had also suggested that an Adviser 
should be brought in to Sarawak so that it could be run along the 
lines of an Unfederated Malay State, but there were now signs that 
the Rajah might be willing to transfer all his interests to the 
British government. There had even been some discussion of the 
compensation which might be paid and of the need to meet the Rajah's 
anxiety that he would be seen as 'throwing over' the natives. Martin 
believed that the 'purge' of senior officers should revive interest 
in the administration of the country which had been severely 
criticized in Breen's confidential report. The Brooke policy of 
protecting native interests had many things to say for it, but 
Sarawak's general backwardness was not in accordance with modern 
ideas. 'That so large an area of potentially rich tropical territory 
should be left undeveloped', he wrote, 'making a relatively negligible 
contribution to the world's wealth and enjoying few of the benefits 
of modern scientific progress, cannot be tolerated indefinitely.'
The duty to provide for social welfare could not be ignored and 
Borneo seemed to be a classic case for the application of the new 
policy of 'planned development'. Too much depended on the Rajah, he 
argued. The increasing complexity of administration was too heavy 
for his shoulders while at the same time the prospects for the 
succession depended entirely on his whim. Martin admitted that the 
loyalty of the Sarawak natives to the Rajah was 'an asset of great 
value, which cannot be lightly sacrificed', but the main difficulty 
was money. This had led to Cabinet's decision against the proposal 
to purchase North Borneo in 1933 and in Sarawak there was the prospect 
not only of compensating the Rajah but of paying for more expensive 
standards of administration from an inadequate revenue. Nevertheless, 
he felt, something should be done before it was too late:
1 'The Future of the British Territories in Borneo', 14 February
1940, CO 531/29 [53011/4]. Subsequent quotations from this source.
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The present time is particularly opportune. In the 
international atmosphere which we may expect after the 
peace settlement expansion of direct British control 
over new spheres may present considerable and perhaps 
insurmountable difficulties; to-day it still can be 
accomplished without objection.
Martin envisaged an administratively autonomous British 
Borneo running its own government but drawing on expert assistance 
from Malaya. The return of Sarawak and North Borneo to Brunei might 
even enable it to be administered as a protected state under the 
Sultan, although he recognized that the latter was not generally 
respected and that Borneo lacked even the racial homogeneity of the 
Malay states. He concluded:
It is hard to doubt that some day we shall build a 
great and prosperous territory in Borneo, making a 
rich contribution, comparable perhaps to that of 
Malaya, to the Empire and presenting a solid bastion 
against the southward thrust of Japan.
While there is no clear indication of how his seniors 
viewed Martin’s arguments, it would seem most unlikely that they 
were dismissed out of hand. At any rate, the future of Sarawak had 
become a policy issue. Subsequent to the receipt of Pepys’ first 
reports, Martin set out three ’lines of progress in preparation for 
discussions which were to be held with Sir Shenton Thomas during his 
forthcoming visit to London:
1. Establishment of the Adviser system, involving a 
new treaty
2. Occasional secondment of or visits by professional
officers from Malaya ^
3. Occasional secondment of Sarawak officers to Malaya.
In essence, the problem was how to reconcile the 1888 Treaty and 
native loyalty to the Rajah with Sarawak’s isolation from the main­
stream of colonial development. In Martin’s view, the prestige of 
the Brookes, which Pepys had shown to be still very real, was ’an 
asset which should not be lightly destroyed’. He recalled Sir 
Gilbert Grindie’s opinion, no doubt prompted by the Iban unrest of 
the early 1930s, that 'if H.M.G. took over Sarawak they would find
1 'Relations of His Majesty's Government to Sarawak', ibid.
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they had taken over a war'.
In the meantime, there was continued pressure from the two 
M.P.s. On 28 February 1940 Kerr asked Malcolm MacDonald in the Commons:
... whether, in view of the proximity of the independent 
protected state of Sarawak to British possessions in the 
East and its strategic importance, he will inform the 
House regarding the recent deposition of the Rajah Muda, 
and the resignation some months ago of five senior members 
of the Civil Service... 2
The Secretary of State replied, predictably enough, that under the 
terms of the 1888 Treaty the government possessed no authority to 
interfere and that it would be improper for him to make any comment. 
Private correspondence was more revealing. Kerr told MacDonald that 
he had read the documents relating to the March 1939 inquiry and 
believed that, if made public, the facts would
... give rise to a very real feeling of uneasiness, a 
feeling that the old-fashioned Rajah rule - an absolute 
monarchy as far as internal affairs are concerned — is 
no longer appropriate, and that the Sarawak government 
should be reinforced by a properly constituted civil 
service under the control of the Colonial Office, or, 
failing this, there should be at least an Agent of the 
British Government actually resident in the territory. 3
Echoing Boyd's feelings, Kerr described the March 1939 
affair as 'a revolt against the tightening up of the previously 
sloppy administrative and judicial systems' and that the resignations 
clearly meant a return to sloppiness. The facts revealed by the 
inquiry, he suggested, were sufficient to show that it was time to 
investigate the feasibility of bringing Sarawak up to the level of 
efficiency of British colonies. MacDonald defended the Rajah s 
actions and his general policy, adding that the secondment of Colonial 
Service officers and the appointment of Pepys as General Adviser 
would be of great benefit to the Sarawak administration. At the same
1 Minute by Martin, 8 May 1940, ibid. Sir Gilbert Grindle, who 
joined the Colonial Office in 1898, was Assistant Under­
secretary of State 1916-25 and Deputy to the Permanent Under 
Secretary of State 1925-31.
2 Hansard3 28 February 1940.
3 Kerr to MacDonald, 21 February 1940, CO 531/29 [53011/4].
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time, he advised against public airing of the issue. The Rajah ,
he told Kerr, ’is... a shy person, and one whom it would be fatal to 
pillory in Parliament or in other public manner, even if he deserved 
it which I have no reason to believe.’ The Rajah could be convinced 
of the need for progressive policy and methods by ’sympathetic 
persuasion’ rather than by less diplomatic means.
However, the M.P.s were not easily put off. Kerr did not 
find Sir Shenton Thomas' despatch of 19 April 1939 in any way 
reassuring on the situation in Sarawak.. Indeed, it gave entire 
corroboration of my belief that the ruling family of Sarawak are 
really not of the mentality or strength of character appropriate to 
their position’.1 2 34 For his part, Etherton persisted in suggesting 
that the Secretary of State should call for the minutes of the inquiry, 
a document which he felt might lead to an assessment of Anthony 
Brooke markedly different from the one given by the Governor who was 
'singularly uninformed as to the real state of affairs in Sarawak... . 
He also suggested that a very strong recommendation be made to the 
Rajah that senior officers should in future be appointed from the 
Colonial Service as well as the Sarawak Service. MacDonald was again 
defensive. He could not control the conditions of service for 
officers in Sarawak, he told Etherton, and it would be beyond 
Sarawak's financial resources to have substantial numbers of seconded 
officers. He admitted there had been a lack of information about 
Sarawak affairs in the past but emphasized that this was something 
which Pepys would be able to remedy:
I pin my faith for the future in the appointment of the 
new Adviser... This marks, to my mind, an important 
stage in our relations with Sarawak and I hope that once 
instituted, I shall be successful in maintaining and 
improving on it, which will mean that new standards of 
criticism and advice on administrative affairs will be 
available to the Sarawak Government. 4
1 MacDonald to Kerr, 26 February 1940, ibid.
2 Kerr to Sir John Brocklebank, 13 March 1940, ibid.
3 Etherton to MacDonald, 14 March 1940, ibid.
4 MacDonald to Etherton, 20 March 1940, ibid.
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In mid-April, Etherton had a private meeting with MacDonald where he 
expressed the hope that the attitude of the Colonial Office would be 
one of ’We shall help and intervene if we possibly can’ rather than 
’We shall not intervene unless we have got to’. He also hoped that 
Sir Shenton Thomas' recommendations on the recruitment of senior 
officers and the separation of the offices of Legal Adviser and Chief 
Justice should be pressed on the Rajah.^
In late June, Sir Shenton Thomas, Sir Alan Burns, Sir Cosmo
Parkinson and Gent discussed the whole question of Sarawak. The
Governor told the group that Pepys had been getting on 'very well
indeed’ with the Rajah who was now probably ready to accept the
Adviser system, particularly in view of his difficulties over the
succession. He thought that the experiment should be allowed to
continue a little longer before the Rajah was approached but Gent
felt it was important to 'get something settled' before Anthony
2Brooke was restored to favour. Consequently it was decided that
the object of policy should be the ’firm establishment’ of a British
Adviser under the authority of a new treaty and that Pepys should
be asked to find out what the Rajah's plans were and when he might
3best be approached on the introduction of the Adviser system. In
a letter to Singapore's Colonial Secretary, S.W. Jones, Sir Shenton
Thomas said that the Rajah was beginning to realize the advantages
of a ’competent Adviser’ and there was even the possibility that
Pepys might be allocated further responsibilities during the Rajah’s
next absence. Pepys was to advise Jones when the subject might be
broached with the Rajah and this was to be done before the General
4Adviser left Sarawak on leave. By the end of July, however, Pepys 
had made it clear to the Governor that he did not want to stay in 
Kuching. The Rajah had evidently told Pepys that he would appoint 
him Officer Administering the Government in his absence but at the 
last moment appointed Archer instead. However, in true Sarawak
1 Etherton to MacDonald, 19 April 1940, ibid.
2 'Relations with Sarawak', ibid.
3 Sir Alan Burns to Shenton Thomas, 1 July 1940, ibid.
4 Shenton Thomas to Jones, 3 July 1940, ibid.
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fashion there was a face-saver. Pepys was to act as Liaison Officer
in Singapore, representing the four Borneo territories in defence
1matters.
According to Jones, the Rajah’s reversal resulted from an 
incident in which Pepys had 'warned [him] off little Sheila' (Pepys’
O
pretty step-daughter). The Rajah had apparently paid undue attention 
to her, but it seems likely that Pepys' dissatisfaction with what had 
turned out to be a largely nominal position caused him to look for 
reasons for leaving. He suggested to the Governor that a man of his 
seniority was not really needed and that the job could be done by a 
Class II MCS officer. Returning to Singapore in September he went 
so far as to tell Jones that there was little point in perpetuating 
the post.^ Viewed generally, it seems likely that the Rajah had 
only agreed to the appointment of Pepys as a temporary sop to the
Colonial Office. As Digby put it later, 'once the boar had ceased
, 4to rush, there was no longer any need for this temporary support .
Faced with the failure of the experiment, Gent's attitude 
hardened considerably. There had been no indication that the Rajah 
was willing to replace Pepys and Gent now had less faith in 
Anthony's capacity as the Rajah’s eventual successor. He believed 
that the time had come when Sir Shenton Thomas should ask the Rajah 
about his intentions concerning Pepys' successor and tell him that 
the British government recommended the appointment of a 'British 
Resident Adviser' to hold office subject to His Majesty's pleasure.
A new treaty would be needed and one official suggested that it 
should also provide for the appointment of a Chief Justice along the 
same lines as the Adviser. His comments also reflected what was now 
a less inhibited attitude towards intervention:
1 SGj, 1 October 1940.
2 Shenton Thomas to Gent, 27 July 1940, CO 531/29 [53011/4].
3 Jones to Gent, 16 September 1940, ibid.
4 Personal communication from Mr K.H. Digby, 2 September 1974.
5 Minute by Gent, 13 August 1940, CO 531/29 [53011/4].
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1888 and 1940 are two different dates, and an Agreement 
which was good enough then may very well not be good 
enough now. And surely we need not be too apologetic; 
the protecting Power, I should have thought, must have 
the right at least to see that there is a reasonably 
decent form of government. 1
Gent hoped that in the Governor’s absence Jones would broach the 
subject with the Rajah when he returned through Singapore from the 
Cameron Highlands and he prepared a draft despatch to Sir Shenton 
Thomas for the Secretary of State reflecting the new ’hard line'.
In this document, Gent rehearsed the arguments which had 
been discussed in the Eastern Department: that Pepys should be
replaced; that there was a need for sufficient access to Sarawak 
to answer Britain's responsibilities as the protecting power; and 
that the 1888 Treaty was 'unduly restrictive', preventing the flow 
of information about Sarawak and the assistance which might be given 
to its government. The second argument was a novel one but it was 
to be used extensively in subsequent years. Although Gent could 
only have pointed to Kerr and Etherton as examples, he complained 
that there had been 'substantial criticisms' of Sarawak's adminis­
trative standards and that under the existing circumstances the 
British government was in no position to answer these, or to 'bring 
influence to bear to effect any reforms which His Majesty's 
Government may believe to be desirable'. Finally, Gent spelled out 
the formula which he believed would meet the situation:
What I should desire most is the consent of His Highness 
to a supplementary formal Agreement... under which 
provision should be made for the acceptance by the Rajah 
of a British Resident Adviser appointed with the approval 
of His Majesty's Government by the British Agent in 
Singapore who would not only concern himself with such 
matters as foreign relations and defence... but also 
would have authority to be consulted at least, if not 
vested with the reserve power of "advice" on the model 
of the Malay States Treaties, on all matters affecting 
the administrative system and standards in Sarawak. It 
would be important that such an officer should expressly 
hold his appointment at the pleasure of His Majesty and 
that he should not be subject to dismissal by the State 
Ruler. 2
1 Minute by H.T. Bourdillon, 14 August 1940, ibid.
2 Draft despatch to Shenton Thomas, August 1940, ibid.
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He hoped that the Rajah would appreciate the importance of the appoint
ment both from the need to ensure the continuity of a ’progressive'
policy in Sarawak and from the uncertainty surrounding the succession.
Sir Shenton Thomas approved the draft although he saw no point in
having Jones meet the Rajah. '... Verbal conversations with him are
apt to be quite useless’, he told Sir Cosmo Parkinson, ’however
2accommodating he may seem at the time'.
Lord Lloyd, however, was not prepared to authorize the
despatch. ’I am not quite clear how this draft proposal [will]
3comply with [the] treaty of 1888’, he commented. His long friend­
ship with Bertram Brooke and an innately conservative attitude to such 
treaties inclined him to look for a more diplomatic means of pursuing 
the subject than direct communication with the Governor. For the 
time being, then, Gent's plan was shelved and Sir Shenton Thomas had 
to be warned that no initiative was intended for the present.
The Supplementary Agreement
In early March 1941, at the height of the Scott case, Gent decided 
to dust off the draft despatch. Lord Lloyd’s death a month earlier 
and his replacement by Lord Moyne meant that the Brookes were now 
without an ally in the Colonial Office. Gent pointed out that the 
problems of the Sarawak situation had not been remedied and that 
Sarawak's strategic importance suggested there should be no further 
delay in persuading the Rajah of the need for a ’responsible British 
Resident’.^  Sir Cosmo Parkinson noted Lord Lloyd's earlier 
reluctance to accept the draft but felt that they should now go ahead. 
The situation in Sarawak, he noted, was 'far from satisfactory' and 
there had been a negative response from the Rajah to Lloyd's earlier 
representations on the Scott case.~* The despatch was duly authorized 
by Moyne on 13 March but before it could reach Singapore news arrived
1 Personal communication from Mr K.H. Digby, 2 September 1974.
2 Shenton Thomas to Parkinson, 30 August 1940, CO 531/29 [53011/4].
3 Minute by Lloyd, 13 September 1940, ibid.
4 Minute by Gent, 4 March 1941, ibid.
5 Minute by Parkinson, 6 March 1941, ibid.
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of the Rajah's 31 March proclamation regarding the constitution.
Sir Shenton's only objection to this development was in 
relation to the provision governing the succession: he believed that
the Rajah did not possess the right to nominate his successor or to 
transfer it to anyone else. Lord Moyne recognized that the 13 March 
despatch had been overtaken by events and that the most important 
thing now was to ensure that the British government be consulted on 
the constitution before it reached final form. Sir Shenton Thomas 
was accordingly instructed to advise the Rajah to this effect and to 
remind him that the rights of the British government under the 1888 
Treaty should not be infringed. As far as the succession was 
concerned, Moyne felt that there was no objection at this stage, 
provided he was consulted if any problem arose.^
In a later despatch the Governor provided more details of 
the background of the March proclamation, including the secret
2agreement between the Rajah and the Committee of Administration and
the influence of MacBryan. On the whole, Sir Shenton still approved
of the idea of a constitution. '... There can be much more
effective administration', he told the Secretary of State, 'as the
Government will no longer be at the whim of an irresponsible ruler
3under the influence of a crook'. The Governor had formed a favourable 
impression of Le Gros Clark who had visited him on 7 April to deliver 
the documents connected with the Rajah's announcement and explain the 
background of events on behalf of the Committee of Administration.
He was pleased, too, when Le Gros Clark replaced Archer as Officer 
Administering the Government a month later. His only worry was that 
the Rajah and MacBryan intended remaining in the state until the end 
of September, thus raising the prospect of 'perpetual intrigue' and 
a clash of authority between the Rajah and the Committee of 
Administration. He consequently recommended that the Rajah should 
be persuaded to visit England or America, at the same time recognizing 
that MacBryan would exert all his influence against any such proposal.
1 Moyne to Shenton Thomas, 13 March 1941, ibid.
2 See Chapter III, pp. 99-100.
3 Shenton Thomas to Moyne, 1 April 1941, ibid.
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This new information alarmed Moyne who feared that in the 
event of any conflict of interest between the Rajah and the Committee, 
there might well be Tpro-Raj ah factional unrest’ among the natives. 
Consequently the proposal for a British Adviser was revived; the 
Rajah and the Committee were to be urged to request from Sir Shenton 
the immediate services of a senior officer to assist in the framing 
of the new constitution.^ Realizing that his despatch had brought 
about an over-reaction in London, the Governor went to some pains to 
emphasize that the situation presented no dangers of ’pro-Rajah 
unrest’. He emphasized that the constitution had been made necessary 
by the need to protect Sarawak's finances and that the authority of 
the Committee was purely temporary. Both he and Pepys believed the
appointment of a British Representative to be unnecessary at this, 2 stage.
The subsequent arrangement was that the Rajah agreed to
avail himself of the assistance offered by the Governor in framing
the constitution. But the Colonial Office was loath to abandon the
plan to replace Pepys and in May the Governor had to reiterate to
the Secretary of State that it was 'inopportune' to press the matter
of a British Representative. The Sarawak government, he said, would
want to know the reasons and consequent negotiations might not only
delay the framing of the new constitution but could lead to 'fresh
intrigues' by MacBryan. 'It would be much better to await [the]
draft...', he advised, 'and then to consider whether as a condition
of approval Sarawak should be asked to agree to a new Treaty
3including provision for [a] British Adviser'. Lord Moyne still
thought that it would be difficult to introduce a major proposal
such as this at a later stage without having first sounded out the
Rajah but he accepted the Governor's counsel, suggesting at the same
time that more information might be obtained on the political
4situation in Sarawak.
1 Moyne to Shenton Thomas, 10 April 1941, ibid.
2 Shenton Thomas to Moyne, 21 April 1941, ibid.
3 Shenton Thomas to Moyne, 20 May 1941, ibid.
4 Moyne to Shenton Thomas, 2 June 1941, ibid.
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Sir Shenton Thomas subsequently arranged for Pepys to visit 
Sarawak and instructed him to sound out Le Gros Clark on the idea of 
a ’British Representative’ with authority to be consulted on all 
administrative matters. The term ’Adviser’ was studiously avoided, 
no doubt because of its Malayan connotations. Le Gros Clark seemed 
agreeable to this, on condition that the Representative did not arrive 
until after the constitution was enacted. Otherwise there would be 
the suspicion that it was the Committee of Administration's doing and 
that it was a further effort to oust the Rajah. Pitt Hardacre, the 
only other person with whom Pepys discussed the idea, suggested that 
while it was not strictly necessary to consult the Rajah under the 
existing constitutional arrangements, it would nevertheless be 
desirable to do so. Other officers with whom Pepys spoke said that 
it would be a good thing if the British government ’took over' and 
appointed an Adviser. MacBryan himself told Pepys in Singapore after 
the latter’s return from Sarawak that he had advised the Rajah that 
a British Representative would be the best thing for the country. 
Indeed, he claimed that the Rajah would have asked for one had it not 
been for Archer’s objections. Pepys also reported, however, that the 
Rajah's reputation within the Service had been ’rather shattered' by 
the news of the secret agreement and there was some doubt as to 
whether he would ever sit as Rajah in Council. There were even 
rumours among the Chinese that he would not be attending the centenary 
celebrations.^
In late July Le Gros Clark received from Sir Shenton Thomas 
a draft 'Supplementary Agreement' which had been prepared by his 
Attorney General subsequent to a visit to Singapore by Pitt Hardacre. 
This was discussed at a meeting of the Committee of Administration 
on 31 July, together with the second draft of the constitution, and 
was matched against an alternative agreement prepared by Digby. 
Naturally enough, the main focus of interest was the definition of 
powers. According to the Singapore Attorney-General's draft, the 
British Representative would be entitled to be consulted 'on all
1 'Reports by Mr W.E. Pepys, Liaison Officer, Sarawak and North 
Borneo, who visited Sarawak on the 28th June 1941. B. - The 
Proposal for a British Representative', ibid.
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matters touching the general administration of the State’ as well as 
foreign relations and defence, to have access to all State documents 
and records and to attend all meetings of the Supreme Council and 
Council Negri where he could take part in discussions if invited but 
not vote.'*' It was generally agreed by the Committee that this 
exceeded the terms which had been settled between Sir Shenton Thomas 
and Pitt Hardacre and that the proposal should only be accepted on 
three conditions: firstly, that the person appointed should be
acceptable to the Rajah; secondly, that the representative's terms 
of reference should be restricted to foreign relations and defence; 
and finally that the government was not bound to accept any advice 
given outside these terms of reference. The Committee agreed that 
there was to be no further 'bargaining' with the Governor 'since it 
was considered that by offering this Agreement Sarawak had already 
made a great concession'. Digby's definition of the British 
Representative’s status was unanimously accepted. His advice was to 
be asked and acted upon in all matters affecting the foreign relations 
and defence of Sarawak and he could be consulted on matters of general 
administration, the relevant documents being provided; attendance at 
Supreme Council and Council meetings was also permitted. The last 
clause was a timely one, reminding the Colonial Office of Sarawak's 
extremely vulnerable position:
H.M. Government will at all times to the utmost of its 
power take whatever steps may be necessary to protect 
the territory of Sarawak from external attacks and will 
bear the cost of such protection. 3
Forwarding the Sarawak government's draft to Lord Moyne, the Governor 
noted that it was not prepared to accept an Adviser with powers 
similar to those of Advisers in the Malay States and that the title 
'Representative' had been adjudged more fitting. However, he felt 
that the draft marked a 'considerable advance' and if the British
1 Minutes of meeting of Committee of Administration, 31 July 1941, 
Brooke Papers, Box 10/4.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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Representative was a capable and experienced man he would be brought 
more and more into consultation with the Sarawak government.^
Lord Moyne was not too disappointed with the outcome, 
believing that the arrangement would ensure reliable information about 
Sarawak and that the Representative might gradually increase his 
influence as he became more useful to the Sarawak government. However, 
he felt that the Representative ought to be consulted on social 
services and all vital financial and economic questions. After some 
further exchanges, Sir Shenton recommended that the Secretary of State 
should accept the formula proposed by Sarawak whereby the Represent­
ative would be entitled to offer his opinion 'on matters touching the 
general administration of the State'. The Sarawak government had 
earlier expressed the view it would be an infringement of sovereignty 
if the Representative were to call for State papers concerning matters 
on which he was not actually consulted. A final meeting was held 
with Le Gros Clark and Digby in Singapore on 23 October and the 
Supplementary Agreement was subsequently signed in Kuala Lumpur by
Sir Shenton Thomas and the Rajah on 22 November shortly before the
2latter departed for Australia. Lord Moyne had agreed that it should 
not be published, nor the British Representative appointed, until
3after the Rajah returned in early 1942.
The Colonial Office and the 1941 Constitution
It was not until August that the Colonial Office received a copy of 
the draft constitution. In the meantime, however, Anthony Brooke 
had offered his own outspoken comments, together with the two 
memoranda which he had circulated within Sarawak. 'Unless the present 
draft of the proposed constitution is fundamentally changed', Anthony 
told Gent in early July, 'the internal situation in this country may
1 Shenton Thomas to Moyne, 28 August 1941, CO 531/30 [53011/4].
2 The text of the Supplementary Agreement can be found in 
Appendix I.
3 Lord Moyne to Shenton Thomas, 10 November 1941, cited in the 
Governor's cable of 16 December 1941, CO 531/30 [53011/4].
185
soon become such as to embarrass Imperial Interests’. While he had
’utter confidence’ in the members of the Committee of Administration
as individuals, he shared Lord Lugard’s poor opinion of this kind of
government. A similar protest against government by ’oligarchy’ was
made to Gent by one of the directors of Sarawak Rubber Estates who
said that there had been ’alarming reports' from their people in
2Sarawak. T.C. Martine, the manager of the Borneo Company which 
owned Sarawak Rubber Estates, was a friend of the Rajah and seems 
to have shared the view of some officers that the constitutional Order 
amounted to a coup d'etat and that British intervention was needed.
Lord Moyne took these representations very seriously and he
subsequently told the Governor that according to his information,
the constitution had been 'severely criticized' by local interests
for the effect it might have on British commerce as well as native
opinion. Emphasizing that the British government should not be
presented with a fait accompli, he asked the Governor to investigate 
3these reports. Sir Shenton was highly sceptical, telling Moyne
that the Borneo Company did not have full knowledge of the facts and
4that Anthony Brooke was trying to enlist Margery Perham’s sympathy. 
When Sir Adam Ritchie of the Borneo Company sought an interview with 
Lord Moyne and Gent in late August he was reassured to some extent 
when told of the plan for a British Representative. However, he was 
anxious that the Representative should be appointed by the Governor 
and thus be responsible to the Colonial Off ice.
Lord Moyne's first official reaction to the draft 
constitution was that the Committee of Administration had indeed 
aggregated far too much power to themselves and that some provision 
should be made for the retention of sufficient prerogative powers, 
such as the right to choose the Supreme Council, to ensure that the
1 Anthony Brooke to Gent, 7 July 1941, CO 531/30 [53011/4].
2 Minute by Monson, 7 August 1941, ibid.
3 Moyne to Shenton Thomas, 8 August 1941, ibid.
4 Shenton Thomas to Moyne, 15 August 1941, ibid.
Ritchie to Gent, 25 August 1941, ibid.5
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Rajah remained a constitutional monarch. Under the existing draft,
Moyne commented, ’it would be conceivable for a group in the Civil
Service to create [a] narrow oligarchy with absolute control of
affairs’.^  In a subsequent cable to Sir Shenton Thomas he expressed
further concern that the Supreme Council might come under the control
of a 'vested official interest' and that the government might fall
2into the hands of a 'close cabal'. Consequently, one of the points 
which he suggested should be brought to the attention of the Sarawak 
authorities was the appointment of members to the Supreme Council. 
Lord Moyne wanted provision to be made for the succession within the 
constitution and hoped there would be a 'clear requirement' that the 
Rajah would always be a British subject. He also felt that there 
should be a clause providing for the revocation or amendment of the 
constitution, 'presumably with the consent of the Council Negri', 
and that the appointment of an Officer Administering the Government
3seemed unnecessary during the Rajah's temporary absences outstation.
After consultations with Digby and Thackwell Lewis, Sir
Shenton Thomas told Moyne he was recommending that the right of
appointments to the Supreme Council should be exercised personally
by the Rajah and not by the Rajah in Council. On the provision that
the Rajah should be a British subject, however, he pointed out that
this would exclude 'any Malayan resident in Sarawak including
descendants of the Chiefs who invited [the] first Rajah to take over
4the Government...'. Nor did he think there was any need for a 
provision for repeal or amendment and he advised strongly against any 
insistence that the British government should be consulted on amend­
ments after the constitution was enacted. Moyne agreed that the 
Rajah could also be a native of Sarawak but he was still anxious 
that there should be a provision for the proclamation of an heir. 
Although the Tuan Muda had already been proclaimed heir in the 31 
March address, the question was by no means clear and the Governor
1 Moyne to Shenton Thomas, 9 September 1941, ibid.
2 Moyne to Shenton Thomas, 11 September 1941, ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Shenton Thomas to Moyne, 14 September 1941, ibid.
187
proposed to raise the matter again. He told the Secretary of State 
that Anthony Brooke who had recently arrived in Singapore was 
’incapable of a balanced view in regard to the new constitution' and 
that he was trying to persuade him to enlist.'*'
We have already seen that in October the Tuan Muda declined
to accept the Rajah's nomination of him as Heir Apparent and that
concern over the succession caused him to visit the Colonial Office
2for consultations with Gent. Subsequent to this he wrote to Gent
about the secret agreement between the Rajah and the Committee of
3Administration and later addressed an official letter to the Under­
secretary of State providing a detailed account of the constitution's 
4origins. In early February 1942 Bertram Brooke wrote to the Under­
secretary of State once more, claiming that even before their exchange 
of telegrams in October about his willingness or otherwise to inherit 
through nomination, the Rajah had announced to the Supreme Council 
his desire that his grandson should be brought into the succession. 
'... The Rajah has finally succumbed', he concluded, 'in assenting 
to a project which others have been trying... to force him into, by 
some method or other, over a period of years'.^ Nevertheless, he 
felt that a detailed examination of the question would serve no
useful purpose at this time. The Secretary of State was inclined to
6agree.
Sarawak and Defence Planning
Vyner Brooke's defiance of the Secretary of State over the Scott case 
had revived some of Gent's doubts about him. In May 1941 he wrote:
1 Shenton Thomas to Moyne, 16 September 1941, ibid.
2 See Chapter III, p.130.
3 Bertram Brooke to Gent, 11 November 1941, CO 531/30 [53011/4].
4 Bertram Brooke to Under-Secretary of State, 13 November 1941, ibid.
5 Bertram Brooke to Under-Secretary of State, 2 February 1942, ibid.
6 Under-Secretary of State (?) to Bertram Brooke, 20 February 1942, 
ibid.
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The Rajah shows signs of being attracted by theories 
of "neutrality" of a sort which has proved so fatal to 
other small nations. It will be realised that on other 
occasions he has actually suggested that Sarawak shd. 
conduct itself as a neutral towards one of our enemies 
in this war. 1
Gent was probably referring here to comments made by the Rajah in the 
course of earlier negotiations concerning Sarawak's defence arrange­
ments. While there is no evidence that the Rajah resisted the 
principle that the defence of Sarawak should be linked with that of 
Brunei and North Borneo, he seems at some point to have at least 
considered the possibility of adopting a neutral position vis ä vis 
Japan. Whether this was on MacBryan's advice is not clear, but xt 
would seem to have been consistent with his Political Adviser's sense 
of Realpolitik and his possible connections with Japanese intelligence.
The whole question of Sarawak's international status had 
been raised by the outbreak of war and one of Anthony Brooke's last 
public acts as Rajah Muda was to issue a Proclamation on 3 September 
supporting Britain.1 23 4 In the mid 1930s the Sarawak government had 
sought clarification from the Singapore authorities on Sarawak s 
position as a protected state in the event of war, only to be fobbed 
off in a way which Digby found somewhat patronizing: '"Don't worry,
little boy", said His Majesty's representative in effect, "your
foreign relations are controlled by His Majesty's Government by virtue
ii 14of the Treaty of 1888, and so we will say when you are at war .
But it was later brought to Sir Shenton Thomas' attention by 
Singapore's legal authorities that Sarawak had not been covered by 
Britain's declarations of war and the Sarawak government was 
consequently informed that it should declare war on Germany and Italy. 
According to Digby's account, the Sarawak government was disinclined 
to conform with these instructions:
1 Minute by Gent, 9 May 1941, ibid.
2 See Chapter VI, pp. 253-4.
3 SGy 1 September 1939.
4 Digby, 'Lawyer in the Wilderness’, p. 83.
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In our opinion Sarawak was enough of a joke in the eyes 
of the world already without our going out of our way 
to provide further fodder for the war-time music halls, 
and we firmly decided to leave Germany and Italy alone. 1
Enemy aliens were thus detained in Sarawak by means of formal orders 
under Sarawak’s own Defence Regulations rather than under the Royal 
Prerogative. When a regiment of Punjabi troops under British officers 
arrived from Singapore in January 1941, strenuous efforts were made 
to assert Sarawak sovereignty. There were problems involving the 
trial of Punjabi soldiers in Sarawak courts for civil offences, the 
legal potentialities of gunnery practice and other weighty matters 
which Digby unsuccessfully attempted to settle in an interview with 
a military legal authority at Fort Canning in Singapore:
I remember little... except that he answered, "You 
know? You’ve got me there", to my first question, and 
"Bai jove! You've got me there too", to my second, the 
last reply being repeated in response to every other 
question which I put to him. 2
Legally speaking, some doubt remained about whether or not Sarawak
3was at war 'until the Japanese arrived and resolved the issue’.
Nevertheless, Sarawak’s inclusion in Imperial defence 
planning after 1937 had drawn it closer to direct British influence. 
Naturally enough, the focus of British interest was the oil field at 
Miri which Sarawak’s only defence force, the 700 man Sarawak 
Constabulary, could hardly be expected to defend. Consequently the 
Overseas Defence Committee in London suggested the creation of a 
joint Brunei-Sarawak Defence Force consisting mainly of the oil 
company's European employees whose task would be to hinder enemy 
landings. However, the Rajah was concerned about the cost and may 
also have been apprehensive about the possibility of MCS interference 
in Sarawak affairs consequent on such a link with Brunei. He reminded 
the British government of its defence obligations under the 1888 
Treaty, emphasizing that any defence force for the oil field
1 Ibid., p. 83.
2 Ibid., p. 84.
3 Personal communication from Mr K.H. Digby, 11 August 1974. 
The main legal precedent involved was the case of the Ionian 
ships in 1855. The English Reports3 Vol. 164, London, 1921.
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should be a Brunei force but that the Sarawak government would provide 
the necessary facilities to allow it to operate across the border in 
Sarawak. At the same time, he offered a single contribution of 
£50,000 towards the cost of defence measures, providing that half went 
towards the establishment of one or more landing grounds in Sarawak 
by the R.A.F.^
From the mid—1930s there had been increasing interest within
the British defence departments, particularly the Admiralty, in the
strategic importance of northern Borneo. The Admiralty was alarmed
by the degree of Japanese ’penetration’ of North Borneo which it saw
as increasing a wartime threat to the Miri oil field and to Singapore
itself.1 2 34 Consequently there was a good deal of concern when it
seemed that the Sarawak government was about to grant a Japanese
company, Nissa Shokai  ^ a concession to mine coal in the Kapit
district. Nissa Shokai, which also owned a small rubber plantation
on the Samarahan river near Kuching, had first been granted permission
to prospect for coal in 1929 and after discovering seams along the
Pila river they had been granted a further licence to prospect
throughout the headwaters of the Rejang river. A five year extension
was granted in 1932 and in May 1937 Nissa Shokai applied to the
Sarawak government for yet another extension to December 1939. At
this point the Chief Secretary, Parnell, wrote to the Sarawak
Government Agent in London asking him to seek the Rajah’s approval
for a proposal that the government’s legal advisers should consult3the Colonial Office on the drafting of a standard lease. The Agent 
subsequently wrote to Gent who immediately sought the opinions of the 
three service departments. When their replies left no doubt about 
the undesirability of granting a concession,^ the Secretary of State,
1 Memorandum by Gent, 14 September 1937, CO 531/27 [53038].
2 Ibid.
3 Parnell to Sarawak Government Agent, 21 May 1937, cited by 
Shenton Thomas in his despatch to Lord Harlech of 5 November 
1937, ibid.
4 Replies by Wing Commander S.C. Strafford, E.N. Syfret 
(Admiralty) and Col. R.B. Pargiter cited in minute by Cowell, 
27 August 1937, ibid.
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Lord Harlech, wrote to Sir Shenton Thomas informing him of the defence
view and asking him to make some inquiries with the Sarawak government,
at the same time emphasizing the British government’s 'special
interest’ in the issuing of important concessions to foreign nationals.
When the Rajah was subsequently invited to the Colonial Office for
discussions, he said that there was no intention of granting a lease
to the Japanese. Furthermore, he undertook to consult the British
government first if consideration was being given to any kind of
2Japanese concession. This was more than the Colonial Office had
hoped for, particularly since its case was weakened by the Japanese
mining concessions in Malaya, but there was still some concern in
Gent's mind that prospecting had been going on since 1929 without the
3Colonial Office's knowledge. It was yet another illustration of the 
need for good information on what was happening in Sarawak.
The first tangible evidence of British interest in Sarawak's 
strategic importance had been seen in 1933 when an R.A.F. reconnais- 4sance party selected sites for airfields at Kuching, Miri and Bintulu. 
Construction of the Kuching strip actually began in April 1936 and it 
was opened in September 1938 while the first landing was made at Miri 
in September 1939. Work also commenced on the Bintulu field in 1936 
but was abandoned in late 1939 almost completed. In early 1941 
extensions to the Kuching field commenced with a view to its 
accommodating all but the heaviest aircraft. By this time, however, 
the Rajah had become concerned that the two completed airfields were 
not only not being used by the R.A.F. except on occasional visits, 
but were completely unprotected. Indeed, they constituted a danger 
to Sarawak's security in that they could be very useful to any 
Japanese thrust towards Singapore. Prior to this, particularly after
1 Harlech to Shenton Thomas, 4 August 1937, ibid.
2 Minute by Gent, 15 September 1937, ibid.
3 Minute by Gent, 2 December 1937, ibid.
4 Personal communication from Mr J.L. Noakes, 8 October 1976.
5 This account is based largely on J.L. Noakes, 'Report Upon 
Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the 
Occupation in December 1941 of Imperial Japanese Forces...'. 
Noakes, who was Secretary for Defence at the time of the 
invasion, wrote most of the report in Batu Lintang camp during 
the first half of 1942.
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the Munich scare in September 1938, the Rajah had reminded the 
British authorities through Sir Shenton Thomas of Britain's defence 
obligations under the 1888 Treaty. And when there was a Japanese 
invasion scare in February 1941 he must have been more concerned 
than ever.
In addition to the £25,000 given in 1937 towards the cost 
of airfields, the Rajah had also contributed generously from state 
reserves towards the British war effort. In late 1939 Sarawak gave 
$1,000,000 and this was followed by $500,000 in June 1940 and a 
further $1,000,000 in February 1941. Money was also being collected 
under government sponsorship by the Sarawak branch of the Malaya 
Patriotic Fund which operated jointly with the China Relief Fund 
Committee in fund-raising activities throughout the state. In 
December 1940 the Rajah introduced a scheme whereby the salaries of 
all European officers were taxed as a means of financing the state's 
own defence force.^ Consequently, he felt that Sarawak had made a 
reasonable contribution and he expected that the problem of the 
airfields would be given attention. In March 1941 he wrote to Sir 
Shenton Thomas promising that Sarawak would continue to assist the 
British war effort to the best of its ability but expecting in 
return that the British government would shoulder full responsibility 
for the defence of the state and its cost, except for the raising 
and maintaining of local forces. The Governor agreed to this 
arrangement and a senior officer was sent to Kuching to report on 
defence measures. It was on his recommendation that the first 
detachment of the 2/15th Punjab Regiment arrived in Sarawak in April 
1941 to protect the sabotage teams organized to destroy the Lutong 
refinery and the Miri oil wells in case of Japanese attack. The 
principle had been established that the denial scheme was a British 
responsibility and that all claims for compensation would be an 
Imperial liability.^
1 SG3 2 January 1941.
2 Noakes, 'Report Upon Defence Measures...', p. 11. Shell sub­
sequently presented the British government with a hefty bill.
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However, the defences of Sarawak continued to be totally
inadequate and in October the state’s Secretary for Defence, J.L.
Noakes, wrote a memorandum for Le Gros Clark pointing out that the
tiny British garrison of 600 men invited attack without being able
to offer any determined opposition to an invading force. Indeed, he
emphasized, there was a danger of the people of Sarawak ’suffering
out of all proportion to the damage inflicted on the enemy'.^ A
copy of the memorandum was sent to Lt. General A.E. Percival, General
Officer Commanding Malaya, and the Committee of Administration
subsequently sent Noakes to Singapore to voice their dissatisfaction.
But Percival, while admitting the position, told Noakes that he was
incapable of doing anything more than sending two anti-aircraft guns
within the next six months. On Noakes' invitation, Percival visited
Kuching on 27 November (the day when an official warning of war
with Japan was received) but the only result was a decision that the
Punjabi force should concentrate on the defence of the Kuching
airfield, even if it meant neglecting coastal and river defences
against a seaborne landing. The airfield was only to be conceded
if enemy strength made the position untenable. 'There have been too
many retreats', the general told the Supreme Council. 'You in
2Kuching must stand and fight'.
BY October 1941 the Colonial Office was well on the way to asserting 
its authority over Sarawak's internal affairs. The British 
Representative provided for in the Supplementary Agreement was no 
doubt expected progressively to assume the powers of a Malayan 
Resident, thus completing a pattern of British domination which had 
been initiated in the Malay states in the 1870s. Until this time 
Sarawak had been an anomaly, but an anomaly which there had been no 
pressing need to resolve. However, the clear indication from 1938 
that the Rajah was on the point of giving up his responsibilities, 
together with serious doubts about his government's administrative 
standards and the state's strategic position, made British inter-
1 Ibid., p. 23.
2 Ibid.
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vention almost inevitable. While the Rajah had been able to resist 
the replacement of Pepys, the secret agreement with the Committee 
of Administration and the 1941 Constitution had increased his 
vulnerability. What remained uncertain was the future of the Brooke 
dynasty. Unlike the Malay sultans, they could not be moved sideways 
to a position of political impotence. It was left to the Japanese 
to solve the problem by moving them out altogether.
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CHAPTER V
The Origins of Indigenous Political Organization, 1930-1945.
DURING the decade prior to the Second World War, politics in Sarawak 
was limited to dynastic and bureaucratic questions involving the 
Brooke family and the seventy or eighty Europeans who constituted 
the highest echelons of the Sarawak Service. Representation of 
native and Chinese interests was still the monopoly of the traditional 
Malay and Chinese elites. However, the pressures set up by Malay 
education and Chinese nationalism during the late 1930s resulted in 
new forms of communal organization which threatened to bypass the 
traditional leadership. The growing economic strength of the Ibans 
was also being expressed in the establishment of communally-based 
co-operatives designed to compete with Chinese traders. During 
this period, moreover, Brooke government was clearly demonstrating 
its inability either to protect the economic interests of its people 
or to satisfy the expectations of the new educated elites. The 
Persatuan Melayu Sarawak, the China Distress Relief Fund committees 
and the United Sea Dayak Co-operative constituted the nuclei of 
political parties which were to emerge at the beginning of the 
cession controversy in early 1946. While it is difficult to 
demonstrate any expression of heightened political consciousness 
during the Japanese occupation, it seems likely that the experience 
of those years broke the spell of European political and cultural 
supremacy even if it did not discredit Brooke rule. The Ibans 
of the Second Division were also given the opportunity of throwing 
off Malay hegemony and participating in the administration as they 
had never done before. By the time cession was announced in 
February 1946 there was both a potential for organized political 
action in Sarawak along lines similar to the Malayan situation and 
a significant number of Ibans who could not have been easily 
reconciled to a restoration of their former status under Brooke rule.
Economic Change
There is so little surviving documentary material for the 1930s in 
Sarawak that it is only possible to provide the barest sketch of socio-
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economic conditions. However, broad economic and educational 
developments were gradually changing the face of Sarawak society 
and creating a situation full of challenge for Brooke rule.
The boom in rubber prices after 1918 further stimulated 
rubber planting in Sarawak, particularly by the Ibans of the 
Second and Third Divisions who quickly discovered the attractions 
of the cash economy. By 1934 the area of planted rubber was in the 
vicinity of 210,000 acres, of which all but about three per cent 
was in the hands of smallholders. While about one-fifth of the 
estimated 50,000 smallholders were Chinese, the remainder were 
Malays and Ibans who planted the narrow strips of fertile alluvial 
soil along the river banks.^ Most of these holdings were no more than 
an acre and a half but surprizingly high yields and good prices 
meant that many Ibans were able to employ Chinese rubber tappers 
on a bagi dua (50/50 share) basis. During the 1920's, rewards from 
rubber were such that there was a significant movement away from the 
traditional slash-and-bum and hunting economy of the Second and 
Third Division Ibans. Vast new areas were planted with rubber. 
Consequently there was considerable dislocation when the price of 
rubber dived in 1931.
Although Sarawak's interests as a smallholder producer
were totally opposed to participation in the International Rubber
Restriction Scheme designed to protect European investment in
2commercial estates, it was one of the signatories of the May 1934 
agreement which established the International Rubber Regulation 
Committee. The Sarawak government supported the interests of English, 
Dutch and French investors in the plantation industry, even though 
such investment was negligible in Sarawak. Under the subsequent five- 
year programme which allocated to each signatory country a quota 
based on total planted area and the percentage of the quota which 
could actually be exported each year, Sarawak's quota for 1934 was 
24,000 tons with a graduated rise to 32,000 tons by 1938. New
1 W.P.N. Bridges, 'A Report on Rubber Regulation in Sarawak',
March 1937.
2 K.E. Knorr, World Rubber And Its Regulation, Stanford 1945, 
pp.122-4.
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planting was forbidden and only such replanting as would balance 
depreciation of mature trees was allowed.
Although exports fell short of the quota in 1934, 
production in that year was 60 per cent above the 1933 figure.
The maturation of young rubber trees and the slump in pepper prices 
from $42 per pikul in 1934 to $24 per pikul in 1935 made it clear 
that this rate of increase would continue unless there was substantial 
restriction of output.
Two successive measures were introduced in Sarawak to 
limit production - a 'tapping holiday' scheme which restricted the 
number of days when rubber could be tapped and a coupon system which 
limited the quantity of rubber which could be sold by an individual 
smallholder. The first scheme aroused a great deal of ill feeling 
since Sarawak's high rainfall meant that tapping was often not possible 
during the stipulated periods. Wherever it was possible to police 
the regulations there were arrests for contravention and the 
Sarawak Gazette for the years 1934-38 is studded with reports of 
convictions. On one occasion a patrol near Sibu was attacked by 
irate Chinese tappers. Restriction of Chinese male immigration 
intended as a further limit to rubber output had created a shortage 
of tappers and enabled them to demand 60 per cent from smallholders.
The scheme also involved a four-year assessment of all 
smallholdings which inevitably created the impression among the Ibans 
that the government was planning a new tax. In October 1935 the 
Gazette reported that in spite of extensive publicity work carried 
out in the Ulu Oya area, the Ibans there were 'still uneasy' and 
inclined to believe that the government proposed to levy a quit- 
rent on their rubber land. Two years later the problem still 
existed in the Nanga Meluan area and the Resident was sympathetic.
'In the past', he wrote, 'Government inspection and survey of 
rubber has generally meant some new form of taxation, and it is 
not surprizing therefore that the Dayaks regard assessment with 
some misgiving'."'"
1 SG, 2 August 1937.
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From the administrative side, the scheme posed problems.
All the smallholdings had to be surveyed, registered and issued with 
individual identification and in the process there arose the enormous 
task of sorting out land claims. From the point of view of the 
smallholders, the scheme was highly objectionable since their natural 
reaction was to plant more rubber trees in order to compensate for 
the loss of income from existing smallholdings brought about by low 
prices and the increased cost of tapping. There were numerous 
reports from the Second and Third Divisions after 1934 of prosecution 
of Ibans and Chinese for new planting. In May 1937, for example,
Ibans from most of the longhouses in Penghulu Ringgit's district 
at Lubok Antu were fined and imprisoned and the penghulu himself and 
five of his tuai rumah were subsequently fined.^ Under the 1934 
regulations, offenders could be sentenced to up to six months 
imprisonment and there were liberal rewards for informers.
In addition to these difficulties, it also became clear
that the reduction in tapping time by more than 30 per cent reduced
output by less than 18 per cent. Consequently it was decided in
1938 to abandon the 'tapping holiday' scheme and to issue coupons to
all smallholders limiting the amount of rubber which they could sell 
2to dealers. The problem, however, was that Ibans often sold their
coupons to Chinese traders at a discount, thus undermining the
effort to preserve equitability. Some smallholders were also much
worse off than before. In one instance a smallholder whose rubber
garden was capable of producing 27 pikuls a month and had been able
to sell 18 pikuls under the tapping holiday scheme received coupons 
3for only 6 pikuls.
Dissatisfaction with the limitations inherent in the coupon 
scheme even sparked off a demonstration by more than 400 Chinese 
smallholders and tappers at Batu Kawa, about ten miles south-west 
of Kuching, in February 1938 and they would have marched in protest
1 SG, 1 June 1937.
2 The new scheme was based on Bridges' recommendations and was 
gazetted as Order R-9 (Rubber Regulation) 1937, SGGs 16 December 
1937.
3 One pikul = 113-1/3 lbs.
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to the town had it not been for the intervention of a Chinese­
speaking officer who persuaded them to be content with sending a 
deputation to the government. Unaccustomed to such behaviour, senior 
government officers had reacted dramatically to the demonstration.
The Chief Secretary, Parnell, told Ong Tiang Swee that if the 
demonstrators did march, force would be used to disperse them.
He planned to station police with batons to drive back the crowd and 
to have others armed with rifles posted around the corner. Parnell 
even appears to have used the word 'shoot'.'*’
The gradual recovery of rubber prices and the increased 
export quota made possible by renewed demand after the outbreak of 
war in 1939 eased the situation of the smallholders but rubber 
restriction had constituted a significant instance of Brooke 
government's contravention of native and Chinese economic interests.
It also provided the first immediate issue which had the potential of 
uniting smallholders of all races against the authority of the Raj.
If the war in Europe had not heightened the demand for Sarawak rubber, 
the contradiction between smallholders and government might well 
have taken on an important political dimension. Furthermore, the 
government's response to Batu Kawa was no different from that of a 
colonial regime.
Rubber restriction had also served to sustain the Iban 
’troubles' which began in 1929 after the resignation of Penghulu Asun 
of the upper Kanowit district in the Third Division. The more 
systematic imposition of taxes, together with the drastically reduced 
price of rubber and the prohibition on new planting and a shortage 
of virgin land,provided fuel for Iban discontent which lingered on 
until shortly before the Japanese occupation when Kendawang, the 
last of the 'rebels', surrendered. 'Asun's rebellion' was in the 
tradition of resistance to Brooke efforts to curb Iban expansion.
But at the same time it reflected the gradual centralization and 
bureaucratization of the government inevitably affecting the 
traditionally close personal relationship between Ibans and European
1 Boyd to Bishop Hudson, 24 February 1938, Boyd Papers.
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officers. The government adopted the suggestion made in the Le Gros 
Clark Report that there should be a more effective presence in the 
disaffected areas but by 1941 little had been done to extend social 
services. In spite of Le Gros Clark's recommendations, little 
thought was given to the changes inevitably arising from their 
involvement in the cash economy and their access to education. Brooke 
policy towards the Ibans hardly advanced beyond the notion of maintaining 
control.
Education
The clearest example of Brooke conservatism was education which had
2been opposed by Charles Brooke and neglected by Vyner Brooke. Apart 
from the SPG and Roman Catholic mission schools and the schools set 
up privately by the Chinese, there had only been sporadic attempts 
by the government to provide education for young Malays destined for 
the Native Officer and Junior Administrative Service. Government 
assistance to Iban education was negligible.
The early 1930s saw something of a revolution in the 
educational opportunities available to the Kuching Malays. The 
Merpati Jepang School opened in 1930 and the Enche Boyong School in 1931. 
In the same year, two existing schools were merged to form the 
government-sponsored Maderasah MeZayu (Malay College) which was 
designed to train Malays as Native Officers and teachers. By 1933 
enrolment had reached 400, bringing the number of students in Malay 
schools in Kuching to between 500 and 600 or three times the 1921 
enrolment. Most importantly, Malay-language education was no longer 
restricted to the children of elite families. The first Malay girls' 
school, the SekoZah Permaisuri_, also opened in 1930 and by the late
1 For an illuminating discussion of the whole question, see
Robert Pringle, 'Asun's "Rebellion": The Political Growing
Pains of a Tribal Society in Brooke Sarawak, 1929-1940', 
SMJ3 Vol. XVI, Nos. 32-33 (New Series), July-December 1968, 
pp.346-76.
2 J.M. Seymour, 'Education in Sarawak under Brooke Rule
1841-1941', SG3 30 June 1970; 31 July 1970; 31 August
1970.
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1930s a handful of Malays had attended the Sultan Idris Training 
College in Malaya. During the 1920s the two English-medium mission 
schools in Kuching, St Thomas' (Church of England)1 and St Joseph's 
(Roman Catholic) had become popular institutions with the Chinese 
because of the growing importance of English. Clerkships in 
government departments required proficiency in English and were 
normally filled by mission school graduates. A number of private 
Chinese-medium schools also appeared in the 1920s and 1930s. Their 
China-born teachers sowed the seeds of the Chinese nationalism which 
was to have its first expression after the Japanese invasion of 
China in 1937.
Iban prosperity in the Second and Third Divisions had also 
brought about something of a social revolution. St Augustine's School 
had been opened at Betong, St Luke's at Simanggang and St Andrew's 
on the Paku and other schools were later opened by the SPG at Saratok, 
Debak (Saribas) and Ruban (Kalaka) in response to Iban requests.
Although reduced income from rubber in the early 1930s meant that it 
was more difficult for parents to send their children to school, the 
Iban demand for education was insatiable. When Father Jack Sparrow 
of the SPG arrived at Ruban in January 1934 he found 300 Ibans waiting 
to build the school there and it was completed in a few months. Two 
more elementary schools were provided by the SPG on the Batang 
Lupar on the understanding that they would be completely self- 
supporting.2 In 1938 the schools at Betong, Ruban, Saratok and 
Debak had more than 200 pupils and 13 teachers although the government 
grant was less than it had been in 1932 when the enrolment was less 
than half.
While educational opportunities expanded for all communities, 
particularly in the urban areas, employment opportunities did not.
The pruning of government departments by Macaskie in 1932 reduced the 
size of the Junior Administrative Service and it was not until the 
late 1930s that financial restraints were relaxed and recruitment 
increased. The Native Officer Service remained the monopoly of the
1 See Brian Taylor and Pamela Heyward, The Kuching Anglican 
Schools 1848-19733 Kuching 1973.
2 Reports of the Bishop of Labuan for 1930-38, SPG Archives.
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perabangan in spite of the growing number of educated Malays who
were much better qualified. It was not until 1941 that the government
appointed the first Malay Native Officer who was not an abang.
Educated Malays and Chinese were often obliged to become medical dressers
in the outstations^ and a number of educated Ibans went to Brunei2or Malaya in search of work. While there is no evidence of open 
discontent, it is clear that by 1941 there was a substantial number 
of young educated people of all races whose job expectations could 
not be satisfied under the existing system of recruitment and whose 
interests could not be adequately represented by the traditional Malay 
and Chinese leadership.
Partieipation in Government
Apart from the major role played by the perabangan in administration, 
actual representation in government was limited to the datus who, 
together with Ong Tiang Swee, constituted the Supreme Council. The 
Council’s formal meetings had ceased in 1927 and by the 1930s the bi­
weekly meeting with the Rajah at his office was little more than a
1 A good example is the career of Haji Su'aut Tahir. Bom in 
Kuching in 1909, the son of a government servant who later 
became a building contractor, he was educated at the Maderasah 
Melayu and St Thomas’ School. For want of other opportunities, 
he joined the Medical Department as a dresser in 1929 and 
during the Australian and British military administration was 
posted to Simanggang as Divisional Medical Officer. He 
established the Persekutuan Melayu Simanggang in 1946 before 
returning to Kuching where he became an active member of the 
Malay National Union and later the Barisan Pemuda Sarawak of 
which he was secretary-general. In 1961 he was one of the 
founding members of the Barisan Raayat Jati Sarawak and acted 
as its publicity officer. In addition to participating in 
municipal politics, he was a member of the Council Negri and 
the Malaysian Parliament. Like so many former dressers, he 
became a superb linguist, achieving fluency in Iban and 
several Chinese dialects.
2 This pattern continued into the 1950s when two Ibans who were 
later to achieve political prominence, Stephen Kalong Ningkan 
and Thomas Kana, worked as dressers for Shell in Brunei.
It should not be thought, however, that the Ibans left Sarawak 
unwillingly. There was a strong Iban tradition that young 
men should berjalai3 or seek adventure and fortune outside 
their own territory.
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social occasion. According to one account, the conversation which
took place was of this order: 'Apa khabar_, datu datu?' 'Khabar
baik, Tuan Rajah'. (What news, datus? Good news, Raj ah).^
Nevertheless, the datus still derived a certain amount of power from
their social prestige and their ability to place their own relatives
and friends in government departments, such as Police, Customs and
Lands and Surveys. Nor was it insignificant that with their
substantial allowances they were among the wealthiest members of
2the Malay community. Furthermore, as the acknowledged authorities 
on Malay adat they constituted a Datus' Court which had jurisdiction 
over certain classes of Malay civil offences until its abolition in 
the 1950s.
During the 1930s the Council Negri was a triennial assembly
of notables from all the Divisions which did little more than confirm
the authority of the Rajah and foster some general idea of unity under
the Raj. Even so, there was no Chinese representation until Ong Tiang
Swee and Wee Kheng Chiang were appointed in 1937. Moreover, as we
have already seen, the 1941 Constitution whose Preamble explicitly
re-stated the Brooke principle of trusteeship and even anticipated
eventual self-government was in no way the result of an indigenous
initiative. As the only non-European member of the Committee of
Administration which had totally eclipsed the Supreme Council in
importance, Ong Tiang Swee took part in the early discussions of the
draft and the datus gave their advice on Malay adat regarding the
succession. But there was no serious attempt to consult 'the
people' for whose benefit the entire exercise was avowedly designed.
The selection of non-European members to the new Council Negri in
October 1941 was still heavily biased in favour of the Malays and
one of the two additional Chinese representatives appointed was a son
3of Ong Tiang Swee.
1 Interview with Haji Su'aut Tahir, May 1975.
2 As members of the Supreme Council, the datus were given a 
monthly allowance of $100 which was 'big money in those 
days'. Abang Haji Mustapha, 'Supreme Council Reminiscences', 
SMJ3 Vol. VII, No.7 (New Series), June 1956, pp.109-10.
3 The other was Tam Sum Guan, a Chaoann.
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The first indication of the Sarawak government's recognition 
of the need to involve more than just a handful of datus and kapitan 
china in the business of government was the establishment in 1919 of 
a Kuching Assessment Committee with Malay, Chinese and Indian 
representation as a means of reorganizing the collection of town rates. 
This was succeeded in 1922 by the Kuching Sanitary and Municipal 
Advisory Board which operated as a municipal authority and not just 
an advisory body after 1934. Consisting of five Europeans, four 
Chinese and one Indian, it was headed by a European Municipal 
Commissioner who was in charge of the daily operation of town services. 
The Chinese members were required to represent the Hokkien, Teochiew, 
Cantonese and Hakka dialect groups and were elected by their own dialect 
associations but the Malay member was always chosen by the government 
from the perabangan, usually a civil servant. Although the Board's 
decisions could be vetoed by the Rajah and the Committee of 
Administration, its achievements were considerable: the building of
a bazaar drainage system, introduction of birth and death registration, 
improvement of health facilities, rent-control for the bazaar and a 
Board of Visitors with the responsibility of checking conditions at the 
jail, lunatic asylum, hospital and leper camp. It was also responsible 
for the building permits, hawker licensing, the fixing of rates and 
assessments and zoning policy. Although the Municipal Board reflected 
the principle of indirect rule, it also constituted a representative 
structure whose decision-making was in some ways more important than 
that of the datus and the kapitans.^
The Board's success probably accounts for the government's 
decision in 1938 to conduct experiments in local government 
ouside Kuching. In that year village councils were set up in the 
Land Dayak settlements of Quop and Mambong in the First Division 
where members were made responsible for the collection of taxes, 
rates and fines and for the general management of local affairs.
The councillors possessed the authority to decide criminal and 
quasi -criminal cases according to their own adat as well as
1 This summary is based on the invaluable account given by 
Lockard, The Southeast Asian Town ..., pp.326-32.
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supervising trading and general living conditions including 
sanitation. Subject to the discretion of the District Officer, 
revenues were to be placed at their disposal for the construction 
and maintenance of roads and public buildings and the purchase of 
implements for more effective cultivation.
It was hoped that the councils would in time be able to
frame their own estimates of revenue and expenditure and the 1938
Annual Report expressed satisfaction with what had already been
achieved. ’These Councils have taken their responsibilities seriously',
it concluded, 'and there is every indication that the experiment
will succeed'.^ However, the process of establishing further councils
was very slow and the only one outside the First Division before the
2war seems to have been at Sarikei.
Fajar Sarccuak and the Persatuan Melayu
The first stirrings of Malay political awareness came to the surface
in 1930 when a small group of educated Malays of non-aristocratic
origin founded Sarawak's first Malay-language newspaper, Fajar
3
Sarawak (Sarawak Dawn). The driving force was 'Master' Rakawi bin
Yusoff, a former schoolteacher and customs officers who used his
retirement bonus to launch the venture. Little is known about Rakawi,
who died in 1936, but he was one of the few Sarawak Malays who had
any links with developments in Malaya. A member from 1934 of the
Sahabat Pena, a writers' guild which was one of the first vehicles of
4Malay cultural nationalism, he had probably also been in contact 
with members of the Kesatuan Melayu Singapore (Singapore Malay Union) 
established in 1926 which was the first of a number of proto­
political organizations in the peninsula."* Rakawi's two-volume
1 Sarawak Administration Report, 1938.
2 SG, 15 November 1941. For post-war developments, see Ian Morrison, 
'Local Self-Government in Sarawak', Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXII,
No.2 (June 1949), pp.178-85 .
3 Fajar 's masthead bore the motto: 'The dawn has broken.
Arise my nation'. It appeared fortnightly.
4 For an account of the Sahabat Pena, see W.R. Roff, The Origins 
of Malay Nationalism, Kuala Lumpur 1967, pp.212-21.
5 Ibid., pp.191-7. Rakawi was Malay representative on the Kuching 
Municipal Board, 1934-35.
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Hikayat Sarawak (Story of Sarawak) and his novel Bunga Sarawak 
(Flower of Sarawak) published in Kuching in the early 1930s also 
constituted the most significant literary achievement of pre-war Sarawak.
Rakawi's publisher and chief collaborator with Fajar
2
Sarawak was Haji Abdul Rahman, a Malay of Minangkabau (west Sumatra) 
ancestry who owned Kuching’s only bookstore and Malay-language printing 
press. Respected like other Minangkabaus in Sarawak for his religious 
knowledge, he seems to have been accepted as an equal by the perabangan 
and he was later to lead the traditional elite in their post-war 
conflict with younger educated Malays. Before the war, however, he 
was probably regarded as something of a radical. Other members of 
the Fajar group who later achieved political distinction were Haji 
Mohd. Daud bin Abdul Gani, Mohd. Johar.i bin Anang and a number of young 
Malays including Mohd. Ma'amon bin Nor who wrote occasional articles.
Fajar Sarawak soon died for want of support from the Malay
3community of Kuching and there are only a few surviving copies.
However, it is possible to infer from these what the Fajar group was 
trying to achieve. Briefly, they were concerned with ’uplifting' the 
social and economic condition of the Malays which was unimpressive by 
contrast with the enormous progress made by the urban Chinese and even 
the Second Division Ibans since 1918. They also aimed at inculcating 
an awareness of Malayness among Malays who were often more conscious 
of their Brunei or Sumatran origins than of belonging to a unified 
community distinct from the Chinese and the Ibans. While there was 
no criticism of Chinese immigration (which had peaked in the mid- 
1920s) Fajar remarked on the increasing number of Chinese taking over 
Malay shops and urged the Malays not to be left behind. At the same 
time, it directed veiled criticism towards the datus for being more 
concerned with improving their own material position than with helping
1 There is only one known copy of Hikayat Sarawak, which has 
been xeroxed by the Sarawak Museum. Unfortunately I was 
unable to have access to it. More copies of Bunga Sarawak 
have survived.
2 I have been able to obtain very little further biographical 
information about Haji Abdul Rahman bin Haji Kassim who
was one of the most important of Sarawak's early Malay leaders.
3 No.l (1 February 1930); No.4 (1 March 1930); No.9 (1 June 
1930); No.10 (16 June 1930).
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poor Malays. There was a strong hint that the perabangan were doing
very little to justify the position of prestige and authority which
they had traditionally enjoyed. Fajar also called on the government
to spend more money on Malay education, including the provision of
scholarships for the Sultan Idris Training College. A proper knowledge
of the Islamic religion was regarded as the only means by which the
Malays could achieve regeneration and they were urged to reject
fatalistic attitudes. However, there was no reflection of the kuam
muda - kaum tua conflict which dominated the intellectual life of
peninsula Malays from early in the century,^ largely because there was
no class of orthodox ulamas (religious teachers) and no tradition of
2village Koran schools as in Malaya. There were few references to 
developments in Malaya but the inclusion of reports on Turkish politics 
indicated an effort to widen the horizons of the Sarawak Malays who had 
been isolated from the Malay and Islamic worlds by Brooke rule.
With the demise of Fajar Sarawak_, the Malays lost what
might otherwise have been an important catalyst of social and economic
change. However, the idea of a pan-Malay organization which had also
been suggested by Rakawi was to have more success. Although the
Persatuan Metayu Sarawak (Sarawak Malay Association) was not formally
registered as a social club until 1939, it had existed in an informal
way for at least two years before this. In May 1937 a circular
was sent out calling for the establishment of a Malay association with
branches in all major towns whose members would subscribe funds for
3co-operative enterprises. There had been an earlier attempt in
4December 1936 to form a Bwmputra (Natives) Club similar to the Malay 
social clubs already existing in Sibu and Miri. The Persatuan Muslim
1 This conflict between Islamic reformists and conservatives
has been fully dealt with by W.R. Roff, 'Kuam Muda - Kuam 
Tua: Innovation and Reaction Amongst the Malays 1900-1941',
in K.G. Tregonning, ed., Papers on Malayan History3 
Singapore 1962, pp.162-92, and The Origins of Malay Nationalism.
2 Elaine McKay, 'The Kuching Communities and Their Response to 
Cession, 1946;, M.A. preliminary thesis, Monash University,
1976, p .36.
3 SG, 1 May 1939; 1 June 1939; 1 July 1939.
4 The name was probably designed to attract Muslim native 
(Melanau) membership as well as Malays. Ibans and other 
non-Muslim natives were not involved.
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Miri, for example, had 400 members in 1937 including Arabs and Muslim
Indians.^ The main reason for the delay in registering the Persatuan
Melayu Sarawak seems to have been that the Datu Patinggi had been
angered by criticism in Fajar and it was not until the Persatuan's
founders agreed that his eldest grandson, Abang Ibrahim, should be
made a datu that he was prepared to extend his patronage. Without
this the Registrar of Societies had not been prepared to consider any
2application for government recognition. From the outset, the
Persatuan's committee was dominated by the perabangan, the Datu Amar
3being president and the Datu Pahlawan one of the vice-presidents.
The Persatuan's aims were similar to those of the peninsula
persatuan: to unite the Malays and work together for their advancement;
to promote business, education, culture and the Malay language; to
protect the Islamic faith; and to act as liaison between the Malays 
4and government. The latter aim was significant since it was yet 
another sign of dissatisfaction with the traditional form of representation 
through the datus. There was a strong feeling that Malays would have 
to bypass the datus if there was to be any improvement in their social 
and economic condition. The Persatuan's concrete achievements before 
the war consisted of little more than a fund-raising effort which 
collected about $4,000 towards the formation of a co-operative and 
the establishment of links with Malay social clubs in Sibu, Miri and 
other centres. However, it sent representatives to attend the second 
annual congress of persatuan in Singapore in December 1940“* and it 
would be surprising if this did not develop a more political orientation 
in the organization as well as helping it to gather popularity in 
Sarawak. At its annual general meeting in June 1941 the Persatuan 
was able to attract 700 Malays, including a number from other towns, 
wearing Malay dress. Abang Suleiman, the Datu Amar, who had been 
president since the Persatuan's inception in 1939, chaired the meeting
1 Interview with Temenggong Datuk Muif, July 1974.
2 Interview with Haji Su'aut Tahir, May 1975.
3 For a full list of committee members 1939-50, see McKay, 
'The Kuching Communities ...', Appendix VII.
4 Interview with Haji Su'aut Tahir, May 1975.
5 Roff, Origins of Malay Nationalism, p.246.
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with Haji Taha's assistance and the gathering was entertained by 
schoolchildren singing religious songs.'*' During the Brooke centenary 
celebrations in September the Persatuan played an important part in 
organizing Malay cultural activities and sports events. In spite 
of a complete moratorium on its activities during the Japanese 
occupation, there was still sufficient cohesion among its members and 
branches immediately after the war for it to be easily revived and 
later used by the anti-cessionists as a ready-made organization 
with the potential of mobilizing Malay support.
The only other Malay organization which constituted any
parallel with cultural and proto-political life in the peninsula was
2the Sarawak branch of the Persaudara'an Sahabat Pena Malaya.
This was presided over first by the Datu Amar and then by Abang Haji 
3Mustapha who had attended school in Singapore and was one of the 
best-educated Malays in the state. The Sarawak branch does not seem 
to have been particularly active but some of its members attended 
conferences in Malaya and no doubt brought back news of developments
1 SGj 1 July 1941.
2 SG3 2 May 1938.
3 Abang Haji Mustapha (d.1965) was the son of the Datu Hakim, 
Abang Haji Moasili, and the grandson of Abang Haji Abdul 
Rahman who had been appointed Datu Hakim by James Brooke. 
Educated at St Thomas' and St Joseph's schools, he was later 
sent to Mecca to study Muslim law. After four years, during 
which he travelled in the Middle East and India, he 
returned to Sarawak and took up a clerical position at 
Limbang. In 1930 he was transferred to the police and was 
one of the first non-Europeans to be commissioned as an 
officer. In 1941 he was appointed by the Rajah to the new 
position of Datu Pahlawan and in June 1946 he was promoted 
to Datu Bandar. The leader of the pro-cession faction in 
Sarawak, he aroused a great deal of ill-feeling within the 
Malay community and did not receive strong support in 1960 
when he founded the Parti Negara Sarawak (PANAS). A strong 
proponent of Sarawak's inclusion in the Malaysian Federation, 
he was one of the major obstacles in winning over the anti- 
cessionists who had formed the rival Parti Barisan Ra'ayat 
Jati Sarawak (Sarawak Natives’Front - Barjasa). His 
polarization of the perabangan over the cession issue 
substantially modified the pattern of Sarawak politics. A 
political realist, his instinct was to be on the winning side 
and to take the rest of the traditional elite with him. For 
an interesting obituary, see Adenan Haji Satem, 'Dato 
Mustapha - A Belated Appreciation', SG3 28 February 1965.
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there. Abang Haji Mustapha was also involved in a co-operative 
whose aims were similar to those of the Persatuan. The Sarawak Malay 
Savings and Investment Society was registered in October 1940 with 
the Datu Patinggi, Datu Haji Mohidin and Abang Haji Mustapha 
dominating the committee. Subscriptions from 69 members amounted 
to almost $9,000^ but there was no public announcement about how 
these funds were to be used.
The movement to establish the Persatuan Melayu seems to
have provided some stimulus to the Indian and Eurasian communities
who began to organize themselves in tentative fashion in the late
1930s. The Indian Association of Sarawak was inaugurated in
September 1937 with Dr K.V. Krishna as President and S.C.S.
Chakraverty as Secretary and chose to hold its first anniversary on
18 September 1938, marking the day when James Brooke received the
2government of Sarawak from the Sultan of Brunei. A Eurasian
Association was formed in 1940, reflecting the growing importance
of this small but comparatively well educated minority. Its
president, Edwin Howell, was the son of the Anglo-Indian SPG
missionary, the Rev William Howell, who married an Iban woman from
the Second Division and became an authority on Iban language and 
3lore. Edwin was appointed Assistant Executive Engineer in
the Public Works Department in 1941, one of the first non-Europeans
to be promoted from the Junior Service, he was also the first
1 SG3 2 December 1940.
2 SGj 1 October 1938. Dr Krishna's speech on this occasion 
is a fascinating example of the way in which Brooke history 
had been mythologized. 'This day is pre-eminently suitable 
to us', he told the meeting, 'for the installation of Sir 
James Brooke tantamounts to installing Justice, and 
banishing Pangeran Mahkota means dispelling ignorance and 
evil'. Ibid. Although there had been practically nothing 
written by Sarawak natives about their history, apart
from Rakawin bin Yusoff's Hikayat Sarawak_, there were 
strong oral traditions of the Brooke and earlier periods. 
The Datu Patinggi, for example, had an amazingly detailed 
account of the Chinese rebellion of 1857. Unfortunately, 
few of these traditions have been recorded.
3 Howell, together with D.J.S. Bailey, produced A Sea Dyak 
Dictionary, Singapore 1900-02, and contributed numerous 
articles to the Sarawak Gazette which were collected in 
1963.
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Eurasian to be awarded the Star of Sarawak. As the second Rajah had
hoped, miscegenation had produced a small group of men who were
easily capable of assuming administrative responsibility. However,
the Europeans of the Sarawak Service were not prepared to
countenance this and it was not until 1940 that Eurasians were
allowed to join the Sarawak Club. Consequently, the first
preoccupation of Kuching’s Eurasian community was with social
2and political recognition.
1 SGG3 29 June 1946. Howell had volunteered to work as an 
engineer in the Middle East during the 1914-18 war. He 
was in Australia at the time of the Japanese invasion 
and in July 1945 joined the Australian Army where he was 
given the rank of Captain. Returning to Sarawak with 
the BBCAU, he was cashiered for allegedly selling army 
stores in co-operation with an Australian officer. In 
1946 he was appointed Assistant Executive Engineer, 
Kuching, and later became a Divisional Engineer for the 
Second Division. For his post-war involvement with the 
Sarawak Dayak Association, see Chapter VIII, pp.
2 Other prominent Eurasian families were the Geikies, the 
Attenboroughs, the Owens, the Ricketts and the Brodies. 
The only non-European who was allowed entry until then 
was Charles Mason. Although nothing has been written 
about the Sarawak Club and the Island Club at Sibu, 
their function seems to have been very similar to that 
of the Malayan clubs as described by John Butcher, 'A 
Social History of the British in Malaya, 1880-1941 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Hull, 1975.
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The United Sea Dayak Co-operative
The late 1930s also saw the first signs of Iban communal organization. 
Rapid expansion of rubber smallholding in the Second Division had 
brought many Ibans into the cash economy in the 1920s, only to have 
their fingers burnt in the early 1930s. Low prices, together with 
resentment towards Chinese traders, suggested to some of the more 
enterprising Saribas Ibans the possibility of a co-operative. In 
October 1939 the Resident of the Second Division reported that the 
Paku and Rimbas Ibans had commenced purchasing supplies direct from 
Kuching ’since they are tired of paying the Chinese the highest 
possible price for everything, and receiving the lowest possible price 
for their rubber.’^  A group of Paku people had even taken out a 
hawking licence and intended operating their own boat to supply Iban 
longhouses along the two rivers. This- initiative was greeted 
enthusiastically by government officers who suggested that the group 
should take out a rubber dealer’s licence.
Although no further details were given, it is likely that
the Resident was referring to the activities of J.H. Chambai,
Manggai and Langi Boudyne who toured the Ulu Paku, Rimbas and Krian
rivers in 1938 hoping to raise support and capital for an Iban
trading company. After three years of canvassing they had obtained
sufficient pledges to float a company and in early 1941 there was
an assembly at Stambak Ulu, Langi Boudyne’s longhouse on the Layar,
2where more than $20,000 of the share money was collected.
Assistance was obtained from the District Officer and the local 
Anglican missionary in drafting the articles of association which 
were later taken to the Legal Adviser in Kuching for correction.
The first investment of the newly-registered United Sea 
Dayak Co-operative was in a number of shophouses at Spaoh on the Paku 
and Betong on the Batang Layar. It was also hoped that an arrangement
1 SG3 1 December 1939.
2 Eliab Bayang to District Officer, Betong, 23 March 1949, Bayang 
Papers. Stambak Ulu was probably the most prosperous Iban 
community in Sarawak. For a photograph of their unusual longhouse, 
see Pringle, Rayahs and Rebels3 opp.p.171.
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could be made to charter a Chinese-owned motor vessel for trade with 
Kuching. Since the Paku and Rimbas rivers gave access to some of the 
richest rubber areas in Sarawak, competition from Chinese traders was 
inevitable and their reluctance to demolish the old bazaar at Spaoh 
was seen by one officer as a means of preventing the co-operative from 
coming into operation.^ However, the instigators of the scheme 
had realised the communal solidarity was vital to its success and 
before the co-operative was registered an oath was sworn by all 
shareholders that they would trade exclusively with it. Nor were 
other Iban companies to be floated without first obtaining the 
Co-operative's approval.
In addition to the people of the Paku, Rimbas and Layar
there were also a number of Ibans who were mostly mission school
graduates employed in government service. Notable among these were
2'Dr' Charles Mason, a Balau Iban who had studied at the King Edward 
Medical College in Singapore. Mason worked as a dresser on Kimanis 
estate in North Borneo 1918-26 before joining Sarawak's Medical 
Departraent and finally taking charge of the leper settlement outside 
Kuching. By virtue of his education and his position as the senior 
Iban government employee, Mason was the unofficial leader of Kuching's 
Iban community and maintained close contacts with the Ibans of the 
Banting and Krian districts. Through his work as a dresser he was 
also well known among the Malays.
Other prominent Kuching shareholders were Eliab Bayang, 
his brother Henry Satab Bayang and his sister Barbara Bayang who was 
the first Iban trained nurse. Related to the Bayangs were Philip 
and Robert Jitam, the sons of a government timekeeper whose ancestors 
had come from Lundu. An employee of the Water Supply Department, 
Philip Jitam occupied a responsible position and was second only to 
Charles Mason in status within Kuching's small Iban community.
1 SGs 1 March 1941.
2 Mason was the son of an Iban tuai rumah and manang (shaman) from 
Banting who converted to Christianity. The SPG missionary at 
Banting, whose wife was a doctor, made him his ward and sent him
to Singapore. During his time in Sibu, Mason acquired considerable 
property and later became involved in gold mining at Bau as well 
as buying shophouses in Kuching.
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Robert worked for Sarawak Steamships Ltd and then the Rubber Fund, 
a quasi-governmental body which later allowed him greater freedom 
of political activity than his brother."'"
The Kuching Ibans shared a similar background and most 
were related to each other. Their ancestors had migrated from the 
Second to the First Division three or four generations previously 
and were closely associated with the Brookes. Many had fought 
on the first Rajah’s side against Iban and Chinese 'rebels' and 
constituted a para-military caste. By the 1930s many had been educated 
at St Thomas' School and were looking for employment in government 
service. However, there were few opportunities and they were 
obliged to become medical dressers or petty clerks and to go to North 
Borneo or Malaya looking for work. Henry Bayang, for example, 
spent most of his life in Malaya as a government dresser. In spite 
of the recommendations of the Le Gros Clark Report, virtually nothing 
was done to recruit Ibans for the Native Officer Service and in 1941 
there were still only three Iban Native Officers: Francis Ansin,
Bennett Jarrow and Michael Sadin, although half a dozen had been taken 
into the constabulary. Among these were Juing Insol, Edward 
Brandah Saban, his brother Andrew Jika Saban, Arthur Muda and Robert 
Nicholl Kasim, all of whom were to assume positions of considerable 
responsibility under the Japanese and the British colonial 
administration after the war.
Ibans in the Junior Service
The frustrations experienced by Ibans and other non-Malay natives 
employed in the Junior Administrative Service can be seen in the career 
of Eliab Bayang. The youngest son of the tua kampong of the Tabuan 
area just outside Kuching, Bayang was a direct descendant of the Orang 
Kaya Ijau of Banting, Lingga, whose family had been firm supporters 
of James Brooke during his most difficult years. Eliab's grandfather 
was Jangun, a Balau Iban from Munggut Lalang near Banting in the 
Second Division who first came to Kuching as part of a war expedition 
in the early 1800s. He gave valuable assistance to James Brooke during 
the Chinese rebellion in 1857 by taking a message to Brooke Brooke,
1 Robert Jitam became the first Iban representative on the 
Kuching Municipal Board in 1948.
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who was then at Lingga. Subsequently the Rajah persuaded Jangun to 
stay on and then brought his people to live in a longhouse called 
Munggut Bringgin which he built on the hill overlooking the bazaar 
and this grew into a village of about sixty families. When more 
Balau Ibans arrived, a move was made to an area four miles outside 
the town where there was land suitable for padi-planting. Jangun's 
son, Bayang, married Jumpit, a Sebuyau woman from Merdang Limo near 
Kuching whose family had migrated much earlier from Sadong, and 
inherited the leadership of Kampong Tabuan Dayak from his father. He 
became a sergeant in the Sarawak Rangers and was famous for his 
skill in the martial arts which he learned in Pontianak, the Celebes 
and Java during visits there. Eliab Bayang was also linked with 
James Brooke's enemies. His wife Chela was the great grand-niece 
of the Orang Kaya Dana Bayang of Padeh, Saribas, one of the first 
Rajah's most formidable opponents.
Educated first at the SPG mission school at Merdang and then 
at St Thomas' School in Kuching to standard VII, Eliab first obtained 
employment as a junior clerk in the Posts and Telegraphs Department 
and worked in the Second Division. Declining Bishop Hose's suggestion 
that he shpuld train for the Anglican priesthood, he went to Miri 
in 1921 and worked for five years in the accounts department of 
Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. He later returned to the Second Division and 
served as a kunsil (court writer) at Engkelili, Sebuyau, Lingga and 
Lubok Antu with a short spell at Simanggang between times as Treasury 
clerk and store keeper. Possessing some instinct for business,
Eliab for many years studied accountancy with an English correspondence 
college. He owned a share in a rubber estate at Merdang Limo and was 
one of the prime movers of the United Sea Dayak Co-operative and had 
links with the Paku Ibans through his wife's relatives at Stambak Ulu.
At Lubok Antu in March 1938 Bayang wrote to H.E. Cutfield, 
Resident of the Second Division in his best mission school style:
It has been my intention for a long time to seek 
for a transfer to the native officers' service, 
but since I was always in doubt as to the 
advisibility of approaching you thereanent, I 
have refrained from doing so till now when I 
think the season is opportune enough for me
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to carry my desire into materialisation.
Employed as a court writer in the Junior Service, Bayang's 
responsibilities were considerable. Not only was he required to act 
as an interpreter for the District Officer's court and to record all 
the hearings, he was also involved in most of the clerical 
responsibilities of the post. At Simanggang, where he was posted 
later, his responsibilities were even greater: the Native Officer
there, Datu Abang Zin Galau, was not literate in either romanized 
Malay or English and consequently a great deal of the work fell on 
Bayang's shoulders. In his report on Bayang to the Promotions Board 
for 1940, however, Outfield was less than enthusiastic. He had not 
been able to recommend Bayang's promotion while Government Clerk at 
Lubok Antu and his work as cashier at Simanggang was 'satisfactory 
only'. Although the most senior Iban clerk in the Division, Cutfield 
continued, he was not necessarily the most efficient. He had been 
engaged on too generous terms in the first instance and was now 
disgruntled at not having received further promotion. However, the 
Resident regarded Bayang as capable of undertaking substation work 
and felt that he should be given the opportunity of proving himself 
as chief clerk at a district headquarters.^
In the same month, Bayang had the temerity to write to the
Chief Secretary himself on the question of leave for members of the
Junior Service. 'We Asiatic', he told Parnell, 'have been badly
treated in all thing and all the orders now in force are good for
3European Nations only.' He pointed out that although members of the
Junior Service were entitled to take annual leave, this often had to
be postponed for some months because of the shortage of staff. It
was 'very wrong and cruel on the part of the Government to have treated
4the Junior Officers this way ...' Bayang recommended a new system 
of three weeks annual leave for those with less than ten years' 
service and four weeks for those with more than ten, provision being
1 Bayang to Cutfield, 9 March 1938, Bayang Papers.
2 Cutfield to Parnell, 20 May 1940, Bayang Papers.
3 Bayang to Parnell, 18 March 1938, Bayang Papers.
4 Ibid.
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made so that if leave had to be accumulated, the Junior Officer 
concerned should be given his travelling expenses by way of compensation. 
A year earlier, Parnell had written to the Resident refusing to 
refund Bayang's passage money: ’The regulations governing ... the
granting of passages to members of the Junior Service on annual leave 
must be rigidly adhered to'.^ Bayang concluded his letter in a tone 
which Parnell might have found vaguely threatening:
It would be fair to treat everybody the same and 
not to European nations only. Sarawak is a 
poor country and it is lucky to have owned calm 
subjects who are always loyal to their Government 
in everything, but as they have been good we^ 
hope the Government will not overpress them.
Eliab Bayang's expressions of discontent and his unprecedented 
complaint to the Chief Secretary seem to have won him a reputation 
among European officers as a malcontent and even a security risk, 
although there is no evidence that before the war with Japan he could 
have been justifiably described as 'pro-Japanese’. Indeed, in 1941 
he was the first Iban to broadcast on Radio Sarawak which was given 
over almost entirely to defence propaganda. What is important about 
his experience is that it mirrors the difficulties experienced by 
mission-educated Ibans capable of assuming responsibility in a system 
where members of the traditional Malay elite, whatever their 
qualifications, were favoured as the second level of government 
administration.
The China Relief Distress Fund
As with other Southeast Asian Chinese communities, it was the 
Japanese invasion of China in 1937 which politicized the Sarawak 
Chinese. Although the focus was not on Sarawak itself, patriotic 
feelings were expressed in such a way as to provide an organizational 
framework which transcended dialect group associations. Local 
committees of the Singapore-based China Distress Relief Fund were 
established in Kuching and Sibu in 1937, apparently on the initiative 
of Wee Kheng Chiang, a Hokkien banker with interests both in Singapore
1 Parnell to Cutfield, 15 January 1937, Bayang Papers.
2 Bayang to Parnell, 18 March 1938, Bayang Papers.
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and Sarawak. Money for the Fund was raised through donations and
the proceeds of concerts and other events organized in conjunction
with the Sarawak branch of the Malaya Patriotic Fund. By late 1941
some millions of dollars had been remitted to China through Singapore.^"
2From 1932 there was an organized boycott of Japanese goods in the
bazaars which the government tried hard to suppress and Sarawak’s
only Japanese company, Nissa Shokai, was subjected to minor
3harassment such as the cutting of telephone wires.
The organization of both the collection of funds and of
the boycott seems to have depended to some extent on the links
provided by the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and dialect group
associations and was supported by Ong Tiang Swee and Tan Sum Guan.
However, it offered opportunities for leadership outside the old
kapitan china dialect group structure. Khan Ah Chong, one of the
most active members of the Kuching committee, was a Malayan Chinese
who had come to Sarawak in the mid-1930s to manage rubber estates.
A member of the Municipal Board and founder of the Kuching Rotary
Club, he enjoyed a prestige which rivalled that of the dialect group
leaders. In Sibu, a handful of China-born schoolteachers seem to have
taken most of the initiative in the local committee. Concerts,
exhibitions and stalls were held to raise money and there was a
voluntary tax on Chinese businesses. A number of Chinese youths went
to enlist in Chiang Kai Shek*s army and Chinese National Day (10 October)
was celebrated with nationalist songs, marching school students and 
4speeches. Such activities, together with the Kuching Municipal Board, 
prompted a pan-Chinese awareness which cut across dialect group differences. 
Nevertheless, this was still insufficient to prompt any form of 
political organization. A branch of the Kuomintang which had withered 
shortly after its establishment in the 1920s was not revived until 
after the war, nor is there any clear evidence of communist organization
1 Oddly enough, Sarawak is not mentioned in Yoji Akashi, 
The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement3 1937- 
19413 University of Kansas 1970.
2 Sarawak Administrative Report3 1932.
3 Digby, 'Lawyer in the Wilderness', p.74.
4 Lockard, The Southeast Asian Town ...3 p.395.
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before then.
One of the most significant political facts, however, was 
that Kuching, which had been a predominantly Malay town until the 
first decade of the twentieth century, was now very much a Chinese 
town. While the population of Kuching grew from about 8,000 in 
1876 to about 35,000 in 1939, the Malay percentage fell from 70 per 
cent to 40 per cent while the Chinese grew from 30 per cent to 55 
per cent. Another 8,000 Chinese farmers and market-gardeners lived 
within a ten-mile radius of the town and were well entrenched along 
Sarawak’s only significant pre-war road which led eastward from 
Kuching towards Serian. The 1939 census also showed that the other 
significant urban communities were Indians (1,258), Eurasians (140), 
Europeans (124) and Japanese (133).^ Sarawak's total population was 
490,806: Sarawak natives (361,955), Chinese (123,626), Indians
(2,323), Javanese (1,855), Europeans (427), Eurasians (277),
Japanese (155) and others (158).
Kuching’s rapid growth after 1910 was induced by the
rubber booms of 1910-20, the late 1920s and the late 1930s for which
it served as the marketing centre and the doorway to immigrant
Chinese workers. Although there was a net outflow of Chinese during
the early 1930s, improved rubber prices revived the flow and by
1937 there were twice as many immigrants as emigrants. The proportion
of Chinese women immigrants also increased. Consequently, the
Chinese population of Kuching rose from 45,000 in 1909 to 124,000 in 
21939. While it is difficult to find much evidence of Malay 
reactions to this situation, it would be surprising if the numerical 
and economic dominance of the Chinese in pre-war Kuching did not 
arouse anxieties and fears among the Malays similar to those being 
felt in the peninsula. Kuching remained the seat of a fundamentally 
Malayophile government, but the economic productivity of the 
Chinese which had been so much admired by James and Charles Brooke 
was now threatening to upset the traditional hegemony of the 
Malays.
1 Ibid., p.273.
2 Ibid., p . 266.
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The Japanese Period
The J a p a n e s e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  Sarawak from J a n u a r y  1942 u n t i l  
August  1945 i s  s p a r s e l y  documented ,  p o s i n g  f o r b i d d i n g  p rob lem s  f o r  
t h e  h i s t o r i a n . ^  For  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h i s  s t u d y ,  however ,  i t  w i l l  
be  s u f f i c i e n t  to  p r o v i d e  a g e n e r a l  s k e t c h  o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and t o  s u g g e s t  i t s  most  i m p o r t a n t  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
e f f e c t s .
The m i l i t a r y  p h a s e  was c o m ple te d  i n  March 1942 when t h e
2
l a s t  o f  t h e  European  o f f i c e r s  were  rounded  up.  G e n e r a l l y  
s p e a k i n g  t h e  J a p a n e s e  were  c o n t e n t  t o  c o n t r o l  c o a s t a l  a r e a s  and 
r i v e r i n e  s e t t l e m e n t s .  A p a r t  f rom o c c a s i o n a l  p a t r o l s  t h e y  made no 
a t t e m p t  t o  b r i n g  t h e  whole  o f  t h e  i n t e r i o r  unde r  t h e i r  c l o s e  
i n f l u e n c e .  In  some a r e a s ,  su c h  as  t h e  rem ote  K e l a b i t  p l a t e a u
1 Most o f  t h e  documents  o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  were  
d e s t r o y e d  b e f o r e  t h e  A l l i e d  r e - o c c u p a t i o n  i n  September
1945. The most  i m p o r t a n t  document  a v a i l a b l e  i s  t h e  37 th  Army 
Group’ s ' S t a t u s  o f  t h e  M i l i t a r y  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  N or th  
Borneo '  f o r  1943,  N i s h i j i m a  C o l l e c t i o n ,  Waseda U n i v e r s i t y .
There  a r e  no Sarawak new spape rs  s u r v i v i n g  from t h e  p e r i o d  and 
to  t h e  b e s t  o f  my knowledge  no p u b l i s h e d  r e m i n i s c e n c e s  have 
a p p e a r e d  i n  J a p a n .  Nor has  i t  b een  p o s s i b l e  t o  o b t a i n  ve ry  
much o r a l  i n f o r m a t i o n .  The on ly  J a p a n e s e  o f f i c i a l  w i t h  whom 
I  have  been  a b l e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  c o n t a c t  i s  S. Suzuk i  who was 
de pu ty  s u p e r i n t e n d e n t  o f  p o l i c e ,  Simanggang,  1943 -45 ,  and 
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a c c o u n t  has  r e l i e d  h e a v i l y  on i n f o r m a t i o n  k i n d l y  
s u p p l i e d  by Mr S u z u k i .  The most u s e f u l  l o c a l  s o u r c e  i s  a 
h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  o c c u p a t i o n  o f  S ibu  by L iu  Yung Tzu,  
T i e h - t ' i  h s ia  t i  h u i- i :  J ih -e h 'u n  lin -ch a n  sha-pa sh a -la o -
yueh s h ih - c h ’i  t i  h s u e h - le i- s h ih  ( H i s t o r y  o f  Blood and 
T e a rs  unde r  t h e  J a p a n e s e  army i n  Sabah and S a raw a k ) ,  2nd e d n . , 
Hong Kong 1969.
2 Most Europeans  who c r o s s e d  i n t o  Dutch Borneo a f t e r  t h e  i n v a s i o n  
managed t o  e s c a p e  t h e  J a p a n e s e .  However ,  one p a r t y  l e d
by G.R.H. A r u n d e l l ,  R e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  Second D i v i s i o n ,  was 
b e t r a y e d  by some. I b a n  e x - p r i s o n e r s  and m a s s a c re d  by t h e  
J a p a n e s e  a t  Ulu Mujang i n  t h e  uppe r  Ba tang  A i . Macpherson ,  
who was by t h a t  t im e  R e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  T h i r d  D i v i s i o n ,  was 
among t h o s e  k i l l e d .  European  c i v i l i a n s  who s u r r e n d e r e d  t o  
t h e  J a p a n e s e  were i n t e r n e d  a t  Ba tu  L i n t a n g ,  j u s t  o u t s i d e  
Kuching .  For  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  l i f e  t h e r e ,  s e e  J . B .  A r c h e r ,  
L intang Camp . . . ,  Kuching [1946 ] ;  Agnes K e i t h ,  Three Came 
Homes Bos ton  1947;  M ic ha e l  O 'Connor,  V ile  Repose3 
London 1950;  Digby,  'Lawyer  i n  t h e  W i l d e r n e s s ' ,  p p . 102-59 .
Donald Hudden, t h e  most  p o p u l a r  D i s t r i c t  O f f i c e r  i n  t h e  
h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  Baram, was k i l l e d  by I b a n  e x - p r i s o n e r s  d e s p a t c h e d  
by t h e  J a p a n e s e  t o  f i n d  him i n  t h e  j u n g l e .
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selected for Allied paratroop landings in early 1945, they were 
hardly seen during the entire course of the war. While the rest 
of Borneo was the responsibility of the Japanese navy, Sarawak, Brunei 
and North Borneo were controlled as one military region by the 37th 
Army whose headquarters were first located at Kuching and then moved 
to North Borneo in late 1943 when it seemed clear to the Japanese 
that they would have to face an Allied counter-attack. For administrative 
purposes, the British Borneo states were divided into five prefectures: 
Kuching-shu, Sibu-shu, Miri-shu, Seikai-shu (Jesselton) and Tokai-shu 
(Sandakan).
The Japanese civil affairs administration of Sarawak
suffered a serious setback at the outset when four transports carrying
the civil affairs staff were sunk by Dutch aircraft at Santubong
2 ’near the mouth of the Sarawak River. This served to heighten the 
administration's emphasis on military priorities: tight control of
coastal and more densely populated areas, economic self-sufficiency 
and the supply of labour and resources to assist the Japanese war 
effort. The focus of Japanese economic interest was, of course, 
the oil field at Miri where a great deal of energy was expended in 
rehabilitating the wells which had been wrecked before the invasion. 
However, for want of geological records and technical expertise the 
field had not been brought back to significant production by the time 
of the surrender. The conquest of Indo-China and Malaya meant that 
Japan was over-supplied with rubber and there was consequently little 
demand for this or for pepper, Sarawak's other major pre-war export.
The one area of the economy on which the Japanese had an important 
impact was padi cultivation, principally because self-sufficiency 
was a matter of absolute necessity after 1943.
The most influential figure in civil affairs administration 
was S. Yamada, an Oxford graduate who had been seconded from the 
Department of the Interior and sent to Sarawak in 1943 as head of the
1 See Tom Harrisson, World Within: A Borneo Story3 London
1959.
2 Personal communication from Mr A.J.N. Richards, 17 June 
1976.
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37th Army's research section. In 1944 he was made head of the
General Affairs section in Kuching and became responsible for the
work of the Ken Sanjikai3 or Prefectural Advisory Council, which
had been authorized by a military decree of 1 October 1943. While
the decree stressed 'the political participation of natives in
the administration of North Borneo,' Chinese, Indians and other
2immigrants were entitled to act as extraordinary members.
Possessing fluent English, which was the language used by the Council, 
Yamada became extremely popular with all community leaders and did 
a great deal to further relations between the Japanese and the local 
population. The Ken Sanjz (Councillors), who were probably chosen 
by him, came from the old elite structure. The Datus Amar and 
Pahlawan and Native Officers Abang Openg and Tuanku Bujang 
represented the perabangan of Kuching and Sibu while Haji Abdul 
Rahman could speak for other Malays. As with the Datu Patinggi, Ong 
Tiang Swee may have declined membership on the grounds of advanced 
age but his son, Ong Kuan Hin, served as did Lee Wing Thoong who 
headed the main Cantonese association. The two Iban representatives 
were Charles Mason and Philip Jitam. It is not clear to what extent, 
if at all, the Ken Sanji advised the Japanese administration on 
political and social questions. Their principal purpose, as far as 
the Japanese were concerned, was to assist with the various economic 
projects which had been planned including a shipyard to make wooden 
hulls from local timber and a factory to extract oil from rubber latex. 
As in Malaya and Indonesia, Japanese policy was to co-opt the 
local elite to assist in promoting self-sufficiency and mobilizing 
labour for the construction of airfields and other projects.
1 Yamada, who would have been by far the best informant on the 
Japanese administration, died a few years ago and does not 
appear to have written his memoirs. However, - Manaki's 
'Reminiscences of Shiseikan Yamada' is a useful source.
The title of Manaki's book (he was a staff colonel in the 
37th Army) is not known. Yamada revisited Sarawak a number 
of times after the war.
2 Extract of Tokyo broadcast, 1 October 1943, Sarawak Government 
Agency Sydney, Circular No.5/43, 12 October 1943. According 
to the broadcast, similar councils were to be set up in each 
of the five provinces but it is not clear if this was done.
223
The Japanese also promoted the formation of communally- 
based associations similar to those which came into being in Malaya. 
While the local branch of the Indian Independence League became the 
natural body representing Sarawak’s tiny Indian community, the 
Overseas Chinese Association and the Perimpun Dayak (Dayak 
Association) were useful means of dealing with the different racial 
groups. While their leaders were responsible for the actions of 
their respective communities, they could also be used to organize 
the demonstrations of loyalty and cultural events which were required 
on such occasions as the Emperor’s birthday and War Heroes Day.
The Overseas Chinese Association,"^" as in Malaya, had the initial task 
of collecting almost $2,000,000 as sook ching (purification through 
suffering) from the Chinese as punishment for their earlier assistance 
to the Chiang Kai-Shek government against Japan. Kuching was 
allocated $900,000, Sibu $700,000 and Miri $300,000 while the Chinese 
of North Borneo were expected to contribute $1,200,000.
Although the Japanese might easily have made use of the 
Persatuan Melayu Sarawak, they banned its activities in the 
apparent belief that it was ’political’ and therefore potentially 
dangerous. Instead they preferred to do what the Brookes had done - 
to work through the traditional elite in the belief that the 
authority of the datus could further Japanese interests more than 
could a group of educated Malays whose social influence was an 
unknown quantity. While it is said by pre-war members of the Persatuan 
that the organization and all its branches remained intact throughout 
the war, it seems unlikely that there were any ’underground’ 
activities. Malay affairs seem to have been the responsibility of 
a department in which Tuanku Bujang and Abang Openg occupied the 
senior positions.
By far the most significant of the associations was the 
Perimpun Dayak whose membership seems to have been drawn in the 
first instance from the pre-war United Sea Dayak Co-operative whose 
origins have already been mentioned. Charles Mason became president
1 Its equivalent in Sibu was the Tung Tiao Hui (joint peace­
keeping association).
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of the Perimpun and Philip Jitam its secretary. Branches were 
established throughout the First and Second Divisions and there 
were some large meetings in Kuching. At the same time the Co­
operative, renamed the Gerempong Dayak3 was maintained not as a 
trading company but as an Iban community welfare organization 
responsible for such things as pocket money to militia recruits and 
students brought to Kuching for training.^
The Perimpun Dayak held its first meeting in Kuching on 
17 February 1944 at which it was announced that the Japanese 
administration had given $4,000 towards its funds. The programme 
indicates very clearly that the Perimpun was designed to promote 
the loyalty of the Ibans to the Japanese administration:
i Fall-in in the play-ground at the back of the 
school [Maderasah Melayu]
ii Give respect due to H.I.M. The Emperor of
Japan. Facing east: Kiojo yo hai "SAIKEREI"
body bending 45 degrees, silence for *5 
minute - Naure -
iii Give respect due to the noble and brave 
heroes of the Nipponese soldiers who 
sacrificed their lives for the sake of Dai 
Toa at the fronts:- "Nippon Gun ni tai 
suru Kansha no Mokuto - Mokuto hajime - 1 
minute silence head bending, eyes shut.^
Although there are very few records of the Perimpun’s activities, it 
was evidently responsible for conducting a census of all Ibans 
and Land Dayaks in the First and Second Divisions and for the 
organization of Iban dances and other cultural items for ceremonial 
occasions, such as the anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Malaya 
in December 1941.
The Japanese also sponsored the establishment in Kuching
of a kaum ibu or women's association with representatives of each of
3the four major races. Lily Eberwein, the first headmistress of the 
Permaisuri Melayu, was secretary of the Malay section while Mary Ong,
1 Some records of the Gerempong Dayak are among the papers 
left by Philip Jitam.
2 Programme of inaugural meeting of Perimpun Dayak, Jitam 
Papers.
3 See Chapter VIII, p.417n.
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Barbara Bayang and Mrs Gopal headed the Chinese, Iban and Indian
sections respectively. All had been carefully chosen by Yamada
both for their status within their own communities and for their
ability. Lily Eberwein was the best educated Malay woman in Sarawak;
Mary Ong was the grand-daughter of Ong Tiang Swee and had trained
as a nursing sister; Barbara Bayang was also a nurse and an active
member of the Sea Dayak Co-operative;^ and Mrs Gopal was the wife
of an Indian doctor. The kaum ibu's main duty was to collect waste
metal and hold jumble sales to raise money for gifts to Japanese
soldiers. However, its members were also required to organize
singing and dancing for concerts held on special occasions and to
2plant and tend plots of tapioca.
It would be easy to exaggerate the importance of the kaum
ibu and its connection with post-war political developments. The
organization was imposed by the Japanese and its monthly meetings,
from all accounts, were slightly comic affairs. It would even be
possible to argue that the most important change affecting women
during the Japanese occupation was the chronic shortage of cloth
which prevented upper-class Malay women from maintaining their
previous custom of concealing themselves in yards of cloth whenever
they left their houses. Nevertheless, the Japanese insistence that
Asians were perfectly capable of doing anything that Europeans could
do (and doing it better) seems to have left its mark. Barbara Bayang
later recalled that it was the self-confidence she developed through
contact with the Japanese that made possible her subsequent involvement 
3in politics.
The basic means of social control was the jikeidccn or 
vigilante structure established in March 1943 which divided all areas
1 Unlike Lily Eberwein, Barbara Bayang avoided involvement in 
the anti-cession movement. However, she later participated 
actively in municipal politics and was one of the founding 
members of Sarawak's first formally recognized party,
the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) in 1959.
2 Interview with Lily Eberwein, April 1974. The tapioca 
root was used as a substitute for rice.
3 Personal information.
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of concentrated population into units of approximately thirty 
households with leaders who were responsible to the police for 
what happened in their division. In the interior, longhouses 
constituted the jikeidan unit. To some extent the system worked as 
an informal spy network which allowed the Japanese to detect malcontents 
and pro-British elements, but it did provide a structure of social 
organization and responsibility previously unknown in Sarawak. The 
Japanese also organized a kyodohei (militia) recruited mainly from 
the Balau Ibans of the Second Division, although the senior officers 
were Malays.^ After receiving elementary military training, some 
were posted for guard duty in the principal towns while others formed 
garrisons in the interior. In the Second Division, for example,
Iban garrisons were posted under Japanese supervision at Betong and 
Saratok, and were at times unsupervised at Pusa, Lingga and Engkelili.^ 
When the 37th Army headquarters were moved to Sapong rubber estate 
south of Jesselton in October 1943 a number of kyodohei were sent 
there as well. All kyodohei units in the interior had been disbanded 
and sent back to Simanggang by the time of the Allied landing and 
there appears to have been no attempt to get them to resist the re­
occupation. But one Balau Iban who had been promoted to the rank 
of captain in the Japanese army was killed during the Allied landing 
at Jesselton.^
There was also extensive recruitment of Ibans for the
police. In 1943, 28 Ibans were put through a six month course at
the newly established police training school at Kuching and were
4distributed through all the Divisions. The handful of Ibans already 
in the police were promoted and the Japanese found them much more 
useful than was at first expected. Unlike the Brookes, the Japanese 
were sensitive to the numerical preponderance of the Ibans and to 
the frustrations arising from the virtual Malay monopoly of the 
police and the Native Officer Service. In their report for 1943
1 Wan Abdul Rahman (the son of Tuanku Bujang), Abang Hadi 
bin Abang Sulai and Haji Bohari. McKay, 'The Kuching 
Communities ...', p.57.
2 S. Suzuki, MS memoir, 1976.
3 Personal communication from Sumping Bayang, 29 May 1976.
4 'Status of the Military Administration in North Borneo', 
op.cit. p.55.
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the Japanese administration expressed great satisfaction with 
the Dusuns of North Borneo and the Ibans whom they found particularly 
hard-working, honest and loyal by contrast with the Malays who were 
’lazy' and only useful as motor mechanics.^
One of the most interesting and significant aspects of
the Japanese administration was the establishment of a measure of
indirect rule in the Second Division through the educated Iban elite.
Whether this arose in the first instance from a shortage of Japanese
personnel or from a deliberate policy of involving Ibans in government
is not clear but there can be little doubt about its success. In
January 1942 Eliab Bayang was appointed Liaison Officer on Iban
affairs to the Japanese military administration at Simanggang.1 2 345
Other Ibans such as Empenit Adam were also appointed gunaho
(district officer) on his recommendation and were responsible to
3him to some extent. One of Bayang’s main tasks was to increase padi
production by supervising Iban and Chinese padi-planting teams and
facilitating the transportation of padi, salt and other goods. But
he enjoyed a position of political influence which was of the order
of a pre-war Resident and he made a number of reports to the
Japanese administration on Iban customs and the qualities required
4for Iban leadership. The handful of Ibans who had been taken into 
the police just before the war were promoted to positions of 
considerable responsibility, the most prominent being Juing Insol^ 
who recruited Balau Ibans for the kyodohei and was extremely valuable 
to the Japanese in many other ways.
An outcome of all this was that the educated Ibans 
employed by the Japanese were persuaded that they were fully capable
1 Ibid., p.79.
2 K. Itoh to Datu Abang Zin Gapor, 9 January 1942, Bayang Papers.
3 Bayang to Japanese Military Administration Board, Kuching,
21 March 1942, ibid.
4 See,e.g., his report of 10 February 1943, ibid.
5 Juing Insol came from a well-known Saribas (Buloh Antu) family. 
One of his ancestors was a famous rebel against the Brookes.
A man of exceptional ability, he could well have become 
Commissioner for Police had it not been for his reputation as 
an anti-British collaborator. See below,p.239.
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of taking a responsible part in the administration of the country.
A good example was Inspector Edward Brandah who was promoted by the 
Japanese to Deputy Superintendent of Police at Miri but joined 
the Allied advance parties before the end of the war. In October 
1946 he wrote to Anthony Brooke:
If ever I am given the opportunity of administering 
the welfare of the people of Sarawak I would say 
that the future prosperity and social status of the 
people should not all be governed and guided by all 
the 100 per cent of the western brains. Technicians, 
lawyers, doctors etc. really require 100 per cent 
western brains but Native administration ... only 
requires 30 per cent ... and the rest should be 
native. The idea came to me as far back as when I 
was in the interior of Sarawak during the Jap 
occupation. A sentimentalist or a fanatic patriot 
I may be, but ... all during the Japanese occupation 
my wife and I resolved not to bow our heads to 
them because they were the enemies of Christianity 
and civilization ... We planned and dreamed that 
when the enemies were driven away we would 
unflinchingly offer ourselves^to assist in the 
reconstruction of Sarawak ...
While the Japanese propaganda machine did not operate to
the extent that it did in Indonesia and Malaya, an effort was made
2to inculcate anti-European feeling. Slogans were also posted around
3Kuching and the other major towns lauding the Japanese armed forces,
the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and Asian brotherhood; rallies
were organized to swear allegiance and support the Japanese as the 
4’light of Asia’. When Prime Minister Tojo visited Kuching a huge 
welcome was arranged.“* Chandra Bose, whose Indian Independence
1 Brandah to Anthony Brooke, 26 October 1946, Brooke Papers, 
Box 13/1.
2 For example, all photographs of Europeans and many English 
books were confiscated.
3 See Plate X.
4 A Japanese broadcast of early March 1943 reported that 100 
Ibans, Indian and Chinese representatives from Kuching had 
recently pledged allegiance to Japan. SG (Sydney), 13 
March 1943.
5 Ho Cheah Min, ’Jih-chih shih-ch’i ti hui-i' (Memoirs of the 
Japanese Occupation), MS prepared for Sarawak History Week, 
1975 .
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League was based in Singapore, was also given a well-orchestrated 
reception. On occasions such as the Emperor's birthday and the 
anniversary of the Pacific war there were public meetings and 
concerts featuring cultural items from all communities. The only 
newspaper available in Kuching during the occupation was one 
published by the Japanese army but radio and public address systems 
were used extensively for propaganda purposes. One of the themes, 
naturally enough, was the Brookes' failure to develop the economy and 
to improve the people's general welfare. When the March 1941 secret 
agreement between the Rajah and the Committee of Administration was 
discovered, it was used as proof that the Rajah had sold the country 
to Britain before fleeing to Australia.^
Although all mission schools remained closed, Malay and 
Chinese schools were reopend after some months. Some effort was made 
to teach the Japanese language, particularly in Sibu where teachers 
were given special courses. At least one Malay student was sent to 
Indonesia for training in veterinary science^ and about ten others were 
selected to study in Japan. A senior group, including the Datu 
Pahlawan, was also chosen to visit Japan but these plans were made 
too late.
Although there was quiet antagonism on the part of many 
Chinese from the outset, the Japanese remained reasonably popular with 
the Malays and Ibans until early 1944. By that time the destruction 
of most of Japan's merchant shipping by the Allies had cut off 
incoming supplies and consumer goods such as cloth were unobtainable. 
Japanese demands on local padi became more onerous and basic 
commodities such as salt and sugar were increasingly scarce. In 
spite of propaganda to the contrary, the Japanese position was seen
1 Suzuki made use of this propaganda among the Ibans in the 
Simanggang district. Personal communication.
2 Ahmad Zaidie bin Wan Adruce studied at Bogor during the war 
where he became a close friend of A.M. Azahari. After the 
war he joined the Indonesian republican navy, serving in 
Kalimantan. The colonial government later sent him to 
Scotland where he took an M.A. and on his return he became 
a senior education officer and vice-chairman of the Kuching 
Municipal Council. He also became president of the BPS and 
opposed Sarawak's integration in Malaysia.
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to be very weak. They were unable to counter Allied air raids and
when they began cutting routes of retreat from the coast into the
interior it was plain that their days were numbered. While the
requisitioning of padi and forced labour'*’ had irritated the Ibans,
the main source of antagonism was an attempt to take away their
hunting guns. After a Chinese-led rebellion in the Jesselton area
2was brutally suppressed in October 1943, the Japanese commander 
issued a proclamation which severely restricted movement and ordered 
the confiscation of all firearms. Wherever this was done the Iban 
reaction was extremely hostile. S. Suzuki, a Japanese police officer 
who was friendly with Eliab Bayang, managed to prevent confiscation 
in the Simanggang district, thus preserving good relations with the
local Ibans, but he was under threat of repatriation and court-martial
i 3for defying orders when the surrender came.
Suzuki was also involved in dealing with Ibans of the
Lubok Antu area who had been told by a detachment of the Australian
Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD) that large rewards would be
paid for the taking of Japanese heads. Excited by this and by the
prospect of looting Japanese stores of rice and other goods, about
500 Iban warriors armed with guns and traditional weapons attacked
the 14-man Japanese garrison at Engkelili one night in April 1945, only
to suffer a number of dead and injured from retaliatory machine gun 
4fire. Suzuki was sent to investigate the incident and by means of
1 According to Mr H.P. Buxton, a Eurasian who had the task to 
supervising construction of the Bintulu airfield, the system 
was that Ibans would work for two weeks at a time. They 
had to provide their own rice but were paid in kerosene and 
sugar.
2 For the history of the 'Kwok Rebellion', see J. Maxwell-Hall, 
Kinabalu Guerillas ...3 Kuching 1965. This would make a 
fascinating subject for study, as would the abortive rebellion 
against the Japanese in the Pontianak area in late 1943. A 
Japanese account of the plot in Boruneo Shimbun, 1 July 1944, 
was translated as Exhibit 1697-A, IMTFE Proceedings_, AWM.
3 S. Suzuki, MS memoir.
4 This raid was led by Penghulu Ulin anak Penghulu Unji of Spak. 
Ulin's warriors, reinforced by Ibans from Ulu Layar, Skrang, 
Lemanak, Engkari, Batang Ai, Delok, Mepi and Lubang Baya later 
attacked Lubok Antu. Benedict Sandin, unpublished MS.
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some skilful diplomacy restored good relations. But up-country 
Ibans throughout the Second and Third divisions were now out after 
heads and loot and it was only a matter of weeks before there was 
a similar attack on Lubok Antu. In the Third Division, a series of 
attacks on Japanese military personnel and civilians moving between 
Sibu and Miri caused seventy casualities and in May the second most 
senior officer of the Miri garrison was killed at Suai where he had 
retreated to avoid the bombing raids. Nevertheless, there had been 
no armed opposition to the Japanese until after the first SRD 
landings.
There can be little doubt that the Japanese invasion of 
Sarawak damaged European prestige but the rapid deterioration of 
economic conditions during the last 18 months of the war created a 
situation in which the Australian Army was enthusiastically received.
The ability of the Australians to provide relief supplies in large 
quantities contrasted markedly with the Japanese failure to deliver 
the goods and there were some who believed that 'Bikau' (British
Borneo Civil Affairs Unit) was the best government that Sarawak
2could have. Although the Japanese did not introduce many radical 
changes, the occupation at least fostered the idea that there could 
be changes: that Brooke government was not the only kind of
government. Generally speaking, the Japanese presence and the responses 
of the different communities created a new pattern of political 
delineation which soon became obvious during the Australian-British 
military administration.
More immediately, the activities of the SRD in their re­
occupation of Sarawak from the interior led to a heightening of 
racial tension seldom seen in Sarawak since the Chinese rebellion of 
1857. Assisted initially by the Kayans and Kenyahs, the SRD units 
with some difficulty won over the Ibans of the Rejang. According to 
W.L.P. Sochon who headed the first party reaching the Rejang, it was
1 According to Suzuki’s own account, he compared what had 
happened with a child cutting itself on a razor. The 
Japanese army, he told the Ibans, was the razor. Whose 
fault was it, then, that Ibans had been ’cut’? MS memoir.
2 See Appendix III.
232
'touch and go for a while' and the decisive factor was the loyalty 
of Sundai and Penghulu Pusu, together with the support of the Kayans 
and Kenyahs.'*' In the last weeks before the Japanese surrender the 
SRD was substantially assisted both by irregular Iban forces and 
individual Chinese volunteers. However, the licence given Ibans 
to take Japanese heads got out of control and a number of Chinese in 
the Song and Kanowit area were killed and the Kapit bazaar burnt 
before SRD officers and Iban leaders such as Native Officer Bennett 
Jarrow and Penghulu Jugah could intervene.
Collaboration
One of the factors in Sarawak's post-war political situation which 
has never been properly assessed is collaboration with the Japanese 
and its consequences. Initially it was a problem with which the 
Australian military administration was not really prepared to deal.
The only instructions on the subject from Divisional headquarters in 
Labuan were that all civilian collaborators were to be taken into 
custody but there was no clear policy on what should be done with 
them subsequently. While there were some preliminary police 
investigations, there were no formal court inquiries until late 
December 1945. Far more important at the time was the seeking out and 
interrogation of suspected Japanese war criminals.
Unlike Malaya, there was no significant interregnum 
from the Japanese surrender until the re-imposition of Allied 
control. In Kuching and the other coastal towns of Sarawak, Japanese 
authorities maintained tight control of the population until the 
day before the official handover to the Australians took place 
(12 September). The arriving Australians found Kuching 'largely 
unscathed' but a number of collaborators were brought in by the
1 Personal communications from Mr W.L.P. Sochon, 9 September 1974; 
12 October 1974.
2 Kuching was occupied by a task force of the Australian 9th 
Division (Kuching Force) then based at Labuan. Commanded by 
Brigadier T.C. Eastick, it remained there until the handover 
to SEAC in early January 1946. Separate commands were set up 
at Sibu, Miri and Brunei which were also responsible to 
Labuan. After the handover, a number of Australian officers 
stayed on and eventually joined the colonial administration.
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populace and others placed in custody for their own safety. There
were a number of assemblies in the streets which had to be dispersed
and Chinese leaders were called in to calm their people and assure
2them that justice would be done to alleged collaborators. The 
vendetta continued during the following days and on 15 September the 
9th Division news sheet reported that the main activity of the 
previous day had been the rounding up of collaborators by the rest 
of the population:
Every hour or so the comparative quiet of the 
town is broken by wild yellings and shouts 
in different tongues as packs of Chinese 
and natives smoke a collaborator out of his 
lair and chase him pell mell down one of the 
main streets. Only the fortunate can evade 
the sticks and fists by gaining the 
protection of Australians.
By the end of the week the Kuching police station and jail were
crowded with people who had begged to be held for their own protection.
According to one Australian observer, however, ’few of these were in
fact collaborators and many were merely the victims of communal4feeling.’ The seriousness of the recriminations in Kuching is 
difficult to estimate. There are suggestions that a few people quietly 
’disappeared’, presumably murdered,and that many Indians were severely 
beaten by groups of Chinese.“* This may have been due to the fact that 
the Indians as a community gave the most explicit public support to 
the Japanese through the Indian Independence League, although there 
were a number of Indian kempeitai informers. Certainly, most of those 
who were denounced as collaborators and sought protection from the 
Australians were Indians.
The Australian authorities were deluged with complaints 
against people who, in the words of the same observer, ’had merely
1 The Platypus_, 13 September 1945. Copy in the possession 
of Sir Thomas Eastick.
2 Police weekly report for week ending 18 September 1945 by 
Capt J. Marlow, Kuching Force diary, op. cit.
3 The Platypus, 15 September 1945. Copy in the possession of 
Sir Thomas Eastick.
4 R.H. Morris, MS memoir.
5 Interview with Mr R.H. Morris, May 1976.
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tried to live under the Japanese occupation.’ Some of the most
bitter but least well founded allegations were made against the Ken
Sanji. Furthermore, some of its members made accusations against
each other, including those of the same race. From the initial
police investigations however, only one Ken Sanji, S.C.S. Chakraverty
of the Indian Independence League, was thought to have a case to
answer and was finally tried and deported. Opposition by the
Indian government to any efforts to punish members of the League
ensured that with the exception of the handful who were beaten up by the
crowd during the first few days, Sarawak’s Indian collaborators
emerged unscathed. According to one observer, 'it was felt that
action against the Indians would produce more trouble than it was 
2worth.' Even if the military administration and the new colonial
government had wished to pursue the collaboration issue there would
have been immense difficulties in obtaining witnesses. By the
beginning of April 1946 dossiers had been prepared by the police on
a number of suspects but prosecution was made difficult by what
one officer described as the 'very definite reluctance' of people
3to come forward and give evidence. However, his suggestion that 
the government should appoint an independent commissioner to whom 
people could make their complaints direct and without fear of 
repercussions seems to have been shelved.
For the most part, collaboration crossed racial lines 
but there was one incident reminiscent of the clashes which took 
place in Malaya during this period. During the war the Japanese had 
brought in some hundreds of Chinese from Shanghai and Canton to 
build wooden-hulled ships and to work on other projects. Ill- 
treatment, together with memories of the Japanese invasion of China, 
had filled them with a fierce spirit of revenge which was shared by 
many local Chinese. But with the speedy removal of the Japanese 
troops, Kuching's Malay community seemed the obvious target. The 
Malays had not fared at all badly under the Japanese. While their 
diet and dress suffered towards the end of the war, there was no
1 Morris, MS memoir.
2 Digby, 'Lawyer in the Wilderness', p.172.
3 Interview with Mr R.H. Morris, May 1976.
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serious interference with their everyday lives. Their community 
leaders were recognized by the Japanese and they retained their 
positions in government; they were seldom used as forced labour.
Not surprisingly, the Chinese saw them as a privileged group and 
were anxious to 'teach them a lesson'.
The precipitating factor, however, seems to have been
a rumour that 2,000 Ibans, had gathered in the Serian district and
were advancing on Kuching.^ A military patrol sent to investigate
found that some Ibans had indeed crossed over from Dutch Borneo and
with local Iban support had instituted a three-day reign of terror
during which a Malay policeman who had been over-zealous in assisting
2the Japanese was tied up and shot and parts of his corpse eaten. 
However, the situation was quickly brought under control and the 
Ibans were sent back across the border like so many naughty school­
boys. On 22 September there were further reports of more Ibans
massing in the Serian district but investigation showed that none
3had crossed the Dutch border into Sarawak again. Nevertheless, the
military authorities failed to dispell Chinese fears of an Iban
attack on Kuching and all that that would mean. Stories of the
Chinese rebellion of 1857 when Chinese heads were smoked by Ibans in
the Kuching bazaar were still current within the Chinese community
and news that Chinese heads had been taken a few months earlier at
4Song and Kanowit aroused fears that it could easily happen again.
At the same time, opportunist elements may have seen an attack on the 
Malays as a means of achieving status and the possibility of looting 
gold jewellery from the kampongs must also have been a motive.
On 25 September there was fighting between Chinese and 
Malays in the main bazaar area in the early morning and by 9.30 
more than 1,000 Chinese had assembled on the road outside the 
Brooke dockyard in readiness for an attack on the mosque and the Malay
1 Kuching Force diary, AWM A2663, 1/5/62.
2 Ibid.; Digby, 'Lawyer in the Wilderness', p.175.
3 Kuching Force diary, op. cit.
4 Benedict Sandin states that 'it was for this reason that 
the Chinese started riots in many towns in Sarawak 
including Kuching . . . ' , Unpublished MS.
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kampongs behind it. However, some Australian officers noticed the
crowd and after a passing truckload of troops had disarmed the would-
be rioters a 24-hour curfew was imposed on the town.^ While it
seems likely that there were no more than ten fatalities in the
earlier fighting, it is still commonly believed in Kuching that as
many as 100 Chinese were killed and that the whole affair was hushed
2up by the military administration for fear of further trouble.
There is even an unsubstantiated story that the trouble was only 
settled when Ong Tiang Swee came to an agreement with the Datu 
Pahlawan that the Chinese should stay out of politics, and that 
this explains why Chinese leaders kept out of the cession controversy 
some months later.^
The significance of collaboration in other parts of Sarawak
is even more difficult to assess although it is clear that there
was antagonism towards collaborators among the Sibu and Simanggang
Chinese. Feelings ran particularly high in Miri where the
Australian authorities had to intervene to prevent a group of Chinese
4women lynching a well-known Chinese collaborator. There was a 
great deal of antagonism towards Miri’s Chinese businessmen from 
working-class Chinese who were already demonstrating leftist attitudes. 
An estimated 3,000 Chinese and Javanese had died of starvation during 
the final months of the occupation.^
This discussion begs the whole question of 'collaboration' 
and the moral judgments associated with it. From a neutral standpoint, 
co-operation with the Japanese might be seen to have taken a number 
of forms. First, there were government servants (mostly Malays), 
who retained their positions under the Japanese administration.
Some, particularly those in the police who had links with the 
kempeitai, took advantage of their position but for the most part
1 Interview with Mr R.H. Morris, May 1976.
2 Interview with Senawi bin Suleiman, July 1974.
3 Ibid. This is highly unlikely, but it is significant that 
it was believed.
4 J.R. Black, 'Rough Notes on Service in British Borneo with 
BBCAU'.
5 AWM A2663, 619/7/68.
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they continued their former work. Secondly, there were the 
businessmen, Chinese and Muslim Indians, who continued to operate 
their shops and businesses. Of these a number went out of their 
way to befriend the Japanese in order to secure business with the 
trading corporations who monopolized the purchase of local produce. 
Thirdly, there were the various community leaders whose status 
was recognized by the Japanese and who were in turn required to make 
public demonstrations of support on important occasions such as the 
Emperor’s birthday. Fourthly, there were the educated Ibans of 
the First and Second Divisions who co-operated with the Japanese 
in a unique system of indirect rule and seized the opportunity of 
throwing off Malay domination. Fifthly, a number of Indians supported 
the Indian Independence League and provided the Japanese with a 
good deal of public support. And finally, there were the various 
kempeitai informers of all races who found profitable 
employment in spying on their fellows.
The question of collaboration was a source of tension 
between some pre-war Sarawak officers who had been in Batu Lintang 
and members of the military administration. Archer, the pre-war 
Chief Secretary who had been appointed civilian adviser to the 
military administration, held that a number of arch-collaborators 
should be tried on capital charges and executed and all others 
jailed or deported.^ The Australian authorities, however, were not 
authorized to do anything more than detain such people as 
Chakraverty, Eliab Bayang and Juing Insol and institute police 
inquiries into the more serious allegations. In the meantime,
Archer took a great deal of placating. In February 1946 he told 
Macaskie that in files left behind by the Japanese there was ’clear 
evidence' that the Datu Patinggi had tried to persuade the Japanese 
authorities to return the Turtle Islands to him, in spite of the 
full settlement that had been made in 1941. Even more annoying to 
Archer was the venerable datu's expressions of support for the 
Japanese, something which he ought to have recognized as a mandatory 
formula:
1 Interview with Mr R.H. Morris, May 1976.
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In his letter to the Jap G.O.C. he not only says 
that he will help the new regime in every way 
because "they have the interests of the Asiatic 
people at heart" but ends up with "I should like 
to assure you of my loyalty towards the new 
regime, and to express my good wishes for the 
success of the new Government". And that is 
one of the men who represented "the whole 
community of Sarawak" the other day. It makes 
me almost sick.^ -
He also told Eastick that ’all the Datus except one were as near
2collaborators as doesn't matter.'
If the restored Brooke government can be said to have 
possessed a policy on collaboration during its brief span of office 
from April until July 1946, it amounted to no more than 'turning a 
blind eye'. The first occasion when the question was raised was the 
tea party for the King's birthday, an occasion to which all of 
Kuching's notables had been traditionally invited. When presented 
with the guest list, the de facto Chief Secretary, C.W. Dawson, 
noticed the names of a number of well known collaborators and posed 
the question to himself:
Either forget all about it or what? If we start 
discriminating it means an investigation into 
perhaps dozens of cases (including such people 
like Datu Patinggi etc., when we would 
immediately be accused of discrimination on 
"cession" grounds).^
It seemed to him very wrong that Haji Sa'erah, 'a well known Jap 
collaborator', should be invited but she had already been accepted 
by the Ranee at a number of public occasions and it would be 
impossible to omit her name without causing 'a pretty good scandal'.
That there was no consistency in the official attitude to 
collaborators can best be seen in the experiences of Eliab Bayang 
and Abang Haji Mustapha. On the reoccupation of Simanggang by SRD 
forces, Bayang had been placed in jail at the instigation of Datu
1 Archer to Macaskie, 11 February 1946, Macaskie Papers, File 5.
2 Archer to Eastick, 11 March 1948. Letter in the possession 
of Sir Thomas Eastick.
3 Dawson Diary, 5 June 1946.
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Zin Gapor in the belief that he had been associated with the
2murder of Europeans during the early days of the Japanese invasion.
There was also a need to protect Bayang from the Lubok Antu Ibans
who were rumoured to be after his head. On 31 December 1945 he
was brought before Major A.C. Waine, one of the two magistrates
acting under the authority of the British military administration
and because of the lack of evidence against him his case was dismissed.
However, someone (probably a pre-war Sarawak officer) made sure
that Bayang was not rehabilitated. A fortnight after his case was
heard, he received a letter from the Chairman of the Promotions
Board informing him that he was dismissed from government service and
was not entitled to receive the government's contribution to his
superannuation. In a letter appealing against his dismissal,
Bayang claimed that he had been forced to join the Japanese
administration, but that during his time as Resident 'the citizens
3were well treated and nothing eventful happened'. His main 
responsibility, he added, had been supervision of the padi 
planting group at Bijat in the Second Division where farmers had had 
the best harvest since the opening of the irrigated area. He then 
suggested that the reasons for his dismissal were ill-founded and 
partisan; originating principally from the Ibans of Lubok Antu and 
the Ulu Ai:
If Government thinks that my dismissal came 
through the various reports submitted by the 
Iban, I strongly beg the Government to re­
investigate the matter fully through a 
reliable officer ... I doubt that the report 
received by Government causing my dismissal 
had not, in any case, [been] done by the Iban 
themselves, but they were backed-up by the 
other races (Malays) through ... jealousy in 
order to overthrow all the Iban officers from 
[government positions] ... hence it will
1 Personal communication from Mr Sumping Bayang, 1 August 1976.
2 'Report by Capt D. Kearney, OC, SRD Party, 2nd Division, on 
occupation of Simanggang. 21 Sept. 1945', AWM 376/5/19.
Juing Insol who was District Officer, Betong, at the time of 
the reoccupation, was also brought to Simanggang for the same 
reason. Insol was later jailed for a wartime assault on a Eurasiam.
3 Undated letter, Bayang Papers.
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be  an e a s y  m a t t e r  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t y  [ t h e  Malays]  
to  h a n d l e  i l l i t e r a t e  I b a n s  as  t h a t  o f  one hund red  
y e a r s  a g o . l
But  B a y a n g ' s  a p p e a l  a p p a r e n t l y  went  unheeded .  A l l  h i s  s u b s e q u e n t
a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  government  p o s i t i o n s  were r e j e c t e d  and when he
formed a f i s h i n g  company he found  t h a t  he  c o u ld  n o t  o b t a i n  a l i c e n c e  
2
to  s e l l  h i s  c a t c h .  B a y a n g ' s  r e a l  o f f e n c e ,  i t  m igh t  be s u g g e s t e d ,  
was t h a t  by becoming de f a c t o  R e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  Second D i v i s i o n  he had 
u s u rp e d  one o f  t h e  most  s e n i o r  p o s i t i o n s  o f  European  a u t h o r i t y  i n  
Sarawak.  Nor had he  gone th ro u g h  t h e  m o t io n s  o f  a p o l o g i z i n g  f o r  
h i s  i n v o lv e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  J a p a n e s e .
Abang H a j i  Mustapha  had c o - o p e r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  J a p a n e s e
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  a d i f f e r e n t  way. The y o u n g e s t  o f  t h e  d a t u s ,  he
spoke  a t  J a p a n e s e - o r g a n i z e d  kampong ' l o y a l t y '  m e e t i n g s  where he
v i g o r o u s l y  denounced t h e  B r i t i s h  and t h e  Americans u n t i l  o n ly  months
3
b e f o r e  t h e  s u r r e n d e r .  He was a l s o  t h e  l e a d e r  o f  a group which  was
t o  have  been  s e n t  on a t o u r  o f  J a p a n .  C o n s e q u e n t ly  he ough t  t o  have
been  one o f  t h e  p r im e  s u b j e c t s  f o r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  by t h e  m i l i t a r y
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  b u t  t h e r e  a p p e a r s  t o  have  been  an i n f o r m a l  d i r e c t i o n ,
e m a n a t in g  from t h e  R a j a h ,  t h a t  he  be  l e f t  a l o n e .  And i n  a c c o r d a n c e
w i t h  a s e c r e t  a g reem en t  a p p a r e n t l y  made w i t h  MacBryan i n  e a r l y
4
J a n u a r y ,  he was even promoted to  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  Datu Bandar  and 
g iv e n  an O.B.E.  Th is  i n d i c a t e d  i n  v e r y  c l e a r  t e rm s  t o  t h e  Malays t h a t  
he had been  c hosen  t o  s u c c e e d  t h e  Datu  P a t i n g g i  as  t h e i r  l e a d e r .
Abang H a j i  M u s ta p h a ' s  p o s i t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  Malay community and h i s  
p o l i c e  c o n n e c t i o n s  meant  t h a t  h i s  s u p p o r t  was as  i m p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  
new c o l o n i a l  government  as  i t  had been  t o  t h e  J a p a n e s e .  I n d e e d ,  i t  
was more i m p o r t a n t  b e c a u s e  he  had made h i s  s u p p o r t  f o r  c e s s i o n  c l e a r  
a t  a  v e ry  e a r l y  s t a g e .  And he  was p r e p a r e d  t o  be  an a c t i v i s t  i n  a 
s i t u a t i o n  where t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  h i s  own community was c l e a r l y  on t h e  
o t h e r  s i d e  o f  t h e  f e n c e .  The. f a i l u r e  t o  p r o s e c u t e  Abang H a j i  Mustapha
1 I b i d .
2 Brangk ing  F i s h i n g  I n d u s t r y  t o  Deputy C h ie f  S e c r e t a r y ,  20 
Sep tember  1947,  Bayang P a p e r s .
3 J o s e p h  Law t o  B e r t r a m  Brooke ,  31 May 1946,  Brooke P a p e r s ,  
Box 2 / 3 ;  Digby,  'Lawyer  i n  t h e  W i l d e r n e s s ' ,  p . 1 7 3 .
4 See Cha p te r  V I I I ,  p . 3 8 8 .
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virtually determined the effective policy to prosecute only those 
who had been clearly involved in acts of violence during the 
occupation. Writing about the situation some years later, Digby 
described the problem which the Datu Pahlawan posed for the civil 
administration:
The restored government could not afford to dismiss 
him and his like, since there were no friendlier 
people with equal authority to put in their places.
It could not, on the other hand, afford to prosecute 
the lesser fry and leave the big fish untouched.
Too many rude comparisons would have been drawn for 
anybody's comfort. The only course^was to let them 
all go on swimming safely together.
It has been suggested that the collaboration question was
used in Sarawak to obtain agreement to cession just as it was by
Sir Harold MacMichael with the Malay sultans to make possible the 
2Malayan Union. Although there is no hard evidence that it was 
deliberately exploited, the question certainly assumed importance 
in the minds of many people during the nine months leading up to the 
Council Negri vote in May 1946. The Datu Pahlawan, for example, 
was probably anxious about the prospect of any thorough-going 
investigation of collaboration and during his visit to Kuching in 
December 1945 MacBryan may have suggested to him and the other 
datus that support for cession would be one way of winning immunity.
It is also possible that other Council Negri members were 
self-conscious about their activities during the occupation and saw 
support for cession as being something in the nature of an insurance 
policy. Khoo Peng Loong, for example, did a lot of business with 
the Japanese in Sibu and had amassed such a quantity of pepper by 
the end of the war that it was almost confiscated by the Custodian 
of Enemy Property. Abang Abdulrahim, brother of Abang Haji 
Mustapha and Native Officer at Sibu during the war, was also 
regarded as a collaborator and might well have felt apprehensive
1 Digby, 'Lawyer in the Wilderness', p.173.
2 McKay, 'The Kuching Communities — ', pp.94-7. See also, J. de 
Vere Allen, The Malayan Union} Cornell 1967, pp.168-72.
3 See Chapter VII, p.310.
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about official investigations. Bennett Jarrow, the Iban Native 
Officer who later supported cession in the Council Negri, was 
supposed to be in the same category.
It was only within the Chinese community of Sarawak that 
collaboration was a real issue with significant consequences. As 
we have seen, Chinese community leaders in Kuching and Sibu were 
active before the war in collecting funds to support the Kuomintang 
government in its struggle against the invading Japanese. When 
the Japanese arrived in Sarawak they immediately rounded up all the 
committee members they could find and placed them in detention.
Many were brutally treated, particularly Chien Chang Poa, the 
Kuching committee chairman.^ Khan Ah Chong also earned special 
punishment by refusing to apologize for his pre-war activities.^ 
There was even a faction within the Japanese administration which 
wanted the execution of all the China Distress Relief Fund committee 
members and was only placated by the substitution of five other
3Chinese who had been caught stealing petrol at Kuching’s airfield.
Many middle class Kuching and Sibu Chinese who wanted
nothing to do with the Japanese remained at home and lived off their
4savings and the sale of property. Poorer Chinese took themselves 
to villages and coastal areas of the First Division such as the 
Nonok peninsula where they lived on fish and home-grown vegetables 
and fruit. Others made a living by manufacturing salt from the 
roots of the nipah palm. Those traders who remained were obliged to 
co-operate to some extent with the Japanese administration and with 
the trading corporations who came in to conduct monopolies over 
padi, pepper, timber and rubber. However, as Japan’s position 
weakened, the scarcity of all kinds of goods provided unprecedented 
opportunities for profit and much of this was used to purchase land 
and other property. Accordingly, at the end of the war there were
1 Ho Cheah Min, ’Memoirs ...'.
2 Interview with Mr Dennis Law, July 1974.
3 Ibid. For a description what happened to the Sibu committee 
members, see Liu, History ...
4 C.f. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur 
1967, p.265.
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in Kuching and Sibu a number of Chinese businessmen who had not 
only managed to survive the occupation without discomfort but 
had in fact substantially improved their material position through 
judicious purchases of property and produce, such as pepper, on a 
buyers’ market. It was upon these men, who were seen to have waxed 
fat on the misfortunes of others, that resentment focussed. Among 
them were dialect group leaders who could now no longer command the 
same respect that they had received before the war. The result was 
a leadership vacuum which was never entirely filled and a split 
within the Chinese community whose traces can still be seen.
T’ien Ju-K'ang,who conducted research on the Sarawak 
Chinese during 1947 and 1948,was in a good position to assess the 
significance of collaboration and while his observations were no doubt 
coloured by the political polarization brought about by contemporary 
events in China, there can be little doubt about the general pattern 
which he described:
Under the present political system the Chinese 
community undoubtedly needs leaders who can 
bridge the gap between their community and the 
Colonial Government, but such leaders must be 
people who can command respect. Before the 
occupation the Chinese public regarded their 
leaders as leaders, despite their faults. Now 
the long-years established authority of the 
leadership has collapsed. Although it would 
be quite unjust to say that all the present 
holders of power were collaborators, yet a few 
of them undoubtedly were, and as long as 
any of these people still appear on the platforms 
of public meetings all their colleagues will be 
tarred with the same brush. At the present time, 
therefore, the gap between the so-called Chinese 
"leaders" and the Chinese public ... is made 
even wider by emotional antagonism. Each side 
acts in its own way without considering the 
existence of the other. The "leaders" have 
only their cliques to support them, the 
community is without leadership.
Before the war the institution acting as a general 
intermediary between the Chinese community of Kuching and the
1 T ’ien Ju-K’ang, The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study of Social
Structure3 London 1950, p.77.
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government was the Chinese Chambers of Commerce whose members were
traditionally the leaders of the various dialect associations and
saw themselves as representing different sectional interests. But
the problem of collaboration made it impossible for the Chamber to
re-organize itself until 1948, by which time there had been a contest
for power involving several factions. The most vocal of these were
the Hua Kheow Tshin Alien (Overseas Chinese Youth Associations) which
were established in Kuching and other centres in early 1946.^
Consisting largely of young Chinese middle-school graduates who
represented the left-wing of Chinese nationalism, the Hua Kheow
Tshin Nien wanted a more democratic system of Chinese representation
than had existed under the Raj and supported the integration of the
2Chinese community 'unhampered by speech group particularism'.
They were also concerned with such questions as citizenship and the 
status of Chinese schools which immediately affected its members' 
interests. The Hua Kheow Tshin Nien accordingly believed that there 
was more hope of achieving these aims under a colonial government 
unhampered by past traditions and were therefore disposed to support 
cession.
The other major political grouping of the time in Kuching
3was the Chung Hua Association. Like the Hua Kheow Tshin Nien, 
it was influenced by a generally felt need for a pan-Chinese body 
'capable of transcending the traditional divisions within the community'. 
However, its political orientation was right-wing and there appear to 
have been early links with the Kuomintang.^ The Chung Hua Association 
assumed responsibility for organizing the celebration of China's 
national day and acted as an intermediary with government for Chinese 
groups or individuals possessing grievances. Although not so 
outspoken, it later shared the Hua Kheow Tshin Nien's favourable 
attitude to cession. Both groups had rejected the pre-war kapitan
1 Associations were registered for Kuching (25 May), Binatang 
(20 March), Bau (3 May), Penrissen Road 10th mile (11 June).
SGG3 16 May 1946, 1 June 1946, 17 June 1946.
2 Lockard, The Southeast Asian Town3 p.546.
3 Registered on 21 May 1946. SGG3 1 June 1946.
4 Lockard, The Southeast Asian Town3 p.504.
5 Ibid.
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system and were anxious to see it replaced with something which 
would not emphasize dialect-group differences. Unlike the pre-war 
Chambers of Commerce, their membership was not dominated by 
wealthy businessmen and they had been politicized to some extent by 
China's apparent emergence as a world power.
Chinese Nationalism
The defeat of Japan and the massive publicity accorded Chiang Kai 
Shek's Nationalist government by his American and British allies 
had a dramatic effect on the overseas Chinese. Victor Purcell has 
described the reactions of the Malayan Chinese, and those of the 
Sarawak Chinese appear to have been very similar. When Australian 
troops entered Kuching in September 1945 they found the streets 
lined with Chinese rather than British or Sarawak flags. In isolated 
places such as Saratok where the Chinese flag was raised immediately 
after the lowering of the Japanese flag ’in expectation of a Chinese 
landing and take-over', the local Ibans insisted that it be taken 
down and replaced by the Sarawak flag.^ There were similar native 
reactions to unrestrained Chinese enthusiasm in Simanggang and Betong.
After more than three years of silence about the progress
of the war, the sudden capitulation of Japan and the blaze of
publicity lauding Chiang Kai Shek for helping to bring this about
fired the patriotism of the Sarawak Chinese. From Singapore and
Hong Kong came lurid posters depicting Chiang leading his forces
to victory over the cowering Japanese. Chinese radio broadcasts
from a mysterious source in Singapore also proclaimed that Britain
was a spent force. Not surprisingly, there were many Chinese in
Sarawak who believed that China had defeated Japan and that the
atomic bomb amounted to no more than a coup de grace. All this
encouraged the idea, which may already have been latent in the minds
of some, that China would move to incorporate the Nan Yang
(South Seas), including the whole of Borneo, Malaya and the Dutch
2East Indies, as her territory. The occupation of northern Viet
1 Personal communciation from Mr Robert Nicholl, 20 October 1975.
2 Morris, MS memoir.
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Nam by N a t i o n a l i s t  a rm ie s  i n  August  1945 prompted  rumours i n  Malaya
and Sumatra  t h a t  C h inese  a r m i e s  would  l a n d  t h e r e ^  and i n  Sarawak
members o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  were f r e q u e n t l y  asked  ’when
2
t h e  C h inese  f o r c e s  would a r r i v e ’ . N a t i o n a l i s t  C h i n a ’ s power
and p o t e n t i a l  had been  so g r o s s l y  o v e r - s t a t e d  by A l l i e d  p r o p a g a n d a
t h a t  t h e  r e s p o n s e  o f  p a t r i o t i c  C h inese  can w e l l  be u n d e r s t o o d  and
t o  such  p e o p l e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  c e s s i o n  must  a t  f i r s t  have  seemed
a b s u r d .  The A u s t r a l i a n  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  Kuching and S ibu
found t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  C h inese  were  f r i e n d l y  and c o - o p e r a t i v e ,
t h e y  were  a l s o  v e ry  a n x io u s  t o  have  t h e i r  say  i n  q u e s t i o n s  o f  p o l i c y .
As one o f  t h e  'B i g  F o u r ' ,  t h e y  a l s o  saw t h e m s e lv e s  as  p a r t i c i p a t i n g
i n  t h e  A l l i e d  v i c t o r y .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  10 O c to b e r  was c e l e b r a t e d  i n
Kuching as  ' J o i n t  A l l i e d  V i c t o r y  & C h in e se  N a t i o n a l  D a y ' .  The
c e r e m o n i a l  d a i s  was d rap e d  w i t h  Kuomintang  as  w e l l  as  B r i t i s h  and
A u s t r a l i a n  f l a g s  and a number o f  C h in e s e  l e a d e r s  i n c l u d i n g  Ong T iang
3Swee gave s p e e c h e s  t o  t h e  a s se m b le d  crowd.  I n  a d d i t i o n  to  a lo n g
and s p e c t a c u l a r  p a r a d e ,  t h e  o r g a n i z i n g  comm it tee  a r r a n g e d  v a r i o u s
s p o r t i n g  f i x t u r e s ,  a d i n n e r  a t  Ong T iang  Swee ' s  h o u s e ,  a c o n c e r t  and
o t h e r  e v e n t s  o v e r  a t h r e e - d a y  p e r i o d .  The re  had  been  s i m i l a r
c e l e b r a t i o n s  a t  M i r i  on 21 Sep tem ber  where o f f i c i a l  p r o c e e d i n g s
4opened w i t h  t h e  s i n g i n g  o f  t h e  Kuomintang anthem.
A l l  t h i s  may have  seemed n a t u r a l  enough to  A u s t r a l i a n  
o f f i c e r s  who had  r e c e n t l y  a r r i v e d  i n  Sarawak ,  b u t  f o r  p r e - w a r  Brooke 
o f f i c e r s  t h e  a l t e r e d  demeanour  o f  t h e  C h inese  community was q u i t e  
s t a g g e r i n g .  C.D. Adams, a v e t e r a n  o f f i c e r  who had been  b r o u g h t  back  
from r e t i r e m e n t  by t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  t o  a s s i s t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  S i b u , c o u l d  n o t  g e t  u sed  to  t h e  changes  which  had 
t a k e n  p l a c e .  'T he  C h i n e s e ' ,  he  t o l d  Macask ie  i n  November,  ' g o t  on 
t h e i r  h i n d  l e g s  and t r i e d  t o  d i c t a t e  t h e  p o l i c y  as  r e g a r d s  
c o l l a b o r a t o r s  and r e f u s e d  t o  be  r u l e d  by Malay m a g i s t r a t e s  i n  f u t u r e ' .
1 P u r c e l l ,  The Chinese in Malaya_, p p . 2 6 3 - 4 .
2 I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  Mr R.H. M o r r i s ,  May 1976.
3 See P l a t e  XI I .
4 L t  G.H. F e a r n s i d e ,  e d . ,  Bayonets Abroad: A History o f  the 2/13th
Battalion A.I.F. in the Second World War . . . _, Sydney [1 9 5 3 ] ,  p . 4 0 5 .
5 Adams t o  M a cask ie ,  15 November 1945,  M acask ie  P a p e r s .  The 
m etaphor  i s  i l l u m i n a t i n g .
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L a t e r  t h a t  month he  com pla in ed  t h a t  t h e  C h inese  were h o a r d i n g  
r i c e ,  o f  which  th e y  had a g r e a t  d e a l  due t o  t h e  J a p a n e s e  s u c c e s s  
i n  e n c o u r a g i n g  p a d i - c u l t i v a t i o n , and were t r y i n g  t o  keep t h e  r e ­
i n t r o d u c e d  S t r a i t s  and Sarawak c u r r e n c y  a t  t h e  same l e v e l  as  
J a p a n e s e  o c c u p a t i o n  c u r r e n c y .  'They  have  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  China  i s  
one o f  t h e  Four  P o w e r s ' ,  he  com pla ined  ' [ a n d  t h a t ]  t h e y  have  t h e  
power t o  d i c t a t e ' .
Some months l a t e r  when two B r i t i s h  M.P .s  v i s i t e d  S ibu
2
t o  c o n s u l t  l o c a l  o p i n i o n  on c e s s i o n ,  t h e y  were met  w i t h  r e q u e s t s  f o r
c om pe nsa t ion  n o t  o n ly  f o r  t h e  damage ca u se d  by bombing b u t  f o r
t h e  $750,000 c o l l e c t e d  by t h e  J a p a n e s e  as  sook  c h in g  and t h e  $6 
, 3head  t a x  l e v i e d  l a t e r .  A d i r e c t  h i t  on t h e  S ibu  b a z a a r  by A l l i e d
bombers had c a u se d  t h e  d e a t h s  o f  150 p e o p l e .  But  w h i l e  t h i s  c o u ld
be a c c e p t e d  p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y  enough ,  c o m pe nsa t ion  and damage to
p r o p e r t y  was t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  e a r n e s t  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  by t h e  k a p i t a n
4
c h i n a ,  Teo Chong Lo, and a d i r e c t o r  o f  one o f  t h e  l o c a l  banks .
There were a l s o  c o n t i n u e d  a p p e a l s  t o  t h e  government  t o  buy back  a t  
p a r  J a p a n e s e  d o l l a r s  which  had  been  p ronounced  w o r t h l e s s .
The o t h e r  p r e - w a r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  were n o t  so  q u i c k  to  r e ­
e s t a b l i s h  t h e m s e lv e s  a l t h o u g h  t h e  P e r s a t u a n  Melayu was e v i d e n t l y  
s p u r r e d  on by t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  t a k e n  by t h e  C h in e s e .  I t s  commit tee  
members made t h e m s e lv e s  known t o  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  commander, B r i g a d i e r  
T.C.  E a s t i c k ,  and on 11 November th e y  o r g a n i z e d  a Sarawak Malay 
R e g a t t a  and Malay c u l t u r a l  show as  i f  i n  answer  to  t h e  Chinese  
d e m o n s t r a t i o n  o f  10 October."* The Per im pun  Dayak was u n d e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
by t h e  m i l i t a r y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  as  a c o l l a b o r a t i o n i s t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
and i t s  members were p r o b a b l y  happy t o  rem a in  o u t  o f  s i g h t .  I t  was n o t  
u n t i l  t h e  news o f  c e s s i o n  was r e c e i v e d  i n  e a r l y  F e b r u a r y  t h a t  t h e  
P e r s a t u a n  and t h e  Perimpun r e c e i v e d  t h e  f i n a l  s t i m u l u s  which  t r a n s f o r m e d
1 Adams to  M a c a s k ie ,  27 November 1945 ,  Macask ie  P a p e r s .
2 See C h a p te r  VI I .
3 B a r r e t t  D i a r y ,  10 May 1946.
4 I b i d .
5 Programme i n  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  S i r  Thomas E a s t i c k .
6 P e r s o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n .
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them from co-operative and uplift societies into political parties. 
However, the anxiety aroused among the Malays and the educated 
Ibans by the new assertiveness of the Chinese had already 
provided a common cause since the Japanese surrender.
.
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CHAPTER VI
The C l o s i n g  o f  Sarawak*s O p t i o n s ,  1942-45
THE J a p a n e s e  i n v a s i o n  o f  Sarawak i n  December 1941 was an e x t e r n a l l y  
imposed m o ra to r iu m  on t h e  a p p a r e n t l y  i n s o l u b l e  p rob lem s  o f  Brooke 
r u l e .  At t h e  same t i m e , i t  s t i m u l a t e d  c o m p e t i t i o n  among a number 
o f  c o n t e n d e r s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  p o s t - w a r  
Sarawak.  The R a j a h ' s  scheme,  a f t e r  an u n s u c c e s s f u l  a t t e m p t  t o  
r e t u r n  t o  t h e  s t a t e ,  was t o  e s t a b l i s h  a g o v e r n m e n t - i n - e x i l e  i n  
A u s t r a l i a  which  would a u t h o r i z e  him t o  t a k e  o v e r  t h e  r e m a in i n g  
r e s e r v e  funds  and wind up t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  l e a v i n g  Sarawak t o  t h e  
v i c t o r s .  T h i s  was a c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n  p e r f e c t l y  i n  k e e p in g  w i t h  h i s  
e a r l i e r  i n t e r e s t  i n  g i v i n g  up h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and making 
f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  h i s  im m ed ia te  f a m i l y .
Anthony Brooke a n t i c i p a t e d  t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  government  
would i n s i s t  upon a g r e a t e r  s a y  i n  S a r a w a k ' s  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  a f t e r  
t h e  war  and was p r e p a r e d  to  compromise t o  some e x t e n t .  He now 
a c c e p t e d  t h e  need  f o r  some fo rm o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i m i t a t i o n  which 
would p r e s e r v e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  Raj and s a t i s f y  t h e  demands 
o f  t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e .  When t h e  Ra jah  a p p o i n t e d  him head  o f  t h e  
P r o v i s i o n a l  Government  i n  e a r l y  1945 t o  t a k e  o v e r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
i n s t i t u t e d  by t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e ,  he  p r o b a b l y  had  h i g h  hopes  o f  
r e t u r n i n g  t o  Sarawak as  R a ja h .  But  t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  i n s i s t e d  
upon t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  F o r e i g n  J u r i s d i c t i o n  Act which  would 
r e d u c e  Brooke s o v e r e i g n t y  to  t h e  same s t a t u s  as  t h e  Malay r u l e r s .  
A n th o n y ' s  r e f u s a l  to  a c c e p t  t h i s  c o s t  t h e  Brooke d y n a s ty  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  s u r v i v i n g  as  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  monarchy.
As e a r l y  as  J a n u a r y  1944 t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  had d e c i d e d  
t h a t  N or th  Borneo s h o u ld  be annexed  and a new t r e a t y  n e g o t i a t e d  
w i t h  t h e  Rajah  o f  Sarawak empowering t h e  B r i t i s h  government  t o  
l e g i s l a t e  f o r  t h e  s t a t e  and e s t a b l i s h i n g  an A d v i s e r  s y s te m  l i k e  t h a t  
o f  t h e  U n f e d e r a t e d  Malay S t a t e s .  The War C a b in e t  was p e r s u a d e d  
to  a dop t  t h i s  p o l i c y  which  was i n h e r i t e d  by t h e  Labour  government  
i n  J u l y  1945.  The a r r a n g e m e n t  had i n i t i a l l y  assumed t h a t  t h e  
Brookes would remain  on as  f i g u r e h e a d s ,  l i k e  t h e  Malay r u l e r s ,
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but the Labour government was disinclined to countenance the 
survival of white rajahs in the post-war Empire.
One of the assumptions of the Colonial Office was that 
the post-war military administration of Borneo would be in British 
hands and that this would assist their bargaining position with the 
Rajah. When it became clear that Borneo was to be reoccupied by 
Australian troops and that the Australians were determined to 
dominate the military administration, there was some anxiety 
about Australian intentions. This, together with the unexpectedly 
early Japanese surrender, made it vital to break the deadlock which 
had developed in negotiations with the Provisional Government. 
Although little is known about the subsequent talks between the 
Rajah and the Colonial Office, it seems doubtful that he saw any 
option other than that of ceding his sovereignty.
While cession was probably more than the Colonial Office 
had originally envisaged in 1944, it was the logical outcome of 
their concern that Sarawak should be brought up to the level of 
British colonial administration in other territories and that 
Britain's Southeast Asian dependencies should be brought under 
tighter control. At the same time, it was the final expression of 
Vyner Booke's lack of faith in his nephew as Rajah.
#
The Rajah in Australia
When news came of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, the Rajah 
and MacBryan were approaching Brisbane. The Rajah immediately 
sought the assistance of the Australian government to return to 
Sarawak and on 16 December cabled Le Gros Clark:
I deeply regret not being with you in Sarawak to 
share this time of anxiety and trial through which 
you are now passing. I send you this message of 
good wishes and encouragement coupled with an 
expression of my full confidence that notwithstanding 
these days the tide will soon turn. I am 
hastening to return to Kuching to join you with
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the utmost speed possible and you may expect me 
to arrive in the near future.^
At the same time Pitt Hardacre, who was then visiting the Sarawak
Government Office in Sydney, asked the Chief Secretary to inform
the District Officer of Upper Sarawak that the Rajah would be
returning via Dutch Borneo and that appropriate arrangements were
2to be made accordingly. On 22 December the Rajah and MacBryan 
left Brisbane by air.
Reaching Surabaya on 25 December, they found that 
Kuching was already out of wireless contact and decided to go on to 
Bandoeng where Major General H. ter Poorten, Commander-in-Chief of 
the Dutch East Indies, had his headquarters. On 29 December ter 
Poorten told them that Kuching had fallen three days earlier but 
the Rajah was unwilling to believe that the Japanese had gained 
control of anything more than a few places on the coast. It was 
agreed that MacBryan should travel to the Dutch Borneo-Sarawak 
frontier with Colonel Gortman, a Dutch guerilla warf are expert, and 
make contact with native leaders with a view to organizing anti- 
Japanese resistance.
What happened subsequently is difficult to piece together 
accurately since the only account is in a letter from the Rajah 
to the British High Commissioner in Canberra, Sir Ronald Cross, 
which was almost certainly written by MacBryan on his return to 
Sydney in late January. However, it appears that the Rajah gave 
MacBryan a commission appointing him as his personal representative, 
together with secret verbal instructions to encourage those Sarawak 
officers who had escaped to accept Gortman's command of a guerilla 
resistance against the Japanese. As the Rajah told Cross:
... it was evident to me and to the General [ter 
Poorten] that the attitude of my Dayak subjects 
who comprise the backbone of the fighting 
population was one of vital importance to the
1 Vyner Brooke to Le Gros Clark, 16 December 1941, CA A981 
[Sarawak 2: Visit of Rajah].
2 Ibid. Upper Sarawak consisted of the Bau-Lundu district, 
south-west of Kuching.
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future because the time would come when we should 
take the offensive and their presence in the 
interior of Borneo as the most skilled jungle men 
in the world might well be invaluable as a strong 
pro British asset.^
When MacBryan arrived in Pontianak on 31 December he
found some of the escaped officers extremely sceptical of the
chances of enlisting Iban assistance. Those who had reached Dutch
Borneo through Iban areas had received the impression that the
Ibans had made a fairly realistic assessment of the military
position and were not prepared to throw away their lives against
superior arms. MacBryan was also the target for a good deal of
hostility when it was revealed that the Treasurer, B.A. Trechman,
had barely succeeded in preventing him from obtaining the authority
to draw on Sarawak state funds which had been brought from Kuching
2and deposited in the bank at Pontianak.
Undeterred by all this, MacBryan joined Gortman at
Sanggau Lidau, an airfield on the Dutch border of the First Division,
and it was there that he met up with the remnants of the 2/15th
Punjabis, commanded by Colonel C.M. Lane and a handful of Sarawak
officers. However, Lane had already been warned by a Sarawak
officer in Pontianak not to allow MacBryan through the Punjabi lines
3under any circumstances. Lane promptly arranged an intelligence 
4report on MacBryan and informed the Dutch that he was a suspected 
spy who was probably hoping to re-enter Sarawak for the purpose of 
cooperating with the Japanese. Singapore was informed and MacBryan 
was subsequently arrested on the request of Sir Shenton Thomas and 
sent back to Batavia under military guard. Although the Rajah was 
still in the capital, MacBryan was not permitted to communicate 
with him and after some days of fruitless questioning it was 
decided to send him on to Singapore for examination by the British 
authorities.
1 Vyner Brooke to Sir Ronald Cross, 31 January 1942, CO 531/30, 
[53079].
2 Interview with Mr B.A. Trechman, 4 March 1975.
3 Personal communication from Mr E.H. Elam, 6 July 1976.
4 ’Report on Mr G.T. MacBryan', Brooke Papers, Box 2/3.
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Lodged incommunicado in Changi prison, MacBryan had a 
piece of extraordinarily good fortune. Sir Roland Braddell, the 
prominent Singapore lawyer who had previously represented the Rajah, 
happened to be visiting Changi to interview a client and immediately 
took up MacBryan's case with the Colonial Secretary and Sir Shenton 
Thomas. Braddell appealed to the Governor to produce the evidence 
against MacBryan or release him and some days later the Rajah's 
Private Secretary found himself on a ship carrying civilian evacuees 
to Perth. From there he travelled to Sydney where the Rajah had 
temporarily installed himself.
The principal accusation levelled against MacBryan was 
that he had advised Japanese residents on the purchase of land 
adjacent to military posts and had extensive contacts with Japanese 
suspects. This prompted the suggestion in Lane's report that he was 
a Quisling on his way back to form a pup»pet Japanese state in Sarawak 
with himself as the head.'*' However, Le Gros Clark and J.L. Noakes 
went into the matter of MacBryan's Japanese contacts in late 1941 
and could find no evidence to support the suspicions held about him.^
In the atmosphere of the time it would not be surprising if the 
antagonism towards him within the Sarawak Service took on a somewhat 
hysterical character. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that MacBryan was indeed hatching such a plan. The idea of linking 
all the Southeast Asian Muslim states in some pan-Islamic confederation 
had always interested him and he may have seen the Japanese as 
providing the opportunity.
Whether such a plan was practical is another question.
It seems highly unlikely that the Japanese military authorities would 
have been eager to accept MacBryan's offer of assistance in organizing 
a new government, but if he did in fact make contact with Japanese 
espionage before the invasion then there may have been some basis 
for encouragement.
1 Ibid.
2 Personal communication from Mr J.L. Noakes, 8 October
1976. Col. Lane's report on MacBryan was largely the work of 
B.J.C. Spurway, the Rajah's former Private Secretary who had 
been replaced by MacBryan in early 1941. Spurway later had 
to make a formal retraction when MacBryan threatened legal 
action. MacBryan to Secretary of State
(Creech-Jones) 9 August 1949. Letter in the possession of
Mrs Frances Benn, MacBryan's third wife.
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MacBryan was certainly not the man to organize an 
indigenous resistance movement against the Japanese. He was by no 
means a military type and his real strength lay in political intrigue, 
principally among the Malays who were the least likely people to 
take part in a resistance movement. MacBryan would also have been 
made aware by those officers who had escaped from Sarawak that the 
Ibans were disinclined to take up arms against the Japanese 
Another possibility is that after the news of Pearl Harbour, MacBryan 
persuaded the Rajah to return to Sarawak and intervene with the 
Japanese when they arrived on behalf of the Sarawak people.^
This would appear to fit the Rajah’s earlier flirtation with the 
idea of neutrality and his later attempt in Australia to contact 
the Japanese authorities in Sarawak by means of the Argentinian 
Consul in Sydney.2
The Sarawak government had already established an office 
in Sydney with Pitt Hardacre in charge and it seemed to be the 
most obvious place for the government to re-group in exile, particularly 
since more than stg. £300,000 had been deposited there to the 
government's credit. The presence of four senior Sarawak officers 
(B.A. Trechman, T. Corson, C.E. Gascoigne and F.H. Pollard) in 
Australia also meant that the quorum of three members required by 
the 1941 Constitution for a sitting of the Supreme Council was 
available and it only remained to obtain permission from the 
Australian authorities and the Colonial Office. The establishment of 
the Council was of vital importance to the Rajah as under the 1941 
Constitution he needed its permission in order to draw on State funds.
In late January 1942 Corson wrote to the Minister for External Affairs, 
Dr H.V. Evatt, asking if there was any objection to the Rajah-in-Council 
sitting in Australia and continuing the functions of the Sarawak 
government. He claimed that this would not involve any change to 
existing relations between the Sarawak and British governments and 
the normal channel of communication through the British Agent
1 Personal communication from Mr C. Pitt Hardacre, 3 October 1976.
2 H.E. Jones (Controller of Commonwealth Investigation Branch) to 
Secretary, Dept, of External Affairs, 12 March 1942, 'Sarawak: 
Visit of the Rajah... to Australia', CA A981.
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would c o n t i n u e .  A c a b l e  t o  t h i s  e f f e c t  was s e n t  t o  S i r  Shen ton
Thomas f o r  t r a n s m i s s i o n  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e .  The A u s t r a l i a n
a u t h o r i t i e s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e y  had no o b j e c t i o n ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e
B r i t i s h  gove rnm en t  was a g r e e a b l e ,  b u t  i n  t h e  meant ime t h e  C o l o n i a l
O f f i c e  had l e a r n t  o f  t h e  p r o p o s a l  f rom t h e  Sarawak Government  Agent
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  a p p o in tm e n t  o f  P i t t  H a r d a c r e  as  S a r a w a k ' s
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i n  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  E a s t  I n d i e s  ' f o r  p u r p o s e  o f  l i a i s o n
2
w i t h  h e a d q u a r t e r s  o f  A l l i e d  Command'. B r i t a i n ' s  High Commiss ioner  i n
C a n b e r r a ,  S i r  Rona ld  C r o s s ,  was a c c o r d i n g l y  i n s t r u c t e d  t o  a s k  t h e
Ra jah  f o r  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  and t o  i n f o r m  him t h a t  unde r
t h e  t e rm s  o f  t h e  1888 T r e a t y ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  gove rnm en t  s h o u l d  be
c o n s u l t e d  on any p l a n  t o  e s t a b l i s h  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  government  o u t s i d e
3
Sarawak t e r r i t o r y .  In  t h e  v iew o f  Gent  and h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  t h e r e  
were g r a v e  d a n g e r s  i n  a l l o w i n g  t h e  Ra jah  t o  o p e r a t e  f r e e l y  from 
A u s t r a l i a .  The p r im a r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  was S a r a w a k ' s  
r e s e r v e s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom, amount ing  t o  a b o u t  $ 1 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,  which  
t h e  Rajah  might  w i s h  t o  t r a n s f e r  t o  A u s t r a l i a .  They were a l s o  
a p p r e h e n s i v e  o f  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  MacBryan, now w i t h  t h e  Ra jah  i n  
Sydney,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  r e p o r t s  
a bou t  him.  B e r t r a m  Brooke opposed  t h e  scheme from t h e  o u t s e t  and 
u rged  t h e  Rajah  t o  r e t u r n  t o  Eng land  i n s t e a d .  Even more f e a r f u l  o f  
M acBryan 's  i n f l u e n c e ,  he  may have  s u s p e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  would 
p e r s u a d e  t h e  Ra jah  t o  wash h i s  hands  o f  Sarawak once  and f o r  a l l .
I t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  w h e t h e r  B e r t r a m  c o o p e r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  C o l o n i a l  
O f f i c e  i n  a j o i n t  e f f o r t  t o  s a b o t a g e  t h e  Supreme C o u n c i l  p r o p o s a l ,  
b u t  t h e y  c e r t a i n l y  p o s s e s s e d  a  common i n t e r e s t  i n  g e t t i n g  t h e  
Ra jah  b a c k  t o  E ng la n d .
Cross  w r o t e  t o  t h e  Ra jah s e e k i n g  f u l l  d e t a i l s  o f  h i s  
4
p l a n s  b u t  i t  was a lm o s t  two months b e f o r e  he c o u ld  o b t a i n  a  r e p l y .
1 Corson t o  E v a t t ,  21 J a n u a r y  1942,  CO 531 /30  [ 5 3 0 0 1 /4 ] .
2 C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  t o  C r o s s ,  17 F e b r u a r y  1942,  i b i d .
3 I b i d .
4 Cross  t o  Vyner Brooke ,  12 March 1942,  i b i d .
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In the meantime the Rajah, who was now living in Melbourne, was 
becoming weary of the whole business of trying to set up an 
administration in Australia. In a letter to Bertram he told of his 
frustration:
All news of Sarawak shut up like a dam (and wireless 
news bottled) days before the Japs made an 
appearance. Our people didn't make much of a show but 
it is difficult to get facts till we hear more ...
I don't know what you think about the Council in 
Sydney. For all the good they do an agency would 
act just as well. Personally I think the Council 
or some such body should carry on in London not 
in Sydney. Sarawak is non est at present and I 
very much doubt if we ever get it back [sic] but if 
conditions return some time to anything like normal 
all the negotiations, carving up, parleying will be 
done in London and not in Sydney ...
Also a strong, Head Office might get a move on in 
London to try and get in touch with the unfortunate 
people in Sarawak either through Geneve [sic] or some 
neutral country. I am doing nothing here except mark 
time and boost the council. If you think I would be 
better employed in England I should be happy to move 
and tell the Council, as present constituted, to go 
to hell - a wire from you would be welcomed - if we 
get back to Sarawak, and if the people wish me back 
(wishful thinking!) I should only do so on my own 
terms and with complete powers. All red tape,
Councils, bureaucracy, etc. etc. to be completely 
eliminated. I am sure you will agree on this.l
Towards the end of April the Rajah told Sir Ronald Cross that the
decision to establish the Council in Australia was 'ill-conceived' and
2had been made under conditions of great anxiety. He had consequently 
decided to disband the Council and enclosed a copy of a cable to 
Bertram in which he set out a new proposal to appoint a Sarawak 
Commission in London as from 1 May 1942 consisting of A.A. Rennie,
H.D. Aplin, J.C. Swayne and J.A. Smith under the Tuan Muda's 
presidency. The new Commission, which was to function at the Sarawak 
Government Office at Millbank until the re-establishment of 
government in Sarawak, had as its principal responsibility the custody
1 Vyner Brooke to Bertram Brooke, 24 March 1942, ibid.
2 Vyner Brooke to Cross, 27 April 1942, ibid.
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of Sarawak’s reserve funds and the currency fund. The Rajah himself 
was to remain in Australia until the situation in the Pacific improved 
and would look after Sarawak’s interests in the area through the 
instrumentality of Pitt Hardacre. Stg.£100,000 was to be transferred 
to London but the remaining A£200,000 of Sarawak funds in Australia 
was to be retained under Pitt Hardacre's supervision.^"
Not surprisingly, the Secretary of State approved this new 
scheme but Anthony Brooke urged Gent not to take too optimistic a 
view of the Rajah's apparent amenability:
I hope that this gift horse hasn't got faulty teeth.
My impression is that either MacBryan's power is 
broken at last, in which case things are looking up 
and my father's letters to his brother have made a 
deep impression. Or - and I think this just as 
likely - MacBryan's influence can still make itself 
felt, and he has prevailed upon the Rajah to make 
this gesture to put those concerned in a good humour 
and to prepare the ground for a final appeal to my 
father for a sum of money which would enable the 
Rajah (and MacBryan) to retire gracefully from the 
Sarawak scene for ever.^
There were already grounds for scepticism, although Bertram Brooke did
not become aware of these until later. In early April the Rajah
wrote to Pitt Hardacre suggesting that since Bertram would probably
accept any proposals 'provided Mac. [Bryan] had no fingers in the pie',
MacBryan should cease to be Private Secretary but be kept on the
payroll. In order to allay his fears, Bertram was to be told that
the Rajah was 'fed up' with MacBryan and that the demise of the
3Supreme Council meant that there was no further need for him.
The Rajah's impatience with the Supreme Council can be 
more clearly understood if it is recognized that during the first few 
months of his stay in Australia he was endeavouring, no doubt with 
MacBryan's encouragement, to get his hands on Sarawak's reserve funds. 
Although there are no surviving records of the deliberations of the
1 Vyner Brooke to Bertram Brooke, 20 April 1942, ibid.
2 Anthony Brooke to Gent, 28 April 1942, ibid.
3 Vyner Brooke to Pitt Hardacre, 3 April 1942, Brooke Papers, 
Box 10/1.
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Supreme C ounc i l  i n  Sydney d u r i n g  t h a t  p e r i o d ,  t h e  e v i d e n c e  o f  
Thackw e l l  Lewis i s  q u i t e  c l e a r  on t h i s  p o i n t .  S h o r t l y  a f t e r  
a r r i v i n g  i n  Sydney t h e  J u d i c i a l  Commiss ioner  was shown a document  
which had been  s e n t  t o  t h e  C o u n c i l  by t h e  Ra jah :
I t  was q u i t e  s h o r t  and s p e a k i n g  from t h e  memory 
t h e  g i s t  o f  i t  was . . .  t h a t  t h e  Ra jah  had d e c i d e d  
t o  abandon t h e  S t a t e  which  c o u ld  be t a k e n  by e i t h e r  
t h e  B r i t i s h  o r  t h e  Dutch a f t e r  t h e  war .  He 
p r o p o s e d  i n  e f f e c t  t o  wind  up t h e  e x i s t i n g  m ach inery  
o f  S t a t e  and a f t e r  making a r r a n g e m e n t s  f o r  t h e  
payment  o f  p e n s i o n s  t o  assume c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  Sarawak 
Funds i n  E ng la n d .  When t h e  C o u n c i l  d e c l i n e d  t o  
c o n s i d e r  t h i s  s u g g e s t i o n  t h e  Rajah  w i r e d  f o r  t h i s  
p a p e r  t o  be  r e t u r n e d  t o  him i n  o r i g i n a l .  T h i s  was 
done b u t  n o t  u n t i l  a  copy had been  t a k e n  . . .
T h i s  made i t  c l e a r  t o  me t h a t  t h e  R a jah .  (1) Had 
no f u r t h e r  i n t e r e s t  i n  Sa rawak.  (2) Was s t i l l  ^ 
a n x io u s  t o  g e t  even  more money oi it  o f  t h e  S t a t e .
The C o u n c i l  was s u c c e s s f u l  i n  b l o c k i n g  t h i s  move a l t h o u g h
t h e  R a j a h ' s  r e a c t i o n  was to  d i s s o l v e  i t .  He c o n t i n u e d  t o  p onde r  o v e r
a means o f  g i v i n g  up h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and i n  a  number o f  l e t t e r s
t o  B e r t r a m  e x p r e s s e d  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  p o s t - w a r  s t a t u s  o f  Sarawak
s h o u l d  be d e c id e d  as  soon as  p o s s i b l e .  I n  June  1942 he  gave t h e
c l e a r  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  he  was l o o k i n g  f o r  a way o u t .  'T a k i n g  i t  by and
l a r g e ' ,  he t o l d  h i s  b r o t h e r ,  ' I  would  r a t h e r  r em a in  " p u t "  i n  England
i f  I  can do t h i s  u n o s t e n t a t i o u s l y  and h o n o u r a b l y .  Anyhow . . .  do
2
what  you can f o r  m e ' .  B e r t r a m  f e l t  s u r e  t h a t  i f  he  had  c a b l e d
a s k i n g  f o r  a u t h o r i t y  t o  commence n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  C o l o n i a l
O f f i c e  on t h e  f u t u r e  o f  Sa rawak,  t h e  Rajah  would have  a g r e e d  
3
im m e d i a t e l y .
For  some months t h e  R a ja h  c o o l e d  h i s  h e e l s  i n  Melbourne  
b u t  i n  Sep tem ber  he d e s p a t c h e d  P i t t  H a r d a c r e  to  London w i t h  a u t h o r i t y  
t o  conduc t  i m p o r t a n t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e .  No 
f u r t h e r  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  m i s s i o n  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  b u t  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  
i t  was c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  Sarawak f i n a n c e s  and t h e  R a j a h ' s  d e s i r e  to  have
1 Thackwell  Lewis t o  Anthony B rooke ,  27 F e b r u a r y  1946,  Brooke P a p e r s ,
Box 2 / 3 .
2 Vyner  Brooke t o  B e r t r a m  B rooke ,  20 June  1942,  c i t e d  by Ber tr am  
Brooke i n  h i s  l e t t e r  t o  P a s k i n , -  December 1943,  Brooke P a p e r s ,  Box 1 0 / 5 .
3 I b i d .
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MacBryan's name cleared^and that Pitt Hardacre was persuaded by
Bertram Brooke and the other members of the Commission not to carry
out the Rajah's instructions. On his way back to Australia, Pitt
Hardacre spent some weeks in Cairo and Jeddah in connection with
an Allied intelligence plan to use Indonesians stranded in the
2Middle East as agents in the archipelago. Frustrated in his second 
attempt to reach a financial settlement and irritated by what he 
regarded as Pitt Hardacre's disobedience, the Rajah dismissed him 
as Government Agent in Sydney, appointing Gascoigne in his place 
and MacBryan as 'Confidential Agent for the South-West Pacific' .
Although the Supreme Council in Sydney and the Colonial
Office and Sarawak Commission in London had thwarted the Rajah's
plans to gain control of Sarawak's assets, there were still
considerable difficulties under the new arrangement. While being
responsible for the administration of Sarawak funds in England, the
Commission was obliged to transmit substantial sums to the Rajah
without having any information about their use. Angered by the
vagueness of Vynerh reports on expenditure and by the news of
MacBryan's re-installation, Bertram Brooke wrote to him in November
1942 pointing out that with regard to Sarawak's finances he had a
responsibility to the British government as well as to the Rajah and
Sarawak, and if these proved incompatible he would have to resign
3
as head of the Commission. Subsequently he went to see Paskin at 
the Colonial Office and discussed the possibility of writing an 
official letter to the Secretary of State. Now that MacBryan had 
been appointed as the Rajah's 'Confidential Agent for the South-West 
Pacific', he feared that as with the 1941 constitution the Rajah 
would make some vital decisions without consulting him. However, 
Vyner had indicated that he would return to England in February and 
Bertram no doubt hoped that it would still be possible to undo any 
damage.
1 Personal communication from Mr C. Pitt Hardacre, 27 October 1976.
2 See Chapter IV, p.l44n.
3 Bertram Brooke to Aplin - July 1943, Brooke Papers,
Box 2/3.
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The Colonial Office was also concerned about Sarawak
finances since all available funds would be needed to defray the
cost of the Borneo Planning Unit, the military administration and
post-war reconstruction in the State. Consequently, Aplin was given
a sympathetic hearing by Paskin when he came to the Colonial Office
in May 1943 to seek its views on the situation. However, the Rajah
was due to return in July and it was apparently decided that nothing
could be resolved until then. In the meantime, Bertram and the
members of the Commission prepared a letter to the Rajah criticizing
a number of charges on Sarawak's reserves which the Rajah had
authorized in Australia and the Colonial Office was given the clear
impression that the Commission was heading for a final 'showdown'
with him. Shortly after the Rajah's arrival, Bertram spent some
time with him discussing the vexed question of finances and it was
agreed that the Commission would be authorized to review all
expenditure for the war period, making retrenchments wherever necessary.
The Colonial Office was happy with this arrangement which it saw as
reducing the chances of the Rajah 'frittering away the resources of
2his Government ...'.
Anthony Brooke's Early Talks with the Colonial Office
Anthony Brooke arrived in England in mid-January 1942 and volunteered
for active service but it was more than two months before he was
called up. In the meantime, it seemed a good opportunity to consider
Sarawak's future relationship with Britain and, with his father's
permission, to make his views known to the Colonial Office. 'Once
in the army', he wrote to Margery Perham, 'it is unlikely that I
shall be able to take part in any discussions regarding the position
of Sarawak in the post-war world, until after the war, by which
3time the matter will probably have been settled'. He was also 
conscious of the possibility that his outspoken letters about the
1 Aplin to Paskin, 8 July 1943, CO 531/31/1 [53077].
2 Monson to G.H.B. Chance [Treasury], 28 July 1943, ibid.
3 Anthony Brooke to Margery Perham, 7 April 1942, Brooke Papers, 
Box 12/1.
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Constitution might have created an unfavourable impression in the 
Colonial Office.
In early March he visited Gent for an exchange of 
personal views. Anthony told him that he recognized the need to 
protect the people of Sarawak from autocratic and undesirable 
actions by their rulers, but that the responsibility should remain 
vested in the Brookes as their subjects expected. While a new 
agreement between Sarawak and Britain could provide an improved 
basis for cooperation, the Rajahs of the future should be left with 
’the fullest measure of freedom to act in internal affairs short 
of the power to abuse it with impunity’.^  He then suggested that a 
new agreement could be based on the following principles:
1. The agreement to be supplementary to the Treaty 
of Protection, 1888.
2. The recruitment of officers to serve under the 
Government of Sarawak to be effected by the
Raj all in copperation with, or with the approval 
of, His Majesty’s Government. (This would not, 
however, limit the right of the Rajah to appoint 
non-Europeans residing in his State to duties 
under the Government of Sarawak).
3. The chief administrative post under the Rajah 
to be filled by an officer appointed by the 
Rajah subject to the approval of His Majesty’s 
Government. Any such officer appointed with 
the cooperation of His Majesty’s Government from 
the Colonial Service would be deemed to be 
seconded to the Sarawak Government for the period 
of his appointment, which would normally be of 
not less than two years duration. (It is 
suggested that this provision be worded so as
to meet the possibility of His Majesty's 
Government agreeing at some future date 
to the appointment of an officer of the 
Sarawak Civil Service in whom it might have 
confidence).
4. In the event of the Rajah exercising his right under 
the Constitution of Sarawak to act contrary to the
1 Anthony Brooke to Gent, 6 April 1942, Brooke Papers, 
Box 13/1.
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advice of his Executive Council (known under the 
present Constitution as the Supreme Council), he 
must forthwith inform the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies of the action taken, at the 
same time transmitting a detailed report giving 
full reasons for his decision."^
While acknowledging that political developments in Sarawak during
1941 had made the Supplementary Agreement 'both desirable and
inevitable', he felt that it might eventually have led to an
undesirable duality in administrative control. He now conceded that
there should be a constitution, although not one which 'vests
responsibility in the hands of a continually changing oligarchy,
2as is the position at present'. The fourth provision would 
ensure that future Rajahs would act reasonably and responsibly and 
there would be an arrangement for reports to be made on any matter 
about which the British government required information. He could 
not guarantee that these 'tentative proposals' would necessarily 
have the support of the Rajah or of his father but hoped that they 
might still form the basis for post-war discussions.
Bertram Brooke regarded his son's views as 'in the main 
as generally sound as any others might be', but in a letter to 
Anthony he expressed strong opposition to any explicit delimitation 
of relations between the two countries:
My view ... is that this cannot be achieved with 
any satisfaction to either party, and unless an 
agreement is a very loose one, with both parties 
determined to carry out much of what is left 
to the imagination in the spirit of mutual 
cooperation there's going to be trouble anyhow, 
and the more details there are, the more wrangling 
there is likely to be as to whether different 
interpretations are 'legally' sound or not.3
Conveying this to Gent, Anthony emphasized that a great deal 
depended on the goodwill of the Ruler. Some kind of new agreement was
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Cited by Anthony Brooke in his letter to Gent, 23 April 1942, 
CO 531/30 [53011/4].
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n e c e s s a r y ,  he  acknow ledged ,  ' t h o u g h  no R u l e r  i n  h i s  s e n s e s ,  who 
c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y  w i s h e s  t o  do t h e  b e s t  f o r  h i s  S t a t e ,  would w ish  to  
r e l i n q u i s h  more freedom t h a n  he  must. ' '*"
Gent  was s y m p a t h e t i c  t o  t h e  p r o p o s a l s  and a g r e e d  t h a t
i t  was p r e f e r a b l e  t o  have  one government  i n  Sa rawak,  ' p r o v i d e d  t h a t
. . .  [ i t ]  was i n s p i r e d  i n  i t s  t a s k  by B r i t i s h  i d e a l s ,  was p r e p a r e d
to  a v a i l  i t s e l f  o f  t h e  b e s t  m a t e r i a l  [men] to  c a r r y  them o u t ,  and
was p r e p a r e d  t o  l e a r n  c o n t i n u a l l y  f rom de ve lopm en ts  i n  o t h e r  B r i t i s h
C o lo n ie s  and P r o t e c t o r a t e s ' .  He t o l d  Anthony t h a t  S a r a w a k ' s
o u t s t a t i o n  o f f i c e r s  were  h i g h l y  r e g a r d e d  by t h e  C o l o n i a l  S e r v i c e  and
2
t h a t  t h e r e  was ' no  i n t e n t i o n  t o  p r o p o s e  a t o t a l  a m a l g a m a t i o n ' .
For  a l l  h i s  show o f  c o n f i d e n c e ,  however ,  Anthony was w e l l
aware t h a t  t h e  e v e n t s  o f  1941 had  b r o u g h t  down t h e  s t o c k s  o f  t h e  Raj
and t h a t  i t  m igh t  n o t  s u r v i v e  t h e  w a r .  While  he had  a lways r e g a r d e d
S a r a w a k ' s  s y s te m  o f  government  as  s u p e r i o r  t o  t h a t  o f  N or th  Borneo ,
he t o l d  Margery Perham, he had  t o  admi t  t h a t  t h e  b u s i n e s s  o f  t h e
R a j a h ' s  $ 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  s u g g e s t e d  t h e r e  was so m e th in g  v e r y  s e r i o u s l y  wrong.
I f  t h e  Rajah  by t h i s  means had  l o s t  t h e  p e o p l e ' s  c o n f i d e n c e  t o  t h e
p o i n t  t h a t  t h e  Brooke f a m i ly  was no l o n g e r  w a n te d ,  'more harm than
good would c l e a r l y  be  done by t h e  r e t u r n  to  Sarawak o f  e i t h e r  my
f a t h e r  o r  m y s e l f  (one can s a f e l y  assume t h a t  my u n c l e  w i l l  r e t i r e  -
3
o r  a b d i c a t e  -  on h i s  r a t h e r  p r i c k l y  l a u r e l s )  ' . A l though  am a lgam a t ion  
w i t h  B ru n e i  and N or th  Borneo had  be e n  s u g g e s t e d  i n  t h e  p a s t ,  he 
t h o u g h t  i t  n e i t h e r  n e c e s s a r y  n o r  d e s i r a b l e .  Defence  and economic  
c o o p e r a t i o n  were i m p o r t a n t ,  he  c o n c ed e d ,  b u t  any a t t e m p t  a t  
amalgam ation  would n o t  conform w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  A t l a n t i c  
C h a r t e r  and t h e  A n g l o - S o v i e t  Agreement  u n l e s s  i t  were  on t h e  b a s i s  
o f  d i s c u s s i o n s  be tw een  Sa rawak,  B r u n e i  and N or th  Borneo .
Tak ing  up t h e  same theme i n  a l e t t e r  t o  Gent ,  he  r e p e a t e d  
t h e  a rgum ents  p u t  fo rw a r d  by h i s  f a t h e r  i n  1931 a g a i n s t  d e m e n t i ' s  
scheme f o r  a ' B r i t i s h  Borneo '  f e d e r a t i o n ,  an i d e a  which  he t h o u g h t
1 I b i d .
2 C i t e d  by Anthony Brooke i n  h i s  l e t t e r  t o  Margery Perham,
7 A p r i l  1942,  Brooke P a p e r s ,  Box 1 2 / 1 .
3 Anthony Brooke t o  Margery Perham, 8 J u l y  1942,  Brooke P a p e r s ,  
Box 1 3 / 1 .
264
might be resurrected now that the future of the three territories was 
in question. The essence of Brooke rule, as he saw it, was the 
status of the Rajah in the eyes of the natives. ’So long as there 
is a white Rajah in Sarawak', he wrote, ’he must shoulder his 
inherent responsibility to the people of being supreme within the 
State and there is yet to be put forward any argument which can 
shake this view ...’  ^ As for the argument that a federation under 
the Governor of the Straits Settlements would have the advantage 
of 'administrative convenience’, he believed that it was Singapore’s 
very distance from Sarawak which had preserved the Rajah’s position 
as 'the actual, and not merely titular, Rule of the State'.
The Colonial Office and Borneo Planning
Planning for the post-war military administration of Britain's Far
Eastern Colonies and dependencies was under way by early 1942 and
in February 1943 the Colonial Office initiated talks which led
to the creation of a Colonial Office - War Office Malayan Planning
Committee, formally constituted in July as the Malayan Planning Unit
under the direction of Major-General H.R. Hone. Since it was clear
that the Unit's authority would only be effective within the limits
of Britain's South-East Asia Command (SEAC), it was necessary to
establish another organization for the Borneo territories which were
within the American South-West Pacific Area (SWPA) command. It was
assumed that a suitable arrangement would be duly made with the
Americans under the charter of the Anglo-American Combined Civil
Affairs Committee set up in Washington in July 1943. This provided
that when an enemy-occupied territory was to be recovered by an
Allied operation, the directives given to the force commander should
include 'the policies to be followed in the handling of Civil Affairs
as formulated by the government which exercised authority over the
2
territory before enemy occupation'. The fact that the Sarawak 
government had previously exercised authority over Sarawak was 
apparently regarded as immaterial.
1 Anthony Brooke to Gent, 24 July 1942, CO 531/30 [53011/4].
2 Cited by F.S.V. Donnison, British Military Administration in The 
Far East 1943-463 London 1956, p.146.
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The Borneo Planning Unit was established within the 
Colonial Office and was staffed with civilians. C.F.C. Macaskie, 
who had been on leave at the time of the Japanese invasion of North 
Borneo, was appointed as head of the Unit and Chief Civil Affairs 
Officer designate for Borneo in October 1943 with instructions to 
build up its staff to a strength of about fifteen. Since the 
disposal of the reserve funds of North Borneo and Sarawak was not 
within the authority of the British government, the cost of the Unit 
was borne by the British Treasury on the assumption that a claim 
for reimbursement could later be made on both the Chartered Company 
and the Rajah.^ Policy from the outset envisaged a single civil 
affairs administration bringing Sarawak, Brunei, Labuan and North 
Borneo under centralized control.
For Gent and his colleagues the war provided the long-
awaited opportunity to overhaul the administrative structure of
Britain's Far East dependencies. On 22 January 1944, probably on
Gent's instigation, the Secretary of State for Colonies in the
2National Government, Colonel Oliver Stanley, persuaded a meeting of
the War Cabinet to appoint a committee on the constitutional future
of Malay and the Borneo territories. In a memorandum which he
3presented on the occasion, again almost certainly the work of Gent 
and his colleagues, Stanley suggested the guidelines which the 
British government should follow. As far as Malaya was concerned, 
'the interests of efficiency and security' required 'the closer 
integration of both ... legislative and administrative arrangements 
...'. And in the 'novel conditions' which would exist on Britain's 
liberation of Malaya this integration could be achieved without the 
'lengthy process' which the earlier supporters of decentralization
1 Ibid, p.145.
2 Stanley had an impressive career before going to the Colonial 
Office. Becoming an M.P. in 1924, he was Minister of Transport, 
1933-34; Minister of Labour, 1934-35; President of Board of 
Education 1935-37 and Secretary of State of War, 1940-42.
3 'Future Constitutional Policy For British Colonial Territories 
In South-East Asia', 14 January 1944, C.M.B. (44) 3, War 
Cabinet Records, PRO CAB 98. Subsequent quotations from this 
source.
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and recentralization had envisaged. Finally, the responsibility 
for coordination of political, economic and social development and 
the representation of British government interests in any regional 
council to be set up by the United Nations for the area was to be 
entrusted to a British ’Governor-General* for Malaya and Borneo.
As for the Borneo territories, the main object of policy 
was to ensure that in future ’their machinery of government is of 
such a character as will conduce to their social and political 
development in conformity with our general Colonial policy'. 
Consequently it was envisaged that Britain would acquire from the 
Chartered Company the sovereignty of North Borneo which would then be 
united with Labuan under a single governor with 'a local Executive 
and Legislative Council'. The Sultan of Brunei was to be ’invited' 
to cede sufficient jurisdiction to the Crown to allow for the 
application of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. A similar 'invitation' 
was to be issued to the Rajah of Sarawak since it was 'most desirable 
that His Majesty's Government should be placed in a position to 
exercise effective control over the administration'. It was felt 
that at this point there was no basis for a closer union of the 
Borneo territories but that a 'community of policy' could be 
assured by the responsibility of the Governor of North Borneo and 
Labuan and the British Advisers in Brunei and Sarawak to the 
Governor-General in Singapore.
In a draft directive on policy for Borneo which he 
presented at the same time, Stanley was more specific about the 
treaty which was to be negotiated with the Rajah 'at the earliest 
possible opportunity'. As well as enabling the British Crown to 
legislate for Sarawak under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, the 
treaty was to provide for a resident British Adviser 'whose advice 
must be sought and acted upon in all substantial matters of policy 
and administration'.^ Commenting on the directive, Stanley said 
that he did not expect either the Rajah or the Sultan to 'raise
1 'Draft Directive On Policy In Borneo', 18 January 1944, 
C.M.B. (44) 6, ibid.
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any difficulties' over the cession of their jurisdiction to the 
Crown.
The Committee on Policy in Malaya and Borneo which was 
subsequently appointed held two meetings and in its final report 
to the War Cabinet in May it supported the policy as outlined in 
Stanley's draft directive for Borneo of January. When Cabinet 
endorsed the report at the end of month, it became official policy.
This blueprint for the post-war future of Britain's 
Southeast Asian dependencies was drawn up at a time when the Japanese 
still had complete control of the area and when plans were being 
made for the daunting task of liberation. Consequently it would be 
surprising if strategic considerations did not loom large in the 
minds of the Colonial Office planners. It was important that the 
Malay States, the Straits Settlements and British Borneo should 
come within a single defence framework in case of any future external 
attack and that their peoples should possess more of a stake in 
resisting such an attack than they had in late 1941. At this point 
the potential of Malay and Indonesian nationalism in resisting the 
re—imposition of British and Dutch control does not seem to have 
been seriously considered. Far more important to Gent and his 
colleagues was the possibility of American disapproval and the need 
to pre-empt any international action which might make the restoration 
of imperial control more difficult. The idea of a regional council 
for Southeast Asia had itself been the British government's sole 
concession to American (and possibly Australian) interest in the 
area post-war.
At the same time, the Japanese invasion had created a 
long-awaited opportunity for the bureaucratic reorganization and 
recentralization which had been in the air since dementi's 
proposals. The question of negotiating new treaties with the Malay 
rulers had been somewhat problematical in the early 1930's. But 
with a British military administration taking over control after a 
glorious British defeat of the Japanese invaders, the climate would
1 Minutes of the first meeting of War Cabinet Committee on 
Malaya and Borneo, 22 March 1944, C.M.B. (44), ibid.
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be more favourable. If there was any resistance from the rulers, 
the question of collaboration with the Japanese would be sufficient 
to reduce them to acquiescence. No problems were envisaged with 
the Borneo states. Both the Chartered Company and the Rajah had 
earlier indicated their willingness to sell out and the Sultan of 
Brunei would agree to whatever the British Resident 'advised .
As Conservative Secretary of State in the coalition 
government, Oliver Stanley was no doubt of Churchill's view that the 
war was not being fought so that Britain could preside over the 
dissolution of the Empire. Beyond this, however, it is difficult 
to detect his personal influence in the proposal which was finally 
accepted by the War Cabinet. Consequently it seems reasonable to 
suggest that the 1944 blueprint was essentially the product of 
strategic and bureaucratic considerations as viewed by the Colonial 
Office and the War Office and possessed little relation to British 
party politics beyond the general desire to preserve the British 
Empire. This was the policy which was inherited by the Labour 
government in July 1945.
When F.W. Pollard, a senior administrative officer and the 
Rajah's cousin, arrived from Australia in October 1943 he discovered 
that the Rajah had nominated him for the Unit whose Sarawak section 
he was supposed to head. But on learning that the plan was to 
administer Sarawak, Brunei, Labuan and North Borneo jointly, he 
immediately suspected that this was a product of political rather 
than military considerations. He told Macaskie that from a military 
point of view there would be much more contact between Sarawak and 
Dutch Borneo, particularly in the Kuching—Pontianak area, than between 
Sarawak and North Borneo. He also expressed surprise that there 
was to be no liaison with the Dutch with whom he had had a good 
deal of contact during his time with SWPA Intelligence in Australia. 
Macaskie could only plead 'military necessity' and Gent told him the 
same story. Pollard was obliged to accept this, but he indicated that 
he would prefer to remain on the Sarawak government payroll while 
working with the Unit. When Paskin told him that it was not possible
1 The subsequent account is based on a memorandum by Pollard of 
5 November 1944, now in the possession of his sister, Mrs 
Hilary Waddington.
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for him to continue as a member of the Sarawak Government Commission 
since his work with the Unit would involve access to ’documents 
affecting the political position of Sarawak', Pollard replied that he 
would not accept any appointment which would prevent him from 
expressing his views on the future of Sarawak. Consequently it was 
agreed that no decisions involving Sarawak would be made by the 
Colonial Office until his views were obtained. But Pollard was 
still worried and it was only after an assurance from Bertram Brooke 
that nothing was being contemplated by the Colonial Office to which 
he could take exception that he finally agreed to accept the post.
Other Sarawak officers recruited by Macaskie were C.F. Birt, D.L. Leach, 
C.E. Gascoigne and R.G. Talbot.
Only six weeks later, however, Macaskie showed Pollard 
the Colonial Office proposal on the future of British Borneo 
which were about to be submitted to the War Cabinet for approval.
When Pollard said that he proposed to write a memorandum setting out 
the ’obvious objections' to the proposal, Macaskie went into reverse.
He told Pollard that he had not really possessed the authority to 
show him the document and that there could be no comment from 
Pollard until his opinion was sought officially. Pollard’s suspicions 
were further increased when he saw a minute by Paskin suggesting that 
the military administration should be maintained, even if the 
American SWPA commander thought it no longer necessary, until the 
proposed new treaty had been signed. In such a case, the military 
administration would continue under the Malayan Commander-in-Chief 
and it would be justified by the need to maintain a unified 
administration due to shortage of staff and greater access to 
supplies through Service channels. Pollard immediately wrote an 
angry minute in which he described the plan as 'remarkably like 
extortion', but this apparently was not forwarded by Macaskie to the 
Colonial Office. In June 1944 the Colonial Office proposal reached 
Pollard officially but by this time it had been approved by the War 
Cabinet Committee and was now to constitute the basis for the 
Borneo Planning Unit's work. Pollard protested to Macaskie and 
sought a meeting with Paskin who was under the impression that 
Pollard had already seen the document and found it unobjectionable.
The question of a military commission once again raised 
the problem in Pollard’s mind of conflicting loyalties. What was 
he to do if the policy of the military administration contravened 
his notion of Sarawak’s interests? Gent reassured Pollard that 
there was no intention of placing him in a position where he would 
have to act in any way contrary to Sarawak’s interests. He also 
outlined the Colonial Office's strategy:
He [Gent] explained to me that there was no intention 
of getting the Rajah to sign an amendment to the 
treaty now as he had replied to the Secretary of 
State that he had no power to do so without reference 
to the people. The intention now was to get the Rajah 
to agree in principle, if necessary under pressure, 
and then, during the period of Military Administration, 
to send^someone out to obtain the consent of the 
people.
In the ensuing discussion, which foreshadowed the talks
between the Provisional Government and the Colonial Office of early
1945, Pollard told Gent that he could not possibly stand aside and
'leave some unnamed person to go through the motions of ascertaining
public opinion on the subject ...’ He regarded the proposal to
negotiate a new treaty while Sarawak was still under military
control as 'a proceeding more in keeping with Nazi ideas than the
2ideals for which this war was allegedly being fought.' When Gent
indicated that the first British Adviser under the new treaty
would be selected from the Sarawak Service, Pollard said that he
could not imagine any Sarawak officer 'worth his salt' accepting a
post in such a situation. Nor, under the circumstances, could he
remain with the Borneo Planning Unit which he now saw as 'an
instrument for carrying out the policy of H.M.G. regardless of the
interest or the wishes of the people of Sarawak and without any
3reference to the Sarawak Government Commission.' On 2 October 1944 
Pollard told Bertram Brooke what had happened and obtained his 
permission to resign and return to the Sarawak Commission.
1 Pollard memorandum, 5 November 1944.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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Gent's strategy seems to have been to neutralize the 
Sarawak Commission by recruiting its outstanding members into the 
Unit where they would be bound to secrecy. However, he did not 
count on Pollard's fierce determination and his willingness to 
sacrifice a substantially higher salary for his principles. 
Macaskie's opinion, as expressed in his autobiography twenty years 
later, was that Pollard had been an unfortunate choice as head of 
the Sarawak section of the Unit. His outlook, Macaskie believed, 
was far too 'insular' for him to be really useful.'*' In other words, 
Pollard had put the interests of the Brooke Raj before those of 
Empire.
The Borneo Planning Unit continued its work in the 
belief that the military administration of the three Borneo states 
would be under British control. Between May and July 1944 the 
Colonial Office and the War Office prepared a joint memorandum on 
the administration of Borneo and Hong Kong which was then submitted 
to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in Washington and accepted 
as a statement of policy under clause 6 of the July 1943 charter. 
The essence of this policy was that Borneo and Hong Kong should be 
the responsibility of a civil affairs staff consisting mainly of 
British officers and that instructions issued to Force Commanders 
should take account of this. Under a further arrangement drawn up 
in March 1945, known as the Cranborne Agreement, the Combined 
Civil Affairs Committee approved the principle that the Chief Civil 
Affairs Officer for Borneo should be responsible to the War Office 
in London as well as to the Allied Commander of SWPA:
It is intended that the Chief Civil Affairs Officer,
British Borneo, should also give such advice as may 
be necessary concerning His Majesty's Government's 
long-term plans for reconstruction, in order that, 
as far as possible, the measures of the military 
administration may be coordinated. He should at 
the discretion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, 
while keeping the latter, or the military 
commanders designated by him, informed, be 
authorised to communicate direct with London on 
questions which do not affect the Allied Commander-
1 Macaskie, 'End of an Era ...', p.126.
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in-Chief’s responsibilities for the military 
administration of British Borneo.^
There is no indication that the question of Sarawak’s 
future was raised at an official level between London and Canberra. 
The Australian government’s reluctance to become involved in 
civil affairs administration of the four Borneo territories had 
been clear from the outset. But Gent and his colleagues in the 
Colonial Office through their contacts with Macaskie and other 
British officers were keenly aware of efforts to keep the 
administration in Australian hands. Nor could they afford to 
ignore the disturbing rumour reported to them from Inglebum and 
elsewhere that Australia intended to have the Borneo territories. 
British control of the civil affairs apparatus was absolutely vital 
to the Colonial Office's planned takeover of Sarawak and North 
Borneo. And while this cannot yet be documented, it seems highly 
likely that anxiety about Australian intentions, together with some 
expectation of American disapproval, influenced the speed with which 
negotiations were concluded with the Rajah and MacBryan’s mission 
arranged.^
The Initiation of Formal negotiations on Sarawak 's Future
In June 1944 the Secretary of State for Colonies, Colonel Oliver
Stanley, had written to the Rajah that in view of the progress of the
war it was time to discuss the relationship between the British
government and Sarawak. Explaining that public opinion in Britain
and Allied countries would hold Britain responsible for the policies
followed in the future development of the State, he expressed a
desire to meet the Rajah and any members of the Sarawak Government
Commission for discussions on the terms of a new relationship more in
keeping with future circumstances. ’... The existing agreements
...’, Stanley told the Rajah, ’do not sufficiently provide His
Majesty's Government with the means to discharge fully the
3responsibilities which will thus be placed upon them ...’
1 Cited by Donnison, British Military Administration . . . _, p.146.
2 See Appendix III.
3 The Facts About Sarawak3 p.76.
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Rather than reply directly, the Rajah sent the Sarawak 
Government Agent, H.D. Aplin, to meet Gent at the Colonial Office.
After questioning Aplin's authority to represent the Rajah, Gent 
explained that the Secretary of State’s intention was to appoint a 
British Representative in Sarawak to advise on political, social and 
economic affairs. This meant that the King would have jurisdiction 
in Sarawak's internal affairs and it was therefore necessary to 
alter the 1888 Treaty or make a new one. The Supplementary Agreement 
reached in September 1941 had not gone far enough to accommodate 
the planned extension of British authority. At the same time, Gent 
told Aplin that the King would not exercise his new authority by 
issuing Orders-In-Council 'unless as an extreme measure'. The 
position would be as in North Borneo where the King possessed the same 
power but had not exercised it beyond an Order-In-Council establishing 
an Admiralty Prize Court. When Aplin asked if Sarawak would be reduced 
to the position of a 'Native State', Gent reassured him that this would 
not be so. Sarawak,he said, possessed competent European officers 
who were capable of running its government properly.^"
After reading Aplin's reports on the meeting with Gent, the 
Rajah wrote to Stanley telling him that while 'nothing but good' 
could come from a closer liaison between the two governments, he 
thought that there could be no change in their mutual relationship as 
long as Sarawak, 'owing to the unavoidable inability of the Protecting 
Power to preserve them from invasion', was under alien rule. If he 
entered into a new agreement at this time, he emphasized, his right 
to do so would 'almost certainly be challenged in the future with 
embarrassing results to myself and possibly to His Majesty's 
Government’. He would also be in the position of binding his 
successor to a form of government which, due to age, he would have 
no chance of putting personally into effect. He was willing to return 
to Sarawak for a short time after the reoccupation if it was thought 
desirable, but regarded his rule as effectively coming to an end:
1 Aplin's official and personal reports to Vyner Brooke, 25 July 
1944, Hussey papers [66735].
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... I feel that the future must be with those 
who have the physical vigour not only to make 
a fresh start, but to continue firmly along 
such lines as will ensure internal peace 
within the State.^
It took Stanley a month to reply to this polite rebuff
but he was determined to persist. While appreciating the Rajah’s
reluctance to make a fresh agreement in the existing circumstances,
he felt that it was still possible ’to consider the lines on which
it would be desirable for the relations between His Majesty's Government
2and Sarawak to be developed’. He therefore asked the Rajah for the 
names of representatives who would take part in initial discussions 
and the Rajah in turn indicated that the Tuan Muda would best fulfil 
this role:
He is an old friend both of Major Gent and Mr 
Paskin. I think these gentlemen would be able 
to assure anyone you nominate that he is in the 
habit of always saying exactly what is in his 
mind.
I can also say that I feel sure the family 
position of his son, A.W.D. Brooke, would not 
in any way bias his views as to steps for the 
future that should be taken in the interests of 
the people of the State.
Agreeing to this arrangement, Stanley used a phrase which Anthony 
Brooke later regarded as epitomizing the Colonial Office's intentions 
and methods. 'I feel sure’, the Secretary of State told the Rajah,
'that this will put us on the path of an understanding as to how 
we shall march together in the future'.^
When Bertram Brooke met Gent in early October he conceded 
that there would have to be changes after the war and that the 
Secretary of State's responsibility for Sarawak in Parliament 
necessitated some influence in the state's administration. However,
1 Vyner Brooke to Stanley, 3 August 1944, The Facts About Sarawak^ 
p. 78.
2 Stanley to Vyner Brooke, 4 September 1944, Hussey Papers [66735].
3 Vyner Brooke to Stanley, 21 September 1944, ibid.
4 Stanley to Vyner Brooke, 27 September 1944, ibid. (My emphasis).
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he added, the Rajah was anxious to avoid any suggestion that he 
had entered into a secret treaty whose legality might later be 
challenged. This was particularly important in view of the 
likelihood that he would not be returning to Sarawk for any length 
of time. He was unwilling to sign anything which might be binding 
on his advisers and successors. Gent said that there was no 
intention of rushing the Rajah into any agreement which he and his 
advisers thought inappropriate to his powers. Nevertheless, it 
would be extremely useful if they could 'discuss and come to an 
understanding on the terms of an agreement which the Rajah in due 
course would be prepared to recommend in accordance with the 
appropriate procedure of the Government of Sarawak'.^ They agreed 
that the Colonial Office would prepare detailed suggestions as a 
basis for formal talks with the Rajah's representatives.
In late October, Paskin told Bertram that a paper was 
being prepared for submission to the Rajah, but during the next few 
months Bertram's health deteriorated and he asked the Rajah to 
relieve him of his position as head of the Sarawak Government 
Commission. At the same time, he knew that Anthony would probably 
be returning to England and seems to have decided that this was a 
good opportunity to bow out and allow his son to exercise his 
rightful responsibilities.
Meanwhile, in Karachi, . . .
Anthony Brooke had been trying for some months to get back to 
England. Having served first as a private in the infantry and then 
in the Officers Training Corps, he was despatched in early 1944 as 
a lieutenant to the Intelligence School in Karachi. While he found 
service life arduous and demanding, the future of Sarawak was never 
very far from his mind. He had had further discussions with his 
father before leaving England and they apparently agreed upon a 
compromise arrangement which could be put to the Colonial Office in 
the likely event of the latter's desire to amend the Treaty. On 
board ship to India in March 1944 he wrote to his wife, Kathleen:
1 'Notes of a discussion ... on the 6th October between the Tuan 
Muda and Mr Gent ...', Brooke papers, Box 10/1.
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... I still feel prefectly confident about the 
outcome of any talks which may eventually take 
place, and intend to hold my ground to the 
bitter end: and I don’t think the British
government can put up any argument which they 
can expect one to accept on purely logical 
grounds which would deprive Sarawak of her 
Independence. The alternative we suggest 
provides all the safeguards they could desire, 
and more, and the position is very different 
from what it would be if we had no alternative 
constructive proposals to put forward ... ^
When it was clear from Kathleen’s letters that his father was concerened 
about the future status of British dependencies in the Far East, 
including Sarawak, he told her that he was not worried. If the Allies 
had any say in the matter, he wrote from Karachi in April, it would 
hardly be in relation to the internal.administration of Sarawak:
After all, American policy ... is in favour of 
granting independence wherever possible, an 
attitude which would favour us. Of course they 
might want to grab the place altogether, but I 
don’t think this is very likely, and we would 
kick up quite a useful shindy if there was any 
sign of that happening. No, we may have a lot 
of things to worry about, but somehow I can't 
bring myself to worry about that.
In early June Anthony received a letter from his father which 
was to have an important influence on his subsequent actions. Bertram 
made it clear he was not prepared to take on the title and 
responsibilities of Rajah at his age. He also said that he had 
advised Vyner to retire from active participation in government and 
not go out to Sarawak again. The Colonial Office were aware of 
his views and he hinted very broadly that the responsibility should 
now be Anthony’s:
It's time someone in the family made up his mind and 
stuck to his decisions. It puts me in a much 
stronger position to urge that the present arrangement 
should not be departed from and that it is for those 
who have the future in their hands to thrash out a 
long term policy to suit the vastly altered 
conditions that will obtain after the war. It’s
1 Anthony Brooke to Kathleen Brooke, March 1944. Letter in the 
possession of Mrs K.M. Brooke.
2 Anthony Brooke to Kathleen Brooke, 24 April 1944. Letter in 
the possession of Mrs K.M. Brooke.
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no septuagenarian's job, and no septuagenarian who 
suggested that he was the chap to carry it out would 
be entitled to much confidence. 1-
Later that month Anthony was able to reassure Kathleen that the
succession was no cause for worry, although he doubted that the
Ranee had given up entirely. Reporting the contents of his father's
letter, he expressed great optimism about the future. 'However',
he added soberly, 'I suppose the old boy will hang on as long as 
2possible ...'
The clear indication from his father that he would now be
assuming the Rajah's responsibilities, together with the news of
Oliver Stanley’s approach to the Rajah, persuaded Anthony that it was
time to return home. But it suited the Colonial Office that he
should remain out of the picture for the time being and it was only
through an extremely vigorous campaign that the young lieutenant
managed to have a cable sent by Mountbatten to the Colonial Office
on 29 October. Mountbatten told Stanley that Anthony was anxious to
return immediately to England for discussions with his uncle, his
father, and if possible the government, on the future of Sarawak.
He appreciated Anthony's position and was prepared to release him
3if Stanley approved.
Mountbatten was aware that both the Colonial Office and 
the War Office were interested in Anthony's future. 'We have been 
informed', he told Anthony's brother-in-law, Captain Tom Halsey, 
'that as a potential Rajah it is undesirable that he should return 
to Sarawak as a comparatively junior member of the Civil 
Administration ...'  ^ Mountbatten promised to 'keep an eye out for 
him', an undertaking which later proved useful to Anthony.
1 Extract of a letter from Bertram Brooke to Anthony Brooke,
21 May 1944, WO 203/3973.
2 Anthony Brooke to Kathleen Brooke, 29 June 1944. Letter in the 
possession of Mrs K.M. Brooke.
3 Mountbatten to Stanley, 29 October 1944, WO 273/3973.
4 Mountbatten to Halsey, 7 July 1944, Brooke Papers, Box
12/1.
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Once the cable had been sent, Anthony felt more relaxed 
and offered an apology to his commanding officer for the trouble he 
had caused:
I feel I owe some kind of explanation to General Lamplough 
and to yourself for assuming all the characteristics of an 
unruly volcano at the present time. The crux of the matter 
is that there is work to be done in connection with 
Sarawak during the next 6 to 9 months which should have 
been done during the past three years. I regard it as 
vital war work.
A few days later he wrote to Gent enclosing a letter concerning
Sarawak's future which he proposed to send to The Times but Gent
replied by cable that it 'would be inadvisable at this stage in view
2of your prospective official position here'. He had conferred with
Bertram Brooke who may have mentioned the likelihood of Anthony
being appointed head of the Sarawak Government Commission in his
place. While accepting Gent's advice, Anthony emphasized the need to
publicize the future policy of the Sarawak government and asked for
an indication of the British government's attitude to the suggestions
which he had put to Gent in April 1942. At this point he was not
yet aware of the plan to make him head of the Sarawak Government
Commission, but news of the imminent restoration of his title of
Rajah Muda had reached him in a cable from his father in the first 
3week of November.
Meanwhile, however, there was no reply to Mountbatten's 
cable of 29 October and mounting frustration led Anthony to seek an 
interview with the Chief Civil Affairs Staff Officer. Events in the 
Pacific and the absence of any understanding through which British 
Borneo might come under Mountbatten's South East Asia Command 
(SEAC), he believed, meant that his proper place was in SWPA where 
he would be in close contact with General Macarthur's staff and the 
Borneo Planning Unit. This would mean taking part in the liberation
1 Anthony Brooke to Colonel Chapman, 31 October 1944, WO 203 
[5033].
2 Gent to Anthony Brooke, - November 1944, WO 203/3973. A 
copy of Anthony's letter to The Times is not available.
3 Anthony Brooke to Kathleen Brooke, 7 November 1944. Letter 
in the possession of Mrs K.M. Brooke.
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of Sarawak and the subsequent military administration in which he 
would hold full civil powers in the absence of his uncle and his 
father. Such a scheme had always been his personal preference but 
his strained relations with the Rajah had not made it possible. 
Instead, he had accepted the alternative offered by the Colonial 
Office and General Hone of making himself useful in SEAC, taking 
part in the liberation of Malaya and returning to Sarawak on the 
termination of the military administration there. But the 
restoration of his title had cleared the air and he now felt it his 
duty to press for the fulfilment of his original plan. ’It is 
repugnant to me to wait for the "difficulties" to be smoothed from 
my path he added impatiently.-^
A few days later he saw the Director of Intelligence and 
requested an interview with Mountbatten so that he could raise the 
proposal he wished to make to the Chief Civil Affairs Staff Officer. 
This time he spelled out more emphatically his desire to be involved 
in the reoccupation of Sarawak and the military administration:
Owing to a combination of unhappy circumstances, 
not a single member of the Brooke family was at 
the helm of affairs in Sarawak in the hour of the 
people's greatest need. This makes it imperative, 
if the Raj is to continue, that a member of the 
family should land and be with the people at the 
hour of their liberation from the Japanese ...
If I cannot have from HMG from the moment of 
Sarawak’s liberation the confidence and support 
to which by qualification and right I feel myself 
to be entitled, I shall be unable to give to 
Sarawak the service expected of me by the people, 
and there will be^no object in my returning to 
that country ...
He finally decided to write to Mountbatten. 'It would not be possible 
for me to face the people of Sarawak in the future', he told the 
'Supremo', 'neither would I deserve their trust as representing them 
at this time, if I did not regard their affairs as being of paramount 
importance'.^
1 Anthony Brooke to CCASO, 21 November 1944, WO 273/3973.
2 Anthony Brooke to Director of Intelligence, 26 November 1944, 
W0273/3973.
3 Anthony Brooke to Mountbatten, 1 December 1944, WO 203/5033.
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M eanw hile , how ever ,  t h e  news o f  A n th o n y 's  p r o b a b le  
a p p o in tm e n t  by t h e  R ajah  as  h ead  o f  t h e  Sarawak Government 
Commission m eant t h a t  he  c o u ld  no l o n g e r  be  k e p t  o u t  o f  t h e  way.
On 2 December, j u s t  a day a f t e r  Anthony w ro te  to  h im , M o u n tb a t te n  
was a u t h o r i z e d  by th e  War O f f i c e  t o  r e l e a s e  Anthony from w ar 
d u t i e s  and i t  was a g re e d  t h a t  t h i s  s h o u ld  be  made e f f e c t i v e  i n  
D e lh i  w here  Anthony was due t o  a r r i v e  on 15 D ecem ber.^  By t h i s  
t im e  Anthony had t o l d  M o u n tb a t t e n 1 2s C h ie f  o f  S t a f f ,  B r i g a d i e r  E . J .  
G ibbons ,  o f  h i s  w ish  t o  meet t h e  V ic e ro y ,  Lord W a v e l l , and o f  h i s  
d e s i r e  t o  be  in v o lv e d  i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  Saraw ak.
M o u n tb a t te n  was w i l l i n g  to  a s s i s t  Anthony i n  o b t a i n i n g  
an i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  V ic e ro y  b u t  he c o u ld  n o t  be  v e ry  h e l p f u l  on 
t h e  more i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  s i n c e  
Borneo was o u t s i d e  t h e  a r e a  o f  h i s  command. A l l  t h a t  M o u n tb a t te n  
knew a b o u t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  was t h a t  he  had  a p p roved  a p r o p o s a l  t h a t  
t h e  Borneo P l a n n in g  U n i t  s h o u ld  keep  i n  c l o s e  to u c h  w i th  M a jo r-  
G e n e ra l  H o n e 's  M alayan P l a n n in g  U n i t  and he  c o u ld  o n ly  s u g g e s t  
t h a t  Anthony s h o u ld  make h i s  v iew s known i n  London.
B e fo re  l e a v i n g  f o r  D e l h i ,  Anthony hoped  to  make a b r o a d c a s t  
on Sarawak w i t h  t h e  aim o f  p u t t i n g  i t  r e s p e c t a b l y  b ack  on th e  map. 
P e r m is s io n  f o r  t h i s  a p p e a r s  to  have  been  r e f u s e d  b u t  he was a b l e  to  
make c o n t a c t  w i th  a  number o f  A m erican  j o u r n a l i s t s  'w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t  
o f  r e - e d u c a t i n g  t h e  A m erican p e o p le  away from  dance  band and a l l - i n
w r e s t l i n g  a s s o c i a t i o n s  w i th  Saraw ak and i n c u l c a t i n g  th e  s p i r i t  o f
,2Sarawak w h ich  r e a l l y  m a t t e r s .  Anthony was a c u t e l y  aware o f  t h e  
u n f o r t u n a t e  ' i m a g e '  w hich  t h e  Ranee and h e r  two y o u n g e r  d a u g h te r s  
had c r e a t e d  f o r  Sarawak b e f o r e  t h e  w ar i n  t h e  A m erican a s  w e l l  as  
t h e  B r i t i s h  p r e s s  and was a n x io u s  t h a t  t h i s  w ould  be  d i s p e l l e d  
once and f o r  a l l .  However, he  was s t r i c t l y  l i m i t e d  t o  t a l k i n g  
a b o u t  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  Sarawak and t h e  Brooke f a m i ly  and was n o t
1 War O f f i c e  t o  M o u n tb a t te n ,  2 December 1944, WO 2 73 /3973 ;  
M o u n tb a t te n  t o  War O f f i c e ,  4 December 1944, i b i d .
2 Anthony B rooke to  K a th le e n  B ro o k e ,  27 November 1944.
L e t t e r  i n  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  Mrs-K.M. B rooke . See C h a p te r  IV 
f o r  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  B ro o k e s '  ' i m a g e ' .
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allowed to publish any views outside these subjects.
His other method of publicizing Sarawak was to insist
upon his title as Rajah Muda which was formally proclaimed in London
2on 8 November 1944. While this emphasis on his formal status
aroused the antagonism of some people, just as it had in Sarawak in
1939 and 1941,it was not ineffective in the corridors of power.
After meeting Anthony, Mountbatten wrote to Wavell suggesting that
he should grant an interview and that it would be useful to realize
that the application had been made 'in his capacity as the future
3Rajah of Sarawak, and not as a Subaltern in the Army'. Wavell
listened sympathetically to Anthony and suggested that he should
see Churchill, for which purpose he gave him a letter of 
4introduction. By 27 December Anthony was back in London eager to 
take an active part in the decisions on Sarawak's future.
The Provisional Government
Anthony Brooke's return significantly altered the situation in London. 
After long talks with Anthony, Bertram Brooke contacted the Rajah.
He told him that Anthony regarded the financial arrangements which 
the Rajah had been attempting to make as 'perfectly reasonable' 
and agreed that Sarawak finances for the remainder of the occupation 
should continue to be handled by the Commission. Bertram then also 
recommended to the Rajah that in view of the need for some recognized 
body to deal with the Colonial Office, and the fact that most members 
of the Sarawak Government Commission would not be involved in the 
future government, it was desirable to appoint some kind of negotiating 
committee. Now that the financial question was no longer a bone of 
contention, the Rajah agreed. On 29 December 1944 he appointed a 
committee consisting of Anthony, Pollard and Thomas Corson, which
1 DICA to Major J.M. Jones, Inf. ADPR (U.S.), 21 November 1944,
WO 273/3973.
2 SG3 15 November 1944.
3 Mountbatten to Wavell, 8 December 1944, WO 203/5033.
4 Interview with Anthony Brooke, 21 February 1975. Anthony later 
regretted that instead of seeing Churchill personally he had 
been content to give the letter to his private secretary.
282
... may well be charged with the responsibility 
of dealing direct with His Majesty's Government 
on behalf of and as representing the Sarawak 
Government, in connection with all matters 
concerning State policy, whilst the Commission 
remains responsible for the handling of the 
finances, as hitherto.^
Three weeks later, the Rajah told Stanley of his decision
to appoint Anthony to administer the government of Sarawak with the
advice of the Commission, 'thus constituting a Provisional Government
2of Sarawak with full powers'. He explained that he had reached
this decision in view of Bertram's wish to be relieved of his
position as chairman of the Commission and on the unanimous advice
of its members. 'In this way', he wrote, 'I hope to provide the
means whereby a stable and full[y] responsible body may plan
thoughtfully and effectively for the future of Sarawak, and at the
same time to clarify the position of the Commission in its relations
3with His Majesty's Government'. The other members of the 
Provisional Government were tobe Pollard and Corson. To all intents 
and purposes, the Provisional Government became interchangeable with 
the Sarawak Commission. But its legal status, particularly in 
relation to the 1941 Constitution and the prerogative powers of the 
Rajah, was never clarified. This suited the Colonial Office which 
was later able to bypass the Provisional Government when negotiations 
reached an impasse and deal directly with the Rajah.
While Anthony was no doubt pleased to have been charged 
with the responsibility of conducting negotiations with the Colonial 
Office, he was still determined to take part in the military 
reoccupation and administration of the state. No doubt he believed 
that this would not only assist Brooke prestige and the subsequent re­
establishment of Brooke government but would strengthen his own
1 Vyner Brooke to Aplin, 29 December 1944, Hussey Papers [53].
2 Vyner Brooke to Stanley, 18 January 1945, Hussey papers [66735].
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political position. The Colonial Office and the War Office, on the
other hand, were equally determined that he should not become
involved. Consequently, when Anthony proposed that there should be
a separate civil affairs unit for Sarawak with himself as head, he
found the Colonial Office extremely discouraging. Macaskie's
response was a diplomatic suggestion that it would damage Anthony's
prestige if he returned to Sarawak as an officer of the Military
Commander's staff,^ while Gent thought that there would be 'almost
2insurmountable difficulties'.
Anthony then suggested to both the War Office and the 
Colonial Office that he be appointed liaison officer between the Chief 
Civil Affairs Officer, Borneo, and the Allied Military Commander 
while repeating his original proposal that the military administration 
of Sarawak shoud be separate. Eventually he managed to interview 
Major General A.V. Anderson, Director of Civil Affairs at the War 
Office, who told him that while civil affairs was a military 
responsibility, the possibility of his being engaged in any military 
activity would have to be taken up with the Secretary of State for 
Colonies. Writing to Gent after the meeting, Anderson indicated 
their mutual objection to Anthony's involvement in the projected 
civil affairs unit:
In that military organization I could see no place for 
the Rajah Muda, whose political stakes (from which he 
could not divest himsefl) could only be a source of 
embarrassment to the Commander ...^
Nor was there any need, he added, for the creation of a position 
linking the Allied Commander and the head of the Borneo civil affairs 
unit. No doubt sensing that there was something of a conspiracy to 
deny him any role in the liberation and immediate post-war administration 
of Sarawak, Anthony seems at this point to have abandoned his 
campaign, concentrating his energies on the Provisional Government.
Stanley subsequently sought to arrange talks with the
1 Macaskie to Gent, 29 December 1944, CO 531/31 [2344].
2 Minute by Paskin, 3 January 1945, ibid.
3 Anderson to Gent, 2 February 1945, ibid.
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Provisional Government and on 13 February Anthony submitted to him 
a set of proposals 'for strengthening relations with His Majesty's 
Government which he hoped would be the subject of personal 
discussions:
1 The British government should second to Sarawak an officer
as Chief Secretary for External Affairs who would be responsible 
for foreign relations and defence. He would also be head of 
the Civil Service and a member of the Supreme Council. A new 
post of Secretary for Internal Affairs would be filled by an 
experienced Sarawak officer and would be the executive officer 
under the Rajah-in-Council.
2 The British government would continue to provide facilities 
for the secondment of officers of the Colonial Service to 
Sarawak.
3 The government of Sarawak would normally recruit only British 
and Sarawak nationals, but if it were necessary to recruit 
technical officers of other nationalities the Secretary of 
State would be consulted.
4 The government of Sarawak would encourage officers to take 
special leave in other parts of the Empire and would welcome 
visits by members of the British government, M.P.'s etc.
5 Sarawak's Head of State would provide the Secretary of State 
unofficially with any information required on internal affairs.^
A day or two later Anthony met Stanley who told him that the conclusion 
of a new agreement was a matter of some urgency since the 
implementation of the Borneo Planning Unit's scheme for civil 
affairs administration depended entirely upon it. Anthony must 
have been optimistic that this could be arranged without too much 
difficulty. 'I shall be exceedingly grateful if you will let me 
know ... when you would like this formality to be completed', he 
told Stanley. '... In so far as the Government of Sarawak is
concerned, no date is too early for the terms of the agreement to
,2be discussed and the necessary formalities completed ...
1 Anthony Brooke to Stanley, 13 February 1945, CO 531/31/3.
2 Anthony Brooke to Stanley, 16 February 1945, Hussey Papers 
[66735].
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In something of an understatement, Stanley pointed out
that the proposals which he had received from Anthony were 'not
altogether in accordance' with the proposed plans for discussion
which he had set out in his letter to the Rajah of 19 June 1944.^
Indeed they were not, and in his reply Anthony interpreted that
letter as envisaging a 'fundamental change’ in the relationship
between the two governments. Referring to the Rajah's original
reply of 4 August 1944, he indicated his determination not to
enter into substantive discussions until after Sarawak's liberation
and the restoration of the status quo ante:
Whilst I and my advisers will at all times be very 
glad, as representing the people of Sarawak, to 
discuss with you any matters of common interest to 
our two Governments, we are of the opinion that it 
would be morally indefensible for the Provisional 
Government of Sarawak to prejudice the post-war 
relations of the Government of Sarawak with His 
Majesty's Government by entering at this time into 
discussions inconsistent with the existing treaty 
relationship
Pending liberation, which would make possible the discussion of any 
changes to 'the independent and sovereign status of the Raj of 
Sarawak', he hoped that it would be possible for them to discuss 
his own proposals.
The first formal meeting took place on 13 March when 
Anthony Brooke, together with Pollard and Corson, faced Stanley, Gent 
and four subordinates across a long table in the conference room 
of the Colonial Office. From the outset it seemed to Anthony that 
Stanley's manner was appropriate not so much to an opening of 
discussions as to an announcement of what the British government
3intended to do about Sarawak. Although Stanley might have 
anticipated Anthony's response from their earlier correspondence, 
both he and Gent were somewhat taken aback by the challenge that his 
speech elicited. No doubt they expected that the strength of the 
British government's position and the Secretary of State's 
considerable authority would carry all before them.
1 Stanley to Anthony Brooke, 22 February 1945. This letter is not 
available.
2 Anthony Brooke to Stanley, 27 February 1945, The Facts About Sarawak_, 
p. 79.
3 Interview with Anthony Brooke, 6 November 1974.
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The ’proposals' put forward by Stanley were simple 
enough but their implications went far beyond anything that 
Anthony could accept. The Sarawak government was to agree
1 to accord to the Crown such jurisdiction as 
would enable the British Government to 
legislate for Sarawak under the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act.
to accept the extension of the authority of 
the Resident British Representative so as to 
give him an effective voice in all substantial 
matters of policy and administration.
Once again it was emphasized that the power of legislating through
Orders-in-Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act would not
normally be used and that the powers of the British Representative
were only being extended 'for the purpose of ... representing
2HMG's views in respect of administrative policy in Sarawak'.
Stanley also took issue with Anthony's claim that it was 'morally 
indefensible' to enter into negotiations at this point and 
suggested that they could surely undertake the preparatory work for 
a new agreement. Anthony defended the phrase with the extra­
ordinarily disingenuous argument that personal and autocratic rule 
had never prevailed in Sarawak and that the country had possessed a 
constitution since 1856. Consequently, he claimed, the government 
of Sarawak could not enter into discussions with the British 
government until they first consulted the people.
Stanley's manner and his approach to the question had 
upset Anthony to the point that he would no longer admit the need 
for preparatory discussions. He told the Secretary of State that 
he and his colleagues had come to the meeting to represent the 
interests of an independent sovereign state and they were not going 
to have any unilateral decision dictated to them. His patience now 
exhausted, Stanley replied that if they were not ready to enter 
into discussions, then the government 'would have to decide on their
1 'Brief note of the proposals of His Majesty's Government in
regard to their future relations with the Government of Sarawak, 
for discussion with the Sarawak representatives\ CO 531/31/3 
[53117/5].
2 Ibid.
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own course’. This veiled threat did not go unnoticed and further 
talks were arranged after Stanley’s departure from the room.
2At the three subsequent meetings, which were not attended 
by Anthony or Stanley, discussion ranged again and again over 
familiar territory and it was increasingly clear that an impasse 
would soon be reached. Perhaps as a means of avoiding this, and of 
reducing the argument to manageable dimensions, Gent produced at 
the fourth meeting on 10 May a statement on the international legal 
status of Sarawak which had been prepared by the Colonial Office’s 
legal advisers and approved by the Foreign Office. This warrants 
quotation since it constitutes the official rationale of the 
bureaucratic approach to the Sarawak question:
From the point of view of international law the 
State of Sarawak possesses no personality whatever and 
is simply a territory within the British Empire. The 
independence of Sarawak is a purely domestic matter 
with which no foreign state has any concern. From the 
point of view of United Kingdom municipal law, Sarawak 
is foreign in the sense of not being British territory: 
but from the point of view of international law, Sarawak 
is British territory and not foreign (vide, for example, 
the use of the word "foreign” in commercial treaties in 
connection with imperial preference). Sarawak is simply 
a British protected state. The Agreements between the 
British Government and the Rajah of Sarawak have no 
existence within the realm of international law, but^  
only operate as domestic matters within the Empire.
In turn, Anthony announced that he would submit the 
question to his own legal advisers and for this purpose he called 
upon the services of two distinguished international jurists,
H. Wynn Parry and Arnold D. McNair. However, the long delay involved 
in obtaining their considered opinion was evidently regarded by 
the Colonial Office as a delaying tactic and in mid-July Stanley 
wrote to the Rajah complaining that 'the Sarawak representatives 
have so far shown themselves personally unresponsive to the
1 ’Sarawak Discussions. Record of the opening meeting held at
the Colonial Office ... 13th March, 1945 ...’, ibid.
2 Minutes of these meetings can also be found at CO 531/31/3 
[53117/5].
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p r o p o s a l s  o f  h i s  M a je s ty ’s G o v e r n m e n t ^  He made i t  c l e a r  t h a t
he w ish ed  t h e  Rajah to  e x e r t  p r e s s u r e  on th e  t h r e e  Sarawak
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  ’ to  g iv e  a c t i v e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  to  th o s e  m easu res
w hich  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  on t h e i r  s i d e  f o r  t h e  r e s u m p t io n  o f  d i s c u s s i o n s  
2
. . . ’ S t a n l e y  was e v i d e n t l y  u n w i l l i n g  to  w a i t  any l o n g e r  f o r  th e
l e g a l  o p in io n  and saw no p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  any compromise from
h i s  s i d e .  W hether  o u t  o f  l o y a l t y  t o  Anthony o r  from  an i n s t i n c t i v e
u n w i l l i n g n e s s  to  become in v o lv e d  i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  h i m s e l f ,  th e
R ajah  was n o t  p r e p a r e d  t o  c o o p e r a t e .  ’Dear P e t e r ’ , he  w ro te  on
3
S t a n l e y ’s l e t t e r ,  'P l e a s e  d e a l  w i th  t h i s ' .  I t  m ust have  become 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  ob v io u s  to  Gent t h a t  t h e  P r o v i s i o n a l  Government had to  
be i s o l a t e d  from th e  R a j a h ’s s u p p o r t ,  a l th o u g h  th e  means o f  
a c h ie v in g  t h i s  w ere  n o t  so  a p p a r e n t .
The C o lo n ia l  O f f i c e  was s t i l l  a w a i t i n g  th e  l e g a l  o p in io n  
a month l a t e r  when t h e  n u c l e a r  homing o f  H iro sh im a  and N a g a sa k i  
and th e  s u b s e q u e n t  J a p a n e s e  c a p i t u l a t i o n  d r a m a t i c a l l y  a l t e r e d  th e  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  i n  w hich  t h e  e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s i o n s  had  t a k e n  p l a c e .  
T here  was now to  be  no p r o t r a c t e d  m i l i t a r y  l i b e r a t i o n  o f  Borneo 
by A u s t r a l i a n  t r o o p s  and Sarawak c o u ld  be  e x p e c te d  to  come u n d e r  
SWPA c o n t r o l  by S ep tem b er .  The need  to  o b t a i n  t h e  R a j a h 's  
agreem en t to  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  F o r e ig n  J u r i s d i c t i o n  Act th u s  
became a c u te  and p r e s s u r e  was e v i d e n t l y  b r o u g h t  t o  b e a r  on th e  
Rajah  d u r in g  th e  f o l l o w in g  w eeks.
The F inal Phase: D irec t N eg o tia tio n s
I t  seems u n l i k e l y  t h a t  when t h e  L abour governm ent to o k  o f f i c e  in  
J u ly  1945 t h e i r  p o l i c y  to w a rd s  B r i t i s h  p o s s e s s i o n s  i n  S o u th e a s t  
A s ia  was s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from  t h a t  o f  t h e  N a t io n a l  
g o ve rnm en t.  W hile  r e c o g n i z i n g  t h a t  Burma would have  to  be g r a n t e d  
in d ep e n d e n c e  t o g e t h e r  w i th  I n d i a ,  th e y  w ere  d e te rm in e d  to  h o ld  on 
to  M alaya w h a te v e r  t h e  A m erican c r i t i c s  m igh t s a y .  They were 
happy t o  c o n t in u e  w i th  t h e  p o l i c y  on t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  f u t u r e  o f
1 S t a n le y  to  Vyner B rooke , 17 J u ly  1945 , The Facts About Sarawak_,
p . 81.
2 I b i d .
3 M inu te  by Vyner B rooke , 19 J u l y  1945 , i b i d .
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Malaya and Borneo w hich  had been  a d o p te d  by t h e  War Cabinet i n  June 
1944, a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  seems to  have  been  a f e e l i n g  t h a t  t h e  Brooke 
Raj s h o u ld  n o t  be r e s t o r e d .
George H a l l  was 63 when a p p o in t e d  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  
f o r  C o lo n ie s  and was a l r e a d y  i n  p o o r  h e a l t h .  As P a r l i a m e n ta r y  
U n d e r - S e c r e ta r y  o f  S t a t e  be tw een  1940 and 1942 he had  v i s i t e d  th e  
West I n d i e s  b u t  was n o t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  c o l o n i a l  a f f a i r s .
As one w r i t e r  has  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  t h a t  he  was a Welsh e x - c o a lm in e r  
and t r a d e  u n i o n i s t  and a f r i e n d  o f  A t t l e e ' s  was t h e  main c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
i n  h i s  a p p o in t m e n t . -^  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  would  be  s u r p r i s i n g  i f  he 
d id  n o t  r e g a r d  t h e  Brookes i n  t h e  same l i g h t  as t h e  b i g  landow ners  o f  
Wales and E ngland  whose w e a l th  he and h i s  p a r t y  w ere  i n t e n t  on r e ­
d i s t r i b u t i n g .
The Labour p a r t y  p o s s e s s e d  no c l e a r  p o l i c y  on B r i t a i n ’ s 
F a r  E a s t  c o lo n i e s  when i t  came i n t o  pow er. The C o lo n ia l  B ureau  o f  
th e  F a b ian  S o c i e t y ,  which a c t e d  as  t h e  Labour p a r t y ' s  u n o f f i c i a l  
p o l i c y  body on th e  c o l o n i e s ,  l i m i t e d  i t s  i n t e r e s t s  to  A f r i c a  and 
I n d i a  and was se ldom  p r e p a r e d  to  lo o k  f u r t h e r  e a s t .  However, t h e  
Labour p a r t y  was d i s i n c l i n e d  t o  c o u n te n a n c e  th e  p e r p e t u a t i o n  o f  
t h e  Brooke R a j .  W hile  t h e  'w h i t e  r a j a h s '  had  seemed a somewhat 
ro m a n t ic  i f  a n a c h r o n i s t i c  i d e a  be tw een  t h e  w a r s ,  th e y  c o u ld  o n ly  be 
a s o u rc e  o f  e m b a r ra s sm e n t  to  B r i t a i n  i n  t h e  p o s t - w a r  w o r ld .
In  m id -A ugust  1945, C a b in e t  d i r e c t e d  H a l l  ' t h a t
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  s h o u ld  now be  g iv e n  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e th e r  t h e
p r e s e n t  o p p o r t u n i t y  s h o u ld  be t a k e n  o f  b r i n g i n g  t o  an end th e  r u l e
2
o f  t h e  R ajah  o f  S a r a w a k ' .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y  t h e  r e c o r d s  r e l a t i n g  
to  t h e  C o lo n ia l  O f f i c e ' s  s u b s e q u e n t  a c t i o n  a r e  n o t  y e t  a v a i l a b l e .
However, i n  an u n d a te d  m in u te  w r i t t e n  s h o r t l y  a f t e r  th e  C a b in e t  
d i r e c t i v e  a s e n i o r  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  o f f i c i a l  ( p ro b a b ly  Gent) 
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w ere  two m a jo r  q u e s t i o n s  f o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n :  
w h e th e r  t h e  R ajah  and Anthony Brooke would  be p r e p a r e d  to  c o o p e r a te
1 David G o ld sw o r th y ,  C olonia l I s su e s  in  B r i t i s h  P o l i t ic s  1945-1961 . . .  3
O xford  1971, p .1 4 .
2 I .C .M .4 5 (4 7 )  C o n c lu s io n s ,  c i t e d  i n  an anonymous m in u te ,  -  August 
1945, CO 5 3 1 /3 1 /3  [5 3 1 1 7 /5 ] .  S u b se q u e n t  q u o t a t i o n s  from t h i s
s o u r c e .
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within the framework of the projected new agreement, and the extent
to which there was a genuine demand among the people of Sarawak
for the restoration of the Brookes. Both questions raised difficulties
... while there has been in the past much criticism of the 
administration of Sarawak, there has also been a general 
concensus [sic] of opinion that the personal rule of the 
Brooke dynasty has been a valuable asset although its 
undoubted popularity with the natives may well have 
rested largely on the tradition established by the first 
Rajah. During the past three and a half years, however, 
the people of Sarawak have been denied the advantages of 
personal rule and in present circumstances it would be 
difficult to tell to what extent attachment to it still 
persists since it would be natural for the relief of 
the population at their liberation ... to express itself 
in welcoming the restoration of the old regime.
He pointed out that the termination of Brooke rule had 
been mooted on a number of occasions, once by the Rajah himself, but 
that even if the Rajah were now prepared to consider it he would 
have to put the question to the Provisional Government, ’and they 
undoubtedly will strenuously oppose such a scheme'. Likewise, 
the Rajah and the Provisional Government might not be willing to 
accept the agreement now being proposed and the only recourse in 
that situation would be outright annexation. That this was being 
seriously considered is clear from the fact that a legal officer 
was already investigating how it might be arranged. However, there 
was still a way out:
... if the Rajah is told that HMG looks to him 
to ensure that a satisfactory agreement is reached 
and that failing this HMG must consider the course 
they will take to ensure that they will have the 
necessary authority in Sarawak; and if the 
Rajah (and the Rajah Muda) accept this virtual 
ultimatum with a good grace and show themselves 
willing to cooperate wholeheartedly in the new 
circumstances which would arise on the 
conclusion [of an agreement] ...
In all probability, ’this virtual ultimatum’ which had been already 
implicit in the negotiations with the Provisional Government during 
the previous six months, was put to the Rajah shortly after the 
Cabinet directive.
In late August the Rajah wrote to MacBryan asking him to 
go to Sarawak the following March as his Private Secretary. He
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a l s o  s a i d  t h a t  he  i n t e n d e d  w r i t i n g  to  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  ab o u t  
t h e  c h a rg e s  a g a i n s t  MacBryan and t h e  p r o t e s t  o v e r  h i s  a r r e s t  i n  
Dutch Borneo i n  J a n u a r y  1942. MacBryan t o l d  t h e  R ajah  t h a t  he  had 
a r r a n g e d  to  m eet Gent w i t h i n  t h e  n e x t  two w eeks . He s u g g e s te d  
t h a t  t h e  b e s t  means o f  d e a l i n g  w i th  t h e  p rob lem  was f o r  t h e  R a jah  
to  a s k  Gent f o r  an o f f i c i a l  l e t t e r  s t a t i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  w ere  no 
o b j e c t i o n s  t o  M acB ryan 's  accom panying  him to  Saraw ak. ’ Such a l e t t e r , ’ 
he w r o t e ,  'w o u ld  answ er  y o u r  p r o t e s t ,  c l e a r  me w i th  t h e  B r i t i s h  
Government and  v i n d i c a t e  my honou r  w i t h o u t  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  a l o t  
o f  a d d i t i o n a l  u n p l e a s a n t n e s s ' . ^ "  A lthough  th e  r e l e v a n t  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  
f i l e  i s  n o t  y e t  a v a i l a b l e ,  i t  seems l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  Rajah  to o k  
M acB ryan 's  a d v i c e .  The c i r c u m s ta n c e s  o f  M acB ryan 's  a p p ro a c h  to  
Gent a r e  l e s s  c l e a r .  They w ere  no d oub t  r e l a t e d  to  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  
h i s  r e p u t a t i o n  b u t  MacBryan m ust a l s o  have  been  aw are o f  G e n t 's  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i t h  t h e  P r o v i s i o n a l  Government and may w e l l  have  o f f e r e d  
some s u g g e s t i o n s .
R e l a t i o n s  be tw een  th e  R a jah  and Anthony had  once a g a in
become s t r a i n e d .  I n  e a r l y  August t h e  Sarawak Government Commission
had d e c id e d  t o  p u r c h a s e  a £20 ,000  h o u se  i n  t h e  R e g e n t 's  P a rk  a r e a
2
f o r  u se  as t h e  P r o v i s i o n a l  G o v ern m en t 's  h e a d q u a r t e r s .  The R ajah
seems to  have  r e g a r d e d  t h i s  a s  an u n n e c e s s a r y  e x t r a v a g a n c e  b u t
3
Anthony was s u p p o r t e d  by h i s  f a t h e r  who p r o b a b ly  saw i t  a s  a good 
i n v e s tm e n t .  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  some t im e  i n  June  o r  J u ly  t h e
4
R ajah  made a r e q u e s t  t o  t h e  Commission f o r  a l a r g e  sum o f  money.
1 MacBryan to  Vyner B rooke , 31 August 1945, Brooke P a p e r s ,  Box 2 /3 .  
The R a j a h 's  e a r l i e r  l e t t e r  to  MacBryan i s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e .
2 E x t r a c t  from  M inu te s  o f  Sarawak Government Commission m e e t in g ,
3 August 1945 , CO 531 /32  [5 3 1 8 5 ] .
3 Anthony Brooke t o  K a th le e n  B rooke , 12 August 1945. L e t t e r  i n  t h e  
p o s s e s s i o n  o f  Mrs K.M. B rooke .
4 In  J u l y  1945 Vyner Brooke e s t a b l i s h e d  a £40 ,000  t r u s t  f o r  th e  
b e n e f i t  o f  h i s  d a u g h te r s  E l i z a b e t h  and V a l e r i e ,  MacBryan and 
Sm ith  b e in g  a p p o in t e d  t r u s t e e s .  I n  Sep tem ber  1947 th e  R ajah  was 
u n d e r  p r e s s u r e  from  h i s  d a u g h te r s  f o r  a d v a n ce s  on t h e i r  a l lo w a n c e s  
and th e  Ranee th e n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  c a p i t a l  sum be  made o v e r
to  them. However, MacBryan b a lk e d  a t  t h i s  f o r  some t im e .  S e e ,  
e . g . , Ranee to  M acBryan, 2 November 1947 , H ussey P a p e r s .
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The request was refused on the grounds that it would be illegal,^ 
a decision which was perfectly within the Commission’s powers 
and in accordance with the Colonial Office’s concern to conserve 
Sarawak’s reserve funds. However, it can hardly have endeared 
Anthony to his uncle who was now under pressure to ensure that 
the Provisional Government became more accommodating in its 
relationship with the Colonial Office.
Rather than speak directly to Anthony, however, the 
Rajah asked the Ranee to convey his feelings. It is difficult to 
separate the Ranee’s own views from those of the Rajah which she was 
evidently reporting in her letter to Anthony of 8 September, but a 
number of points are clear. First of all, the Rajah insisted that 
the Provisional Government should keep on good terms with the 
Colonial Office. He had every intention of appointing a British 
Representative for Sarawak, without whom there would be no security 
in future. Secondly, he emphasized that there was ’NO SUCH THING 
at the present moment as a "SARAWAK GOVERNMENT"’ and that when he 
resumed his full authority he would appoint anyone he wished:
... what the Raja wants you to understnad is that as 
long as he is alive and capable, he wants to Rule 
Sarawak in his own way, there will be plenty of time 
for you to Rule it AFTER he's passed out. He 
believes in the cooperation of the British Government, 
and on being on the friendliest terms with the 
Colonial Office.^
Thirdly, the Rajah wished Anthony to know that he intended taking 
MacBryan out to Sarawak with him once he was cleared by the Colonial 
Office of all suspicion. Accordingly, he wanted Anthony and the 
Provisional Government to allow MacBryan to answer in person the 
accusations which had been made against him in early 1942. However, 
the Ranee was at some pains to emphasize that the Rajah was not 
being unduly influenced by MacBryan:
1 Anonymous memorandum marked ’Confidential’, 13 February 1946, 
Brooke Papers, Box 12/2. In an accompanying note, Bertram 
Brooke vouched for its accuracy.
2 Sylvia Brooke to Anthony Brooke, 8 September 1945, Hussey 
Papers [53].
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I can positively assure you that MacBryan has NO HOLD 
over the Raja more than that the Raja finds that 
Mac’s particular form of genius is extremely useful 
to him, and there are certain things that MacBryan can do 
for the Raja no one else could possibly accomplish. The 
Raja is perfectly aware of Mac's failings and faults and 
has him well in hand.^
On 10 September, by which time MacBryan had probably met
Gent, the Rajah wrote to the members of the Provisional Government
announcing that in view of the end of hostilities in the Far East
and the recovery of Sarawak he was resuming his powers, subject to
the provisions of the 1941 Constitution. This necessitated
terminating the appointment of Officer Administering the Government
and he requested the Provisional Government to arrange a special
issue of the Gazette to announce this and to prepare a suitable
letter to the Secretary of State for Colonies which he would sign,
2He was only prepared to meet Anthony when this had been done. The 
reaction of Anthony and his colleagues was to question the Rajah's 
right to reassert his authority in such a fashion. A meeting of the 
Provisional Government was held on 12 September and a telegram was 
sent to the Rajah congratulating him on the surrender of the 
Japanese and expressing the hope that he would soon be back in 
Sarawak. On the same day, however, Anthony wrote to the Rajah 
telling him that the Provisional Government could not respond to his 
request until Pollard returned from leave.
When a meeting was finally held on 18 September, the
problem of the undefined status of the Provisional Government became
painfully apparent. While there was a unanimous desire to see the
Rajah resume an active part in Sarawak affairs, the members believed
that he was 'exceeding his powers under the Constitution in demanding
that measures be taken to implement a decision made by him without
3references to his Government.' However, the only point at issue 
was the method of implementing the proposal and this, they believed,
1 Ibid.
2 Vyner Brooke to Provisional Government, 10 September 1945, ibid.
3 'Minutes of the Sixty-Third Meeting of the Sarawak Commission ... 
September 18th, 1945 ...', ibid.
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could be settled by means of a frank discussion with the Rajah.
Strenuous efforts were made to arrange an interview and an
appointment was made for Anthony and two other members of the
Commission to see him at 5 p.m. on 19 September. But at 4 p.m.
that day the Ranee telephoned to say that the Rajah would not be
able to talk to them after all. And when Swayne tried again in the
belief that he and Aplin might have more influence on the Rajah, he
was told by the Ranee that the Rajah would not meet any of the
Commission's members until his instructions on the special issue
of the Gazette had been obeyed.^ Why the Rajah changed his mind
is not known but it seems likely that after making the appointment
he was informed by J.A. Smith, chief clerk at the Sarawak Government
Office, of what had been said at the meeting. At any rate, the next
day (20 September) the Rajah wrote a formal letter to Anthony
announcing that he had told Hall of his decision to dissolve the
Provisional Government and to appoint a new Supreme Council under the
1941 Constitution as soon as possible 'with a view to forming a
legal Government'. He had also made a formal application for
travel facilities for himself and his party to visit Sarawak in
October. He thus requested all the members of the Provisional
2Government to submit their resignations at once.
Another meeting of the Provisional Government was held 
on 22 September to discuss the Rajah's letter. It was decided that 
the position had not altered materially and that it was still 
desirable to seek a personal interview with the Rajah. A reply 
to the Rajah was also drafted setting out the members' view 
that constitutional procedure should be strictly adhered to and 
repeating the request for an interview:
We feel bound to express ... our keenest disappointment 
and regret at Your Highness' inability to meet members 
of the Provisional Government, and that Your Highness 
has seen fit to disregard constitutional procedure and 
to communicate direct with ... [the] Secretary of
1 'Minutes of the Sixty-Fourth Meeting of the Sarawak Commission
... September 22nd 1945 . ibid.
2 Vyner Brooke to Anthony Brooke, 20 September 1945, ibid. 
Similar letters were addressed to the other members.
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State for Colonies on an official subject. It was 
hoped that Your Highness would be persuaded in 
conversation, and without resort to a formal 
interchange of correspondence, that your proposal 
to reassume your powers and prerogatives could 
properly be implemented by simple constitutional 
procedure, since unilateral action on Your Highness' 
part might not, in view of your position in relation 
to the Constitution, be effective in facilitating 
recognition by His Majesty's Government of the 
authority which Your Highness wishes to reassume.
It will, we feel sure, be readily appreciated by 
Your Highness that no change affecting the present 
constitution of the Provisional Government of 
Sarawak, duly recognised as such by His Majesty's 
Government, can be effected except by constitutional 
means, and that such plans as Your Highness has in 
mind can only be considered after Your Highness has 
properly reassumed the powers of Rajah-in-Council  ^
and Head of the Provisional Government of Sarawak.
If the Provisional Government's earlier letter had irritated the 
Rajah, this one must have enraged him. Writing to Anthony on 
4 October he announced that he was dismissing him as head of the 
Provisional Government with retrospective effect from 10 September:
This failure to act upon my instruction and the 
subsequent receipt of a letter purporting to be 
signed by an Officer Administering the Government 
and Members of a Provisional Government which no 
longer existed seems to me to be a direct 
affront to myself, and I can only regard your 
action as an act of insubordination without2 
parallel in my experience of State affairs.
The same evening, the Rajah visited Hall at the Colonial 
Office and informed him of the action he had taken. Late that night 
MacBryan telephoned Smith to tell him that he had been appointed 
Acting Government Agent in Aplin's place. Smith had informed the 
Rajah on 14 September that he was resigning from the Provisional 
Government and this was his reward - a doubling in salary. In a 
letter to Smith confirming the appointment the Rajah instructed 
him to produce a special issue of the Gazette conveying his decisions.
1 'Minutes of the Sixty-Fourth Meeting of the Sarawak Commission ...
September 22nd 1945 ibid.
2 Vyner Brooke to Anthony Brooke, 4 October 1945, ibid.
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' . . . I am deeply shocked that you should have adopted such an 
intransigent attitude in negotiations,’ Vyner told Anthony on 
12 October. 'The proposals made by His Majesty's Government were 
eminently reasonable, having regard to the War and that Sarawak was 
overrun ...' He also expressed his annoyance that Anthony had spent 
£20,000 on a house and £5,000 on fittings. '... You may neither use 
in future the style and title of Rajah Muda,' he concluded, 'nor 
consider you have any right of succession to the Raj of Sarawak; ...'^
During August and September a series of events was in
train which, given Anthony's inflexible position on the application of
the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, could hardly have been varied. However,
it is important to take account of the fact that the Rajah wrote his
letter dismissing Anthony on the same day (4 October) that Hall
finally received Wynn Parry and McNair's joint opinion on the
2international legal status of Sarawak. As this opinion upheld 
Sarawak's sovereignty and consequently could only strengthen Anthony 
Brooke in his determination to resist Colonial Office pressure, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that it was closely connected with his 
dismissal and the Rajah's meeting the same evening with Hall. It is 
likely that the Colonial Office had prior knowledge of the opinion 
and, believing that there was no future in negotiations with Anthony, 
approached the Rajah direct.
No doubt realizing that Anthony was unlikely to remain 
silent about what had happened, the Rajah made two attempts to ensure 
that he did not cause too much trouble. On 7 November Anthony was 
called in to the Sarawak Government Office and told by Smith on 
the Rajah's instructions that the deeds of the house bought by the 
Sarawak Commission would be transferred to him and his allowance of 
£2,800 continued for life if he agreed to two conditions: that he
should 'not in future interfere with any public affairs affecting 
Sarawak, His Highness the Rajah or any members of His Highness' 
family, or 'indulge in any public or private talk whatsoever, 
malicious or otherwise, concerning Sarawak, His Highness the Rajah
1 Vyner Brooke to Anthony Brooke, 12 October 1945, cited by Sylvia 
Brooke, Queen of the Headhunters ...3 p.149-50.
2 Personal communication from Anthony Brooke, 13 December 1976.
For the opinion, see Appendix I.
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or His Highness’ family’.^  Anthony apparently rejected this out of
hand although it was more than year before he made any public
2reference to the attempt to buy him off. The Rajah's next move was
in late January 1946 when Anthony had commenced an energetic
campaign to attract publicity to what was happening about Sarawak.
3Anthony’s monthly allowance was delayed, as if to suggest that it
might be discontinued altogether if he insisted on talking to the
newspapers. However, a letter from Bertram to the Rajah probably
4put an end to this strategy.
Boyd soon got wind of the story that a new agreement 
would be negotiated between the Rajah and the Secretary of State. 
Accordingly he wrote a memorandum for Hall“* advising him that any 
such agreement should be submitted to the Council Negri, as required 
by the 1941 Constitution. Boyd was not altogether happy about this 
body, believing that in a country where more than 90 per cent of 
the people were illiterate it would have been sensible to have gone 
more slowly, in the first instance upgrading the Committee of 
Administration’s legislative authority, subject to certain safeguards. 
But it was too late for this. Due to the deaths of several European 
and Asian members, the Council Negri would probably be less 
representative than it had been before the war and the European vote 
would be dominant even if its numbers were not. However, he warned, 
the opposition mustered by Anthony in Sarawak was likely to be strong 
and it would be unfortunate if, 'through a misunderstanding of the 
facts’, the Council was split. As a precaution, he suggested, the 
cession proposal should be explained to all local leaders by a 
person who was well known and trusted and could answer any questions. 
He thought that the Rajah might be intending to do this but he may 
also have had in mind the possibility that Hall might honour him with 
the responsibility.
1 Anthony Brooke to Crown Agents, 19 October 1946, CO 531/32 [53185].
2 Manchester Guardian, 3 January 1947.
3 Note by Bertram Brooke, 22 March 1946, Hussey Papers, [66735].
4 Bertram Brooke to Vyner Brooke, 29 January 1946, Brooke Papers,
Box 2/3.
5 Undated memorandum [October 1945?] Boyd Papers.
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Boyd told Hall that the vote of the Council Negri might 
not give an accurate indication of opinion because most people in 
Sarawak ’do not care by whom and how they are governed as long as 
they are allowed to live their lives in their own way'. But it 
would nevertheless amount to an expression of the opinion of the 
local legislature and could therefore be used in Britain to refute 
any suggestion that public opinion is Sarawak had not been consulted. 
’This is ... an obvious point on which to direct any attack’, he 
added, 'and it ... would be wise to prepare in advance an impregnable 
defence ...’ Finally, the task of re-establishing civil government 
was quite beyond the resources of any member of the Sarawak service 
and a suitable man would have to be appointed by the Secretary of 
State. Even if cession did not go through, such a man should still 
be appointed as Adviser to the Sarawak government. Boyd's advice 
was probably set aside in favour of the arrangements made with the 
Rajah and MacBryan, but in late January 1946 when it became 
necessary for the Colonial Office to adopt a new strategy his 
suggestions appear to have been influential. Concern about British 
domestic reactions always outweighed any consideration of what the 
response might be in Sarawak.
The Cession Negotiations
Very little is known about the subsequent negotiations between the
Rajah and the Colonial Office. Even when the Colonial Office files
on the subject'*’ are made available it is unlikely that they will
contain the whole story, much of which seems to have taken place at
private meetings and through telephone calls. What we do know is
that the Rajah obtained a verbal assurance from Hall before signing
the cession Agreement at the Colonial Office on 24 October that ’no
2one would be worse off as a result of cession’. The Agreement 
apparently committed the Rajah and the Colonial Office to conclude
1 The relevant files are probably CO 531/250/31/3 [53117/1, Pt.II);
CO 531/31/3 [53117/1, Pt.I]; CO 531/248/31/3 [53117]; CO 531/253/31/3 
[53117/2], All are closed until 1996.
2 Vyner Brooke to Secretary of State (James Griffiths),
12 December 1950, Hussey Papers.
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negotiations on the cession of Sarawak to the Crown subject to 
MacBryan's obtaining the necessary authority from the Council Negri 
and the Supreme Council.1 23456 The Rajah also agreed that in the event of 
cession the assets of the 1912 Sarawak State Advisory Council Fund 
would be paid to the Sarawak government and not to himself as 
provided in the terms of the Fund and on 31 October he signed a 
document which solved the problem of the succession by proclaiming the 
King as his heir. MacBryan clearly played an important part in the 
negotiations and at a meeting with Hall at Bath the Secretary of 
State even indicated that he would receive a knighthood. This was 
particularly gratifying to MacBryan who had for some time been trying 
to dispell the suspicions which had been created by his actions in 
1941-42.
The Agreement of 24 October did not concern itself with any 
form of financial settlement, something which the Colonial Office 
wished to postpone until after the completion of MacBryan’s mission. 
However, it was interested in getting the Sarawak government to 
accept responsibility for the cost of relief and rehabilitation 
supplies and equipment for the state^ and to keep a close check on 
Sarawak's funds now that the Sarawak Commission was no longer in 
existence. A sharp rise in withdrawals in late 1945 caused Gent to 
ask Smith if the Rajah could be persuaded to provide detailed 
monthly estimates of the succeeding month’s withdrawals. In 
Paskin's words, what was required was 'an understanding with the 
Rajah that these funds should be expended only on objects acceptable 
to the Secretary of State ...’ The Colonial Office clearly expected
1 Minute by Galsworthy, 18 December 1945, CO 531/31/1 [53077].
The Agreement is also referred to in a letter from Vyner Brooke 
to Hall, 1 October 1945, Hussey Papers.
2 Hussey Papers.
3 MacBryan to Smith, 4 December 1947, ibid. Smith was also given to 
understand that he would receive an honour.
4 The net cost of rehabilitation for the three Borneo territories was 
estimated by the Colonial Office in late 1945 at £3,4‘1'2,000. 
Sarawak's share of this is not known but probably accounted for 
half. Colonial Office to Acting Sarawak Government Agent, J.A. 
Smith, 14 December 1945, CO 531/31/1 [53077] .
5 Minute by Galsworthy, 8 December 1945, CO 531/31/1 [53077].
6 Minute by Paskin, 28 November 1945, ibid.
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to  t a k e  o v e r  a l l  o f  S a r a w a k ’s r e m a in i n g  r e s e r v e s .
I n s t e a d ,  however ,  MacBryan a r r a n g e d  a m e e t in g  w i t h  Gent
a t  which  he  s t r e s s e d  t h e  R a j a h ' s  w ish  t h a t  t h e r e  s h o u ld  be an e a r l y
and o v e r a l l  f i n a n c i a l  s e t t l e m e n t .  He p r o p o se d  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a
Sarawak Sta te  Trust Fund t o  be f i n a n c e d  w i t h  £ 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  from Sarawak
government  f u n d s  t o  be a d m i n i s t e r e d  by t h r e e  t r u s t e e s ,  two a p p o i n t e d
by t h e  Sarawak government  and t h e  o t h e r  by t h e  B r i t i s h  governm en t .
The Fund,  wh ich  MacBryan saw as  t h e  R a j a h ' s  q u id  p ro  quo f o r
c e s s i o n ,  would  e a r n  £30 ,000  a n n u a l l y  f rom which  a l l o w a n c e s  would be
p a i d  t o  t h e  R a ja h  and h i s  d e p e n d a n t s .  The r e m a in d e r  would be u sed
f o r  e d u c a t i o n a l  p u r p o s e s  and a f t e r  an a g r e e d  t im e  t h e  Fund would p a s s
from t h e  Brooke f a m i l y  and he h e l d  ' f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  p e o p l e
of  S a r a w a k ' . ^  MacBryan p r o p o s e d  t o  o b t a i n  t h e  ag reem en t  o f  t h e
2d a t u s  t o  t h e  Fund d u r i n g  h i s  f o r t h c o m i n g  v i s i t .  Gent d i d  n o t
commit t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  t o  a c c e p t i n g  t h e  Fund a l t h o u g h  he  was
p r e p a r e d  t o  g i v e  i t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  I n  t h e  meant ime he  w r o t e  t o  t h e
Ra jah  s e e k i n g  a g re e m e n t  on r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  r e l i e f  and
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  s u p p l i e s  and e q u ip m e n t .  Nor was he p r e p a r e d  t o  a c c e p t
MacBryan' s  c l a i m  t h e  Sarawak government  had  no power t o  d i s p o s e  o f
3
funds  w i t h o u t  t h e  c o n s e n t  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  N e g r i .
Sm ith  and MacBryan met  Gent  a g a i n  on 18 December t o
r e i t e r a t e  t h e  R a j a h ' s  w ish  t h a t  t h e r e  s h o u l d  be  one o v e r a l l  f i n a n c i a l
s e t t l e m e n t  r a t h e r  t h a n  a number o f  s e p a r a t e  a g r e e m e n t s .  A f t e r
d i s c u s s i o n  i t  was f i n a l l y  a g r e e d  t h a t  MacBryan' s  commission  f o r  h i s
p r o j e c t e d  v i s i t  t o  Sarawak s h o u l d  a l l o w  him t o  a t t e m p t  t o  s e c u r e
' g e n e r a l  f i n a n c i a l  powers  f o r  t h e  R a j a h '  on t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t
he  s h o u l d  n o t  s e e k  ag re e m e n t  on any s p e c i f i c  p r o p o s a l ,  such  as  t h e
4
Sarawak S t a t e  T r u s t  Fund. When MacBryan s u b s e q u e n t l y  o b t a i n e d  t h e  
ag reem en t  t o  t h e  Fund i n  t h e  fo rm  o f  an O rder  i s s u e d  by t h e  C o u n c i l  on 
5 J a n u a r y  1946 ,^  t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  was p r e s e n t e d  w i t h  a f a i t  a c c o m p l i .
1 MacBryan t o  P e r c e v a l  L lo y d ,  24 O c to b e r  1947,  Hussey P a p e r s .
The Ra jah  was t o  r e c e i v e  £10 ,000  a y e a r ,  t h e  R anee  £ 3 ,0 0 0 ,
E l i z a b e t h  and V a l e r i e  £2 ,0 00  e a c h ,  B e r t r a m  £5 ,000  and Anthony 
£3 ,0 0 0 .
2 Minute  by G a l s w o r th y ,  8 December 1945,  CO 5 3 1 / 3 1 / 1 [ 5 3 0 7 7 ] .
3 Gent t o  Vyner  B rooke ,  13 December 1945,  i b i d .
4 Minute  by G a l s w o r th y ,  18 December 1945,  i b i d .
See C h a p te r  V I I ,  p . 3 1 4 .5
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When he announced the cession in February 1946, Hall 
revealed that the Rajah would hand over Sarawak together with its 
accumulated reserves of £2,750,000 and Post Office Savings Bank 
account of £77,000 on the understanding that £1,000,000 should be 
set aside for a trust fund. This would provide for the Rajah and 
his dependants and ’certain local functionaries’ on a scale similar 
to that which existed before the Japanese invastion. The beneficiaries 
would be named and the benefits limited to their lifetimes, after 
which the income ’would be devoted to social and other measures 
designed for the progress and benefit of the people of the territory, 
thus providing a permanent memorial to the rule of the Brooke family 
in Sarawak.'*'
However, at two meetings in March 1946 attended by
MacBryan the Colonial Office apparently decided that the proposal
for a £1,000,000 Fund should be dropped because of income tax
difficulties and that instead £30,000 should be paid annually out of
Sarawak's revenues to the trustees from which the pensions would
then be paid, the remainder being allocated to 'social and other 
2measures’. These might still be subject to income tax and Gent
was probably attracted to Smith's suggestion (made while MacBryan
was in Sarawak) that there was really no need for the Fund and that
3the pensions could be paid direct from Sarawak revenues.
Although the Rajah does not seem to have understood or
even followed the discussions over the Fund, he assumed that it
would be established and informed the Singapore press to this effect4
on his way out to Sarawak in April. But on 9 May he received a 
cable from Hall informing him that any pension would still be liable 
to income tax and suggesting that he retain £50,000 of the proceeds 
of the 1912 Sarawak State Advisory Council Trust Fund
1 Hansard^ 6 February 1946.
2 Creech-Jones to Vyner Brooke, 20 September 1948, Hussey Papers.
3 Ibid.
4 Sarawak T r i b u n e 16 April 1946.
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instead. Responding to this, the Rajah indicated that he would
retain £100,000, the balance of the Fund's assets, estimated at
2£50,000, to be placed in trust for educational purposes. The
£100,000 would be for himself and his immediate family 'in lieu
of any other claim for Trust Fund or Sarawak revenues' and he would
ask the Council Negri to pass a bill granting annual pensions to
3Betram, Anthony and the datus. This was the basis of the Rajah's 
Dependants ' Ordinance enacted by the Council Negri on 17 May 1946 
under which Bertram was granted a pension of £5,000 p.a. and 
Anthony £2,800 while the datus were to receive from $12,000 p.a.
3(Datu Patinggi) to $1,800 (Datu Pahlawan) in order of seniority.
It also said that the Order of 5 January 1946 setting up
the Sarawak State Trust Fund was deemed to have had no effect. In
1 Hall to Vyner Brooke, 9 May 1946, Hussey Papers.
2 Vyner Brooke to Hall, 11 May 1946, ibid. When the balance was 
found to amount to £70,000, the Rajah agreed that £50,000 should 
be spent on buildings for a teachers' college in Kuching to be 
known as the Rajah Brooke Training Centre3 and that the remaining 
£20,000 should go to the Rajah of Sarawak Fund (see Chapter III, pp. 
74-5) which had been established in 1930. Creech-Jones to
Vyner Brooke, 20 September 1948, Brooke Papers, Box 6/1 . The 
Rajah of Sarawak Fund was administered by the Colonial Office 
for the benefit of sons of daughters of British colonial officers 
until a few years ago when Lord Tanlaw (Simon Brooke Mackay, the 
Rajah's grandson) succeeded in having the remaining capital 
transferred to a new trust known as the Sarawak Foundation which now 
offers a limited number of scholarships for study in Britain to 
Sarawak students.
3 Order No.R.17 (Rajah's Dependants) 1946, SGG3 25 May 1946. In 
a document dated 30 June 1946 the Rajah specified further 
dependants, CO 531/32 [53185]. MacBryan and Smith were both 
granted pensions of £500 p.a. as the Rajah's trustees. Among the 
other beneficiaries was Esca Daykin's widow. (See Chapter I,
p.16).
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spite of all MacBryan's subsequent efforts to revive it, based on 
the contention that the 5 January Order had never been formally 
repealed, the Sarawak State Trust Fund remained a dead letter.
The Reasons for Cession
Two explanations have been offered for the Rajah’s decision to cede 
Sarawak: the Rajah’s and the popular view of the time, neither of 
which is particularly illuminating as it stands. Not the least 
of the historian's problems is that the Rajah left pathetically 
little of his own writing on this or any other subject. Apart from 
what may eventually be revealed in the Colonial Office files, his 
only surviving comment is in a letter to his former Private 
Secretary, B.J.C. Spurway, 14 years after cession, a propos of
1 Having failed to interest the Rajah in reviving the question 
of the Trust Fund, MacBryan visited Kuching in May 1950 where 
he had talks with the Chief Secretary and the Attorney-General. 
However, the colonial government took the view (shared by 
Sir Roland Braddell whom MacBryan had consulted) that legally 
speaking there was no Trust. MacBryan to Mrs Evelyn Hussey,
10 May 1950, Hussey Papers; [Digby?] to Mark Morrison, 
n.d., Mark Morrison Papers, Item 4; Sarawak Tribune 3 23 
June 1950. This reverse, together with his subsequent 
failure to prevent the proclamation of Pangeran Muda Omar 
Ali as successor to Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin of Brunei on the 
latter’s death brought about a nervous breakdown which led 
to his certification and forcible deportation to Singapore 
for treatment. Sarawak Tribune^ 23 June 1950. Before 
Tajuddin died he had appointed MacBryan Political Adviser 
for his planned visit to England (where he proposed to ask 
for increased oil royalties) and trustee of the political 
rights of his daughter, Tuanku Ehsan, whom he wished to 
succeed him. MacBryan to Mrs Hussey, 27 October 1950, Hussey 
Papers; see also, Chapter III, p.89. When the Colonial 
Office refused to recognize Tuanku Ehsan as heir to the 
throne, MacBryan claimed that the coronation of Omar Ali 
would be invalid without an item of the royal regalia (the 
tongkat utar or snake-headed staff of office) with which 
Tajuddin had entrusted him. After release in Singapore, 
MacBryan went to Hong Kong where he died in highly mysterious 
circumstances c.1951. The tongkat ular disappeared (as did 
most of his papers) and is still the subject of controversy 
in Brunei. MacBryan would make a fascinating subject for a 
biography.
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Robert Payne's book The White Rajahs of Sarawak  ^which had recently 
appeared:
... I am glad you liked Payne's book. I think it 
was very fair. I was very criticized when I gave 
up Sarawak in '46, but I did it for the best, as 
I had no trust in Peter, and I saw too much of my 
father, when in his dotage. ^arawak is no place 
for aged or aging Rajah's ...
3It is also the explanation favoured by Sir Steven Runciman.
However, the Rajah's remarks must be assessed in the light of the 
fact that he had indeed been 'very criticized' and in attempting 
to defend himself may have produced his own mythology of what 
happened. Even when all the surviving records for the period are 
made public, the basis for assessing the Rajah's personal motivation 
may be no more substantial than it is today.
First of all, it is fairly clear that the Rajah never had 
any intention of returning to Sarawak after the war to resume the 
reins of office. Then aged 72 and with his energies failing, his 
main wish seems to have been for a quiet life in England where he 
could pursue his old love of gardening and attend the occasional race­
meeting. The prospect of financing and supervising the reconstruction 
made necessary by the war, the extent of which was as yet unknown, 
must have been daunting to say the least. Then there was the 
question of Anthony. It may have been that his nephew's inflexibility 
in the negotiations with the Colonial Office finally persuaded the 
Rajah that he should not succeed him and that Sarawak should instead 
become a colony of the Crown. As we have seen, Vyner had become 
exasperated with Anthony on a number of previous occasions and had
1 London 1960. Payne does not mention negotiations with the 
Colonial Office and makes the superficial judgement that 
'alone, on his own responsibility, Vyner decided the time 
was soon coming when Sarawak would have to take its place 
among the possessions of the British Commonwealth'. 
p.176.
2 Vyner Brooke to Spurway, 7 October 1960. Letter in the 
possession of Mr B.J.C. Spurway.
3 '[The Rajah] himself seems to have been moved by distrust 
of his heir, and his own age and poor health. But he 
could give more valid reasons ...’ The White Rajahs ..., 
p.259.
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very serious doubts about his nephew’s suitability to become 
Raj ah.
More importantly, it may have seemed to him by late 1945 
that there was something inevitable about a Colonial Office takeover. 
Pressure for Colonial Office intervention in Sarawak's internal 
affairs had mounted in the immediate pre-war years and a Labour 
government could only be expected to behave less sympathetically. In 
October 1941 the Rajah had signed a Supplementary Agreement allowing 
for the appointment of a British Representative and must have known 
which way this arrangement was pointing. He may well have taken 
the view that there could be no practical compromise between 
autocratic Brooke rule and rule by the Colonial Office through an 
MCS-type administration.^
Announcing the cession in the House of Commons on 
6 February 1946, Hall was at some pains to emphasize that the Rajah 
had not been forced into making the decision. Indeed, he added, 
the initiative had come from the Rajah himself when he found that
2the terms suggested by the Colonial Office did not go far enough.
This may be true, but there may also have been a careful effort to
prepare the ground for such a suggestion. There were a number of
problems which could easily have been introduced as a subtle means of
persuading the Rajah that there was no point in retaining his
sovereignty. The most important of these was probably the cost of
the military administration (part of which the Sarawak Commission in
31944 had agreed to bear) and the cost of relief and rehabilitation 
supplies and equipment, which together would eat up all of Sarawak's 
remaining reserve funds. This would have provided effective leverage 
on the Rajah who was already known to be unenthusiastic about resuming 
his responsibilities and concerned to make a financial settlement 
providing for the Ranee and their daughters. Hall's statement may 
have been true as far as it went, but it tells us nothing of the
1 Personal communication from Mr K.H. Digby, 8 September 1974.
2 Hansard3 6 February 1946.
3 Paskin to Sarawak Government Agent, 7 December 1944, ref.no. 
55104/10/A/44, cited in a letter from the Colonial Office
to Smith, 14 December 1945, CO 531/31/1 [53077].
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R a j a h ' s  m o t i v e s  and t h e  p r e s s u r e s  which  may have b e e n  b r o u g h t  to  
b e a r  on him i n  a d i p l o m a t i c  way by t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e .
The p o p u l a r  v iew was t h a t  t h e  Ra jah  s o l d  Sarawak to  t h e  
B r i t i s h  go v e rn m e n t ,  t h e r e b y  s t i r r i n g  up a f a m i ly  row. Newspaper 
r e p o r t s  a t  t h e  t im e  c e r t a i n l y  gave t h i s  i m p r e s s i o n  and  t h e r e  a r e  
some fo rm e r  Sarawak o f f i c e r s  and t h e i r  w ives  who s t i l l  b e l i e v e  i t  
t o  have  b e e n  t h e  case."*' C e r t a i n l y ,  t h e  R a j a h ' s  p r e o c c u p a t i o n  from 
t h e  l a t e  1930s w i t h  making f i n a n c i a l  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  h i s  f a m i ly  
s u p p o r t s  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  The R a j a h ' s  ' s a l e '  o f  h i s  a u t o c r a t i c  
powers t o  t h e  Committee  o f  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  f o r  $ 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  i n  1941 and 
h i s  l a t e r  a t t e m p t  i n  A u s t r a l i a  t o  t a k e  o v e r  S a r a w a k ' s  a s s e t s  
s t r o n g l y  s u g g e s t  a w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  d i s p o s e  o f  Sarawak f o r  c a s h ,  
r e g a r d l e s s  o f  h i s  b r o t h e r ' s  and  n e p h e w 's  r i g h t s  o r  ' t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  t h e  n a t i v e s ' .
I n s t e a d  o f  t h e  £ 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  which  t h e  Ra jah  r e c e i v e d  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  p o p u l a r  rumour ,  however ,  what  he i n  f a c t  r e c e i v e d  as 
a c o nsequence  o f  h i s  a g reem en t  t o  cede Sarawk t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  Crown 
was t h e  £100 ,000  c a p i t a l  o f  t h e  Fund e s t a b l i s h e d  by h i s  f a t h e r  i n  
1912 a g a i n s t  j u s t  such  a c o n t i n g e n c y .  ' C l e a r l y ,  Vyner  Brooke d i d  
n o t  a g r e e  t o  c e s s i o n  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  g a i n .  His  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  was ,  v e r y  
s i m p l y ,  t h a t  he  and h i s  f a m i ly  would  be no worse o f f  as  a r e s u l t  
o f  c e s s i o n .  I n  f a c t ,  w i t h  a c a p i t a l  sum o f  £100 ,000  which was 
s u b j e c t  to  income t a x  and w i t h  a w i f e  and two d a u g h t e r s  t o  m a i n t a i n  
i n  t h e  s t y l e  t o  which  t h e y  were  a c cu s to m e d ,  he  was q u i t e  d e f i n i t e l y
1 The Ra jah  h i m s e l f  made r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h i s  i n  a  1956 
p e t i t i o n  t o  t h e  Queen, e m p h a s i z i n g  t h a t  ' i n  f a c t  no 
f i n a n c i a l  c o m p e n s a t i o n ,  p e c u n i a r y  p r o f i t ,  n o r  
recom pense  o f  any k i n d  was r e c e i v e d  . . .  i n  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  . . .  C e s s io n  . . . '  and a s k i n g  t h a t  
e v e r y t h i n g  be  done t o  make i t  p l a i n  t h a t  t h e  rumour 
was ' u n t r u e  and d e f a m a t o r y ' .  He a l s o  c om pla ined  t h a t  
H a l l  had  n o t  honou red  h i s  6 F e b r u a r y  1946 u n d e r t a k i n g  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  Sarawak S t a t e  T r u s t  Fund. The 
f o r m a l  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  p e t i t i o n ,  how ever ,  was t o  
r e q u e s t  t h a t  t h e  Nine C a r d i n a l  P r i n c i p l e s  s h o u l d  be 
i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  new c o n s t i t u t i o n  which  was t o  be 
g r a n t e d  t o  Sarawak.  P e t i t i o n  d a t e d  10 F e b r u a r y  1956,  
Brooke P a p e r s ,  Box 1 2 / 2 .
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w orse  o f f .  U n l ik e  t h e  d i r e c t o r s  o f  t h e  C h a r te r e d  Company whose
i n t e r e s t  i n  o b t a i n i n g  t h e  b e s t  p o s s i b l e  f i n a n c i a l  s e t t l e m e n t  f o r
t h e i r  s h a r e h o l d e r s  and more r e a l i s t i c  a t t i t u d e  to w a rd s  t h e
C o lo n ia l  O f f i c e  k e p t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  on t h e  a n n e x a t io n  o f  N o r th  Borneo
2
go ing  u n t i l  m id -1946 , t h e  R a jah  had  been  p r e p a r e d  to  p l a c e  h i s  
t r u s t  i n  a g e n t l e m e n 's  a g re e m e n t .  Even i f  he  had  been  p r e p a r e d  to  
d r i v e  a h a r d e r  b a r g a i n ,  t h e r e  was no b i g  b u s i n e s s  i n t e r e s t  to  lobby  
i n  h i s  s u p p o r t .
The R a j a h ' s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  g iv e  up h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
and h i s  l a c k  o f  c o n f id e n c e  i n  Anthony w ere  v i t a l  f a c t o r s  i n  making 
c e s s i o n  p o s s i b l e .  However, i n  J u l y  o r  A ugust 1945 th e  Labour 
governm ent seems t o  have  d e c id e d  t h a t  Brooke r u l e  s h o u ld  come to  
an en d .  Once t h e  d e c i s i o n  had  been  made, i t  was p o l i t i c a l l y  im p o r ta n t  
t h a t  th e  i n i t i a t i v e  s h o u ld  be  s e e n  to  come from t h e  R a ja h .  There  
was a l s o  a need  to  o b t a i n  a t  l e a s t  to k e n  a p p r o v a l  from  th e  p e o p le  o f  
Saraw ak , h e n c e  t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e ' s  ag reem en t  t h a t  MacBryan s h o u ld  
be d e s p a tc h e d  to  Sarawak as  soon  as  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  m i l i t a r y  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  was e f f e c t i v e l y  a t  an end i n  l a t e  December 1945.
Concern a b o u t  p o s s i b l e  A u s t r a l i a n  r e a c t i o n s  was s t i l l  s u f f i c i e n t  
f o r  t h e  p u rp o se  o f  M acB ryan 's  v i s i t  t o  be  k e p t  s e c r e t  and f o r  a 
s p e c i a l  C o lo n ia l  O f f i c e  e m is s a r y  ( J . J .  P a s k in )  to  be s e n t  s p e c i a l l y  
to  in fo rm  M acask ie .
B e fo re  t h e  war a C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  memorandum i n d i c a t e d  
s t r o n g  i n t e r e s t  i n  S a ra w a k 's  r e s o u r c e s  and th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  i n  s p i t e
1 Of t h e  £ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,  MacBryan was a p p a r e n t l y  g iv e n  £10 ,000
by t h e  R a ja h .  From August 1948 t h e  R ajah  became in v o lv e d  
i n  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  w i th  t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  o v e r  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  s e t t l e m e n t .  He c o n t in u e d  to  r e f e r  t o  H a l l ' s  
v e r b a l  a s s u r a n c e  o f  24 O c to b e r  1945 t h a t  he and h i s  
f a m i ly  and o t h e r  d e p e n d a n ts  w ould  be  'n o  w o rse  o f f '  as 
a r e s u l t  o f  c e s s i o n .  S ee ,  e . g . ,  C re e c h -J o n e s  to  
Vyner B rooke , 20 S ep tem ber 1948 , Brooke P a p e r s ,  Box 6 / 1 ;
Vyner Brooke to  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  (James G r i f f i t h s )
12 December 1950, Hussey P a p e r s .  I t  was s u g g e s t e d  to  
C re e c h -J o n e s  i n  1949 t h a t  t h e  R a jah  s h o u ld  be  made a 
p e e r .  However, t h e  Labour p a r t y  d e c l i n e d  to  c o n f e r  
t h i s  h o n o u r ,  p r o b a b ly  i n  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  would  
lo o k  to o  much l i k e  a p a y - o f f .
2 No a c c o u n t  i s  a v a i l a b l e  o f  t h e s e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
3 M acask ie  to  W .P.N .L . D i tm a s ,  24 December 1945, M acask ie  P a p e r s ,  
F i l e  2.
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of the doubtful future of oil the state would ultimately prove
to possess enormous economic potential.^ The only arguments which
could be used at that time to justify a British takeover were (i) that
exploitation of Sarawak's resources was essential in order to
finance the provision of social services on a par with those
available in British colonies; (ii) that Sarawak could be used in
resisting any southwards sweep by Japan; and (iii) that the longer
a takeover was postponed, the more difficult international opinion 
2would make it. However, the Japanese invasion and the dangers 
which nationalism and international opinion posed for British 
interests suggested the new argument that in the post-war 'reconstruction' 
of Southeast Asia, small states like Sarawak could not be allowed to 
survive.
1 See Chapter IV, pp.172-3.
2 Ibid.
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CHAPTER VII
The Legitimization of Cession
ONCE Sarawak’s future had been decided by the Rajah and the Colonial 
Office, all that remained was the problem of how to legitimize the 
transfer of sovereignty. Confident of MacBryan's ability to persuade 
the Malay and Chinese leaders to give their approval, the Rajah 
assured the Colonial Office that this would suffice. The repercussions 
of MacBryan’s visit and the unexpected opposition of the Malay National 
Union overturned the original plan. However, in its subsequent 
arrangements designed to make cession legally defensible the Colonial 
Office was primarily concerned with British domestic opposition. The 
two-man parliamentary mission to 'ascertain native views’ was 
itself no more than a sop to parliamentary and press opinion. Although 
the Rajah had originally felt that European officers should not vote 
on the cession issue and that there should be a secret ballot, cession 
was passed by a European majority on a show of hands. The Colonial 
Office representative and a handful of Brooke officers had played a 
key role in ensuring that cession went through and when the Colonial 
Office displayed a last-minute attack of nerves, Chance itself made a 
decisive entrance. Altogether the cession was a grubby affair, but 
if it was to go through it could hardly have been otherwise.
MacBryan's Visit
The Colonial Office was loath to have MacBryan further involved in 
the cession arrangements but the Rajah insisted that he was the only 
person who could secure the agreement of the Sarawak leaders.
MacBryan's dubious record raised some important eyebrows in the War 
Office and the question was debated at the highest level before 
permission could finally be obtained for him to visit Sarawak. Even 
then it was only on the strict condition that he was accompanied by 
an officer of the MCS, W.C.S. Corry. Approval was obtained from the
1 The original choice, J.G. Black, had fallen ill.
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Australian Army Department for the two men to visit the war zone but 
the War Office continued to express its doubts to SEAC headquarters. 
Informing Mountbatten's Chief of Staff, Brigadier E.C. Gibbons, of 
the projected visit and its importance for the constitutional future 
of Borneo, the War Office expressed its serious reservations about 
MacBryan:
However much we may deplore the instrument chosen for 
this mission [the] choice has been made by the 
S[ecretary] of S[tate] for Colonies with his eyes 
open and War Office at Army Council level has agreed 
to the individual in question being sent out for the 
purpose. Corry has been fully instructed and told 
not to let him out of his sight. 2
3Hall had himself informed Mountbatten of the situation. MacBryan's 
mission was the price which had to be.paid for the 24 October agree­
ment .
From what is known of MacBryan's visit there are some
obvious parallels with Sir Harold MacMichael's mission to the Malay
4rulers in late 1945. Both men were determined to obtain approval 
for a course of action which had already been decided and were not 
too particular about the methods they used. While there is no 
evidence that MacBryan actually used the threat of prosecution for 
collaboration in order to pressure the datus,~* it is likely that he 
exploited their very real fears by promising immunity. There had 
been talk among some of the Brooke officers released from prison
ß
camp of investigating the actions of Tuanku Bujang and Abang Openg, 
two Native Officers who had served as Ken Sanji. And in September 
there was 'an atmosphere of considerable uneasiness as to what 
attitude the Authorities would take vis a vis those who had worked
1 War Office to Mountbatten, 21 December 1945, WO 203/5535.
2 War Office to Gibbons, 19 December 1945, WO 203/3973.
3 Hall to Mountbatten, 15 December 1945, ibid.
4 See Allen, The Malayan Union, pp. 168-72.
5 This is suggested by Elaine McKay, 'The Kuching Communities...', 
pp. 94-7.
6 Report by D.C. White to R.L. Daubeny [September 1945], AWM 
A2663, 376/5/13.
311
for the Japanese...'.'*' There is no way of verifying later accusations 
that MacBryan used trickery and even force to obtain the signatures 
he wanted but it is clear that he deliberately misrepresented Bertram 
and Anthony Brooke as having given their consent to the cession.
MacBryan and Corry arrived at Labuan in late December and 
after a meeting with Macaskie and Paskin they went on to Kuching.
There are three versions of what happened during the following week, 
the first being MacBryan's own account to the Rajah two years after 
the event:
... When you sent me to Sarawak to obtain agreement to 
the cession I explained to the native members of the 
Councils (and to old Tiang Swee too) that if they con­
ceded your wish for cession in their interests and 
allowed the establishment of the Sarawak State Trust 
Fund... the natives would be the real beneficiaries... 
because the interest on the fund, as each member of 
your "family" died, would become available for scholar­
ships on the lines of Rhodes scholarships. By this 
arrangement, as time went on, there would be in Sarawak 
a number of highly educated natives who would perpetuate 
the Brooke tradition in the East to the lasting advantage 
of the natives and the British. When they understood 
this all the members of the Councils, including the Datu 
Patinggi, were only too glad to sign the instruments 
providing for cession which I brought back with me.... 2
The two other versions are contained in letters written by
3the Datu Patinggi at the time and an account given by Ong Tiang
4Swee and Tuanku Bujang to Pollard in May. While there are some gaps 
and inconsistencies, it is possible to piece together a reasonably 
accurate picture of what took place. MacBryan’s first step was to 
visit each of the datus and Ong Tiang Swee separately, seeking their 
signatures to a 'letter' which would give the Rajah authority to go 
ahead with the cession. He also told them not to discuss the matter
1 Ibid.
2 MacBryan to Vyner Brooke, 3 December 1947, Hussey Papers.
3 Datu Patinggi to Gascoigne, 4 January 1946, The Facts About 
Sarawak^ pp. 89-90; Datu Patinggi to Archer, 8 January 1946, 
ibid., p. 90.
'Report on Visit to Sarawak by Mr. F.H. Pollard', Hussey Papers, 
pp. 4, 11.
4
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with any tuan (European) and promised cash payments of $12,000 to the 
Datu Patinggi, $10,000 each to the Datus Menteri, Hakim, Amar and 
Pahlawan and $2,000 to the mufti Haji Nawawi, who was to witness the 
signatures. The Datu Pahlawan and Ong Tiang Swee also agreed to 
accept $42,500 each for the relief of Malays and Chinese affected by 
the war.
Only the Datu Patinggi refused to sign and the next day he 
was visited by the Datus Amar and Menteri, together with Abang Mohd. 
Daim^jwho told him that they feared for his safety if he did not 
conform with MacBryan's wishes. On 4 January the Datu Patinggi wrote 
to Col. C.E. Gascoigne, Treasurer in the military administration, 
describing what had happened and asking for an inquiry into the 
circumstances of MacBryan's visit. He also asked Gascoigne to advise 
him as quickly as possible on what he should do because the document 
was due to be signed at his house on 7 January. Gascoigne, however, 
does not seem to have replied. The military administration was 
turning a blind eye on the whole affair, almost certainly on the 
instructions of the Colonial Office as conveyed by Paskin.
However, MacBryan had to move faster than he had originally
intended. A meeting of the Supreme Council was called for 5 January
and was attended by the Datus Patinggi, Pahlawan, Amar, Menteri and
Ong Tiang Swee, providing the quorum of five required under the 1941
Constitution. Corry appears to have been present throughout the
proceedings. Having displayed his power of attorney from the Rajah
which requested the Datu Patinggi to receive MacBryan as his 'envoy
and representative' and to 'carry out his orders as if they were my 
2own', MacBryan retired with the old datu to an inside room. Shortly
afterwards, MacBryan emerged and told the others that the Datu
Patinggi had refused to sign unless, in addition to the $12,000 which
had been mentioned, he was given sole rights to the eggs of the 
3Turtle Islands and the title of Datu Patinggi was made hereditary in
1 The father-in-law of the Datu Patinggi's eldest grandson, Abang 
Ibrahim.
2 Brooke Papers, Box 11/2. The document is dated November 1945 
and has the Rajah's seal.
3 See Chapter III, pp. 91-2.
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his family. When this was conceded after considerable discussion, 
MacBryan signed an agreement with the Datu Patinggi^ and all five 
members then signed two Orders-in-Council.
2The first of the Orders simply empowered MacBryan to act
as Chief Secretary until 8 January for the purpose of convening a
3meeting of the Council Negri. The second, which was probably the 
’letter' MacBryan had originally mentioned, provided that notwith­
standing the 1941 Constitution, as from 1 January 1946 ’all the 
prerogatives of the Rajah shall be exercised by the Rajah and not 
otherwise'. It stated the Rajah's intention of concluding an agreement 
with the British government for the cession of the state to the Crown 
'so that exercise of any other authority in the State except that of 
His Majesty will thereupon be determined', and that the members of 
the Supreme Council had intimated their 'unanimous advice and consent 
that now an agreement should be concluded by the Rajah'. Abang Haji 
Mustapha read out a Malay translation of this document and a version 
in jawi script was signed by all the datus present.
Following this, Ong Tiang Swee was asked to withdraw and 
MacBryan then proceeded to convene a meeting of the Council Negri 
of which, as Chief Secretary, he was ex officio President. The 
business of the Council that day consisted o^ two Orders which were 
despatched with similar speed. The first of these was an indemni­
fication Order protecting the Rajah retrospectively from all actions 
taken from 25 December 1941 until 31 December 1945 which lacked 
validity under the 1941 Constitution. What this meant in effect was 
that the Council Negri was giving a rubber stamp to all of those 
actions which the Rajah had taken in his old autocratic way: the
exercise of prerogative powers; the issue of proclamations; the 
appointment and dismissal of officers; financial disbursements, 
charges and commitments; all were now legally presumed to have been 
carried out by the Rajah 'with the advice and consent of the Supreme 
Council and the Council Negri in joint session assembled'.
1 For this document see Appendix IV.
2 These Orders and the three others mentioned below (together 
with Malay translations) were discovered by me among the papers 
now deposited by Mrs Evelyn Hussey at Rhodes House.
3 For this Order and Order No. C-22 of the Council Negri, see 
Appendix IV.
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The second Order authorized the setting aside of £1,000,000 
from the state’s reserve funds for the Sarawak State Trust Fund.
Interest on the sum was to be paid out according to the Rajah's 
absolute discretion and upon his death a number of trustees would 
assume this responsibility. Needless to say, the Rajah also possessed 
absolute discretion over the formulation of the Trust Deed and the 
selection of Trustees. 'In establishing this Fund', the Order 
concluded, 'it is the purpose of the Council Negri to assure [sic] 
that the establishments of His Highness the Rajah and of his Ministers 
shall be independently maintained in view of His Highness' decision 
to provide for the cession of the State of Sarawak to His Majesty 
the King.' The next day at the Datu Patinggi's house this truly 
extraordinary four-man assembly authorized Order No. C-22 (Constitutional 
Repeal) 1946 which repealed the 1941 Constitution in its entirety, 
thus relegating the Supreme Council and the Council Negri to limbo 
until the constitution was revived by the Rajah after civil govern­
ment had been resumed. All the documents having been signed, MacBryan 
then distributed the money explaining (probably for Corry's benefit) 
that it was back payment of salary for the war period.
MacBryan also persuaded Ong Tiang Swee and the principal 
Chinese association leaders to sign a statement of support for a new 
agreement with the British government:
We understand that the individual members of the Supreme 
Council have accorded their unanimous advice and consent 
that such an Agreement should be negotiated, and we here­
by affirm and declare our complete confidence in the 
judgment and sagacity of Your Highness and our unreserved 
support for whatever measures Your Highness determines to 
pursue, since we know full well that the paramount 
interest of Your Highness is the welfare of all the people 
of all the races dwelling in Sarawak. 1
1 Hussey Papers. The following also signed the document:
Wee Kheng Chiang 
Lee Wing Thoong 
Tan Bak Lim 
Yong Pong Chiang 
Wong Cheng Guan 
Chan Qui Chong 
Sia Lai Hin 
Woon Siang Kwang 
(unsigned)
(Hokkien Association)
(Kwong Hui Seow Association) 
(Teochew Association)
(Hakka Association)
(Foochow Association)
(Chawan Hui Kuan)
(Lui Chew Association)
(Kheng Chew Association) 
(Heng Ann Association)
Later that month, Ong Tiang Swee sent a cable to the Rajah expressing 
the appreciation of the Sarawak Chinese for the $42,500 which he had 
given. The cable also stressed the loyalty of the Chinese community 
to the Rajah and expressed the hope that he would return to Sarawak 
shortly. Neither action was publicly known in Sarawak until the end 
of January.
Returning to Singapore on 7 January, MacBryan and Corry
reported by cable to the Rajah and the Colonial Office before meeting
Mountbatten. ’The agreements reached are unanimous’, MacBryan told
the Rajah, ’and fulfil in every sense Your Highness' expectations.'^
Corry cabled the Colonial Office that the mission had been 'success- 
2fully completed'. He also wrote to Gent that as far as he could 
see it would be ’perfectly fair to go ahead with the change of status 
No sooner had MacBryan and Corry left Kuching, however, than the Datu 
Temenggong who was the Datu Patinggi's nephew^ prevailed upon his 
uncle to hand the $12,000 to Gascoigne with the explanation that it 
was a bribe.^ However, the story remained a closely-guarded secret 
in Kuching for another month and was not known to the anti-cession 
faction in London until the end of March.
Once the Orders which MacBryan had brought back for the 
Rajah's ratification were in the hands of the Colonial Office's legal 
advisers, it soon became apparent that they were of dubious legal 
validity. There were a number of possible objections, not the least
1 MacBryan to Vyner Brooke, 7 January 1946, WO 203/3974.
2 Corry to Galsworthy, 7 January 1946, WO 203/3974.
3 'Transcript of a tape recorded interview with W.C.S. Corry...', 
undated, Rhodes House MSS. Ind.Ocn. s.215. Corry later felt 
some embarrassment that he had been duped by MacBryan. 'I 
undertook this mission rather too soon after being released 
from wartime internment', he confessed later, 'My mental 
reactions were not back to normal and I have subsequently 
regretted having agreed to go to Sarawak so soon'. 'Transcript... 
op. cit.; interview with Sir Dennis White, 22 January 1975.
4 Abang Kipali had been appointed Datu Temenggong in March 1941.
He was not a member of the Supreme Council until April 1946.
He is the only surviving Brooke datu.
5 'Report on Visit to Sarawak by Mr F.H. Pollard', Hussey Papers,
p. 11.
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being that the state was under a military administration which did 
not recognize the legal authority of any previously constituted civil 
body. Furthermore, the ad hoc meetings of a handful of members 
called by MacBryan did not even begin to satisfy the formal require­
ments laid down by the 1941 Constitution. Finally, there was the 
nice legal point of whether the Raj ah-in-Council, as established by 
the 1941 Constitution, possessed the authority to repeal that 
constitution in its entirety and return to the status quo ante in 
which the Rajah’s prerogative powers were absolute. If presented as 
formal proof that the Rajah had been authorized by the two councils 
to proceed with cession, the documents would have been laughed out 
of court.
The interest already being displayed by such eminent 
authorities as Margery Perham,and Anthony Brooke's unfavourable 
publicity of MacBryan's background,meant that the Colonial Office 
was doubly defensive about the special emissary's mission. In late 
January, according to one source, the Colonial Office had been 
'brought to a halt' on Sarawak and did not know what to do.~^  The 
possibility of reconvening the Provisional Government was even being 
considered, although this would have upset the Rajah considerably.
The problem was to find some alternative means of legitimization 
which would not present too many difficulties in execution and which 
would withstand the attacks bound to be made by the anti-cession 
faction in England and the Conservative Party.
It was quickly decided that the cession would have to be 
put in the form of enabling legislation at properly constituted 
meetings of the Council Negri and Supreme Council and that the Rajah 
should visit Sarawak for that purpose. This proposal was put by 
Hall on 1 February and was immediately accepted, the Rajah no doubt 
assuming that his authority would be sufficient to guarantee that 
cession would go through without any trouble. However, the Colonial 
Office was determined that this time the matter should be properly 
settled. Enclosing drafts of the bills which were to be put to the
1 Professor Wilfrid Le Gros Clark to Margaret Noble, 28 January 
1946, Brooke Papers, Box 12/4.
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Council Negri and the Supreme Council, Creech Jones told the Rajah
in mid-March that 'every possible step should be taken to ensure
that the proceedings of the Councils comply with the Constitution
so that there may be no room for doubts and possible criticisms'."^
The Colonial Office believed that the Councils could not be regarded
as being properly constituted unless there was the full number of
appointed or non-ex officio members, although this did not apply to
ex officio members. Respecting the Rajah's feeling that it was an
issue of particular concern to non-European members and one on which
European members should not vote, it was suggested that in the absence
2of standing orders the Rajah should publicly express this view.
The Announcement of Cession
On 6 February a message from the Rajah to the people of Sarawak was
3released in London and Kuching. In this the Rajah revealed that
the King had agreed to the proposal that Sarawak should be ceded to
him. 'We believe', he said, 'that there lies, in the future, hope
for my people in the prospect of an era of awakening, enlightenment,
stability and social progress, such as they have never had before.'
The acceptance of the cession, he added, was the consummation of the
hopes of the first Rajah. Denying press reports that the British
government had sought to impose a new political order on Sarawak,
he insisted that the initiative had come from him alone. His intention
was that they should 'enjoy the more direct protection of His Majesty,
and those inestimable rights of freedom which His Majesty's citizens
enjoy'. In conclusion, the statement made an uncharacteristically
crude assertion of the Rajah's authority in language which strongly
4suggested MacBryan:
1 Creech Jones to Vyner Brooke, 12 March 1946, CO ref. no 53117/ 
1/9/46, Brooke Papers, Box 6/1.
2 Ibid.
3 Sarawak Tribune3 8 February 1946. Subsequent quotations from 
this source.
4 Bertram Brooke believed that the message had been devised by 
the Ranee and MacBryan. 'Its egotistic and flamboyant 
vulgarity', he wrote, 'is entirely inconsistent with his [Vyner's] 
character, which has many aspects - but vulgarity is not one of 
themI' Brooke Papers, Box 2/3.
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It is the case in Sarawak that all authority derives 
from the Rajah. The people trust the Rajah and what 
the Rajah advises for the people is the will of the 
people. I am the spokesman of the people's will. No 
other than myself has [the] right to speak on your 
behalf. No one of you will question whatso'er I do 
in his high interest. No power nor personal interest 
shall subvert my peoples' happiness and future. The 
happiness of your future lies within another realm.
There shall be no Rajah of Sarawak after me. My 
people will become the subjects of The King. Now 
draws near the time when I will come to you. Expect 
me soon.
THIS IS FOR YOUR GOOD MY ROYAL COMMAND.
Announcing the Rajah's decision in the House of Commons the same day, 
Hall explained that during the negotiations subsequent to the dis­
missal of the Provisional Government, the Rajah himself indicated 
that the Colonial Office's proposals did not go far enough and 
offered to cede Sarawak to the Crown subject to the agreement of the 
'Supreme State Council'. The Rajah, he continued, then sent his 
personal emissary to Sarawak 'to consult leading representatives of 
the people' and as a consequence of the 'very favourable reaction' 
of those representatives recorded in letters from leaders of the 
Malay and Chinese communities, now felt able to proceed.
The necessary document was in the process of being drawn 
up and would be 'presented to the representatives of the people for 
their agreement' on the Rajah's return to Sarawak, probably in March. 
When pressed by Oliver Stanley and other Conservatives about MacBryan, 
the necessity of going beyond the original constitutional requirements 
and other aspects of the affair, Hall put up a spirited defence.
The Rajah himself, he insisted, had come to the Colonial Office and 
'volunteered the cession'; MacBryan was accompanied by 'a very high 
official from the Colonial Office'; and the majority of members of 
the 'Council' had been approached. In the next exchange, Stanley 
pointed out that the negotiations to give the British government 
legislative power in Sarawak were initiated with the Provisional 
Government in early 1945 on the assumption that the Rajah was never 
going to return to Sarawak. It consequently seemed wrong, he said,
1 Hansard^ 6 February 1946. Subsequent quotations from this source.
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that ’something which might appear as annexation’ should be dependent 
on the opinion of the Rajah who had no personal interest in the 
state's future and on the activities of MacBryan with whom he did not 
think Hall should be associated.
Hall reminded Stanley that he had opened negotiations on the 
imposition of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, and then proceeded to 
misrepresent the 1941 Constitution as not depriving the Rajah of his 
powers and still enabling him to ’interfere with any legislation on 
any financial matter'. Cession, he concluded, would only take place 
after 'full consultation with a properly constituted Supreme State 
Council in Sarawak'. The Labour leader in the House, Herbert Morrison, 
refused to give any undertaking that the question would be fully 
debated later. 'I am bound to say', he told Anthony Eden who had 
expressed concern about the international implications, 'there is 
something curious about the indignation of the Conservative Party 
over a little bit being added to the British Empire'. Nor would Hall 
respond to a final request for assurance that no decision would be 
made until a referendum had been taken of the people of Sarawak.
One factor which assisted the anti-cession faction in 
Britain and placed the government and the Rajah on the defensive from 
the outset was the general impression that the Rajah had 'sold out’ 
for £1,000,000. 'Britain Buys Sarawak. Rajah Hands It Over:
£1,000,000 Fund', ran the Evening Standard headline that afternoon, 
but the significance of the Fund was lost on most readers. 'It is 
not a deal in any sense of the word', protested MacBryan in the Daily 
Herald on 7 February. 'It is a manifestation of the progressive 
viewpoint of Sir Charles.' But the same day the Daily Express reported 
a party which the Rajah and Ranee had given at Ciro's Club to celebrate 
what it called the '£1,000,000 compensation' paid to the Brookes. It 
also reported the Ranee's rather distorted view of Brooke history. 'I 
think the Rajah deserves it after all his years in that country', she 
said in response to a toast in 'stingers'.^ 'He has been striving 
for incorporation in the Empire all his life, just as the first and 
second rajahs fought for it all their lives.'
1 A corruption of stengah (half) which was pidgin Malay for half 
whiskey and soda.
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Evidently anticipating something of the kind ever since the 
dismissal of the Provisional Government in October, and particularly 
after the Malayan Union White Paper on 22 January,^ Anthony was quick 
to issue a statement:
It is for the British Government and the Rajah of Sarawak 
to convince the world that this transaction amounts to 
anything more than crude Imperialism. Such a transaction, 
if allowed to stand, would defile the pages of British 
and Sarawak history. Whatever the Rajah and the British 
Government may say, sovereignty resides in the people of 
Sarawak and the rights of the people are not for sale. I 
shall personally oppose the measure by every means in my 
power. 2
However, the British press took a generally complacent view of the 
affair. There were predictable regrets that ’the most romantic
3kingdom in Asia will cease to exist’ but most British newspapers
accepted the argument that there was no place for weak states in the
post-war ’reconstruction’ of East Asia. Admitting that the cession
was 'a rather queer business’ and sceptical as to the means by which
consent had been obtained, the Manchester Guardian editorial of 8
February nevertheless felt that there was nothing to be done. '... To
go back on the Rajah’s decision would be to create instability and4the very evils everybody is trying to avoid'.
1 See, e.g., the Yorkshire Post3 21 January 1946; The Times3 
23 January 1946; The Daily Telegraphy 26 January 1946;
New Statesman and Nation3 26 January 1946.
2 Manchester Guardian_, 7 February 1946. See also Bertram 
Brooke's letter to The Times3 9 February 1946.
3 The Times 3 7 February 1946.
4 Manchester Guardian3 8 February 1946. The only strongly 
critical views were expressed in The Observer and the Sunday 
Times of 10 February 1946. The editor of the Sunday Times3 
H.V.Hodson, was sympathetic to Bertram and Anthony Brooke.
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Reactions in Sarawak
Although the British press had been speculating about the future of
Sarawak since October 1945 and there had been echoes in Singapore,
little information had reached Sarawak itself. MacBryan had caused
a ripple within a small section of Kuching's Malay community but the
significance of his visit was not widely understood. The first
indication of Sarawak's future came when Singapore Radio broadcast
a London Times editorial on the Malayan Union White Paper of 22
January, suggesting that Sarawak, Brunei, North Borneo and Labuan
might be included.'*' Initially, of course, the news was confined to
those who possessed radio sets (no more than 500 in the whole state
2before the war) and had access to the Chinese-owned and operated
3
Sarawak Tribune or the Chinese language newspapers. Consequently 
the first recorded reactions to a change of status were those of the 
Kuching and Sibu Chinese who were generally favourable towards 
incorporation.
Immediately after the Singapore Radio broadcast the Hua 
Kheow Tshin Nieh called a three-day meeting in Kuching which was 
attended by more than forty delegates from various Chinese associations. 
However, interest focussed more on Ong Tiang Swee and the question of 
Chinese political representation than the future of Sarawak. On the 
first day (27 January) the meeting passed four important resolutions:
(i) to choose five delegates who would interview Ong Tiang Swee 
about the letter to the Rajah which he and the other Chinese 
leaders had signed for MacBryan;
(ii) to request all those who had signed to send telegrams to 
the Colonial Office stating that the letter 'did not 
represent the aspirations and wishes of the Chinese 
community';
1 The Timesj 23 January 1946.
2 Interview with Mr H.P. Buxton, Bintulu, July 1974.
3 The Rajah's 6 February message was published in the Sarawak 
Tribune of 8 February 1946 and Hall's statement on 11 February.
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(iii) to establish an 'Overseas Chinese Committee for the 
Promotion of Democratic Politics';
(iv) to organize a supreme authority for the Sarawak Chinese.^"
Indignation at Ong Tiang Swee's actions ran high during the meeting
and on the first day the delegates decided that a telegram should be
sent to the Colonial Secretary 'stating that Mr Ong Tiang Swee and
others who signed the document... were acting on their own initiative:
their actions were against the public opinion of the Chinese
community; and requesting the practice of democratic politics in 
2Sarawak'. Meanwhile in Sibu a meeting of delegates from similar 
associations which had originally been intended to organize a reception 
for the Rajah's home-coming, cancelled its plans after hearing 
Singapore Radio. Interestingly enough, its leading lights were under 
the impression that if the people of Sarawak wanted self-government, 
the Rajah would return to resume his old position. Otherwise the 
Colonial Office would consider handing it over to the United Nations 
as a trust territory. Writing to the Sibu Hu a Kiccw Jit Pau (Overseas 
Chinese Daily News), Yao Ken Swee said that in view of the victory of 
democratic countries, it was clear that Sarawak should also follow 
the trend which was developing in Malaya towards democracy. The 
Atlantic Charter and the San Francisco meeting, he continued, required 
the power of government to be handed back to the people. Fundamental 
human rights and the rights of all communities could then be protected. 
Calling on the Chinese of Sibu not to wash their hands of Sarawak's 
political future, he advocated the establishment of a 'committee for 
the promotion of democracy'. 'We should not be treated as guests or 
foreigners in Sarawak;' he concluded, 'we are the people of Sarawak. 
Whether Sarawak is to be self-governing or to come under the trustee-
1 Hua Kiaw Jit Pau (Overseas Chinese Daily News) (Sibu), 6 February 
1946.
2 Ibid.
3 Hua Kiaw Jit Pau3 29 January 1946; see also the letter by Yao 
Ken Swee to the same newspaper published on 8 February 1946.
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ship of the United Nations in future, our "committee for the promotion 
of democracy" should be formed.'"*"
In self defence, Ong Tiang Swee wrote to the Sarawak Tribune
in late February regretting that his cable of thanks to the Rajah
had given rise to ’misinterpretation’ and ’misunderstandings'. He
explained that the action had been taken in the belief that the Rajah
was returning and that there was no possibility of a change in
Sarawak's future status. ’The need for consultation with regard to
the despatch of the message therefore did not arise at that time’,
2he wrote, ’as it was considered a mere formality.’ He added that 
since the Rajah had apparently made his decision before the cable 
was sent, it could hardly be regarded as having affected the situation 
in any way.
It was not until after the Rajah’s message of 6 February 
that there was general Chinese comment, the assumption still being 
that Sarawak would form part of the Malayan Union and that the 
Sarawak Chinese would enjoy the substantially improved rights of 
Malayan Union citizenship. Lim Kong Ngan, for example, saw incorpor­
ation as enabling Sarawak people to take part in politics. People of
all races, he said, would have equal rights and a democratic system
3should be adopted. Lo Fey Sian would have preferred Sarawak to be 
handed over to the United Nations but was prepared to settle for the 
Malayan Union: ’All we want’, he said, 'is to have our status
raised so that we can enjoy equal rights with the natives.’^  Ong 
Tiang Swee and Kueh Choo Seng, the diocesan registrar, both thought 
that colonial status would mean economic and commercial development 
with more opportunities for the working classes and the natives.
While the old system was most suitable to people's needs, Kueh 
continued, autocratic rule now was 'decidedly out'. Ong also favoured 
incorporation in the Malayan Union in the belief that not only would
1 Ibid. Since the issues of the Hua Kiaw Jit Pau for March and 
April 1946 are missing, it is not possible to trace the response 
to Yao Ken Swee's proposal.
2 Sarawak Tribune, 26 February 1946.
3 Sarawak Tribune, 15 February 1946.
4 Ibid.
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the Chinese have equal rights but kapitan status would be abolished 
and the powers of the datus limited. He also thought that the 
Chinese government would come to an agreement with the British govern­
ment for the protection of the rights of the Sarawak Chinese.^ In
Ngui Ah Shin's view 'what is good for the Malayan should be good
2enough for the Sarawakian'. Khan Ah Chong was the only Chinese 
interviewed who greatly regretted the loss of the Rajah and suggested 
that while cession might bring material developments, taxation would 
also increase."*
The Chinese language press was non-committal and editorial 
comment was limited to the Sarawak Tribune_,^  a young newspaper whose 
editor trod a careful path between sentimental regret at the passing 
of Brooke rule and approval of the developments which colonial status 
would bring about. Like the Chinese whose opinions the newspaper 
quoted, he emphasized that times had changed and that Sarawak must 
'go forward with the tide'. Unless there was material progress, the 
people of Sarawak would be 'living in a state of blissful backwardness 
untouched by the 20th Century human progress and civilization...'.
At the same time, he added, happiness could not be measured in miles 
of roads and railways and the volume of trade. And if progress 
created needs which could not be satisfied, 'like Esau we would have 
sold our birthright for a cup of pottage'. This was the hopeless 
dilemma which had always faced the Brookes: how to bring about
development and at the same time avoid exploitation and social dis­
ruption. The editor, Dennis Law, was representative of a group of 
mission-educated Chinese who had a stake in economic progress and 
modernization but appreciated some of the features of personal rule
1 Ibid.
2 Sarawak Tribune3 22 February 1946.
3 Sarawak Tribune3 15 February 1946.
4 The Sarawak Tribune was the successor of the Sarawak Times 
which had a brief life in 1941. There are no copies surviving.
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and were somewhat dubious as to what would replace it. No doubt 
there was an undercurrent of anxiety that another kind of government 
might not be able to exercise the same control over the Ibans whose 
recent exploits on the Rejang were well known. A good deal was seen 
to depend on the Rajah’s visit and the assurances that he could give.
On 10 February the Datu Patinggi wrote to the MNU expressing
his shock at the Rajah’s message and explaining, somewhat ingenuously,
that he had thought the document which he and the other Supreme
Council members had signed for MacBryan no more than a request that
2the Rajah should return to Sarawak. Two days later he wrote again,
3this time providing details of the payments which MacBryan had made,
a transaction which had been kept fairly secret. The response was
electric. At a special general meeting of the MNU that evening, Haji
Abdul Rahman told the members present that the cession proposal was
a 'vital problem of our history [which] is left to you to discuss
fully'. After some further speeches it was unanimously decided to
send a message to the Secretary of State and Parliament pointing out
that the people had not been consulted and expressing their wish that
Athe 1888 Treaty and the 1941 Constitution should be upheld. While 
it was reported by Radio Singapore and The T i m e s the meeting 
aroused some local scepticism. A letter to the Sarawak Tribune 
signed 'Loyal Citizens' expressed amusement that the Union which had 
been silent since its inception in 1939 was now attempting 'a Big 
move' - in the wrong direction. The MNU's action, it continued,
1 The Sarawak Tribune of 25 March 1946 reported the formation 
of the Badgers Club. Named after the badger which graced the 
coat of arms of the Raj, the club consisted of a number of 
English-educated Chinese including Ong Tiang Swee, Wee Kheng 
Chiang, William Tan, Ong Kee Hui, Dennis Law and others who 
were born in Sarawak and were sentimentally attached to the 
Brookes. In some ways this group invites comparison with 'the 
Queen's Chinese' of Singapore and Penang.
2 Datu Patinggi to MNU President, 10 February 1946, Brooke 
Papers, Box 11/2.
3 Datu Patinggi to MNU President, Brooke Papers, Box 11/2.
4 Sarawak Tribune, 13 February 1946.
5 Sarawak Tribune3 20 February 1946; The Times3 18 February 1946.
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should not be taken as representing the Malays and the native 
population in general but its own 2,000 members.^
However, the Rajah took their action much more seriously,
replying to the MNU by cable that he would consult the two councils
2and had 'only the interests of the people at heart'. Archer also
received a cable from the Rajah that he would pay annual visits to
Sarawak in order to pilot the people through the difficult period of 
3transition. Both messages were published in the Sarawak Tribune. 
However, this was insufficient reassurance for those who did not want 
to see the Brooke Raj come to an end. On 12 March the Datu Patinggi 
received a letter signed by Abang Haji Zaini, his four vice-presidents 
and four Kuching tua kampong asking him to convey this message to 
the Rajah:
It is the will of the indigenous people of Sarawak that 
His Highness the Rajah... should be urged to render 
secure the Government of the country. If His Highness 
considers himself to be too old or ailing in health, he 
should hand over the Government to His Highness the Tuan 
Muda, who should become Rajah; and if His Highness the 
Tuan Muda cannot shoulder the responsibilities on account 
of his health, then the title of Rajah should be conferred 
on his son Anthony Brooke... in order that the Brooke line 
should be unbroken.... 4
Outside the major urban centres of Kuching, Sibu and Miri 
the only news for some time was the Rajah's message of 6 February 
which had been telegraphed to all government posts. However, there 
was no further explanation and when Archer telegraphed instructions 
that meetings were to be held to ascertain people's reactions, there 
was very little to report. At Bintulu, for example, where Harry 
Buxton, a Eurasian forestry officer, was Acting District Officer, a 
meeting of all races was held but the people were so overwhelmed 
that they could say nothing. In a confidential letter to Archer later,
1 Sarawak Tribune_, 16 February 1946.
2 Sarawak Tribunej 23 February 1946.
3 Sarawak Tribune> 22 February 1946.
4 MNU to Datu Patinggi, 12 March 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 11/2.
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Buxton explained that the first reaction was one of puzzlement, followed 
in time by opposition to cession. But when he went to Kuching later 
he discovered that his letter had been destroyed.^"
Iban reactions to the cession announcement are difficult to 
gauge but from a number of reports it is clear that illiterate up­
river people continued to think for some time that the Rajah was still 
in the country and that nothing had changed. It was only the mission- 
educated Ibans of the First and Second Divisions who were aware of 
what had happened and reacted accordingly. The principal focus was 
Kuching where there was a small group of Ibans in government service.
The most articulate of these was Inspector Edward Brandah, who told 
the Sarawak Tribune that it would take the Ibans years to realize 
that there was no longer a Rajah:
The Ibans have respected the Rajah more as a father than 
as a ruler, and one of the instances of his intimate and 
personal interests and cares for the Iban welfare is 
that he personally informs some newly engaged Government 
Officers that the Ibans are not an inferior race but just 
different. The Ibans will lose a great and kind protector 
in the person of... the Rajah. But what can we do? We 
can sharpen our spears and parangs and adorn our shields 
when he informs us that there are troubles at Ulu Kapit 
or Lubok Antu; but this time we cannot help him and I do 
not think he needs our help. Our fears are like that of 
a small boy who is sent to boarding school. He knows 
that he is in safe hands but he is not very sure whether 
he will receive the same treatment as his parents have 
given him at home; more over he is always afraid of being 
bullied by his seniors if he does not pick up the school 
rule in an approved method and in a specific period. We 
may forget the Rajah only in words but not in heart and 
mind, for what he has done, it was done for our future 
happiness and prosperity which lies in another realm under 
the protection of His Majesty the King. 2
1 Interview with Mr H.P. Buxton, July 1974.
2 Sarawak Tribune> 23 February 1946. Brandah went to London in
May 1946 as a member of Sarawak's contingent to the victory
celebrations and while there was asked by the SDA to represent 
its opposition to cession to Attlee. However, Brandah was 
clearly unenthusiastic about pressing the anti-cession case
and was politely fobbed off by Gent and Mayle. Lt. Col. B. Langran 
to Macaskie, 13 May 1946, Macaskie Papers, File 6; Dawson to 
Mayle, 19 October 1946, CO 531/32 [53185].
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On 24 February there was a meeting of Kuching's Iban community at
the house of Philip Jitam where it was decided to establish a Sarawak
Dayak Association (SDA) with membership from all Divisions. While the
presence of Abang Haji Zaini suggests that the MNU was anxious for
the SDA to take a firmly anti-cession line from the outset, the
meeting adopted a cautious attitude and it was felt that the Rajah
should be allowed to explain the situation before they could make up
their minds.^ No doubt this was partly due to the influence of
2Edwin Howell who had been appointed 'Honorary Adviser'.
The SDA was subsequently registered as a social organization
on 1 March with Charles Mason as President, Edward Brandah as Vice
President, Philip Jitam and Andrew Jika as Joint Secretaries and
Robert Jitam as Treasurer. Like the MNU, the SDA was not an avowedly
political organization and its stated aims were broadly similar -
the promotion of unity among the various Iban and Land Dayak groups
(hence the Sarawak Dayak Association); their social, moral,
educational and intellectual advancement; the introduction of modern
methods of agriculture and the provision of accommodation for up-
3country visitors to Kuching. While there was no mention of
providing representation for Iban views to government, there can be 
little doubt that this was one important aim.
Although cables were sent off to London signed jointly by
Abang Haji Zaini and Philip Jitam, it was not until early June that
4the MNU and the SDA reached any firm co-operative understanding.
While no details are available, it seems that the MNU leadership 
had to concede that in the event of the restoration of Brooke rule, 
political representation through the Council Negri, the Supreme
1 Sarawak Tribune3 26 February 1946.
2 For a biographical note on Howell, see Chapter V, pp. 210-11.
3 Rules and By-Laws of The Dayak Association of Sarawak.
Established 1st March 19463 Kuching [1946]. Other members 
of the SDA Committee of Management were: Satap Henry Bay,
A.L. Reggie, Awan Rekan, S. Gawing, G. Jamuh, Johnathan Saban. 
Of these, only Awan Rekan was a Land Dayak.
4 Mohd. Nor to Anthony Brooke, 4 July 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 
12/14.
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Council or whatever other organ of government came into being, would 
be on the basis of the relative numerical strength of the Malays and 
the Ibans.^ This was an extremely significant concession on the part 
of the conservative Malay leadership, marking an important break with 
traditional Malay hegemony. However, it proved to be only a temporary 
departure. Nor were the possible political ambitions of the Chinese 
and their numerical strength taken into account.
The Sarawak Issue
In the meantime, unfavourable publicity in the British press fostered
by the anti-cession faction had begun to reap results. On 13
February Hall was subjected to a barrage of searching questions in
Parliament, revealing that the meetings of the Council Negri and
Supreme Council which MacBryan had arranged were being regarded ’only
as exploratory discussions’ and that their proceedings would not be
gazetted or published. While he did not think it necessary to propose
to the Rajah that there should be an independent commission of
inquiry, he was prepared to consider Stanley’s request for an
independent observer to report on the situation in Sarawak. However,
he avoided the question of the Trust Fund and the suggestion that
the government had a moral responsibility for the way in which it was 
2used. The Sarawak question had blown up far beyond Hall's expect­
ations and Gammans even believed that the debate seriously affected 
his health.^
Margery Perham took up the idea of a commission the next 
day in a letter to The Times. Characterizing the cession as ’a 
somewhat casual and private affair', she asked whether it was morally 
or constitutionally proper for the Rajah to give his country and for 
the British government to receive it in such a way. She was concerned 
both with the interpretations which would be made internationally and 
the significance for the Empire which she described as being held
1 Interview with Mohd. Ma’amon bin Nor, May 1975.
2 Hansard^ 13 February 1946.
3 L.D. Gammans, ’Parliamentary Mission to Sarawak’, Gammans Papers, 
Item 8, pp. 4-5.
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together by treaties and agreements and 'faith in the justice and 
dignity of the British Government'. In her conclusion she summarized 
very nicely the alternatives:
It may well be that annexation is in the interests and 
accords with the wishes of the Sarawak people, though 
since the administration of our smaller and more remote 
territories sometimes suffers from periods of neglect 
and stagnation, the improvement cannot be taken as 
automatic. On the other hand, it may be that, under 
some improved method of British surveillance, the dynasty, 
becoming no doubt increasingly constitutional in function, 
might for some time prove the best focus for the unity of 
a racially mixed people and the best expression of its 
sense of historical identity. 1
One outcome of all this was Hall's decision to send some
kind of 'independent person of standing' to observe the proceedings
in Sarawak and defuse the critics. When such a person proved
difficult to find, the compromise was a two-man parliamentary mission
representing both parties and Hall subsequently issued invitations
to the Labour member for South Croydon, D.R. Rees-Williams, and the
2Conservative member for Hornsey, L.D. Gammans. Gammans had been in 
charge of co-operatives in Malaya before the war and spoke fluent 
Malay. In 1944 he had published a pamphlet outlining his views on 
post-war British policy in Malaya and Borneo. Primarily concerned 
with the question of economic development, he saw both the Chartered 
Company and the Brooke regime as anachronisms. 'The ideal arrange­
ment', he wrote, 'would be that the whole of these territories should
come under some much more direct form of British control so that they
3could be developed with the resources of the Colonial Office.' At 
the same time, however, he advocated strict control of immigration 
(in order to avoid what had happened in Malaya) and careful control 
of outside capital 'so that the economic and social balance of the 
indigenous inhabitants was not disturbed either too rapidly or too
1 The Times_, 14 February 1946.
2 Hall had hoped that the Conservatives would agree to send Lord 
Soulbury, a former High Commissioner to Ceylon, but Stanley 
insisted on Gammans and the Secretary of State was obliged to 
agree. Interview with Lord Ogmore, March 1975.
3 Singapore Sequel3 London 1944, p. 23.
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completely. This was the impossible task which the Brookes themselves 
had undertaken. Elected to the House of Commons in July 1945, Gammans 
became Conservative spokesman on Far Eastern affairs and quickly 
proved to be a thorn in the side of the new Secretary of State for 
Colonies. During the debate on the Malayan Union in January 1946 
he was particularly troublesome, representing what he saw as the 
interests of the Malays against alien interlopers and misguided 
British policy.
Rees-Williams was not specially qualified for the task. He
had been a lawyer in private practice in Penang before the war and
spoke a little Malay but had not demonstrated any particular interest
in Far Eastern affairs during Commons debates. Like most of his
middle-class socialist colleagues he accepted the idea of Indian
independence but otherwise supported the continuation of Britain's
imperial role in Africa and Asia. The casual way in which Hall
2recruited him for the Sarawak mission suggests that the Secretary 
of State saw him essentially as someone who was unlikely to rock the 
political boat..
The terms of the inquiry indicated by Hall were deliberately 
vague and precluded the preparation of a formal report whose tabling 
might have created political problems. In his first official 
approach to Gammans on 12 March, the Permanent Under-Secretary for 
Colonies, Arthur Creech-Jones, wrote that in view of Hall's interest 
in the matter and the 'public concern' which had already been 
expressed there was a need for an 'independent opinion'. He thus 
suggested that the two M.P.s should visit Sarawak 'for the purposes 
of satisfying themselves after due inquiry that, so far as the wishes 
of the people of the territory can be ascertained, there is no
reasonable doubt that the Rajah's proposals are acceptable to his
3subjects'. Their conclusions were to be reported by cable and 
cession would not be finalized until it had been received and studied. 
Accepting the invitation, Gammans suggested that there should be an
1 Ibid.
2 Interview with Lord Ogmore, March 1975.
3 Creech-Jones to Gammans, 12 March 1946, Gammans Papers, Item I.
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interval of from two to three weeks from the formal proposal of the 
cession bill in the Council Negri to the actual vote, thus enabling 
them to contact all the members individually and avoiding any later 
accusation that they were ’stampeded into a hasty decision’. He also 
believed that there was another alternative to cession or the 
continuation of Brooke rule - the appointment of an adviser to a 
government headed by Anthony Brooke. Most importantly, he had doubts 
about the method of communicating their findings. If the result was 
clear-cut there would be no problem but otherwise complications might 
arise. ’I imagine too', he concluded, ’that there must be some 
measure laid before Parliament in a form which is debatable, and I 
should have thought that the House might have insisted on hearing 
from us before coming to any decision in the matter.’^
This was the last thing that Hall wanted, however, and the
question was tactfully avoided by him and Creech-Jones. It was
announced by Hall in the House on 27 March that the M.P.s were being
asked 'to confirm by independent inquiry whether or not the Rajah’s
proposal for the cession of the territory to His Majesty is broadly
2acceptable to the native communities of Sarawak'. And in a
conversation with Gammans and Rees-Williams at about this time,
Hall once again stressed the informality of their mission. He also 
wished to adhere to the earlier suggestion that they should cable 
their report to him. However, he intended confirming that the Rajah 
would not summon the two Councils to vote on the issue until he 
(Hall) had communicated with him subsequent to receiving their report. 
Gammans remained dubious that it would be possible to cable their 
conclusions unless the issue was ’so clear and free from ambiguity 
that there can be no possible doubt as to the attitude of the
3people of the country'. He also repeated to Hall his belief that 
the issue would come up for discussion in the House and that at least
1 Gammans to Creech-Jones, 14 March 1946, ibid.
2 Hansard3 27 March 1946.
3 Gammans to Hall, 10 April 1946, Gammans Papers, Item 1.
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a verbal report would be made of their findings when they returned. 
However, his mind was already turning to Malaya which he was planning 
to visit after Sarawak and by the time he reached Kuching his official 
mission was probably of subordinate interest.
Since Rees-Williams' correspondence with Hall and Creech- 
Jones is unavailable it is not possible to say whether the Labour M.P. 
was at all apprehensive of the Secretary of State's real purpose. In 
retrospect, however, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
mission was manipulated by Hall for his own narrow ends. While not 
constituting an official parliamentary commission of inquiry, the 
nominal consultation of native opinion was useful in defusing 
parliamentary and press criticism and in lending cession some semblance 
of international respectability. Only sixteen years later, Lord 
Cobbold was to lead another mission to Sarawak to place the seal of 
approval on the state's inclusion in the proposed Federation of 
Malaysia.^
Long before the M.P.s' mission was officially announced,
there was energetic lobbying by the anti-cession and pro-cession
factions in Britain. On one side, Bertram Brooke, Anthony Brooke,
F.F. Boult, Pollard and other Sarawak officers and friends attempted
to inform the M.P.s of the background of the situation and to persuade
them that Sarawak was indeed a sovereign state whose independence
2should be respected. On the other, Stirling Boyd circulated a
memorandum criticizing Brooke rule and suggesting that British control
3of Sarawak was a long-overdue necessity. A number of M.P.s had 
already seen his dossier on the 1939 crisis and were unsympathetic 
to the continuation of Brooke rule. Furthermore, the Bishop of 
Newcastle, Noel Hudson, who had been Bishop of Labuan 1931-37 seems
1 See Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and 
Sarawak, 19623 London 1962.
2 See, for example, Boult to Gammans, 10 April 1946, Brooke 
Papers, Box 11/5.
3 'Administration of Sarawak', Gammans Papers, Item 6.
334
to have lent his considerable authority to the pro-cession side. 
Gammans and Rees-Williams also met the Rajah and MacBryan.
Not the least of the problems encountered by the anti­
cession faction in trying to stimulate public interest was the public 
image of the Rajah's family in Britain. For many people the Brookes 
were primarily a source of scandal and there was little interest in
their remote and exotic kingdom beyond such sensational subjects as
head-hunting and the orang utan. Margaret Noble, the wife of the 
general manager of Sarawak Oilfields Ltd and a friend of both the 
Rajah and the Tuan Muda lent her support to the anti-cession faction 
but found that she could make little headway. Thirty years later she 
described how difficult it was to get anyone to think seriously about 
the cession problem: 'They all said vaguely "Oh yes... those
peculiar girls and their extraordinary marriages.... Why did she fait 
for the Leader of the Band? Sarawaki and all that!..*,‘’•
In the meantime, the Rajah had become a little disconcerted
by the tenor of the cables and letters he had received from the MNU
and the SDA. As he put it himself, he did not wish to be 'spat on'
and was anxious to get some indication of attitudes to cession before
4finally committing himself to visit Sarawak. Accordingly he asked 
the Colonial Office to allow two Sarawak officers to conduct a quick 
survey of opinion in the state. E. Banks, who had been Curator of 
the Sarawak Museum since 1925, was given the task of surveying the 
First, Fourth and Fifth Divisions while J.C.H. Barcroft, pre-war 
Resident of the Second Division, was made responsible for the rest 
of the state. Both had been interned at Batu Lintang during the war 
and were still recuperating in England when MacBryan contacted them 
and explained their mission.
1 Bishop Hudson to Margaret Noble, 19 February 1946, 2 March 1946, 
Brooke Papers, Box 12/4.
2 See Chapter IV, pp. 141-4.
3 Personal communication from Mrs Margaret Noble, 5 August 1976.
4 Personal information.
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Banks subsequently reported in late March that there was a
two-thirds majority in favour of cession in the First and Fourth
Divisions and that the Fifth Division was sharply divided owing to
fears of a return to Brunei rule."^  Barcroft appears to have agreed
that there was an overall two-thirds majority in favour of obeying
the Rajah’s wishes on cession and this was the message which, as
instructed by MacBryan, was finally cabled from Kuching in the
Chartered Bank’s own code. The Rajah was reassured by these
2indications. ’Barkis is willun’, he replied. At the same time,
however, Banks believed that cession 'was understood by none', himself
included. 'Sarawak is divided’, he wrote to Macaskie from Kuching
after cabling his report, ’some for Brooke, some for Bevin, very hard
to estimate the proportions and impossible to say who will win,
dependant [sic] on the powers-that-may-be at home and let us hope 3soon!’ The Datu Pahlawan, too, was doubtful enough about cession
to write to MacBryan for advice on whether it was what the Rajah
truly wanted. MacBryan cabled him that in the native interest it
must go through, but that it should be dependent on the establishment
of the Sarawak State Trust Fund. He advised him to collect as many votes4as possible for the Council Negri meeting.
1 Personal communication from Mr E. Banks, 21 October 1975.
2 Personal communication from Mr E. Banks, 25 November 1975.
3 Banks to Macaskie, 23 March 1946, Macaskie Papers, File 3.
In view of the repercussions of MacBryan's visit just two 
months earlier, it is not surprising that Banks and Barcroft 
should have encountered a great deal of suspicion from other 
Brooke officers already in Sarawak. Banks’ friendship with 
MacBryan before the war was well known. Nor were the military 
authorities pleased when they learnt of the coded messages 
sent through the Chartered Bank. Colonel Goss called Banks
in for questioning and there had to be consultations with 
Macaskie before the matter was smoothed over. ’... It only 
remains for them to regard me as a journalist...’, Banks 
told Macaskie, 'and not as a spy to make for peace, perfect 
peace'. Ibid.
4 MacBryan to Smith, 4 December 1946, Hussey Papers; MacBryan 
to Vyner Brooke, 3 December 1946, ibid.
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Arrangements for Cession
The evidence suggests that there was a deliberate effort on the part
of the Colonial Office and the military administration to suppress
the fact that Bertram and Anthony had not been consulted by the
Rajah on the cession and to prevent them from going out to Sarawak.
On 8 February the Tuan Muda addressed a cable to ’Secretary
Provisional Government Kuching’ requesting him to inform European
and native officers that 'neither my son nor myself has been consulted
concerning proposed cession and were unaware until yesterday that any
such action was contemplated’.^  When this was not acknowledged he
inquired of the Colonial Office what had happened and was eventually
informed on 21 February that since there was no 'Provisional
2Government’ the cable could not be delivered. Faced with this clear
prevarication, Bertram then addressed a similar cable to Archer,
adding that all he wanted was to go to Sarawak 'to ascertain and to
3submit to the real wishes of the people’. 'In the interests of all',
Archer replied, '[I] feel [I] cannot comply with [your] request until4Rajah returns.’
In the meantime the Tuan Muda had received a cable from 
the Datu Patinggi begging him and Anthony to visit Sarawak together 
with the Rajah. '... We all have an exceedingly longing desire to 
meet you and I hope to get an answer', the Patinggi concluded.
Bertram replied through Archer that they would spare no effort to 
comply with the request but Archer's earlier response suggested to 
him that once again the message might not reach its destination. 
Consequently he wrote to Hall requesting him to instruct the head 
of the military administration to pass on his cable without delay.
'I cannot believe', he told the Secretary of State, 'that it would 
be the desire of His Majesty's Government to employ the existing 
conditions to prevent me from answering the Datu Patinggi, who might
1 Bertram Brooke to Secretary, Provisional Government, 8 February 
1946, Hussey Papers [66735].
2 Note by Bertram Brooke, ibid.
3 Bertram Brooke to Archer, 28 February 1946, ibid.
4 Archer to Bertram Brooke, 5 March 1946, ibid.
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well misinterpret my silence'. Then on 25 March he received a cable
from the MNU saying that they did not accept as valid the documents
signed by the members of the Supreme Council and did not agree with
cession. If the Rajah was unable to rule, Abang Haji Zaini continued,
the Raj should be handed over to the Tuan Muda or Anthony who were
2once again invited to visit Sarawak.
It was shortly after this that the President of the MNU
revealed to Bertram for the first time the story of MacBryan's
3payments to the datus. Confirming this came a cable from the Datu 
4Patinggi and another from Barcroft, who was in Sarawak assessing local 
reactions for the Rajah, to the effect that although the natives and 
Chinese were against cession, 'uncle's generous present' (the bribes) 
had ensured that a majority of the Council Negri and Supreme Council 
members would vote for it.~* Bertram immediately cabled the MNU to 
ask W.P.N.L. Ditmas or one of the other Brooke officers to obtain 
supporting evidence of the payments and make a report, only to be 
told that there was no official they could contact.^ At their 
suggestion he then sent a message to the datus concerned asking for 
an explanation and informing them that he and Pollard but not MacBryan 
would be coming out to Sarawak before the Council Negri meeting.^ He 
also cabled the President of the Chinese Chambers of Commerce asking 
for a frank statement whether or not the Chinese of Sarawak wishedg
the state to be ceded. In reply, the datus told him that the money 
which they had accepted was 'assistance from the Rajah on account of
1 Brooke Papers, Box 12/14.
2 MNU President to Bertram Brooke, 25 March 1946, Hussey Papers 
[66735].
3 MNU President to Bertram Brooke, 31 March 1946, ibid.
4 Datu Patinggi to Bertram Brooke, 3 April 1946, ibid.
5 Barcroft to Bertram Brooke, 3 April 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 
12/14.
6 Bertram Brooke to MNU President, 1 April 1946, ibid.; MNU 
President to Bertram Brooke, 6 April 1946, ibid.
7 Bertram Brooke to Datus Menteri, Hakim, Pahlawan and Amar, 8 
April 1946, Hussey Papers [66735].
8 Bertram Brooke to President, Chinese Chambers of Commerce,
undated, ibid. ,
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the tribulations we suffered under the Japanese occupation'.'*' Confirm­
ing the amounts of the payments, they said that they had not been 
compelled to sign anything and had agreed to the Rajah's proposal 'in
order that there should be greater prosperity, freedom and happiness
2... for the country and the people'. The Chinese Chambers of
Commerce said that they were awaiting the Rajah's arrival before
coming to any decision but considered the matter as 'one for Sarawak3nationals and not we Chinese'. Bertram had to be content with
telling the datus that they possessed an 'immense moral responsibility'
to vote as the people they represented really wished and not commit4themselves until he had met them face to face.
That Archer was not happy with these proceedings is clear 
from his correspondence with Macaskie. On 2 March he wrote asking 
why the Tuan Muda's second cable, which had been addressed to him 
personally, had been divulged to the military authorities at Labuan 
when this was against regulations. He had not wanted to do anything 
to embarrass Macaskie, he stressed, and had composed his reply to 
the Tuan Muda after consultation with Goss. 'It was always quite 
plain to me', he told Macaskie, 'that if I had done as the Tuan Muda 
wished I should not have been able to remain in the BMA (British 
Military Administration). This, however, would not have stopped me 
if I thought the message should have gone out willy nilly: however,
I did not so t h i n k . H e  expected repercussions from the Tuan Muda 
but seemed more concerned that Macaskie had not trusted his judgement. 
In reply, Macaskie told him that the cable's address had been 
'ambiguous' and had not necessarily been sent to him in his private 
capacity. 'However', he added mysteriously, 'that side of it is 
rather a curious story, which I will tell you about when we meet.'
1 Datus Menteri, Hakim, Amar and Pahlawan to Bertram Brooke, 11 
April 1946, Hussey Papers [66735].
2 Ibid.
3 Chinese Chambers of Commerce to Bertram Brooke, 6 April 1946, ibid.
4 Bertram Brooke to Datus Menteri, Hakim, Amar and Pahlawan, 12 
April 1946, ibid.
5 Archer to Macaskie, 6 March 1946, Macaskie Papers.
6 Macaskie to Archer, 9 March 1946, ibid.
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The important thing, Macaskie told Goss, was that although the Tuan 
Muda’s cable had finally been published in the Sarawak Tribune3 there 
should be no official backing of any kind for the message."^ The 
Chief Civil Affairs Officer was no doubt under strict orders from 
the Colonial Office not to allow anything which might prejudice the 
prospects of cession.
In the meantime the Tuan Muda had been experiencing great
difficulty in making arrangements to visit Sarawak. In early March
he wrote to the Rajah asking that he and Anthony should be allowed
2to accompany the Rajah’s party to Sarawak and when the Rajah refused
he asked the Colonial Office to facilitate transportation. However,
there had to be a good deal of lobbying done with M.P.s before Hall
would even consider the question. For his part, Bertram realized
that it might be less difficult if Pollard accompanied him rather
than Anthony. Besides, as he told a friend, ’they’re so anxious to
"fix him up" that if anything happened when we were there, he’d be
3accused of stirring it up’. On 2 April Hall finally informed Bertram
that permission had been obtained from the Rajah for him and Pollard
to visit Sarawak, subject to the condition that he accepted the
4decision of the two councils on cession. The Tuan Muda agreed to 
this but also requested permission to take two more companions and 
Hall then told him that this was a matter which would have to be 
raised personally with the Rajah who was then on the point of leaving. 
When the Rajah indicated that he was agreeable, Bertram then gave the
1 Macaskie to Goss, 2 March 1946, ibid.
2 Bertram Brooke to Vyner Brooke, 5 March 1946, Brooke Papers, 
Box 2/3.
3 Bertram Brooke to Margaret Noble, 5 April 1946, Brooke Papers, 
Box 12/3.
4 Bertram Brooke to Hall, 5 April 1946, The Facts About Sarawak3 
pp. 99-100.
5 Hall to Bertram Brooke, 5 April 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 11/2.
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1 2names of Sir Theodore Adams and J.R. Combe to the Colonial Office.
But the Rajah subsequently objected that both were ’completely out
of touch’ with Sarawak and Bertram once again had to ask the Colonial
Office to exert pressure on the Rajah. Permission for Adams and
3Combe did not come through from the Rajah until 23 April and the
Tuan Muda promptly cabled an assurance that his sole purpose was to
obtain the ’true reactions' of the majority of the people to cession
and to assure those who approached him that he and Anthony were
prepared to continue the old adat but would submit to the wishes of
the people. If cession did not go through, he presumed that the
government would continue along pre-war lines pending fresh
4negotiations with the British government.
The Colonial Office’s own arrangements for the cession 
exercise were rather hurried. Christopher Dawson, a Class II 
officer of the Malayan Civil Service who had been British Adviser to
1 Sir Theodore Adams, 1885-1961, was a veteran of the MCS which 
he joined in 1908. As Resident of Selangor in the early 
1930s he had intervened in the royal succession there, much 
to the annoyance of the Sultan. He then served as Chief 
Commissioner, Northern Provinces of Nigeria, 1937-43, and in 
the War Cabinet Office, 1943-45. It is difficult to see why 
Bertram Brooke would have chosen him, unless he thought that 
he might be a useful influence on the Colonial Office. How­
ever, Adams seems to have left Sarawak supporting cession and 
he probably wrote a memorandum for the Colonial Office to that 
effect.
2 Combe was a Sarawak officer who had joined the Administrative 
Service in 1928 and had retired in 1934. Bertram Brooke 
seems to have thought of him at one point as an adviser to 
Anthony should he have become Rajah.
3 Vyner Brooke to Sarawak Government Office, 23 April 1946,
Brooke Papers, Box 11/2.
4 Bertram Brooke to Vyner Brooke, ibid.
5 Born on 31 May 1896, C.W. Dawson was educated at Dulwich College 
which he left in 1915 to join the East Surrey Regiment. After 
seeing active service on the North West Frontier and in 
Mesopotamia, he was demobilized at the rank of captain and then 
took up a scholarship at Brasenose College, Oxford. After a 
year he decided to apply for the MCS and in 1920 went out as a 
cadet. His first years were spent in Singapore and Johore and
[contd over]
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the state of Perlis before the war, was selected to act as Chief
Secretary to the new colonial government if cession went through.
For the time being he was to be styled ’British Representative’ under
the terms of the Supplementary Agreement of October 1941, but he was
also given a commission with plenipotentiary powers to negotiate with
the Rajah on the Secretary of State’s behalf."^ His verbal instructions
from Hall were 'to be neutral in the matter of cession, taking no
action to help or hinder its coming into being, to observe and report
to the Sec. of State the reactions of the people to the Rajah's
proposal, and, in the event of cession being agreed and approved by
2H.M.G., to accept it on behalf of the Crown’. However, Dawson later 
admitted that although he was supposed to be neutral, 'a pretty broad
3hint was dropped that cession would be in line with H.M.G.'s policy’.
W.L. Dale, a Colonial Office legal adviser who had not been 
involved in the earlier negotiations, was given just ten days' notice 
to join the Rajah’s party^ and there was only one opportunity to 
discuss the draft legislation with Smith and Digby who was on leave 
after release from prison camp. The Rajah had not yet supplied a 
list of life members of both councils and Digby emphasized that there 
would be ’great difficulty' in reconstituting them.'*
5 [contd from previous page]
after serving as District Officer at Alor Gajah he returned to 
the Secretariat in Singapore. In 1929 he was called to the Bar 
at Gray's Inn and from 1933 until 1936 was Legal Adviser and 
then a judge in Kedah. In c.1938 he was appointed British 
Adviser, Perlis, and at the outbreak of war was recalled to 
the Defence Secretariat (Malaya) in Singapore. In 1941 he was 
made Secretary of Defence, Malaya, and was interned for the 
duration of the war. After four years’ service in Sarawak he 
retired in early 1950 and then served with distinction as 
Deputy Chief Secretary of the British Administration of Eritrea 
1951-52. He was awarded the C.M.G. in 1947.
1 Document in the possession of Mr C.W. Dawson.
2 Preface to Dawson's 1946 diary, Rhodes House. This is an 
invaluable source for the history of cession.
3 Ibid.
4 Interview with Sir William Dale, 4 April 1975.
5 'Note on meeting held in Mr. Dale’s room at the Colonial Office 
on the 5th April [1946]', Digby Papers, Rhodes House, uncat. MSS.
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In preparation for the Council Negri meeting, the Rajah took
care that the officers whom he selected to accompany him to Sarawak
and those whom he called from Australia to resume duty were supporters
of cession. Of the six officers who went to Sarawak in the Rajah's
party, three were subsequently appointed official members of the
Council Negri and voted for cession. Furthermore, R.G. Aikman, the
Resident-elect of the Third Division and therefore an ex officio
member of the Council Negri, who was recuperating in Australia after
release from internment was instructed by cable not to report for
duty until the end of May (i.e. until after the Council Negri meeting)
while G.A.C. Field who was also in Australia but was not a member was
told to report by April. The explanation for this inconsistency
seems to have been that Aikman had written to the Sarawak Government
Office in London in October 1945 advising strongly against any
concessions to the Colonial Office.^ As for the natives, when Dawson
met the Rajah in early April the latter gave him the impression that
'it was only necessary for him to appear in Sarawak and to tell the
people of his opinion that cession was for the ultimate good of the
State for the whole weight of popular opinion to come to his side
2of the scale'. The Rajah repeated this optimistic view several 
times on their way out to Sarawak.
The Rajah 's Return
Although MacBryan had been expected to accompany the Rajah to Sarawak, 
at the last moment it became clear that he was not going after all.
On 28 March he wrote an 'hysterical' letter to the Rajah and three 
days later told J.A. Smith that he was resigning from his position 
as Private Secretary on a matter of principle which he was not 
prepared to discuss. On the following day, the Rajah told Smith that
3MacBryan had 'ratted'. What probably happened was that MacBryan,
1 The Facts About Sarawak, p. 14.
2 Dawson's report to Hall, 20 May 1946.
3 Notes by Bertram Brooke, 6 April 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 11/2. 
MacBryan's resignation was effective from 31 March 1946. SGG, 
16 May 1946.
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who anticipated great embarrassment if the Tuan Muda visited Sarawak,
failed to persuade the Rajah that he should not be allowed there for
the Council Negri meeting.^ Pollard was disappointed because he had
hoped to implicate both the Rajah and the Colonial Office when the
evidence against MacBryan was produced, although he recognized the
2possibility that they would make a scapegoat of him. Both Bertram
Brooke and F.F. Boult suspected that it was all a ruse and that
3MacBryan would join the Rajah’s party later, while Anthony believed
from the outset that the Colonial Office would not risk the possible
4
embarrassment arising from MacBryan’s presence there.
Reaching Singapore on 13 April, the Rajah had to finalize 
arrangements with Mountbatten for the resumption of civil government."* 
He also took the opportunity to make a formal statement to the press 
which he hoped would dispel some of the 'misconceptions’ about his 
action, particularly the story that he was ’selling' Sarawak for 
£1,000,000.1 23456 7
The arrival of the royal party in Kuching the next day was 
a memorable occasion. All the way from Pending to the Astana there 
were groups of people waving flags and streamers. At the Astana 
itself there was a guard of honour consisting of Punjabi soldiers 
and British sailors. The next morning the Rajah visited the Supreme 
Council Chambers where the proclamation agreed upon with Mountbatten 
in Singapore two days earlier was read by the commander of the 32nd 
Brigade. The Rajah then read his own proclamation resuming civil 
government and the Datu Patinggi presented him with the sword of 
state to symbolize the restoration of Brooke rule.^ He did not raise
1 Pollard to Margaret Noble, 28 April 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 
12/4.
2 Ibid.
3 Bertram Brooke to Margaret Noble, 5 April 1946, Brooke Papers,
Box 12/3.
4 Anthony Brooke to Arthur Bryant, 10 March 1946, Brooke Papers,
Box 11/3.
5 'Notes of Agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, South 
East Asia and the Rajah of Sarawak’, W0 203/4294.
6 Sarawak Tribune3 16 April 1946.
7 See Plate XII.
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the question of Sarawak's future with the surviving members of the
1941 Supreme Council.^ However, the Datu Patinggi had earlier handed
in a letter to the Rajah opposing cession, together with the 12 March
memorandum from MNU leaders and tua kampong pleading that if the
Rajah felt unable to continue in charge of the government, he should
2hand over to the Tuan Muda or Anthony. When the old man then 
announced his intention of revealing details of the bribes to the 
parliamentary mission, the Rajah described the money as allowances 
due to the datus since the outbreak of war. 'We have not had an 
opportunity yet of explaining the true position to the chieftains', 
he said, 'who are under a misapprehension if they think the money was 
a bribe.1 2345^
In the early evening there was a royal tour of Kuching
which provided the Rajah with the first opportunity of personally
observing reactions to the proposed cession. The welcome was
enthusiastic: schoolchildren singing the Sarawak anthem; decorated
arches; Sarawak and Chinese flags; and handfuls of yellow rice thrown
over the official cars. The Rajah and Ranee were received everywhere
with smiles and gaiety, leading a sceptical Dawson to conclude that
there must have been something in the past to account for their
4enormous popularity. But throughout the Malay kampong area there
were placards denouncing cession and interference with independence
and demanding the continuation of Brooke rule. Dawson noticed that
they were numbered and were actually shown at two places along the
route. 'I wonder if the placards signify anything more than an
effort by a vocal handful spread along a good stretch of road (and 
5twice over!)' he wrote in his diary. A British intelligence officer 
was even more suspicious, reporting to the Labuan authorities that 
the posters 'appeared with the concurrence of the B.M.A.' and implying
1 Malay Mail, 17 April 1946.
2 Malay Mail, 29 April 1946. See above, p.327.
3 Malay Mail, 20 April 1946.
4 Dawson Diary, 15 April 1946. The welcome was organized to some 
extent by Brooke officers serving in the military administration.
5 Dawson Diary, 15 April 1946.
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that the Malays had been put up to it by those Brooke officers who
were opposed to cession.^ Macaskie’s inquiries revealed that neither
the military administration nor the police expected placards to be
2displayed and were taken completely by surprise.
One of the Rajah’s first tasks was to assist the Colonial
Office in straightening out the constitutional tangle created by
MacBryan so that the Council Negri and Supreme Council could be
summoned to approve the cession legislation. On 17 April, therefore,
the Rajah on his own authority issued Order No. C-23 (Constitution
Re-Enactment) 1946 purporting to declare null and void the Council
Negri's 6 January Order (which restored the Rajah's prerogative
powers and repealed the 1941 Constitution) and upholding the legality
of Order No. C-21 (Constitution) 1941 which had originally authorized
3the Constitution. However, since the Rajah's authority to issue 
Order No. C-23 itself probably depended on the legality of the 6 
January Order, the constitutional tangle only became worse. Indeed, 
according to Digby who had framed the 1941 Constitution, Order No. C-23 
'amounted to a usurpation and was so irregular as to be clearly 
invalid'.^
Assuming that the 1941 Constitution was once more in force, 
the Rajah proceeded to fill the vacancies in the Supreme Council 
brought about by the deaths of various members since November 1941.“* 
Having done this, he then called a meeting of the Council on 24 April 
whose principal business was to approve yet another Order (issued 
this time on the authority of the Rajah-in-Council) stating that since 
doubts existed as to the validity of the Supreme Council Order of 
5 January restoring the Rajah's prerogative powers, it was 'expedient' 
that it be revoked forthwith.^ Dale evidently had second thoughts 
about Order No. C-23 and designed the second Order to strengthen the
1 Macaskie to T.I.K. Lloyd, 26 April 1946, Macaskie Papers.
2 Ibid.
3 SGGj 24 April 1946. See Appendix IV.
4 Personal communication from Mr K.H. Digby, 12 December 1976.
5 SGGj 24 April 1946.
6 SGG3 1 May 1946. See Appendix IV.
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constitutional position. The new official and unofficial members of 
the Council Negri were appointed on the authority of the Rajah-in- 
Council.^
At the meeting the Rajah also made his first statement
concerning cession to the people of Sarawak since the 6 February
announcement. Guaranteeing that adat lama (established custom) and
the principles of the 1941 Constitution would be observed, he
emphasized that he was not abandoning Sarawak and would continue to
make his customary visits. Trusting the British government more
than anyone else, he said that it would mean greater progress and
stable government ’whereas otherwise there would be uncertainty and
2a confused future for Sarawak'. He had no confidence that Anthony 
would be a good ruler. ’I have given him three chances to prove his
3worth', he concluded, 'and he has failed. My Heir must be the King.' 
Archer, who had been appointed Political Adviser to the military 
administration, was to act as Chief Secretary until cession was 
finalized, although in fact Dawson shouldered most of the responsi­
bility.
By 20 April the Rajah had become exasperated. There had
been difficulties in arranging representation in the Council Negri
and fixing a date for the meeting which would give the M.P.s time
to conduct their investigation. A delay in the M.P.s' visit was
the last straw. Fixing the date of the Council Negri meeting for
15 May, he flatly refused to remain in Sarawak after 22 May. In
another outburst of irritation, the Rajah told Dawson that he had
changed his mind about the Astana. Although the Instrument of
4Cession specified that it was to be handed over, he now wished to 
retain it as his own property. A great deal of diplomacy had to be 
used by Dawson to placate the Rajah, but the matter was satisfactorily 
settled, the Rajah agreeing to transfer the Astana and his private 
land and houses to the Crown. He retained the fight to occupy the
1 Ibid.
2 Sarawak Tribune, 26 April 1946.
3 Ibid.
4 See Appendix IV.
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Astana during his visits to Sarawak and at other times it was to be 
used by the colonial government which would meet the cost of 
maintenance and staffing. However, this was only confirmed in 
writing on the day the Rajah left Sarawak.'*'
On 26 April the Rajah and Ranee, accompanied by Dale and 
Dawson, began their official outstation tour by visiting Sibu where 
they walked through the streets and drove around the kampongs to a 
warm reception. The next day the Rajah held open court where he 
listened to a variety of petitions and cursorily explained why he 
had decided to cede the state. Dawson felt that the need to maintain 
neutrality on the cession issue prohibited his attendance at this 
occasion but he remarked on the Rajah’s apparent diffidence towards 
such an important matter. ’Either HH has lost interest (which would
be fatal)’, he wrote, ’or he is supremely confident of the outcome....
2I wonder if the old boy is really trying.’ He was sceptical, too, 
of the Ranee who had been busy making indifferent sketches of Malay 
girls: ’... Ranee affects to be so attached to them but I wonder
how much is genuine.’ It seemed to him at times that they both 
regarded the tour as ’a trial and a bore’. Nevertheless the Rajah's 
impact, particularly in the Second Division where he had spent so 
much time as a District Officer, was very considerable. Rantai, an
Iban from the Ulu Ai who had been imprisoned by the Japanese for4sheltering Arundell's party in early 1942, told the Tuan Muda in 
Kuching in May that the Rajah had persuaded the people of the Second 
Division that cession would not entail any change, that he would 
still visit them and that 'everything would continue exactly as 
before'
While the Rajah and Ranee visited Marudi and Miri, Dawson 
returned to Kuching but he was at Simanggang when they arrived there
1 Dawson to Vyner Brooke, 21 May 1946. Letter in the possession 
of Miss Angela Brooke.
2 Dawson Diary, 27 April 1946.
3 Ibid.
4 See Chapter V, p. 220.
5 Pollard, ’Report...', pp. 1-2.
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on 1 May. Again there were numerous petitions and cases to 
be heard, including a reasonable request from some Ibans that they 
be given four Japanese heads to replace those of four Chinese which 
they had been forced to return to the victims' families. The Rajah 
stated his views on cession and the response of some Ibans was: 
'Which son of the King will come to rule us?' Dawson felt that as 
long as there was an undertaking that the Rajah's replacement would 
visit them periodically, 'simple Dayaks' would accept cession.^
The Expedition of H.M.S. Piokle
Arriving in Singapore on 28 April, Rees-Williams and the delegation's
2secretary, E.C.G. Barrett were officially briefed on the proposed
functions of the new British Special Commissioner for Southeast Asia,
Malcolm MacDonald, due to arrive shortly. It had been proposed that
he should co-ordinate the policies of the Malayan, Borneo, Ceylon
and Hong Kong governments and their relations with such neighbouring
countries as Siam and the Netherlands East Indies. On 30 April
Rees-Williams lunched with Mountbatten whom he found preoccupied
with the strategic importance of Southeast Asia, particularly with
3developments in the Netherlands East Indies. The Labour M.P. had 
earlier told the press that the British government 'had no imperial­
istic designs on Sarawak'.^
Gammans reached Singapore on the morning of 2 May and on 
the same day the two M.P.s flew to Kuching where they were immediately
1 Dawson Diary, 1 May 1946.
2 E.C.G. Barrett joined the MCS as a cadet in 1931 and served 
in various states until 1942. After his visit to Sarawak he 
resumed duty with the MCS and became Chief Registration 
Officer for the Federation of Malaya in 1949 and the first 
President of the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council in 1951. In 
1953 he was Acting British Adviser, Perak, and British Adviser, 
Kedah, from then until his retirement in 1957. An excellent 
linguist, he was a lecturer in Malay at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1957-71. 
Barrett's diary of the M.P.s' tour, now deposited at Rhodes 
House, is an invaluable source.
3 Lord Ogmore, MS memoir, p. 33.
4 The Times, 29 April 1946.
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transferred to H.M.S. Pickte^ a minesweeper which Mountbatten had 
provided in response to their representations that a proper consult­
ation of the people’s views would be impossible without sea transport. 
Most of Sarawak’s own shipping had been sunk or was out of action 
and they had realized that without naval assistance they would be 
stranded in Kuching. The Colonial Office's failure to consider such 
questions was symptomatic of its lack of interest in obtaining a 
genuine indication of Sarawak opinion. At this point Dawson thought 
Gammans was insisting that even if cession was approved in the 
Council Negri, the issue would still have to be decided by Parliament. 
And the reputation which Gammans had already made through his 
opposition to the Malayan Union suggested that he would probably 
adopt an anti-cession stance. This was also Rees-Williams' impression.
The itinerary which the two M.P.s presented to Dawson on
3 May was quite impractical since it involved their returning to
Kuching on 14 May, only a day before the Council Negri meeting.
Visits to Marudi and Simanggang, the administrative centres of the
Fourth and Second Divisions, were cancelled because the two M.P.s
(much to Dawson’s disgust) refused to go to any place where it would
2be necessary to spend a night ashore. There also had to be time
for the Secretary of State to consider their report before giving
the go-ahead and it was later decided that they would cable the
result of each meeting and make a ’comprehensive report' after the
Sibu meeting which was now scheduled for 10 May. The M.P.s issued
invitations to various groups to a public meeting that evening and
let it be known that they would also welcome representations from
anyone beforehand. However, they remained on board ship at Pending,
about five miles from Kuching town, and only the more enterprising
spirits made the journey. In the meantime, an application by some
3Sarawak officers to accompany them on the tour was refused.
1 An earlier namesake had brought the news of Lord Nelson's 
death to England.
2 Dawson Diary, 18 May 1946.
3 Pollard, 'Report...', p. 1.
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In the afternoon they were visited by representatives of 
the two local Chinese-language newspapers, the Chung Hua Journal and 
the Chinese Daily Dews_, who gave the impression that the Sarawak 
Chinese had no right to take sides in the controversy. Gammans, who 
later became one of the main critics of the Malayan Union citizenship 
provisions, suggested to them the advantages which full citizenship 
rights would entail. The M.P.s later called on the Datu Patinggi 
whose compound was crowded with more than one hundred young Malays 
with banners bearing such English slogans as 'No Cession' and 'We 
Want Brooke Rule'. More surprisingly, there were other slogans 
saying: 'Let Judas Get His Desserts' and 'A Daniel Come to Judgement'.
As the car entered the drive there was a shout in English of 'No 
Cession!' According to Rees-Williams, the old datu seemed 'a bit 
confused as to the issue',^ but the letter which one of his
2secretaries read out made it very clear that he opposed cession. At 
the same time, he was anxious to talk about the Turtle Islands, a 
question which, as we have seen, he had mentioned to MacBryan as part 
of the price for his agreement to cession.
Most of the talking was done by three young men: his
3secretary, Sharkawi bin Haji Osman, and Mohd. Nor and Edham bin 
Bojeng of the MNU who also presented a formal letter of protest against 
cession signed by Abang Haji Zaini.^ They told the M.P.s that
99 per cent of Sarawak's Malays wanted independence, fearing that 
their voice as a community would be lost if they became part of the 
colonial empire. Not only that, Sarawak would be swamped by 
• immigrants and Malay culture extinguished. They said that there were 
only two Malay members of the Council Negri, Abang Haji Mustapha and 
his brother, Abang Haji Abdulrahim, and both were the Rajah's 'yes- 
men' . Blind obedience to the Rajah on the part of Council members
1 Lord Ogmore, MS memoir, p. 35.
2 Datu Patinggi to Gammans and Rees-Williams, 3 May 1946, Gammans 
Papers.
3 For biographical notes on Sharkawi and Mohd. Nor, see Chapter 
VIII, pp. 380-2.
4 Abang Haji Zaini to Gammans and Rees-Williams, 3 May 1946, 
Gammans Papers. See Appendix V.
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would cause them to agree to cession. Referring to the MacBryan 
visit, they claimed that the document concerning cession was in 
English and was not explained. The Datu Patinggi, they said, had 
signed thinking that he was merely asking the Rajah to return, nor 
was any copy of the letter left behind. Once the signatures had been 
given, MacBryan had handed out the money and it was only a month 
later that the Datu Patinggi discovered that he had agreed to cession. 
They also felt that the Datu Patinggi’s opinion should carry more 
weight than that of anyone else in either the Council Negri or the 
Supreme Council because his ancestors were themselves rulers of 
Sarawak. If the Rajah did not want to rule, they concluded, he should 
hand over to his brother until such time as Anthony Brooke became 
Rajah.^ By this time the MNU had succeeded in erecting Abang Haji 
Abdillah as the figurehead of the anti-cession cause, a position in 
which he cannot have been particularly happy. But he had been 
told that as head of Sarawak’s Malay community his responsibility 
was to protect their general interest as well as those of the abang 
class.
The public meeting the same evening rehearsed most of the
themes and arguments which the two M.P.s were to hear during their 
2forthcoming tour. Opposing cession were the Datu Patinggi, whose 
afternoon speech was again read by his secretary, and Abang Haji 
Zaini and Mohd. Ma’amon Nor who spoke as principal delegates of the 
MNU. Giving unqualified support for cession were Abang Haji Mustapha, 
the Datu Amar, Hong Guan Lim, and Ong Kwan Hin (representing his 
father, Ong Tiang Swee) who argued that the state's royalties were 
insufficient to meet the cost of rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
Revenue in the past had been derived from opium, spirits and gambling, 
duties on rubber, pepper, sago, copra and jungle produce, and 
royalties on oil and gold. However, Ong Kwan Hin believed, it was 
desirable that taxes on opium and gambling should be abolished and 
while rubber, sago and copra would bring in some revenue, the future
1 Barrett Diary, 3 May 1946.
2 The following account is based on the Barrett and Dawson diaries 
for 3 May 1946 and the Sarawak Tribune of 6 May 1946.
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of rubber was uncertain. Furthermore, the oil and gold industries
had been destroyed during the war and it would be some time before
they could be re-established. Sarawak was not bankrupt, he concluded,
but only Britain could provide the vast capital resources needed for
recovery and progress. Representing the Hua Kheow Tshin Nien,^ " Lim
Kong Ngan was more interested in political questions. Describing
Brooke rule as autocratic and anachronistic, he criticized the
concentration of executive, legislative and legal powers in the hands
of one man. Culture, education, economic development and transport
had also been backward. He agreed to cession if it would mean some
improvement, although he pointed out that the British government had
not indicated what its policy would be and whether Sarawak would be
a Crown Colony or part of the Malayan Union. Both of the Iban
speakers, Philip Jitam and the Rev. Basil Temenggong, expressed
qualified support for cession, insisting that the Nine Cardinal
Principles of the 1941 Constitution be upheld and that indigenous
2customs be respected. The Rev. Temenggong, who had spent the war
in India and was the best educated Iban in the state, added that the
Ibans were not ready for sudden changes and were afraid of exploitation.
He also called for a clear expression of British policy for Sarawak.
The only European to make a significant speech was Monsignor 
3Hopfgartner who denied that no economic progress had been made 
during the 45 years he had spent in Sarawak and claimed that the 
principal Chinese had not been adequately represented at the meeting.
He believed that the Chinese and Ibans would accept cession as long 
as the scales were not weighted in favour of one community and 
Sarawak was administered as a separate colony. Otherwise its interests 
would be neglected. The Eurasian community was not officially 
represented but its unofficial spokesman, Edwin Howell, told the two 
M.P.s privately that the Rajah, the Tuan Muda and Anthony Brooke were
1 See Chapter V, p. 244.
2 Bishop of Kuching, 1968-.
3 An Austrian citizen from the Tyrol, Hopfgartner had not been 
incarcerated by the Japanese. A superb linguist, he had 
worked mostly among the Chinese and after the war supported
the faction led by Tan Bak Lim who was a Roman Catholic convert.
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inadequate administrators and that cession was the only solution for 
Sarawak. D.M. Deen of the All India Muslim League also supported 
cession. ’Our interest lies in the ruling principle', he observed 
enigmatically, 'and we accept what is good for our future.'
Summing up the results in his diary, Dawson was jubilant: 
the Malays were divided but the Chinese and Indian merchants supported 
cession; the young Chinese were in favour if it meant a more 
progressive government; and the Ibans were agreeable as long as the 
Nine Cardinal Principles were respected.'*' However, the meeting had 
only been called that same morning and was mostly by invitation. The 
audience of about 75 people was considerably less than might have 
been expected if more notice had been given and it had been a proper 
public meeting.
Regarding Kuching as representing the major part of 
intelligent opinion in the state, Gammans was favourably impressed 
by the meeting and its general support for cession. Indeed, he told 
Dawson, unless there was 'violent expression of contrary opinion'
2elsewhere, the question would be duly passed by the Council Negri.
In view of the Rajah's assurance to the Supreme Council on 24 April
that adat lama and the principles of the constitution would be
observed and the concern expressed at the meeting about this, the
two M.P.s advised Hall to make a statement of the British government's
3own policy post-cession. Gammans, at least, must have been aware
that a blanket commitment to preserve adat lama might seriously
embarrass a future colonial government. However, when the Pickle
broke down on the way to Miri and it seemed that the tour might not
be completed, Gammans was not disappointed. He was already confident
of the outcome and, according to Dawson, was preoccupied with
4developments in Malaya. Telegrams from the Malay sultans and Dato
1 Dawson Diary, 3 May 1946.
2 Dawson Diary, 5 May 1946.
3 Gammans and Rees-Williams to Hall, [4 May 1946], Gammans 
Papers.
4 Ibid.
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Onn bin Jaafar, founder of the United Malays National Organization, 
had been reaching the two M.P.s ever since their arrival in Kuching.
During the next ten days, Gammans and Rees-Williams,
accompanied by Barrett and Dawson, visited Limbang, Lawas, Miri,
Bintulu, Sibu, Sarikei and Lingga. Although they hoped to hear the
widest possible range of opinion, the short notice of their visit
and difficulties in communications meant that urban Chinese and Malays
were well represented while up-river people for the most part were not.
The Muruts of Lawas and the Upper Limbang, for example, could not
be contacted in time.^ It also seems that the First Division
Resident's message inviting outstation representatives to meet the
M.P.s in Kuching was somewhat vague and that no provision was made
2for transport and accommodation. Furthermore, there is some
evidence to suggest that individual government officers stage-
managed meetings to some extent by choosing the representatives
(many of whom were in the government's pay) and emphasizing that
cession was the Rajah's will. Prior to the crucial Sibu meeting,
a letter supporting cession was drawn up by Native Officer Jarrow
for Temenggong Koh to present on behalf of thirteen penghulus as the
expression of Third Division Iban opinion. Barrett, who seems to
have been an unbiased observer, felt that the Acting Resident, C.D.
3Adams, had set up the meeting to support cession. And a number of
Malays later claimed that they had not spoken out against it for fear
of Abang Razak, a customs officer in Sibu who seems to have exercised
4considerable influence.
Dawson (on the invitation of the M.P.s) acted as chairman 
and, with Barrett, interpreter at all the meetings. While there is
1 Barrett Diary, 7 May 1946.
2 Barrett Diary, 14 May 1946.
3 Interview with Mr E.C.G. Barrett, April 1975. Adams had 
joined the Sarawak Service in 1909 and retired in 1937 as 
Resident of the Third Division, an area where he had spent 
most of his career and was extremely influential with the 
Ibans. It seems likely that the Rajah arranged for him to 
return under the military administration to ensure that the 
Third Division accepted cession.
4 Barrett Diary, 13 May 1946.
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no evidence to suggest that Dawson consciously directed proceedings
to favour the expression of pro-cession opinions, he cannot have
been completely neutral. As he told Hall later, the opportunity of
making introductory remarks before each session meant that it was
possible to ’establish a suitable atmosphere'.^ Moreover, as the
representative of the British government his presence may have
quietened many of those who, while opposing cession, felt that the
expression of such opinions might be held against them later. Another
factor which emerged from the meetings was that cession was not 
2understood. This is hardly surprising in view of the fact that 
almost no effort had been made to explain the issue and that the 
responsibility rested with European officers, most of whom supported 
cession. The Rajah’s support for cession meant that pre-war officers 
who would otherwise have fought tooth and nail against it now 
accepted the inevitability of a British takeover. The handful who 
continued to oppose it seem to have done so partly out of loyalty 
to Bertram Brooke and partly out of disgust at the way cession was 
being put through.
There was some evidence of anti-cession ’rigging' but this
seems to have been exceptional. At Bintulu, where Anthony Brooke
had been stationed before the war and was well regarded, Harry Buxton,
a Eurasian forestry officer who had been acting District Officer
during the military administration, may have persuaded the local
3Malays and Melanaus to present a united front against cession. The 
unanimity of their opposition certainly impressed the M.P.s although 
it raised Dawson's suspicions.^ He also felt that the Resident at 
Miri, John Gilbert, who was known to oppose cession, had tried to 
'bias the meeting slightly, against cession'.'*
1 Dawson's report to Hall, 20 May 1946.
2 Ibid.
3 Interview with Mr H.P. Buxton, July 1974.
4 Dawson Diary, 9 May 1946.
5 Dawson Diary, 8 May 1946.
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The meetings at Limbang and Miri did not significantly alter
the impression created by the Kuching meeting and it was only after
Bintulu that Dawson began to fear that the M.P.s might be too
impressed by the strength of anti-cession feeling. The Bintulu
meeting provided an interesting range of Malay/Melanau, Iban and
Chinese anti-cession opinion. ’It may be enough to upset the whole
thing by giving an anti-cession twist to the M.P.s' report’, Dawson
wrote afterwards, ’thus inducing the S. of S. to stop proceedings;
much will depend on what happens at Sibu tomorrow.'^ When Gammans
told him that the cession bill should go before the Council Negri
whatever happened, Dawson suspected that the M.P. was being mischievous.
'I wonder if Gammans is trying to get things in a jam by encouraging
the vote of Council to go on', he reflected, ’while knowing that he
2intends their report to be adverse to cession.’ As a safeguard he 
cabled the Secretary of State warning him that the M.P.s’ report 
might not be favourable after all. However, the Sibu meeting was 
to tip the balance decisively, not only because the M.P.s regarded 
the Sibu district as containing about one-third of Sarawak's total 
population but because they also saw it as the best opportunity to 
test Iban opinion. As Dawson acknowledged, a substantial proportion 
of the Iban population had to be seen to be in favour before the 
cession proposal could be said to possess any popular support.
Dawson must therefore have been delighted when Temenggong 
3Koh presented the M.P.s with his letter which he described as having 
the assent not only of thirteen penghulus and the Iban government 
servants present but all the Ibans of the Third Division! His only 
concern was that adat lama should remain unchanged. When asked by 
Gammans if he was just following the Rajah or if he wanted cession 
for its own sake, he replied that they trusted the Rajah. Inspector 
Arthur Muda, however, said that he supported cession for its own 
sake because he wanted education for the Ibans to be promoted as 
quickly as possible. Another English-speaking Iban told the M.P.s
1 Dawson Diary, 9 May 1946.
2 Ibid.
3 For a biographical note, see Cooper, Men of Sarawak_, pp. 49-57; 
obituary, SG} 30 November, 1956.
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that his people had not had a fair deal under the Brookes and that 
cession would mean better education and general development. Of the 
Malays, only one speaker mentioned the possibility of Brooke rule 
continuing through one of the Rajah’s relatives. According to Native 
Officer Abang Ahmad, if the adat was preserved it was all the same 
to the people whether they were ruled by the King or the Rajah - just 
as long as it was not the Japanese. Others said that the Rajah knew 
what was best and that cession would lead to greater progress , 
including the provision of religious teachers from Egypt or Malaya.
The kapitan china, Teo Chong Low, who had been in Sarawak
for 56 years and claimed to speak on behalf of all the Sibu Chinese,
supported cession as being desirable in itself but was more interested
in pressing claims for war compensation.^ A show of hands was taken
2and the M.P.s cabled the results to London before compiling their 
’comprehensive’ and decisive report. In the former they emphasized 
that Sibu was more significant for native as opposed to Chinese 
opinion and was the most important meeting to date. At the same 
time, they added that Sibu was the first place which the Rajah had 
visited and the feeling of the meeting was consequently very different 
from the previous ones. They also conceded that the thirteen Iban 
penghulus had agreed to cession because they trusted the Rajah, not 
because they supported cession in its own right.
3In their 'comprehensive report', the two M.P.s distinguished 
three general reactions to the cession proposal:
1. the opinion of Malays and Ibans who did not themselves see any 
advantages in cession but were prepared to trust the Rajah’s 
judgement;
2. the opinion of young Malays in Sibu, Chinese and educated Ibans 
who supported cession for its own sake - the Chinese because it 
promised better commercial prospects, and the Malays and Ibans 
because they were dissatisfied with education and general progress
1 Dawson Diary, 10 May 1946.
2 Gammans and Rees-Williams to Hall, 10 May 1946, Gammans Papers.
3 Gammans and Rees-Williams to Hall, 10 May 1946, Gammans Papers.
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3. the opinion of the MNU and Malays in small towns who supported 
the continuance of Brooke rule under the Rajah.
Gammans and Rees-Williams were prepared to conclude that there was 
’sufficient acquiescent or favourable opinion in the country’ to 
justify the matter going before the Council Negri on 15 May and to 
’strongly urge' that there should be no postponement. They also 
explained that much of what they described as the ’hesitation' of 
Malays and Ibans was due to the absence of any clearly-defined post­
cession policy and the subsequent fear that their customs would be 
encroached upon and their culture swamped by immigrant races.
The implication that most of the opposition to cession arose
from anxieties about an uncertain future rather than from any positive
attachment to Brooke rule was misleading but it provided the verbal
formula which Hall needed to use as his justification in the House.
The hasty and premature compilation of the report also meant that
while support for cession at Sarikei was regarded as confirming the
Sibu verdict, adamant Iban and Malay opposition at Lingga"*" in the
heart of the Second Division was discounted. The M.P.s told Hall
that the Lingga meeting did not affect their earlier 'comprehensive 
_t 2report .
The range of opinions expressed at the various meetings can 
more accurately be characterized as follows:
1. Chinese traders and nationalists who supported cession because 
it meant greater economic opportunities and the strengthening 
of their political status and representation;
2. educated Malays and some Ibans who supported cession because it 
meant greater educational and employment opportunities than 
had been available under the Brookes;
3. Ibans and Malays who agreed to cession because their loyalty to 
the Rajah prevailed over their serious misgivings about what 
cession would mean;
1 Barrett Diary, 12 May 1946.
2 Gammans and Rees-Williams to Hall, 12 May 1946, Gammans Papers.
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(d) Ibans and Malays whose loyalty to the Raj prevailed over their 
loyalty and obedience to Vyner Brooke;
(e) Malays of the abang class whose interests lay with the perpetuation 
of Brooke rule;
(f) Malay commoners who saw the continuation of Brooke rule as a 
means of securing genuine self-government and independence for 
Sarawak within the foreseeable future.
The last two categories, together with a small number of educated 
Kuching Ibans whose traditional association with the Malays was 
relatively strong, constituted the base of the anti-cession movement 
which was to develop during the forthcoming months.
While the two M.P.s made more of an effort to test native
opinion than the Colonial Office had probably envisaged, they were
swayed by other factors which could hardly have found a place in
their cabled reports. Gammans in particular was not at all impressed
with the Brooke family and some of the senior officers. The Rajah,
he wrote later in a private memorandum to Hall, was 'lazy and rather
stupid and for many years has preferred the fleshpots of Europe to
the austerities of Sarawak'.^ Gammans believed that one of the
Rajah's main reasons for insisting that the Council Negri should meet
on 15 May was his anxiety to be home in time for the Derby. The Tuan
Muda he described as 'completely brainless' and too old to be
considered as a ruler even if he had been physically fit. Like many
other people, Gammans was scandalized by the Ranee's conduct, seeing
her as 'a bad influence in all this rather sordid Brooke family row'.
She had, he said, visited a 'low down cabaret' three times and not
only danced the conga with professional dancing partners who were
also prostitutes but took them back to the Astana to paint their
pictures. 'A more undignified woman it would be difficult to find',
he concluded, neglecting to mention that both he and Rees-Williams
had prevailed on Dawson to take them to that same 'low down cabaret'
2on at least two occasions.
1 L.D. Gammans, 'Parliamentary Mission to Sarawak', pp. 22-3. 
Subsequent quotations from this source.
2 Dawson Diary, 13 and 16 May 1946.
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Anthony had seemed to Gammans ’a most unsatisfactory young
man’ who would never have been a good ruler under the new constitution.
He had met him a number of times in London and was disposed to accept
all the stories he heard in Sarawak about his ’ego-mania* and
eccentricities, including astrology. Noting the second Rajah’s
anxiety that the attractions of Europe might prove too tempting for
his successors, he regarded the end of the Brooke dynasty as ’yet
another example of the truth that institutions seldom perish from
2external causes but rot from within’. Gammans was appalled by the 
behaviour of some of the Sarawak officers, particularly Archer who 
had resorted to the bottle not long after being released from Batu 
Lintang where he had conducted himself admirably in spite of beatings 
and serious illness. But the Conservative M.P. was intolerant of 
human frailty and was content with superficial impressions:
I went one night to the Cathay Cabaret and found there 
most of the Sarawak Government, very drunk, dancing 
with the professional partners, who were far more sober 
than the Chief Secretary or any of the Residents of 
the districts. 3
On his return to England, Gammans made much of what he regarded as
4the unsatisfactory character of some of the Brooke officers and it 
is reasonable to suggest that this, together with his low opinion of 
the Brooke family, weighed at least as heavily as his impressions 
of native opinion in his final assessment. Gammans probably saw the 
issue not so much in terms of native opinion as whether the British 
government should allow the Brooke regime to continue.
Rees-Williams did not take such a disapproving view of the
Brookes. In his eyes, the Ranee was ’... a bright and vivacious
lady who brought the charm of Mayfair to the Tropics and some of the
5exotic perfume of the Tropics to Mayfair’. MacBryan, too, was a
1 Gammans, 'Parliamentary Mission to Sarawak’, p. 24.
2 Ibid., p. 25.
3 Ibid., p. 23.
4 Personal information from Mrs Margaret Noble.
5 Lord Ogmore MS, p. 25.
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'colourful character, belonging to a former age in our association
with the East rather than to the present when circumspect delegates
of Government and big business move in a deprecating way about their
business'.^ He was impressed with the outstation officers but did
not think that there were people who could run a Secretariat 
2properly. He also felt that the Brookes had done very little for
the Ibans, particularly in the area of education. At one place he
was told by Ibans that the only means of obtaining education was to
3serve a prison term. But it was an ironical twist that the Labour 
member whose government was now committed to replacing the Brookes 
should have taken a more romantic and sympathetic attitude than the 
Conservative member who was soon to become the champion of the Malay 
sultans.
The Council Negri Meeting
On 8 May, just one week before the Council Negri was due to be opened,
Bertram Brooke arrived in Kuching accompanied by Adams, Pollard and
Combe. 'It is no exaggeration to say that the difference of opinion
between us is... vital', he wrote to Vyner the previous day, 'but
you need have no fear that I have any intention of allowing the4matter... to become the subject of a family dog-fight...' Although 
Vyner was determined to offset the impact of his brother's presence 
as much as possible, Bertram did not go out of his way to use his 
influence against cession. Installed at 'The Residency' (the house 
of the First Division Resident which was second only to the Astana 
in importance), one of his few forays was to Ong Tiang Swee's house 
where he learnt for the first time the details of MacBryan's visit. 
However, the Datu Patinggi and members of the MNU soon came to pay 
their respects, as did most of the pre-war European officers and 
Native Officers, and there was a good deal of discussion about cession.
1 Ibid., p. 28.
2 Interview with Lord Ogmore, March 1975.
3 Lord Ogmore MS, p. 35.
4 Bertram Brooke to Vyner Brooke, 7 May 1946, Brooke Papers, 
Box 2/3.
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When it became clear for the first time that Bertram had
not only not consented to cession but had not even been consulted
by the Rajah, there was a dramatic change in many people’s attitudes.
For example, Philip Jitam who had given qualified support for cession
at the public meeting on 3 May and was scheduled to second a Council
Negri motion by the Datu Pahlawan authorizing cession, was now
adamantly opposed, as was his brother Robert. Dawson was convinced
that Philip had been ’nobbled’ by the Tuan Muda's party^ and was
apprehensive for the first time about the outcome of the vote.
Visiting Bertram on 14 May he found him in discussion with a large
group of people, including Philip Jitam, remarking in his diary later
that Bertram's 'Pretence of "not come to fuss or fight" is camouflage
for a studied campaign to nobble the council (while "honest men" are
sailing up rivers in an endeavour to sound the feelings of the 
2people)...' It is very likely that Pollard indulged in some quiet 
3lobbying, but Bertram appears to have preserved appropriate decorum 
in spite of the fact that the only official information he received 
about the Council Negri meeting was the date on which it was to be 
held.
According to Combe, the Tuan Muda could have prevented 
cession from going through if he had chosen to campaign vigorously 
against it.^ However, this was anything but Bertram's style. His 
only communication with Vyner before the meeting was a letter 
complaining that MacBryan had completely misled the datus and Ong 
Tiang Swee as to his attitude on cession and that the majority of 
the people had no idea what cession really meant. He sought 
permission to make the situation clear to the members of the Council 
Negri, insisting nevertheless that it was ’no representative body 
assembled to express the real wishes of the people’. He also 
protested strongly against the ’secrecy and unnecessary speed with
1 Dawson Diary, 16 May 1946.
2 Dawson Diary, 14 May 1946.
3 Ibid.; interview with Mr J.R. Combe, November 1974.
4 Interview with Mr J.R. Combe, November 1974.
5 Bertram Brooke to Vyner Brooke, 13 May 1946, Gammans Papers.
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which this whole question has been handled’ and suggested that it 
should be deferred so that there could be further consultations with 
the British government.
Dawson was not prepared to countenance the request to
address the Council Negri and Archer subsequently replied on the
Rajah's behalf suggesting that he should issue a written statement
as the Rajah had done.'*' While Dawson was concerned that there should
2not be a public slanging-match between the Rajah and his brother, 
he was probably more worried about the impact that a speech by the 
Tuan Muda might have on the voting. However, Bertram was not to be 
put off so easily and he was finally invited to make his speech from 
a place next to the President's chair.
Gammans and Rees-Williams had initially insisted on a
3secret ballot and the Rajah had agreed to this, but it was finally
decided with the M.P.s' approval that this vital question should be
resolved at the meeting itself by a show of hands. At the last
moment Gammans, much to Dawson's annoyance, advised European members
4of the Council Negri not to vote but neither of the M.P.s took a 
sustained interest in the actual arrangements for the meeting, 
including the appointment of members. Rees-Williams was already 
describing the whole affair to a Daily Mail reporter as 'opera bouffe 
(an expression which Dawson himself had used),'* and seems to have 
been cynically complacent about the outcome.
Another last-minute development was the arrival of the long 
awaited official statement from the Colonial Office of the British 
government's policy in Sarawak should cession be accepted by the 
Council Negri. Published on the morning of the first reading of the 
cession bill, the statement was deliberately vague and non-committal 
except that Sarawak was not to become part of the Malayan Union.
1 Archer to Bertram Brooke, 14 May 1946, Gammans Papers.
2 Dawson Diary, 14 May 1946.
3 Dawson Diary, 3 May 1946; Dawson’s report to Hall, 20 May 1946, 
CO 938/1 [58501].
4 Dawson Diary, 14 May 1946.
Dawson Diary, 15 May 1946.5
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Its administration as a colony would be ’generally on the same lines 
as other colonies within the British Empire' and ’in general in 
accord' with the nine Cardinal Principles of the 1941 Constitution."^"
The constitution would have to be altered to allow for amendments 
necessitated by cession including provision for the Royal Assent but 
as part of the preparation for this the Governor would be required 
to discuss the whole constitutional question with community represent­
atives and other concerned persons ’with a view to recommending what 
steps should be taken at the time when these changes are made to 
associate the people of Sarawak with its Government and administration 
on a basis as broadly representative as conditions permit’. It was 
hoped that in this way the 'maximum progressive constitutional 
development’ would be achieved. The 'fullest regard’ would be given 
to the rights and customs of all communities and there was no 
intention of exploiting the people or the resources of the country. 
Among the most important objectives would be the rehabilitation and 
improvement of medical services and communications and 'controlled 
development of trade and resources with a view to raising the standard 
of living of the inhabitants’.
The statement’s impact at this vital stage is difficult to
assess. However, it was carefully studied by people like Philip
Jitam who had expressed doubts about future policy and Dawson conceded
that its reservations, while being necessary, 'were taken to be
2subtle methods by which any guarantee could later be avoided’. It 
seemed that the simple natives were capable of some degree of 
scepticism.
For his part, the Rajah called to the Astana all the European 
official members including Gilbert, Ditmas and Barcroft whose support 
for cession was in doubt while Archer attempted to use his influence 
with Native Of ficers Tuanku Mohammed of the Baram district, Abang 
Mustapha of Limbang and Edward Jerah of Simanggang, telling them it 
was their duty to vote for cession. Jerah told Archer that not only
1 Sarawak Tribune3 15 May 1946. Subsequent quotations from this 
source.
2 Dawson’s report to Hall, 20 May 1946.
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was the whole thing wrong since the Tuan Muda had not been consulted, 
but the people of the Second Division opposed cession. When 
Temenggong Koh, who accompanied Jerah at this interview, learnt for 
the first time that the Tuan Muda had not given his approval, he 
exclaimed: 'In that case the Rajah has cheated us.
In the meantime, a bitter struggle had been going on between
the MNU and the Datu Pahlawan and his supporters for the votes of
native members of the Council Negri. Lending her assistance to the
Datu Pahlawan's camp was Haji Sa’erah who was well placed to pick up
2the political gossip of the day. Pollard believed that the failure
of any of the Third Division native members to call on the Tuan Muda
was probably due to their having been warned of the consequences of
3such an action. It is clear that the acting Resident, C.D. Adams, 
was quite capable of taking such precautions and that these would 
have been supported by Archer.
Chinese members of the Council were also subjected to
pressure. Tan Bak Lim, a fourth generation Sarawak Chinese and head
of the Teochiew community told Pollard that the Hua Kheow Tshin Nien
4had threatened to kill him if he voted against cession. However, 
he was refused police protection and this may have accounted for his 
pro-cession vote. It is likely that the illness which prevented Ong 
Hap Leong from attending the Council Negri meeting was of a political 
kind. Khoo Peng Loong, as representative of the Sibu Foochow 
community, seems to have been genuinely in favour of cession.
When the Council Negri meeting was opened by the Rajah on
1 Pollard, 'Report...', p. 6.
2 Her house was conveniently located and 'was not only a 
listening post, it was almost an operations room for the 
collection of and processing of intelligence and the issue
of sitreps [sic]'. Personal communication from Mr R.H. Morris, 
28 November 1976. Haji Sa'erah was also connected with a 
cabaret which was patronized by many of the leading figures 
including Archer, Dale, Dawson and the two M.P.s.
3 Pollard, 'Report...', p. 7.
4 Pollard, 'Report...', p. 5. Tan's claim was confirmed by 
Monsignor Hopfgartner.
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14 May the situation was extremely tense. Having made his outstation 
tour and done his best to ensure that the European members would 
vote for cession, the Rajah adopted a low posture during the formal 
proceedings of the Council Negri. After a brief speech on the 
morning of 15 May in which he suggested that Hall’s statement 
published that day should have resolved any doubts that ’the future 
happiness and prosperity of Sarawak’ lay with cession,'*' he left the 
Council Negri chambers and the formal business was conducted in his 
absence.
The Council Negri meeting was conducted under conditions
which were biased in favour of a pro-cession vote. The Council
President, Archer, was a staunch supporter of cession and had already
done his utmost to influence individual members. During the debate
on the second reading he spoke three times and his behaviour was so
2extraordinary that Dawson and others suspected that he was drunk.
3Members spoke in their own language and there were no translations.
Temenggong Koh who spoke no English and hardly any Malay cannot have
understood very much. According to one description, he spent the
4entire meeting dozing or scratching the horny sole of his foot. And 
yet, of all the Iban members he was by far the most influential with 
his own people. Since the voting was by show of hands, it is 
possible that a number of native members (and perhaps some European 
members) declined to vote against cession for fear of repercussions. 
If cession were defeated, they would have to reckon with the Rajah 
and the possibility of losing their government positions. If it 
went through, they would have to face an equally uncertain future 
under the new colonial government.
1 Rajah's speech at opening of Council Negri, 15 May 1946,
Jitam Papers.
2 Dawson Diary, entry for 16 May 1946; interview with Mr E.C.G. 
Barrett, April 1975.
3 Pollard, ’Report...’, p. 8.
4 R.H. Morris, MS memoir.
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The case for cession was opened by the Datu Pahlawan who 
moved the second reading of the bill and was supported by Abang 
Abdulrahim (his brother), Archer, Native Officer Jarrow, L.D. Kennedy, 
Khoo Peng Loong and B.J.C. Spurway. Their main emphasis was on the 
greater progress which would take place under a colonial government, 
particularly in education, agriculture and health services. In the 
Datu Pahlawan’s view, the people of Sarawak had ambitions that their 
children should become doctors, engineers and lawyers but because of 
the low standard of education 'all these magnificent ideas only remain 
frozen in their hearts'. Spurway added that one of the benefits of 
cession would be an infusion of highly qualified technical officers 
and the strengthening of the Administrative Service. Khoo Peng Loong 
was also enthusiastic about improved educational opportunities but 
spent as much time advocating the abolition of revenue from gambling 
and opium. The second argument, which was used quite forcefully by 
Archer and Kennedy, was that the state could not continue to operate 
without British financial assistance. 'It is a very serious thing 
for Sarawak', Archer told the members from the chair. 'We either 
exist or do not exist.' After a number of speeches opposing cession 
had been delivered, Archer began to fear that the tide was running 
in the wrong direction. Sarawak could not afford to remain independent, 
he insisted. Revenue was less than before the war and would probably 
decline still further and unless Sarawak came together with other 
countries into 'some sort of amalgamation', it would be 'sunk'.
Unless there was more money for agriculture to increase the food 
supply, people would starve. Kennedy, too, argued that Sarawak could 
not in its present form survive the difficulties ahead; it could not 
fulfil its financial obligations without the assistance of the 
British government.
Other European members criticized the haste with which
1 This account of the Council Negri debate is based on the 
official minutes, the Barrett and Dawson diaries, Dawson's 
official report to Hall, accounts in the Sarawak Tribune>
Daily Mail and Malay Mail and interviews with Mr E.C.G. 
Barrett, Archdeacon P.P.H. Howes, Mr C.W. Dawson and Sir 
Dennis White. Quotations are from the official minutes unless 
otherwise specified.
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cession was being put through and the argument that Sarawak could not 
survive without financial assistance. The Resident of the Fourth 
and Fifth Divisions, John Gilbert, pointed out that it was an in­
opportune moment to decide Sarawak’s future and that while people 
in Kuching had debated the question there were thousands in other 
parts of Sarawak who had not had a chance. ’I am unable to believe', 
he added, 'if we have to go anywhere else for money or loan from the 
British Government, they will point a pistol to us and say, "No 
cession, no money".' The Rev. Peter Howes wished that cession could 
be postponed until the people knew more about the issues involved:
When they ask whether they will be happy under British 
rule, are they to be told nothing about Jamaica? When 
they ask whether their lands will be secured to them 
under British Rule, are they to be told only of Uganda 
and not of Kenya? They ought to know about both. They 
do not yet know about such things and this should be 
taken into consideration.
While it had been said that existing rights and customs were to be 
observed, he added, the statement was no guarantee of good faith - 
particularly in view of the fact that the Tuan Muda's rights had not 
been observed.
The three principal native speakers against cession were 
Philip Jitam (who had seconded the Datu Pahlawan's motion as earlier 
arranged), the Datu Patinggi and Abang Mustapha. Philip Jitam 
thought that Hall's statement did not provide a sufficient guarantee 
that the Nine Cardinal Principles would be 'upheld wholly and unreserv­
edly'. Nor had the cession proposed been mutually agreed upon, and 
until there was mutual consent the question should not be decided.^"
1 In the draft of his Council Negri speech, Jitam had provided 
a homely view of the cession dispute which he might well 
have used to some effect:
A certain property was left as a legacy to be held 
in trust for two brothers. The eldest brother was 
given the trusteeship. Consequently the trustee, with­
out prior consultation trys [sic] to dispose of the 
property. Does [sic] this act considered as binding 
and proper? And would you, acting in the best of faiths 
knowing all the facts, condemn or condone such an act?
Jitam Papers.
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The Datu Patinggi saw the question in terms of his loyalty as leader 
of the Malay community both to the Rajah and to the Brooke succession. 
To support cession would be to deprive the Rajah of his throne and 
to spurn both the good services rendered by the Brookes and the 
independence of Sarawak. If cession was agreed to, he concluded 
tearfully,
... my good service extending to 62 years will be in 
vain and it is also a great sin against the Almighty 
God which will give me no peace in this world and here­
after, and also my act of injustice will all be written 
by historians in different parts of the world. Because 
I am an old man, I do not want, therefore [a] bad name 
in the world and hereafter.
Abang Mustapha emphasized the accessibility of the Rajah as 
one of the principal virtues of Brooke rule which would not be 
possible under a British colonial government. Nor was he impressed 
with the argument that Sarawak's indebtedness made cession necessary. 
'Our father the Rajah and our grandfather the King did not lose the 
war against Japan and Germany', he pointed out. 'We won. There is 
nothing in the history of the world to show the victor giving up his 
country....' The question of war debts could be arranged between the 
Rajah and his people. Abang Mustapha's final appeal provided a 
prophetic view of what the Rajah's threatened departure would mean 
to the people of Sarawak:
The father cannot and must not leave his house if his 
family cries because they love him. I regret very much 
if the father does not care for the appeal of his 
children and his family. I am afraid, later, it will 
become a matter not to be so nice in the house and also 
it will become a question which is harder and heavier 
for the father and the grandfather. Because of this we 
most earnestly beseech that Sarawak should not be ceded 
as long as the Rajah and his line of succession and the 
people of this country still has breath.
Although it had been earlier suggested that Archer would 
read the Tuan Muda's prepared speech, he was at the last moment 
invited to read it himself. While its content was moderate enough, 
it was delivered with tremendous vehemence which sometimes almost 
reached the level of shouting.^ His sole object, Bertram said, was
1 Daily Mail, 17 May 1946.
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to represent the line of succession of the Raj and to assure the people 
of its willingness to submit to their wishes as to whether it should 
continue or come to an end. He agreed that the war had made necessary 
a new relationship between Sarawak and Britain but that the matter 
had been handled 'with unnecessary haste' and there was no reason why 
a solution could not be found by means of consultations with the 
British government. However, he did not want the vote to cause 
animosity and ill-feeling. 'I would rather see this line of succession 
come to an end', he concluded, 'than that any family differences of 
opinion should be the cause of quarrelling or ill-feeling among the 
people of Sarawak.'
The force of the debate had gone so much against cession 
that the already agitated Archer was in a highly nervous state when 
he stammered his last appeal before the vote was taken:
There seems to be a sort of feeling here... that it is 
a ramp.l The British government is not bad. I can 
assure you that we will get a fair and absolutely good 
deal. I do not know how long I will be here, but you 
will be here anyway. You have got to vote on it. I 
can see the feeling of the house is rather tense now.
There is no idea of suborning by the British Government.
I can assure you of that. I am not lying about it.
So strong was the feeling of the meeting, however, that when Edward
Jerah proposed immediately after the debate that there be a secret
ballot, the motion was not put clearly and the native members voted
2against it in the belief that they were voting against cession!
The motion on the second reading was then put (but had to 
be put again when the first show of hands was indecisive)and was 
carried by 19 votes to 16, there being a native majority against 
cession of 13 votes to 12. It was the votes of seven European 
officials which carried the day, although the Residents of the First 
and Fourth Divisions (Ditmas and Gilbert) and Howes voted against the 
motion.
1 A put-up job.
2 Pollard, 'Report...', p. 8.
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For:
J.B. Archer (Acting Chief 
Secretary)
Against:
J.O. Gilbert (Resident, Fourth
and Fifth Divisions)
G.E. Cascoigne (Treasurer) W.P.N.L. Ditmas (Resident,
First Division)
L.D. Kennedy (Trade and 
Customs)
Abang Openg (Native Officer, 
First Division)
B.J.C. Spurway (Forests) Abang Kiprawi (Native Officer, 
First Division)
C.D. Adams (Acting Resident, 
Third Division)
Abang Samsuddin
R.E. Edwards 
Datu Pahlawan
Datu Patinggi
Datu Amar Abang Abu Talip (Native Officer, 
Second Division)
Datu Menteri Datu Zin (Native Officer, 
Second Division)
Haji Nawawi (Mufti) Abang Haji Draup (Native Officer,
Second Division)
Tan Bak Lim Abang Ali (Miri)
Father A. Mulder Datu Tuanku Mohd. (Native Officer,
Fourth Division)
Temenggong Koh Abang Mustapha (Native Officer 
Fifth Division)
Bennett Jarrow (Native 
Officer, Third Division)
Rev P.P.H. Howes
J. Owen (Eurasian 
representative)
Philip Jitam
Khoo Peng Loong (Sibu Chinese 
representative)
Abang Ahmat (Sibu)
D.M. Deen (Indian Muslim
representative)
Abang Haji Abdulrahim (Native 
Officer, Third Division)
Edward Jerah (Native Officer, 
Second Division)
Abstained:
J.C.H. Barcroft (Resident, Second Division) 
Datu Hakim
Absent:
Ong Hap Leong 
Tze Shuen Sung
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Following the vote, the Council was adjourned by Archer on
the tacit understanding that the only further formality required was
the Rajah's assent. Gairanans and Rees-Williams reported the proceedings
to the Secretary of State as 'sloppy and unbusinesslike', complaining
that there had been no translations or secret ballot and that the
President had taken a partisan role. It all confirmed their 'former
poor opinion of many Sarawakian civil servants...'.^" And discovering
that standing orders required a committee report and a third reading,
they insisted to Archer (who was enjoying himself at a victory party)
that the full procedure was essential. When Archer launched into a
diatribe against 'lawyers' and refused to chair another session, it
took Dawson and Dale all their powers of persuasion to bring him
around. The Tuan Muda had angrily accused him of having been bribed
2and he was in a state of high nervous excitement. The bewildered 
members then had to assemble again the next day and were told that the 
bill would come into force 'forthwith'.
Abang Mustapha protested against this and was supported by 
Abang Openg who said that at least two years were necessary to give 
the matter proper consideration. When this was regarded by Archer as 
an amendment it was seconded by Gilbert and then defeated by 18 votes 
to 15. After a further categorical assurance from Archer that adat 
lama of all races would be followed, Howes asked him if any attempt 
had been made to obtain loan funds for Sarawak before cession was 
offered by the Rajah. However, the question was not translated and 
Archer's reply was inaudible. The cession bill was then put and was 
passed by 19 votes to 16, the only difference being that Barcroft
3and the Datu Hakim who had earlier abstained now voted for cession 
while Adams was absent ill. The only other business was the Rajah's 
Dependants Ordinance which went through all stages after standing 
orders had been suspended.
Gammans and Rees-Williams thought that the day's conduct of
1 Gammans and Rees-Williams to Hall, 16 May 1946, Gammans Papers.
2 Dawson Diary, 16 May 1946; Dawson's report to Hall, 20 May 
1946.
3 Pollard, 'Report...', Appendix A.
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proceedings was 'more businesslike' and informed the Secretary of State 
that the voting represented the 'fair view' of the Council as it was 
constituted. However, the MNU quickly issued a protest pointing out 
that passing of the cession bill had depended on a European majority 
(a 'foreign vote') and that the Malays who could be regarded as in any 
way representative had voted against cession while those who supported 
it had only represented themselves.^ When Pollard visited the Datu 
Patinggi's house that evening he found about thirty Malays in a high 
state of excitement about the day's events. There was strong criticism 
of Archer's statement that Sarawak was in dire straits financially, 
particularly since no facts and figures had been given. Cession, they 
felt, could only be considered as the last way out if taxes and internal 
loans failed to meet the estimated deficit for 1946 of $2,000,000.^
Informing N.L. Mayle (who had inherited Gent's responsibility
for Sarawak in January) of the first day's voting, Dawson anticipated
a complaint to London from the M.P.s about the European majority,
pointing out that the official members had not voted en btoc and knew
3'as well as anybody... what is good for the country'. Given the 
narrow majority in favour of cession, Dawson experienced some mental 
torment before deciding to advise Mayle that the exercise should be 
completed. 'Let us face the consequences (street-fighting some say 
but I don’t believe them, and anyhow the troops... have finally gone)', 
he wrote in his diary, 'and we will soon find that it will sort 
itself out'.^ Mayle expressed concern at the closeness of the vote, 
telling Dawson that unless there was a majority of at least four in 
the second vote he should mark time until receiving further instructions 
When voting on the third reading only increased the previous days' 
majority to three, Dawson felt that he would not be given the final 
authorization to put the cession bill to the Supreme Council for 
approval and then to sign the Instrument of Cession with the Rajah on
1 'Record of the Visit of Lt. Col. Rees-Williams, M.P., and Captain 
Gammans, M.P., to Sarawak', Gammans Papers, Item 9, p. 15.
2 Pollard, 'Report...', p. 10.
3 Dawson Diary, 16 May 1946.
4 Dawson Diary, 17 May 1946.
<
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21 May as planned. But on the morning of 18 May he was relieved to 
have a cable from Mayle empowering him to go ahead. ’A dramatic 
moment in history; a bit added to H.M.’s dominions’, he remarked in 
his diary, anticipating nevertheless that the Tuan Muda (who had left 
that day) had not 'shot his bolt' and that there would be debate, 
press activity and 'general fuss' for some time to come.^
The Supreme Council duly approved the bill by a majority of
six votes to two on 20 May and the signing of the Instrument of
Cession took place at the Astana beneath the portraits of the first
two Rajahs the following morning. 'The result, narrow though it is',
Dawson told Hall in his official report, 'represents a victory of
common-sense over sentiment; and that in a country where sentiment
(towards the Brookes) is a very important factor. Everybody, and not
the least myself, will feel a tinge of regret at the ending of a
romantic historical episode which had lasted for a century; but...3had become anachronistic.'
Returning to his office after the signing, Dawson found a
cable which had not been decoded because of the sudden illness of
the cipher clerk. Decoding it himself, he was startled to find that
it was an instruction from Hall not to go ahead with the signing.
'Cold feet at the last moment', Dawson told himself, 'not I hope a
plot to fix the blame on executive officers (me) in order to side-
4step political bother.' Consulting Dale, he sent off a reply 
explaining that the message had arrived too late and that it was now 
impossible to reverse what had been done. The Rajah was leaving the 
same afternoon.
Dawson's suspicions about Gammans also came to the surface 
again with reports of the latter's remark in Singapore that 'few 
people in Sarawak want cession'. 'He is probably doing as I supposed 
he might do', Dawson wrote in his diary, 'deliberately leading us to
1 Dawson Diary, 18 May 1946.
2 For a description of the ceremony, see the Sarawak Tribune>
22 May 1946. The document itself can be found in Appendix iV.
3 Dawson's report to Hall, 20 May 1946.
4 Dawson Diary, 21 May 1946.
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the voting stage (knowing it would be narrow) in order to bust it
sky-high later.''*' But altogether he thought that it was a good thing
that the message had been received too late. 'A last minute wind-up
with everything laid on would have been the final blow to the Rajah
and the whole project', he decided. 'The Colonial Office have in
fact been prevented from making fools of themselves. They wanted to
2go on and must now go on.' And his hopes that they would be ashamed
of their last-minute 'windiness' were gratified by a cable arriving
on 25 May which admitted that the 'stop' message would have made
nonsense of the whole proceedings. It also revealed, no doubt to
Dawson’s surprise, that the Conservatives had decided not to oppose 
3cession.
Privately, Dawson was prepared to concede that the majority
4of Malay and Iban opinion was probably against cession but he had no 
doubt that what had been done was in their best interests. Reports 
that MacBryan was suing Anthony Brooke for libel only confirmed his 
belief that cession had been a good thing. 'The Brookes may be 
romantic', he wrote, 'but what a clotted mass of intrigue surrounds 
them.'’’ Dawson recognized, too, that he had played a crucial part 
in ensuring that cession went through:
... the way in was so narrow that I can really claim that 
it was because I managed to become 'persona grata' both 
with the Europeans (by drinking them under the table) and 
with the Malays (by talking their language and dancing 
their dances) that the very narrow margin was in favour 
of cession. They could see (by looking at me) that the 
alternative to the Rajah was not entirely non-human; and 
this (it seems proud to say) may well have turned the 
trick.... 6
D.C. White, who had acted as clerk to the Council Negri, had assured 
Dawson that if instead of himself and Dale the Colonial Office had
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Dawson Diary, 25 May 1946
4 Dawson Diary, 8 June 1946
5 Dawson Diary, 2 June 1946
6 Dawson Diary, 31 May 1946
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sent out ’two ordinary stuffy "officials"’ who could not win the 
sympathy and enthusiasm of the European officers or anyone else, 
cession would have failed.^
Although there had been controversy in Britain about 
Sarawak’s future by the time of the Council Negri meeting, a great 
deal depended on whether the Conservative Party wanted to make an 
issue out of cession. There were many M.P.s including Stanley, 
Fletcher and Donner who had already questioned Hall in the House and 
were anxious to press home the attack. When the Council Negri voting 
figures were posted and it was known that Hall's ’stop' telegram had
2been too late, it seemed to William Teeling the perfect opportunity.
However, the pre-arranged cable which Stanley received from Gammans
did not contain what was expected. Gammans told Stanley that only
the Chinese wanted cession for its own sake, that there was strong
opposition from some responsible Malays and Ibans and that cession
had only been put through with a European majority. However, he
thought that the majority were prepared to accept the Rajah's
assurances and he was personally convinced that ’on balance' cession
was best for the people. Consequently he advised the party 'not to
3oppose Sarawak cession and not to give unqualified support’.
As Teeling explained to Anthony Brooke later, Gammans' cable 
took them completely by surprise. On past form he had been expected 
to lead an angry attack on the government and his cable left some 
members shaking their heads in disbelief. Even Stanley, who had been 
'luke warm' about the Sarawak affair from the outset because of his 
earlier involvement in the negotiations, expressed disappointment 
that Gammans had not sent 'something stronger'.^ Consequently, when 
Hall gave the House details of the voting on 22 May there was hardly 
a whisper of criticism from the Conservatives. Admitting that the 
close result had caused the government to review its commitment to
1 Dawson Diary, 26 May 1946.
2 Teeling to Anthony Brooke, 3 June 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 11/4.
3 Gammans to Stanley, 18 May 1946, WO 203/5535. Gammans elaborated 
on this view in 'Death of a State', Sunday Times_, 2 June 1946.
4 Teeling to Anthony Brooke, 3 June 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 11/4.
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accept cession, Hall said it had finally been decided that the narrow
majority of European members did not provide sufficient grounds for
rejecting it. In support of this he quoted the M.P.s1 234 findings and
pointed out that they had not insisted that the vote should be limited
to non-European members. The disproportionate representation of the
Malays by comparison with the Ibans and the Chinese he also suggested
as a reason why the native vote should not be regarded as superseding
the M.P.'s report on the people's views. Besides, he concluded, it
would have been wrong to have ignored the European members 'who voted
as individuals with knowledge of Sarawak and not as an official bloc'.^
Referring to Gammans' cable, which he had already shown to Hall,
Stanley said that while he regretted some of the earlier steps, 'the
only thing is to hope that this Act of Cession will prove to be of
2benefit to the people'. There was not even a call for formal reports
3from Gammans and Rees-Williams and Sarawak did not become a subject 
of controversy in the House again until December when Anthony Brooke 
was banned by the colonial government from making a visit there.
The British press accepted the Council Negri decision with­
out much criticism, although the anti-cession faction attacked the 
vote in the letter columns.^ A typical response was from The Times.
'On the whole', observed its special editorial of 16 May before the 
final vote was known, 'incorporation of Sarawak... seems likely... 
to promote the best interests of the people, even though the dis­
appearance of a unique polity may cause some sentimental regret.' At 
the same time, however, it issued a warning that cession should not 
be pursued 'if the people primarily affected show themselves unwilling 
to accept it'.
1 Hansard, 22 May 1946.
2 Ibid.
3 However, in addition to the informal report which Gammans wrote
in June ('Parliamentary Mission to Sarawak') there was an 
official report which was not tabled: 'Record of the Visit of
Lt.-Col. Rees-Williams, M.P., and Captain Gammans, M.P., to 
Sarawak', Gammans Papers, Item 9. This was largely based on 
Barrett's diary.
4 See, e.g., letters to The Times3 18 and 22 May 1946; The Daily 
Telegraph3 22 May 1946; Manchester Guardian3 24 May 1946.
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CHAPTER VIII
The Anti-Cession Movement
BEFORE the Japanese invasion, there were already signs within the 
urban Malay and Chinese communities that the traditional leadership 
was failing to meet the expectations of new educated groups. While 
the Japanese occupation did not provide opportunities for political 
activity, it did inspire the self-confidence required to adopt a 
political stance and to organize what amounted to political parties. 
Although the MNU and the SDA saw themselves initially as defending 
a threatened moral order, and while there are few signs of outside 
influence during the first phase of their campaign against cession, 
internal conflicts soon made it clear that some of their members 
would not be content with a mere return to the status quo ante. The 
tensions within the MNU demonstrated that in addition to the pre­
dictable anxiety of the traditional Malay elite to preserve the 
position of privilege which it had enjoyed under Brooke rule, there 
were some young Malays who saw the restoration of Brooke rule as a 
means of achieving a form of national independence in which political 
power would be shared with the Ibans.
The Anti-Cession Parties
The early months of 1946 had seen the emergence of the MNU and the SDA 
as Sarawak's first political parties. While their organizational 
background was rooted in the pre-war years, the impetus for their 
renewed activity had been provided by the political awakening of the 
Chinese and the announcement of cession. By the time of the Rajah’s 
visit in April, the MNU had revived its pre-war branches throughout 
the state and its registered membership was estimated by the military 
administration at 2,417 of whom about half were from the First 
Division.'*' By June the SDA was claiming 400 members, almost all of 
whom were from the First Division.
1 Macaskie to Colonial Office, 23 March 1946, WO 203/5535.
Figures for the other Divisions were: Second Division, 280;
Third Division, 395; Fourth Division, 26; Fifth Division, 6.
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The 12 February meeting of the MNU which had been called to
discuss the Datu Patinggi's letters about the bribes inevitably brought
about a polarization between those who opposed cession and those who
supported it. At a subsequent extraordinary meeting on 27 February the
Datu Amar,who had been President since the MNU’s registration in 1939,
resigned from what had rapidly become an impossible position, taking
with him a number of supporters. Abang Haji Zaini, the son of the Datu
Bentara, took over as president and Abang Openg became vice-president.^
The supporters of cession were challenged to debate the question but
2no one seems to have responded. Nor were the columns of the Sarawak 
Tribune generally available for correspondence after 5 March.
From the outset the younger members of the MNU took the lead 
in organizing activities. A political committee was formed, instruction 
was given in public-speaking and there was also an attempt to widen 
the intellectual horizons of members. On 3 March a Malay and English 
Literary Section was formed and its chairman, Johari Bojeng, emphasized 
that 'he who has not been "presented to the freedom" of literature had
3not wakened up out of his prenatal sleep’. At the next meeting there
were lectures on 'Malay Culture', 'How to Become a Good Speaker' and
4speeches by fourteen other members on a host of subjects. The MNU 
was clearly providing the new educated elite with practically its 
first real outlet for intellectual as well as political expression 
since the short-lived Fajar Sarawak and the Persaudara'an Sahabat Pena 
of pre-war days. However, there were no signs that this cultural and 
political awakening was linked in any way with Islamic reformism.
Unlike their cousins in Malaya, the Sarawak Malays did not possess a 
strong tradition of Islamic education and there were no echoes of the 
kaum muda - kaum tua debate which had absorbed so much energy in the 
peninsula during the 1920s.^
1 Sarawak Tribune, 1 March 1946.
2 Sarawak Tribune, 5 March 1946.
3 Ibid.
4 Sarawak Tribune, 12 March 1946.
Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, pp. 56-90.5
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Educated Ibans like Robert Jitam seem to have been influenced 
in their opposition to cession by a number of considerations. Incul­
cated with the ideals of British justice, Jitam was inclined to project 
his own feelings about cession on to the uneducated Ibans of the 
Second and Third Divisions. ’... To see a deed actually done beneath 
one's nose, so to speak', he told Anthony Brooke's sister, Anne 
Bryant, in August 1946, 'against that principle of fair play and by 
one who is set up as the fountain head of all virtues, simply upset 
one's feelings and the natural sequence is that one sees red.'^ More 
importantly, he was fearful of how the Ibans would fare as a race 
under colonial rule and the anticipated influx of Chinese and other 
aliens:
The Dayaks especially are quite unprepared to meet such 
an onslaught and coupled with the fact that most of our 
kiths and kins in the villages are still living in the 
"Stone Age" era, I fear very much that in time we will 
be submerged beneath the avalanche of immigration and 
development that the name of "Dayak" will be just a 
mere namesake and no more. Of course, it could not 
happen in one day but to quote a few examples, one is apt 
to ask - Where are the Sakais in Malaya and the aborigines 
of Australia now? Apparently, we are earmarked for the 
next extinction. That is the sole reason why we protested 
vehemently.... 2
This fear of Chinese domination was one of the principal bonds between 
the MNU and the SDA.
The major weakness of the SDA was that its appeal was limited 
to the First Division and those areas of the Second Division whose 
people had been trading in rubber and pepper for some years and were 
comparatively westernized. The committee members of the SDA came from 
families who had migrated to the First Division three or four 
generations earlier. Having allied themselves with the Brookes and 
the Malays against the Ibans of the Skrang and Saribas, they 
identified with the Raj. Their close contact and common interest 
with the Malays had broken down the strong historical antipathy which 
still existed among the Ibans of the Third Division, thus enabling a
1 Robert Jitam to Anne Bryant, 10 August 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 11/1.
2 Ibid.
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degree of political co-operation. However, it also isolated them 
from the Ibans of the Second and Third Divisions and prevented them 
from gathering political support in traditional Iban areas. The Ibans 
of the Third Division also seem to have been quick to accept the 
transfer of political authority from the Brookes to the British 
Rajah. There were some good historical reasons why they should not 
have identified so closely with the Raj as their cousins of the First 
Division.
Nor was there unanimity on cession among the Kuching Ibans.
As we have already noted, Edwin Howell the SDA adviser supported
cession and exercised considerable influence over the other members.^
An educated Anglo-Iban (some would have called him and Edward Brandah
’British Ibans’), he identified to some extent with the Eurasian
community's desire for career advancement and social status which
cession promised. It was only after Bertram Brooke’s visit that
Philip Jitam and other members of the SDA began to oppose cession.
Howell’s failure to be selected as Eurasian representative in the 
2Council Negri may also have cooled his earlier support for cession.
No doubt it was these contradictions which prevented close
co-operation between the SDA and the MNU for some months after the
former came into existence. It was not until early June that
negotiations took place, resulting in an agreement on future co-oper- 
3ation. Nor would these have been successful had it not been for
4the close personal friendship between Robert Jitam and Mohd. Nor 
and the efforts of Suhaily bin Matlayeir who knew most of the Ibans
1 Chapter VII, p. 328.
2 The Eurasian appointed by the Rajah was Tommy Owen, the son of 
a former Resident, H.L. Owen, who had been retired in 1929.
Owen voted for cession in May 1946.
3 Suhaily bin Matlayeir to Anthony Brooke, 4 July 1946, Brooke 
Papers, Box 12/14.
4 For a biographical note on Robert Jitam, see Chapter V, p.
Mohd. Ma'amon bin Nor was educated at St Joseph’s School, 
Kuching, and was the first Sarawak Malay to pass the Senior 
Cambridge examination. His father was a businessman and his 
grandfather, Ghafor, had taken a prominent part in putting 
down the Chinese rebellion in 1857. He won a scholarship to 
Serdang Agricultural College in Malaya but when this was
[contd. over]
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in Kuching and was able to speak their language. The earlier
2’stubbornness' of the SDA members which Suhaily complained about
stemmed partly from the suspicion that the Malays were simply using
3them for their own ends, a feeling which was no doubt strengthened 
by the patronizing attitude of the MNU’s conservatives. Before final 
agreement could be reached the MNU had to concede that in any future 
system of government, political representation would reflect the 
numerical ratio of Ibans to Malays. This was a significant con­
cession on the part of the MNU conservatives and it is not surprising 
that they thought better of it later.
From July until October the MNU was in the throes of an 
internal conflict and the SDA was wavering on whether to continue 
opposing cession. Within the MNU, tension had quickly developed 
between the representatives of the traditional Malay elite and the 
younger activists. The conservatives were satisfied with sending 
cables and petitions and were not really interested in a broadly 
based political movement with close Iban co-operation. The younger 
activists, who described themselves as the 'inner circle' of the MNU,
4 [contd. from previous page]
cancelled found it difficult to obtain a job and ran a 
restaurant at the MNU headquarters. The youngest of the Fajar 
Sarawak group, he contributed articles to the newspapers and 
visited the kampongs encouraging the Malays to improve their 
economic situation. One of the leading activists of the MNU, 
he later helped form the Barisan Pemuda Sarawak in June 1947. 
Having spent all his money on the anti-cession campaign, he 
went to Brunei in 1948 to work for Shell and remained there 
for some years. Consequently he did not join any political 
party in the early 1960s. His son, Bujang Mohd. Nor, became 
Sarawak's Financial Secretary in 1971.
1 Interview with Mohd. Ma'amon bin Nor, May 1975.
2 Suhaily bin Matlayeir to Anthony Brooke, op. cit.
3 Interview with Mohd. Ma'amon bin Nor, May 1975.
4 Ibid.
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included Mohd. Nor, Sharkawi bin Haji Osman, Mohd. Suhaily bin 
Matleyir, Edham bin Bojeng and other young educated Malays not of 
abang origin who were disinclined to defer automatically to those who 
had traditionally been their social betters. They rebelled against 
the undemocratic way in which the MNU was run and found they had more 
in common politically with such people as Robert Jitam of the SDA.
The conflict was significant because it mirrored the wide 
difference in interests and attitudes which existed within the MNU.
All wished to see a restoration of the Raj, but not necessarily for 
the same reasons. The motivation of the traditional elite was clear 
enough. The restoration of Brooke rule meant for them a return to 
the status quo ante in which they had occupied the top position of 
power and prestige within Malay society and, by extension, within 
Sarawak's confederation of ethnic groups. On the other hand, if the 
Datu Patinggi had agreed to cession (as we have seen he did at one 
point) they would almost certainly have gone with him in order to 
enjoy the rewards which the colonial government would have given 
them. There must have been many an envious eye cast on Abang Haji 
Mustapha who had jumped at the right time.
People like Abang Haji Zaini and Abang Bol Hassan seem to 
have taken the view (which was well established in Sarawak history) 
that the perabangan provided leadership which was to be accepted 
without question by the Malays and Ibans. They were also conservative 
in their notions of what constituted political effectiveness. Always 
a little embarrassed about such things as public speeches, demon­
strations and posters, they adopted a fundamentally constitutionalist 
approach, invoking the political wills of the first two Rajahs and 
Vyner Brooke's accession oath, the Atlantic Charter and the San 
Francisco Conference on the rights of small nations.
The motivation of the younger Malays who constituted the 
most active force within the MNU was more complex. While some wanted
1 Sharkawi was one of the few Sarawak Malays educated abroad. 
He had been taught in Singapore by the Malay nationalist,
Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, who later formed the Pan Malayan 
Islamic Party.
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the restoration of Brooke rule per se, others wanted self-government 
and independence as suggested in the 1941 Constitution. The return 
of the Brookes under the limitations of the constitution they saw as 
providing an interim period which would allow for the development of 
a multi-racial political organization. They were prepared to co­
operate with members of the traditional elite and would probably have 
supported the idea of the Datu Patinggi or one of his grandsons 
becoming Rajah in place of the Brookes.^ But in the meantime the 
restoration of Brooke rule was their only means of retaining political 
independence.
The first signs of a rift within the ranks of the MNU
emerged in July when a handful of the younger activists proposed the
formation of a 'United Sarawak National Organization', which was
2conceived as an indigenous anti-cession front. While its proposers 
tactfully emphasized its usefulness in fund-raising and creating a 
greater sense of anti-cession solidarity, its real aims were those 
of a political party committed not just to the restoration of the 
Brookes but to educational and social change. However, the more 
conservative members of the MNU, notably Haji Abdul Rahman and Abang 
Haji Zaini, resented this initiative from their social inferiors.
Nor were they prepared to co-operate with the SDA to this extent and 
the scheme was subsequently dropped although by no means forgotten.
It is a difficult task to discover the ideological influences 
on the young activists of the MNU. During the first phase of the MNU 
campaign, they seem to have accepted the strictly constitutionalist 
frame of reference supplied by Haji Abdul Rahman. From Singapore's 
Malay-language Utusan Melayu there was information about what was 
happening in Malaya and the British government's cave-in over the 
' Malayan Union was to have an important effect in Sarawak. There were 
few publicized references to developments in Indonesia by MNU members
1 The 1941 Constitution accommodated the possibility of a Malay 
Rajah and there was at least a rumour that MacBryan had 
considered setting up the Datu Patinggi.
2 Mohd. Nor to Anthony Brooke, 4 July 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 
12/14.
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until the appearance of Sarawak’s first post-war newspaper, Utusan
Sarawak^ in 1949^ but many Sarawak Malays must have been aware of
what was happening there. Photographs of Sukarno and other Indonesian
nationalist leaders were pinned side by side with those of the Rajah
2and Ranee in some of Kuching's Malay houses in 1946 and many First 
Division families had links with Sambas and other places further 
afield. There were even some nationalists among the Javanese brought 
in as labourers by the Japanese and one, Mujono, was repatriated to 
Pontianak by the Australian military authorities on suspicion of being
3an ’agitator’. However, the handful of Javanese who remained in 
Kuching and Miri did not play any significant part in the anti­
cession movement and there is only one report of Indonesian national-
4ist agitation during the period 1946-47. By early 1947 the colonial 
government was reporting that the increasing Indonesian influence 
was coming from Singapore and not Pontianak.“*
Members of the MNU began to make visits to Singapore in
February 1947 but there is no clear evidence that the anti-cessionists
£
were associated with the Singapore-based Indonesian Association or 
Gerakan Angkatan Muda (GERAM). The latter was interested in the anti­
cession movement and sent representatives including Abdullah Zawawi 
Hamzah and Abdul Samad bin Ismail (editor of Utusan Melayu) to contact 
its leaders in Singapore.^ When the United Sarawak National Association
1 Utusan Sarawak was edited and largely owned by Abang (now 
Datu) Ekhwan Zaini, the son of Abang Haji Zaini.
2 Morris, MS memoir.
3 Morris, op. cit. Mujono was active in the Sambas area during 
Indonesian Confrontation.
4 Ibid.
5 'Summary of Comments received from Governor of Sarawak on the 
aide memoire in relation to Sarawak Affairs prepared by 
direction of His Highness Rajah Brooke', Hussey Papers.
6 Sjamsudin Lubis and S.L. Tobing, Rahsia Perdjuangan Indonesia 
di Singaporej Singapore 1949.
7 Malayan Security Service: Fortnightly Intelligence Journals 
together with Occasional Supplements (1946-1948), report for 
15 August 1947. I am indebted to Dr Anthony Stockwell for 
this reference.
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(USNA) was formed by expatriate Sarawak Malays in April 1947, Tahu
Kalu, President of the Singapore branch of the Malay Nationalist
Party (MNP),advised it to affiliate with the MNP. However, this
advice was rejected (possibly due to Anthony Brooke’s influence) and
USNA remained isolated."^ Nor was there any link with the Singapore
branch of Ahmad Boestamam’s Angkatan Pemuda Insaf which grew out of 
2the MNP. Indeed, the anti-cession movement remained pretty much
separate from the mainstream of Malay nationalism until 1948. The
main point of contact was Utusan Melayu which was widely read by the
Malays of Kuching, Sibu and Miri. Utusan Melayu naturally gave wide
coverage to Malay opposition to the Malayan Union and was warmly
sympathetic to Anthony Brooke and the anti-cession cause. One of its
3reporters, Mahfuz Hamid, spent the early part of 1947 in Sarawak 
where he wrote a number of articles. Perhaps the first clear sign 
of an Indonesian or Malayan influence was the use of the slogan 
Merdeka Brooke (Brooke independence) by mid-1947^ and the naming of 
the MNU’s splinter group, the Bartsan Pemuda S a r a w a k (Sarawak Youth 
Front), which had clear Indonesian overtones. It is significant 
that up to this point the Kuching Malays preferred to use English 
names for their organizations (Malay National Union, United Sarawak 
National Organization) rather than the Malay versions.
There was a curiously ’anti-political’ strain running 
through the thinking of the young MNU activists. Mohd. Nor, for 
example, told Anthony Brooke shortly after cession was formalized in 
July that ’politics' was something alien to Sarawak and had been 
introduced by MacBryan and the British government:
1 Ibid.
2 Interview with Ahmad Boestamam, July 1974.
3 Suhaily bin Matlayeir to Anne Bryant, 17 January 1947, Brooke 
Papers, Box 11/1. Unfortunately, the only Utusan Melayu files 
for 1945 and 1946 were destroyed by the Kuala Lumpur floods
of 1971 and those for 1947 were being restored at the time of 
this study.
4 Jean Halsey to Margaret Noble, 28 April 1947, Brooke Papers, Box 12/8.
5 See below, p. 416.
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The Sarawak people do not want to be politicians as 
politics only make people cheat, and this cheating 
caused the world war. Sarawak is a peaceful and 
independent State with a surplus of food; no paupers, 
no starvation, no unemployment and no civil war. The 
people lived in peace and happiness, and no politicians 
should be allowed to come into the country; but now 
MacBryan and George Hall wish to introduce politics 
into Sarawak so in the future there will be no happiness 
and no prosperity; there will be civil war, famine, 
strikes, demonstrations etc. 1
Given this pejorative connotation of 'politics', Mohd. Nor did not 
at this point recognize his own efforts in helping to restore the 
Raj as bearing any relation to political activity. However, the 'inner 
circle's' struggle with the MNU leadership was to provide an object 
lesson in politics.
Official Reactions
The colonial government's reaction to the activities of the anti­
cession parties was to encourage the formation of a pro-cession Young 
Malay Association (YMA) headed by the Datu Pahlawan. Registered on 
4 June, its official aim was that of 'stimulating social relations
among the young Malays of the country, promoting sports and recreations,
2and encouraging education'. But the YMA was really designed to help 
Malays who had supported cession and were consequently coming under 
considerable social pressure, including the boycott of weddings, 
funerals and other social occasions. One of the YMA's principal 
functions was to provide moral support for the families of 'pro­
cessionists' who were suffering from this social ostracism. The 
parent body in Kuching consisted, predictably enough, of Malay 
policemen, firemen and government clerks who were dependent to some
extent on Abang Haji Mustapha's patronage. Indeed, it was almost
3compulsory for Malay policemen to join. YMAs were also formed in 
Sibu (where Abang Abdulrahim was President) and other towns to perform 
similar tasks in response to the MNU's activities. In July the Rajah
1 Mohd. Nor to Anthony Brooke, 4 July 1946, Brooke Papers, 
Box 12/14.
2 Sarawak Tribune> 11 June 1946.
3 Interview with Senawi bin Suleiman, July 1974.
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himself donated $2,000 towards the YMA’s 'welfare'.^"
Some members of the colonial administration did their best 
to intimidate the membership of the MNU and the SDA, most of whom 
were government servants. Annoyed by the constant interchange of 
cables between the Brookes and the two anti-cession parties, Dawson 
thought that banning them would do more harm than good and that the 
situation could be kept under control:
... when you get rabid telegrams going on about 
"independence”, "annexation", "U.N.O.", "Atlantic 
Charter", "Brooke for Sarawak and St. George for England" 
etc. it makes you wonder how much potential trouble is 
on hand. Not much in fact, I think. It is still the 
vocals; so long as they don’t foment and deliberately 
promote trouble among the others - the neutral or placid 
majority. Then there is real trouble potential. 2
However, not all of Dawson's subordinates were so patient. When yet
another cable from Anthony Brooke arrived on 22 June, D.C. White,
Government Under-Secretary and Registrar of Societies, called in
Philip Jitam and emphasized that it was contrary to the required
conduct of an association not to have kept full minutes of the meeting
which had been held to discuss their response to Anthony Brooke's
cable of 5 June. 'To draft your reply as representing the whole you
have to call a general meeting', White told Jitam, 'but since cession
would be through in a matter of days, I do not think... that you
3need exert yourselves - it is all over bar the shouting.'
Most SDA members were living at some distance from Kuching 
and White must have known very well that it was impossible to have a 
general meeting each time to decide such matters. Nevertheless, the 
harassment was not ineffective and the SDA's committee hesitated for 
some days before replying to the 22 June cable. Practically all the 
committee members were government servants and there was great concern 
that continued activity in the face of strong government disapproval 
might bring about not only their dismissal but confiscation of the
1 Sarawak Tribune„ 30 September 1946.
2 Dawson Diary, 8 June 1946.
3 Robert Jitam to Anthony Brooke, 10 July 1946, Brooke Papers, 
Box 11/3.
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government's contribution to their superannuation. No doubt it was 
as a result of such anxiety that Dr Charles Mason effectively resigned 
from the presidency of the SDA in July while Philip Jitam hesitated 
for some time before agreeing (as a member of the Council Negri) to 
take the oath of allegiance to the King and resigning his position as 
joint secretary.^ As an employee of the Sarawak Rubber Fund which 
was not under direct government control, Robert Jitam felt compara­
tively free from pressure and it was largely due to his activity that 
the SDA was kept alive after July and contact maintained with the MNU.
Dawson's tact in dealing with the Malays assisted the new 
colonial administration in establishing itself with the minimum of 
difficulty. However, there was one major event before the formaliz­
ation of cession on 1 July which hardened the division between those 
Malays who had decided to support cession and those who opposed it.
As promised by the Rajah, the Datu Pahlawan was rewarded for his
assistance with the Council Negri vote by being promoted to Datu 
2Bandar in June while Ong Tiang Swee was released from a $100,000
3mortgage repayment to the government. The reaction of the Datu 
Patinggi and his kinsmen was predictable enough. They regarded Abang 
Haji Mustapha not only as MacBryan’s creature and a traitor both to 
the Brookes and the Malays, but a usurper to the highest honour.
Abang Haji Mustapha could claim descent from Datu Patinggi Ali but 
his line was not as direct. The senior datuship had been given to 
a member of Abang Haji Abdillah's family since James Brooke's time 
and, as we have seen, he had even agreed to support cession if his 
eldest grandson, Abang Ibrahim, succeeded him and the title of Datu 
Patinggi was made hereditary.
As far as the non-Malays were concerned, the appointment 
was a jockeying for position within the Malay elite. More importantly, 
however, it was also seen to constitute the highest official
1 Philip Jitam to Clerk of Council Negri, 15 July 1946, Jitam 
Papers; Philip Jitam to Joint Secretary of Sarawak Dayak 
Association, 15 July 1946, ibid.
2 SGG3 29 June 1946.
3 Dawson to Mayle, 19 October 1946, CO 531/32 [53185].
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approbation of a man regarded as one of the most vocal supporters of 
the Japanese and a prime target for prosecution as a collaborator.
Robert Jitam, who had refused to work under the Japanese administration, 
was particularly bitter about this 'paradox'. In October 1946 he 
wrote to Anne Bryant:
Take for instance... Datu Pahlawan and Abang Openg, 
both of whom were working for the Japs in high posts.
The way they preened themselves off owing to their high 
positions at that time has to be seen to be believed.
I was thinking that in due course they would meet 
"justice", but instead of which they are now elevated.
So would you, if you are in my shoes, have any faith 
in those people to guide and administer to their own 
kind? 1
People like himself who had expected recognition from the government
for their self-denial found instead that they were 'awarded the heavy 
2boot...'. Ironically enough, the anti-cessionists were later to be
regarded by Sarawak's first Governor as a collection of collaborators 
3and malcontents.
Although Dawson’s initial impressions of the senior members 
of the Sarawak Service had not been particularly favourable, he grew 
to appreciate why Brooke rule had retained its unique popularity. 
Furthermore, he could see that the transition to colonial rule should 
be as inconspicuous as possible in order to avoid problems. Conse­
quently, when it became clear that Malcolm MacDonald wished to make 
a grand occasion of the 1 July ceremony he became extremely irritated. 
'God Save the King', he complained to his diary, 'I can't! This 4place will be a riot if they push the thing too far. Let it riot!'
Nor was it a very impressive beginning for the much-vaunted British 
colonial government. The flags, printing blocks and other items 
promised by Singapore had not arrived and the Letters Patent and 
Royal Instructions were not received until 29 June.
1 Robert Jitam to Anne Bryant, 14 October 1946, Brooke Papers, 
Box 11/1.
2 Ibid.
3 See below, p-407.
4 Dawson Diary, 27 June 1946.
390
The official ceremony confirming the British Crown's accept­
ance of cession and annexing Sarawak as a Crown possession took place 
in a subdued and somewhat resentful atmosphere. There were no Iban 
representatives present and the Datu Patinggi excused himself, even
declining to receive Malcolm MacDonald at his house.^ Ironically
2enough, very few Union Jacks were available for the day and most of
the decorations were in fact Sarawak flags, the Chinese being tactful
enough not to display the Chinese national flag. The Special
Commissioner, Malcolm MacDonald, read cables from the Rajah and the
King expressing their best wishes for Sarawak’s future and then
confirmed Dawson’s appointment as Chief Secretary and Acting Governor,
the Datu Bandar reading Malay translations. In the late afternoon
MacDonald insisted on making a tour of the kampongs in spite of the
boycott, acknowledging non-existent salutes and waving cheerily to
unresponsive Malays. 'Rather undignified I thought', commented Dawson
3who accompanied him, 'but I suppose he knows his stuff?' It seemed 
to him that empty roads were almost worse than anti-cession demon­
strations .
In the evening there was a garden party at the Astana where 
most of the guests were government officials and Chinese and the next 
day MacDonald addressed schoolchildren before returning to Singapore. 
He had hoped to make a tour of Iban areas but this was postponed 
until August. Nevertheless, it was already clear that the Special 
Commissioner appreciated the importance of personal rule to the Ibans 
and the Malays. He was only too happy to step into the White Rajah's 
shoes on what became increasingly frequent visits to the Third 
Division and adopt what he conceived to be the appropriate style. 
Indeed, Temenggong Koh's longhouse on the Baleh became his weekender.^ 
More importantly, he saw the usefulness of cultivating 'loyal' Ibans 
as a useful ally against anti-cession Malays.
1 Anon, to Bertram Brooke, 1 July 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 11/2.
2 Dawson Diary, 27 June 1946.
3 Dawson Diary, 2 July 1946.
4 For the Special Commissioner's own sentimental memoir of his 
time in Sarawak, see Borneo People, London 1956.
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A few days after the ceremony, the Datu Patinggi received a 
letter from Dawson telling him that unless he made an oath of loyalty 
to the new government he would forfeit his membership of the Council 
Negri and the Supreme Council. However, the old man refused to bow 
to such pressure. ’This new affirmation', he told Anthony Brooke on 
8 July when the Supreme Council sat without him, ’is only a tool to 
confuse members of the Council and the world so that it can be said 
that there has been recognition of Sarawak as a colony.’"*' In making 
this stand, the Patinggi probably stemmed what might otherwise have 
been a gradual flow of support from the anti-cession camp towards 
accepting cession as a fait accompli.
While Dawson was careful to avoid any open breach with the 
2Datu Patinggi, he was not so tolerant of the angry speeches made by 
Abang Haji Zaini in the aftermath of 1 July. When he learnt that 
the MNU President had talked about the 'blood-sucking British’ and 
threatened to boycott the Union Jack at school sports meetings, Dawson 
thought that he would not be able to stand much more of this. 'There 
are limits to the everlasting kindness of the British’, he wrote in 
his diary. Nevertheless, he would not allow the Datu Bandar’s 
supporters in the police to 'break up’ the MNU. He also became less 
concerned about Abang Haji Zaini's activities when told that the 
latter was only interested in self-advancement and ’would fold up 
and come to heel if offered a Datuship (D. Bentara) by Govt.'^ Dawson 
was attracted by this idea but does not appear to have pursued it.
When it was announced in mid-July that the first Governor 
of Sarawak was to be Sir Charles Arden-Clarke,^  Resident Commissioner 
of Basutoland, Dawson found it difficult to contain his bitterness at 
being passed over for a job for which he was eminently suited.
1 Datu Patinggi to Anthony Brooke, 8 July 1946, Brooke Papers,
Box 10/1.
2 Dawson Diary, 28 July 1946.
3 Dawson Diary, - August 1946.
4 Dawson Diary, -August 1946.
5 The Timest 18 July 1946. Charles Noble Arden-Clarke (1898-1962) 
served in the Machine Gun Corps during the 1914-18 war and joined
[contd. over]
392
This is pretty hard [Dawson wrote in his diary]. Do 
I want to stay on as no. 2 to an 'African'. Not me.
And yet I hate pushing this place over having had such 
a hand in bringing it in... It is bad policy. What 
this country wants is to be left alone. They begin to 
know me. They have to have M. MacD (twice). Now 
another new face. I suspect it is done so suddenly in 
order to prevent me from becoming too much a persona 
grata and so more difficult for the next man. But what 
chicanery after all I have done. Feathers in the hat 
from Nigeria! (Not even knowing Malay or the local 
dancing and other 'adat' which has brought this place 
to hand.) They use all that, my personality, my 
natural influence with Malays etc. to get the place, 
and then hand it over to an African.... 1
2The Rajah also clearly expected that Dawson would be made Governor
and Malcolm MacDonald had even recommended him for the post. 'What
is needed', the Special Commissioner told the Colonial Office a few
days after the 1 July ceremony, 'is an uninterrupted period in which
the govt, can play itself in. Dawson seems to me a wholly admirable
3man with the right sympathy and wisdom for his difficult task.'
Dawson's policy was to make the transition from Brooke rule 
to colonial rule as gentle as possible but this was not in accord 
with Colonial Office thinking. Arden-Clarke, who was considered by 
many people as over-qualified for the job, seems to have been chosen
5 [contd. from previous page]
the Colonial Administrative Service in 1920. From then until 
1933 he was an Administrative Officer in Northern Nigeria and 
was promoted to Acting Principal Assistant Secretary in the 
Nigerian Secretariat in 1934. He was made Assistant Resident 
Commissioner and Government Secretary, Bechuanaland Protector­
ate, in 1936 and Resident Commissioner in 1937 before going to 
Basutoland in 1942. After leaving Sarawak in 1949, he served 
as Governor of the Gold Coast (Ghana) until 1957 and made a 
name for himself as an astute and tactful administrator. 
Assessing Kwame Nkrumah as possessing great potential as a 
post-colonial leader, Arden-Clarke defied the Colonial Office 
and gave Nkrumah a fairly free hand. However, Sarawak was 
'different' and his lack of sensitivity to the situation 
created problems during his time there.
1 Dawson Diary, 17 July 1946.
2 Dawson Diary, 25 July 1946.
3 MacDonald to Colonial Office, 4 July 1946, cited by Dawson in 
his Diary, 19 July 1946.
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with the intention of making a clean break with the Brooke past. 
Possessing no knowledge of the area, he was no doubt considered less 
prone to the 'sentimentality* which the Colonial Office had always 
been at pains to avoid within the Colonial Administrative Service.
He was probably also chosen as a disciplinarian capable of handling 
the problems of a belated transition to colonial status. It would be 
surprising if the Colonial Office had not been somewhat apprehensive 
about the situation in Sarawak, particularly in view of the native 
vote in the Council Negri and the publicity being created by the MNU 
and SDA and the anti-cession faction in England.
The Anti-Cession Campaign
During the six months following the Council Negri meeting a somewhat 
desultory campaign was conducted by the MNU and SDA in concert with 
the anti-cession faction in England. Three weeks after the Council 
Negri vote William Charles Crocker, a celebrated barrister who had 
been introduced to Bertram by his son-in-law, Arthur Bryant, told the 
latter that in his view Bertram and Anthony should do two things: 
give guidance and support to the two anti-cession groups in their 
demand for a restoration of independence, and make the Labour govern­
ment realize that 'the permanent Civil Servants had used this somewhat 
inexperienced Government as a tool in a dishonourable piece of 
imperial aggrandizement'.^ It seemed to him 'hopeless' to place any 
reliance on the Conservatives who had remained unmoved by this and 
other breaches of the Atlantic Charter.
In the meantime, it was necessary to go through the motions
of petitioning the Crown in the vain hope that the Order-in-Council
would not be issued. However, Bertram's letter to the King was
passed on to Hall who reminded him, predictably enough, that he had
2agreed to abide by the decision of the two councils. Once the Order- 
in-Council had been issued in late June, Bertram began to wonder if 
there was any point in continuing the fight for what was now the 
restoration of Brooke rule rather than its continuation. He was
1 Crocker to Bryant, 12 June 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 11/3.
2 Hall to Bertram Brooke, 28 June 1946, Facts About Sarawak  ^ pp. 97-8.
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concerned about the moral propriety of encouraging people in Sarawak 
to resist cession when he was not at all sure that there was any 
possibility of securing its repeal. Furthermore, he had mixed 
feelings from the outset about the political activity which seemed to 
be developing in Sarawak. Indeed, he told H.V.Hodson, editor of the 
Sunday Times} that he was almost embarrassed by the support he was 
receiving from the MNU and some of the pre-war officers:
This "Union" is something quite new. I am afraid that 
the fact that it has come into being shows that there 
is a good deal of unrest out there, and that what used 
to be an easy-going and politically homogeneous populace 
is now divided into "camps". I fear also that such is 
the case with Sarawak officers. I hear of "So-and-so" 
alluded to as "for the Rajah" or "for Peter", as the 
case may be. 1
The old Sarawak which he had known had not possessed such divisions 
and his instinct was to heal them at all costs. But a great deal 
had happened since 1936 when he last visited the state, not the least 
being the Japanese occupation. There was no returning to the 
harmonious and happy world of the pre-war Raj which he remembered.
All that Bertram Brooke was now prepared to do was to test
the Rajah’s action in the courts and with this intention he had
discussions with both Crocker and Theodore Page, a barrister who had
some knowledge of Islamic law as well as a strong interest in
constitutional issues. However, the questions involved were extremely
complicated, as was the actual procedure, and it was not until 1950
that the case was decided by the Privy Council effectively in the 
2Rajah's favour.
1 Bertram Brooke to Hodson, 26 March 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 11/2. 
Bertram became even more ill at ease when he saw the anti­
cession Utusan Sarawak three years later.
2 The first step was in July 1948 when a plaint was filed on Bertram’s 
behalf in the Resident’s Court at Brunei with the intention of 
recalling the line of succession as set out by James Brooke in 
his political will and Vyner’s extraction of $2,000,000 from
state funds in 1941. It was hoped eventually to petition the 
Crown to repeal the Order-in-Council of 26 June 1946 and to 
receive an account of the Rajah's transfer of funds. When the 
Resident's court refused to summons the Rajah and the descendants
[contd. over]
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It was Anthony and his sister, Anne Bryant, who kept in
touch with the MNU and SDA and helped to boost their sagging morale.
On 5 June 1946, for example, Anthony cabled their Presidents seeking
responses to a comment by Gammans in the Evening Standard that ’the
people of Sarawak do not care whether or not the Raj is brought to an
end’.^  This brought vehement denials from the Datu Patinggi and the
Presidents of the MNU and SDA and a call to the Tuan Muda to assime
2the prerogatives of the Raj. The Patinggi also sent a separate 
message to Anthony expressing his feelings in more poetic terms:
Harimau mati meninggal belang gag ah mati meninggal 
tulong manusia mati meninggalkan ncona.
[When a tiger dies, his striped skin remains; when 
an elephant dies, his bones remain; a dead man leaves 
his reputation behind.] 3
The exchanges of cables became more frequent as 1 July 
approached, culminating in another cable that day from the Datu 
Patinggi and Abang Haji Zaini to Prime Minister Attlee protesting 
that cession did not have the lawful assent of the representatives of 
the indigenous people and that five of the native members who had
2 [contd. from previous page]
of James Brooke's trustees on the grounds that this was beyond 
its jurisdiction and the decision was upheld by the Judge of 
Appeal in the State of Brunei, it was then possible to apply 
for special leave to appeal to the Privy Council. This was 
granted after long argument but on 30 March 1950 the judgment 
delivered by Lord Normand finally upheld the Brunei court’s 
decision. Ironically enough, the substantive question of the 
legality of cession was not discussed, most of the argument 
turning on the interpretation of the amended Courts Enactment 
1908 of the State of Brunei and the Civil Procedure Code of 
the Federated Malay States. However, the judgment did 
determine that the original grant made to James Brooke by the 
Sultan of Brunei was a unilateral deed and that the Sultan did 
not retain any measure of authority over Sarawak. Besides, i: 
added, '... the principles of international law or comity wou_d 
exclude from the jurisdiction of the Courts of Brunei any 
question relating to the sovereignty or the land of Sarawak'. 
The Law Reports (Appeal Cases)..., 1950, pp. 313-27.
1 Anthony Brooke to MNU and SDA Presidents, 5 June 1946, Hussey 
Papers, File 66735; Evening Standard3 5 June 1946.
2 Datu Patinggi and MNU and SDA Presidents to Bertram Brooke,
19 June 1946, Facts About Sarawak3 p. 111.
3 Datu Patinggi to Anthony Brooke, 19 June 1946, Hussey Papers.
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voted for cession were ’under monetary influence’. Since the Rajah
had violated his accession oath and had relinquished the Raj, they
said, he had committed a 'breach of faith [towards] the people of
Sarawak’ and should be replaced by his brother. They called on Attlee
to uphold justice and the political will of the second Rajah.'*' On the
following day the Patinggi, referring to himself as 'the fourteenth
hereditary chieftain and representative of the people of Sarawak [since]
before Brooke rule', invited Bertram and Anthony to return to Sarawak
to initiate fresh discussions on the question of cession. ’I
completely trust his Majesty the King', he concluded, 'and the British
Government, which is supremely just, to take my request into consider-
2ation in order to satisfy the people's wish.'
Irritated by this and by Bertram's accusation that he had
used his European officers to outvote the indigenous opponents of
cession, the Rajah made an uncharacteristically bitter attack on the
Datu Patinggi's 'impertinence' in claiming to be the fourteenth
hereditary chieftain of Sarawak. Emphasizing that there had been no
hereditary chieftains and no state of Sarawak before James Brooke,
he concluded: 'The Datu Patinggi's influence in the Colony is utterly
3unimportant...’.
In its first post-war issue on 1 September 1946 the Sarawak 
Gazette published the minutes of the Council Negri meeting as a 
service to future historians rather than as a reminder to the people 
of Sarawak of what had happened. 'This controversy is now thoroughly 
dead', its editor, K.H. Digby, hopefully proclaimed, 'and possibly 
would never have flared in such splendour if the flames had not been 
fanned, outside Sarawak, by ignorant adherents of the contending 
parties. Ignorance can seldom have flaunted itself with so much 
brazen courage and so little shame'. While it was true that since 
July the cables and letters from Anthony Brooke and others had helped
1 Datu Patinggi and MNU President to Attlee, 1 July 1946, Hussey 
Papers, File 66735.
2 Datu Patinggi to Bertram Brooke, 2 July 1946, ibid.
3 The Times_, 13 July 1946; for Anthony Brooke's reply, see The 
Timesj 16 July 1946.
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to keep alive the spirits of the two anti-cession parties, the British 
and colonial governments themselves provided much of the stimulus 
which revived enthusiasm towards the end of the year and hardened the 
lines of political confrontation for the next three years.
When it was revealed in London in the first week of October 
that the Malayan Union constitution was to be radically altered and 
perhaps even abolished, the anti-cession faction took new heart. 
Together with its report of this development The Observer of 6 October 
quoted Anthony Brooke as saying that he intended seeking a judicial 
decree declaring the cession of Sarawak illegal. Although the exact 
legal procedure was not yet clear, he anticipated that it would 
eventually lead to a judgment by the Privy Council. When this news 
was published a few days later in the Sarawak Tribune it provided a 
badly-needed stimulus to the MNU and the SDA whose morale had been 
teetering since July. The British government's cave-in on the Malayan 
Union had provided the first concrete indication that cession might be 
reversed.
The first opportunity to demonstrate this new spirit was the 
installation of the Governor on 28 October. There was some encourage­
ment from outside. The Rev. Howes, for example, wrote to Philip Jitam 
from England saying that if the people of Sarawak did not protest,
'then the people of this country will certainly believe that everybody 
in Sarawak wants Cession'. If sufficient people kept on speaking the 
truth, he added hopefully, 'then people in this country will support 
them, and make the Government give up the Cession...'.^ However, 
the anti-cession parties were well aware of the importance of marking 
the occasion with a protest and their arrangements soon came to 
Dawson's ears.
... the Datu Patinggi [he told Mayle] is again making 
efforts to organize a boycott of the Malays when the new 
Governor arrives. He had the effrontery to call a 
meeting of the village elders (who are paid by the 
Government) for the purpose. I shall put in some counter 
propaganda but, of course, if I take too strong a line,
I shall be immediately accused in the English papers of
1 Howes to Philip Jitam, 22 October 1946, Jitam Papers.
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attempting to victimize people for having the courage 
to express their opinions. 1
There were even suggestions in the British press that the installation
2would be the scene of violent clashes.
On his arrival in Kuching, Arden-Clarke was not presented
with an address by the Iban community and the Malay address was
presented by the Datu Bandar fon behalf of the Malay community'
instead of the Datu Patinggi. The latter and Abang Haji Zaini signed
3a letter to the Governor protesting against cession and the MNU the 
next day sent another letter challenging Abang Haji Mustapha's claim 
to speak for the Malays. This in turn developed into a controversy 
between the MNU and the YMA in the columns of the Sarawak Tribune. ^
If Arden-Clarke was irritated to find anti-cession posters 
marking his arrival in Kuching, he cannot have been much happier about 
his reception a week later in Sibu where the Pergerakan Pemuda Melayu 
(Malay Youth Movement) arranged a similar show. He had been led to 
believe that while there was some anti-cession feeling, it was limited 
to one or two Malay kampongs in Kuching and that up-country areas 
were solidly in favour of the new government. Orders were subsequently 
given for anti-cession posters in Sibu to be torn down.
From the outset, the PPM was a more radical organization 
than the MNU. One of the reasons, no doubt, was that Sibu Malay 
society lacked the traditional elite which exercised such a conservative 
influence through the leadership of the MNU. Although Haji Abdul 
Rahman made a number of efforts to strengthen the PPM's links with the 
MNU, many of its members rejected his constitutionalist approach.
All its early activities showed that the PPM was much more inclined 
to take direct action in the name of the anti-cession cause. Some of
1 Dawson to Mayle, 19 October 1946, CO 53/32 [53185].
2 Daily Mail3 29 October 1946.
3 Datu Patinggi and Abang Haji Zaini to Arden-Clarke, 29 October 
1946, Brooke Papers, Box 13/1.
4 Sarawak Tribune3 1, 6, 7, 8 November, 1946.
5 SG3 1 January 1947.
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its members also seem to have been more open to outside influence.
Awang Rambli, its effective leader,^- was well-read and in August 1947
during her visit to Sarawak Kathleen Brooke was alarmed to discover
that one of her PPM guides, Abang Han, was carrying a copy of one of
2Karl Marx’s works with him around the country. However, it was only
after Anthony Brooke advised them to give up the struggle in 1951 that
some PPM members decided to throw in their lot with Indonesia.
’Indonesian-style feelings’ had existed before 1949 and there was some
contact with the prominent Malay nationalist, Dr Burhanuddin, but the
movement was fundamentally pro-Anthony Brooke and the restoration of 
3the Brooke Raj.
By the time Arden-Glarke reached Miri, London newspaper 
accounts of the Kuching boycott had been published in the Sarawak 
Tribune_, together with reports of Anthony’s reiterated determination 
to fight annexation ’as long as there is breath in our bodies'.^ More 
importantly, it was revealed that he proposed to visit Sarawak and had 
asked the Colonial Office to assist with arrangements for air travel
1 Awang Rambli bin Mohd. Deli was born at Muara (Brunei) in 
c.1912 and was adopted at an early age by the mandor (labour 
supervisor) of Brooketon colliery. Both his natural parents 
were Brunei Malays, hence the title awang. Rambli lived for 
some years in Kuching as a child and attended English school 
to Standard 3. He joined the Customs Department in July 1929 
and was one of the resigners in early 1946. He had earlier 
joined the YMA in Sibu but after resigning became an active 
member of the PPM and was the leading spirit of the Rukun 
Tigabelas (Thirteen Precepts) which organized the assassination 
of Arden-Clarke’s successor, Duncan Stewart, in December 1949. 
Found guilty of conspiracy to murder, he was hanged at Kuching 
prison on 23 March 1950 at the age of 38.
2 Interview with Mrs K.M. Brooke, 21 October 1974.
Abang Han bin Abang Ahmad was born in Sibu in c.1925 and worked 
for some years as an oil-tester in the Shell Oil Laboratories 
at Seria (Brunei). The librarian for the PPM, he also joined 
the Rukun Tigabelas and was found guilty on a charge of 
conspiracy to murder Duncan Stewart. His sentence was commuted 
to 15 years imprisonment after a recommendation of mercy.
3 Interview with Ainnie bin Dobhie conducted by Dr A.J.S. Reid, 
1969.
4 Sarawak Tribune3 8 November 1946.
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to Singapore since all passages were still under military control."^
His stated reasons for making the visit were the invitations which
had been issued to him by the anti-cession leaders and the need to
collect information in connection with the libel action which MacBryan
was bringing against him. He evidently saw the action as a means of
keeping the Sarawak issue bubbling in Britain. The collection of
documents relating to cession which he and Crocker had been working
on for some months had also just been privately published as The Facts
About Sarawak and was being distributed overseas as well as to M.P.s
2and newspaper editors in Britain.
The news of Anthony Brooke's imminent return spread quickly
through the state and many of the anti-cession banners told Arden-
Clarke: ’We want Anthony Brooke to be Rajah of Sarawak'. At Miri
there was a complete boycott by the Malays and when he summoned the
local headmen the next day to tell them that cession was settled,
he was told by Native Officer Datu Tuanku Mohammed (who had voted
against cession in the Council Negri) that the Malays, Ibans and
Kedayans all objected to cession and would not be silenced. A
meeting was subsequently held on 14 November to arrange for delegates to
be sent to Kuching for Anthony Brooke's arrival and a reception for
him when he came to Miri. Petitions to the Governor were also sent
through the MNU and the PPM by Malay and Kayan headmen of Belaga,
the Kapit branch of the PPM, Penghulu Janting, who claimed to represent
2,421 Malays and Ibans of Song,and Penghulu Hang Nyipa who claimed
3to represent 2,000 Ibans of Kapit.
1 Personal communication from Anthony Brooke, 13 December 1976.
2 The Facts About Sarawak was first published in England in a 
limited quantity and was later reprinted in Bombay for 
distribution in Malaya and Sarawak. Interestingly enough, it 
was not so very different in style and purpose from the pamphlet 
A Statement Regarding Sarawak which was privately published by 
Brooke Brooke in 1862? after his dispute with his uncle.
3 All these messages are contained in 'Translation from letters 
and telegrams received by Anthony Brooke from Sarawak',
Brooke Papers, Box 12/14.
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The Colonial Office had no intention of giving way on 
Sarawak as they had on Malaya. Besides, the anti-cession faction in 
Britain could not match the powerful lobbying machine assembled by 
the Malayan veterans with the assistance of wealthy commercial interests. 
Nor did it seek to make common cause with the agitation against the 
Malayan Union although the 'Malayans’ were sympathetic. Writing to 
Sir Frank Swettenham in February 1946 about the Sultan of Johore's 
backsliding, Sir George Maxwell remarked that the Rajah looked like 
'another renegade'.^" Sir Andrew Caldecott also had a poor opinion of 
the Rajah. 'I understand him to have been a great manufacturer [of 
cheese] during his latter residence in the Astana', he told Bertram,
'so that he may have become assimilated to his own creations.' Un­
like the Sultan of Johore, however, the Rajah could not be chivvied 
into reasserting his responsibilities. Nor was he responsive to 
appeals from Sarawak's educated elite. Ironically enough, it was the 
absence of British investors with a stake in restoring the status quo 
ante in Sarawak which prevented the anti-cession faction from applying 
any real leverage on the government and the bureaucrats. Indeed, the 
handful of British commercial interests in Sarawak had been in 
favour of greater British control. Anxious to put an end to further 
speculation in Britain and Sarawak about cession, the new Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech-Jones, quickly issued a
statement emphasizing that cession was 'no longer a matter for
3discussion or negotiations'. But expectations had been raised which 
could not be brought to earth so easily. The anti-cession parties 
pulsed with new optimism and ambitious arrangements were soon in hand 
for Anthony Brooke's reception.
The MNU now found it much easier to strengthen their 
existing branches and to form new ones. Haji Abdul Rahman even took 
the initiative of calling for the formation of a hawn ibu (women's 
section), a step which suggests that he was not entirely the hide­
bound conservative which the 'inner circle' sometimes portrayed him 
to be. The MNU was also making some headway in its efforts to
1 Swettenham to Maxwell, 22 February 1946, Maxwell Papers.
2 Caldecott to Bertram Brooke, 4 April 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 2/3.
3 Sarawak Tribune3 13 November 1946.
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demolish the YMA. In mid-November 27 Malay firemen who had been
'tricked' into joining the YMA resigned their membership and promptly
joined the MNU.^ More importantly, there were signs that the leader-
2ship of the YMA in Sibu might be won over.
The Banning of Anthony Brooke
On 17 November Abang Haji Abdillah sent a cable to Bertram Brooke
saying that he wished to see him urgently. 'I now have the feeling
that my end is approaching', he said, 'and on that account I have a
longing to meet you again while I am still in this world...'. Four
days later the old man died and the large crowds which gathered at
4his funeral attested to the political importance of his passing.
While some members of the MNU could recall the difficulty there had 
been in securing his patronage for their movement, they saw his death 
as enhancing its moral strength. Indeed, the Datu Patinggi who had 
been such an important rallying point for members of the SDA as well 
as for the Malays, was to become something of a political martyr.
His house, Darul Komia (abode of peace), had already been used by 
the MNU for some of its meetings and was later to serve as the first 
headquarters of the Barisan Pemuda Sarawak.
It was only a week after the Datu Patinggi's death that his 
family and the MNU invited all Malay members of the Council Negri 
together with representatives of the SDA and headmen from the Kuching 
district to discuss future strategy. At this meeting it was decided 
that the first tactic should be to work through the Malay councillors 
and consequently when the Council Negri met the next morning the 
Datus Hakim and Menteri and two other members who had not been present
1 Mohd. Nor to Anne Bryant, 18 November 1946, Brooke Papers,
Box 11/1.
2 Before the resignations the Kuching YMA was estimated to have 
173 members and the Sibu YMA about 30 members.
3 Datu Patinggi to Bertram Brooke, 17 November 1946, Hussey 
Papers, File 66735.
4 For obituaries, see Sarawak Tribune, 23 November 1946; The 
Times, 23 November 1946.
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at the May meeting refused to confirm the official minutes. However, 
no other members of either Council had followed the Datu Patinggi in 
refusing to take the oath of allegiance to the King and in his speech 
at the opening of the Council Negri on 2 December, Arden-Clarke 
reiterated that the decision on cession was final and irreversible.
A month earlier, Anthony Brooke had decided to visit Sarawak.
On 6 November he wrote to the Colonial Office requesting assistance
in obtaining a priority passage so that he could collect material
for the libel suit which MacBryan had brought against him. On 13
November the Colonial Office replied that it could not arrange a
priority passage but said nothing to indicate that Anthony would be
refused entry. Consequently he made his own way, leaving London for
New York on 6 December with the intention of crossing the Pacific.
Before leaving, he cabled the MNU asking for an office to be put at
his disposal and for a house which would be accessible to the public.
'I am not proposing to incite the native chiefs’, he told newspaper
reporters. 'I want to consult my friends in Sarawak about legally
2regaining independence.' Subsequent statements to the press in New 
York and San Francisco, which received wide publicity, emphasized 
that he had been invited to Sarawak by the MNU ’to consult the wishes 
of the native communities in relation to the restoration of Sarawak
3independence’. He also indicated that the Privy Council might take 
two or three years to decide whether cession was legal, but that if 
in the meantime it became clear that the people did not want colonial
status, the Crown could still use its powers under the Order-in-4Council to revoke cession.
However, Arden-Clarke was not prepared to allow Anthony 
into Sarawak and after consultations with Malcolm MacDonald he was 
authorized by the Colonial Office to issue a prohibition order under
1 Mohd. Nor to Anthony Brooke, 4 December 1946, Brooke Papers, 
Box 12/14.
2 Sarawak Tribune, 9 December 1946.
3 Scottish Daily Mail, 9 December 1946.
4 New York Herald Tribune, 8 December 1946.
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the same legislation which had been invoked to expel MacBryan in 1936.^ 
In its official statement, the colonial government accused Anthony 
of wanting to restore Brooke rule with himself as Rajah. His presence 
in Sarawak, it was argued, ’would influence popular feeling by
2exploiting the affection and prestige attached to the Brooke name'.
In a country where false reports and fears were easily engendered 
among the largely illiterate population, it continued, there was a 
risk of violence. Consequently, the government’s duty was 'to ensure 
that the present peaceful state of the country is not unnecessarily 
disturbed and to protect the people against the danger of disorder
3which might perhaps be of a grave character'. Whether there was in 
fact such a danger is now impossible to establish, but it was an 
effective argument.
Reaching Manila in mid-December, Anthony learnt of the
prohibition order and was refused a visa for Singapore when he
rejected the condition that he should refrain from political activity
4there concerning Sarawak. He then flew to Hong Kong where the 
British authorities warned him not to communicate with the press. How­
ever, subsequent publicity in the British press and in Parliament
forced Hall to agree a week later that his passport should be endorsed
5for Singapore and the Malayan Union. By early January he was in 
Singapore expressing determination to stay until the ban was lifted. 
Gladys Brooke had been there for some weeks and later took a house 
called Rumah Sarawak (Sarawak House) which was to serve as the head­
quarters of the anti-cession movement in Singapore.
In the meantime the ban had sparked off a spirited debate 
in the House of Commons where the Conservatives, led by William Teeling
1 The ban on Anthony Brooke was not removed until 1963 when 
Sarawak became part of Malaysia. The Sarawak government 
then invited Anthony Brooke to visit the state, which he 
did in 1965. Johari Anang, the mainstay of the MNU who had 
been hoping to meet Anthony, died the night before his arrival.
2 Malay Mail, 19 December 1946.
3 Ibid.
4 The Times, 19 December 1946.
5 The Times, 24 December 1946.
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and Oliver Stanley, pressed Creech-Jones on the reasons for the 
decision. Accusing Anthony of attempting to ’subvert existing author­
ity’, the Secretary of State insisted that 'the people should not be 
confused at this moment with another constitutional problem'. When 
Churchill described this as ’... phrase by phrase, and line by line... 
the very perfect declaration of tyranny’,^ - Creech-Jones was unable 
to answer. Nor could he produce any evidence to suggest that Anthony 
was intent on setting himself up as Rajah. However, he did say that 
in view of his demotion on three occasions, Anthony was a 'completely 
irresponsible person'. Most importantly, he revealed that the 
Colonial Office had earlier decided to take a tough line on Sarawak:
A decision was taken during this year that it would be 
fatal at this moment to confuse the Sarawak public 
again, when the great work of rehabilitating the 
country, of restoring order, of getting social services 
running, must at once be taken in hand. 2
Anthony Brooke's projected visit had resulted in feverish 
activity not only within the MNU and the SDA in Kuching but within 
anti-cession groups throughout the state. A massive rally of 20,000 
to 30,000 Malays and Ibans from all districts was planned for his 
arrival and it was intended that this should contrast dramatically 
with the virtual boycott of Arden-Clarke. Invitations for Anthony to 
visit Sibu, Miri and other centres were sent to the MNU and the PPM 
from their branches and Mohd. Nor was appointed as his personal aide- 
de-camp. On 24 November several thousand Malays gathered before the 
main mosque in Kuching to 'pray for a return of Sarawak's freedom
3and a restoration of the throne'. Consequently there was great
dismay when the news of Anthony's banning was revealed. It did not
seem possible that a member of the Brooke family could be refused
4entry to Sarawak. However, petitions were quickly drawn up and on
1 Hansard_, 19 December 1946.
2 Ibid.
3 Abang Haji Zaini and six tua kampong to Arden-Clarke, 27 
November 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 11/1.
4 General Secretary MNU to Arden-Clarke, 19 January 1947, Brooke 
Papers, Box 13/1. Sarawak Tribune3 24 February 1947 (message 
to Attlee).
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18 January there was another demonstration with placards around the
mosque. Inside, Abang Bol Hassan prayed for the lifting of the ban
and at the same time called for the observance of law and order during
the campaign.^ He and Abang Haji Zaini later went to Singapore to
2seek Malcolm MacDonald's assistance.
Circular No. 9
While the MNU and the SDA expressed bitter disappointment at the 
banning, it was of some use as a political issue. In the meantime, 
however, the colonial government had provided a much more effective 
rallying point. On 11 December Suhaily bin Matlayeir received advance 
notice of a government circular explicitly aimed at discouraging anti­
cession activity. 'Any government servant', ran its final paragraph, 
'who associates himself with any activity designed to keep open the
question of cession or commits any act of disloyalty to government
3will render himself liable to instant dismissal’. Anyone who felt 
unable to comply with this instruction was required to inform his 
head of department by 31 December.
Suhaily and the other members of the 'inner circle'
immediately organized a meeting of Malay government servants at Darul
Kornia, advising them not to sign any such circular 'as every4signature of yours will have great value to them’. At this point 
Sharkawi bin Haji Osman was confident that 80 per cent of all Malay 
government servants would resign 'rather than to give up their Birth­
rights and Independence...'.^ However, he was thankful that the 
government had not taken such a step earlier as many would have then 
given in 'not fully realizing the "Truth" which they have at heart 
today'.^ Although the 'inner circle' had provided some advance
1 General Secretary MNU to Crocker, 19 January 1947, Brooke Papers, 
Box 13/1.
2 Sarawak Tribune3 13 February 1947.
3 Malay Mail3 2 January 1947.
4 Suhaily bin Matlayeir to Anne Bryant, 17 January 1946, Brooke 
Papers, Box 11/1.
5 Sharkawi bin Haji Osman to Anne Bryant, 16 December 1946, Brooke 
Papers, Box 11/1.
6 Ibid.
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warning, the official release of the circular on 20 December still 
came as a tremendous shock to most Malays. As the MNU cabled Crocker 
the next day, it was 'just like an atomic bomb dropped on them'.^
They now felt that the government would use any means to crush the 
anti-cession movement.
There can be little doubt that it was Arden-Clarke's
impatience with the anti-cessionists and his penchant for African-
style colonial discipline which prompted Circular No. 9. According
to Digby, the Governor had arrived in Sarawak in a 'belligerent mood'
and 'was resolved to strangle the anti-cession movement... as soon as 
2possible'. In his own words, he was determined 'to make it clear to
the people that cession was not likely to be revoked in as sudden
and abrupt a fashion as, by their way of thinking, it had been brought 
3about'. Arden-Clarke was also under the impression from the outset 
that the Council Negri debate in May had aroused little interest 
locally and that most of the anti-cession leaders were Japanese 
collaborators. '... It was only when it became apparent that there 
was not to be an orgy of witch-hunting', he told Stirling Boyd, 'that 4their confidence returned and they started to organize opposition...'. 
Furthermore, in view of Creech-Jones' uncompromising statement of 13 
November he knew that he would have the support of the British govern­
ment .
The MNU's strategy, no doubt influenced by the threatened 
boycott which had been so effective in Malaya some months earlier, 
was to persuade people to refuse acknowledgement of the circular and 
to bring the administration to a standstill until it was withdrawn. 
Special forms were printed protesting against the government's action 
and these were signed by 353 government employees. The MNU campaigned 
to obtain as many signatures as possible to the protests in Kuching 
and similar work was done by the PPM in Sibu. As Haji Su'aut Tahir 
quickly found, however, it was not an easy task to win over most
1 MNU to Crocker, 21 December 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 13/1.
2 Digby, 'Lawyer in the Wilderness', p. 213.
3 Arden-Clarke to Boyd, 6 April 1948, Boyd Papers.
4 Ibid.
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Malays. ’There have been a lot of obstacles and difficulties in 
bringing these people into one', he told Anne Bryant, ’and make them 
realise how much their independence would mean to them...'.^ Nor was 
there a Malay newspaper to help arouse political consciousness and 
mobilize opinion as Utusan Melayu and Warta Negara were doing in Malaya. 
The MNU had to rely very much on its members' family and other links 
in order to extend its base and the campaign was consequently a highly 
personal one.
During the three months from late December 1946 until April
1947 there was a bitter struggle between the anti-cession activists
and the colonial government for the loyalties of the Malay government
servants. At least two propagandists, one of them a Malay, were sent
to Sarawak by the Malayan Union government’s public relations depart- 
2ment. And Digby, who had resumed his position as Legal Adviser and
was also editing the Sarawak Gazette, was commissioned to write a
3series of articles answering Anthony Brooke. These were inserted4anonymously in the Sarawak Tribune with the aim of countering the 
publicity which the anti-cession case was receiving in the Singapore 
press. (They later formed the basis of a lawsuit which Anthony 
brought against Digby and the Tribune.)^ Sarawak newspaper editors 
were also quietly told that ’undue’ publicity given to the anti­
cession parties would be considered an unfriendly act by the government, 
although the effectively pro-cession Tribune had refused to publish 
letters relating to the anti-cession campaign since March 1946 except 
for those already published in the Singapore and British press.
In the meantime, departmental heads were instructed to 
dissuade resigners and it was strongly hinted that the latter would 
lose their bonus payments and the government's contribution to their
1 Haji Su'aut Tahir to Anne Bryant, 11 January 1947, Brooke 
Papers, Box 11/1.
2 Suhaily bin Matlayeir to Anne Bryant, 17 January 1947, Brooke 
Papers, Box 11/1.
3 Digby, 'Lawyer in the Wilderness’, pp. 213-8.
4 9 November 1946; 3 January 1947; 7 January 1947.
Personal communication from Mr K.H. Digby, 2 September 1974.5
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superannuation. The government also brought pressure to bear on
European officers, particularly those who had served before the war
in Sarawak and were known to be sympathetic to the anti-cession cause.
Soon after Arden-Clarke’s arrival he made it clear that they must
either give their entire support to the government or leave.^ Kenneth
Whale, the manager of Sarawak Steamships Ltd who was strongly opposed
to cession, found that some officers who had continued to express
their views after the Council Negri began to show ’a marked reluctance
2... to discuss the cession at all*. Furthermore, there were strong 
rumours that outgoing mail was being censored. On the positive side, 
the government in late December instituted an inquiry into pay and 
conditions in the Junior Administrative Service. A month earlier it 
had been announced that £5,000,000 had been allocated to Sarawak from
3the Colonial Development Fund.
The MNU did not possess anything like the government's
resources and was obliged to depend very much on appeals to Malay
solidarity and individual persuasion. There were strong hints that
the religious and social boycott of pro-cession families would be
extended to those who did not resign and this was quickly seized upon
by the government as ’intimidation', in spite of its own highly4compromised position. Anxious for advice and moral support, the MNU
sent representatives to Singapore to meet Anthony Brooke in February,
while Mohd. Nor and Robert Jitam went unofficially. In a letter to
his sister, Anne Bryant, Anthony indicated that he had encouraged
5them to withdraw their resignations. However, it is clear that the
1 Personal information.
2 Anonymous memorandum, probably by Kenneth Whale, 29 January 1948, 
Brooke Papers, Box 11/2. Whale appears to have given encourage­
ment and assistance to the anti-cessionists. One of the most 
prominent activists, Suahily bin Matleyir, was employed in his 
office.
3 Sarawak Tribune3 29 November 1946.
4 According to a government statement issued in Singapore on 12 
January 1947, many of the resigners had privately informed their 
departmental heads that their action was due to pressure brought
to bear on them by their families or fear of a social and religious 
boycott. The Times 3 13 January 1947. This was repeated by Creech- 
Jones in the Commons on 22 January. Anthony Brooke subsequently 
received a refutation of this allegation signed by representatives 
of 22 departments. Sarawak Tribune3 3 February 1947.
5 Anthony Brooke to Anne Bryant, 12 March 1947, Brooke Papers, Box 11/3.
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unofficial delegates' visit to Singapore decisively strengthened their 
resolve to pursue the campaign. As soon as Robert Jitam and Mohd.
Nor returned to Kuching there was a four-hour meeting with more than 
50 of the resigners where it was decided:
(1) that the resigners should not take back their notices;
(2) that government schools should be boycotted after 1 April;
(3) that the religious and social boycott of pro-cessionists 
should continue until they surrendered; and
(4) that non-establishment government staff should cease work 
on 1 April in protest against the circular."^
Subsequent to this, 28 of the 353 who had refused to conform with the
circular’s direction withdrew their resignations but 23 more Malay
2teachers from outstation schools resigned on 31 March.
The Kuching anti-cessionists also took heart from the 
decision of the committee of the Sibu YMA to switch their support to
3the anti-cession cause. Its secretary, Abang Kipli bin Haji Othman, 
who had been a customs officer, seems to have felt that the political 
tide was now running in favour of the restoration of the Brookes. 
Consequently he made his way to Singapore to be with Anthony Brooke 
and later formed the United Sarawak National Association (USNA) whose 
members were Sarawak Malays and Ibans working in Singapore and Malaya.
One complication which caused the colonial government and 
the British authorities in Singapore some embarrassment at this point 
was Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin's statement to the Singapore press in late 
February 1947 that if Sarawak was to be ceded to anyone, it should4have been to him. All this came as a surprise to Anthony Brooke who 
had previously thought of the Sultan as 'a British Government stooge'.
1 Mohd. Nor to Anne Bryant, 21 March 1947, Brooke Papers, Box 11/1.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. Kipli's subsequent career was quite colourful. He 
became strongly pro-Indonesia and during Confrontation emerged 
as 'Djenderal Abang Kipli' of the Indonesian-sponsored Tentera 
Nasional Kalimantan Utava (North Kalimantan National Army).
He is now living in Jakarta but still has relatives in Kuching.
4 Straits Times3 28 February 1947.
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He suspected at first that it was connected with some Colonial Office
plan to reconstitute Sarawak under the nominal suzerainty of Brunei,
a device which might defuse the problem of Sarawak’s colonial status.^"
However, the Sultan was doing no more than repeating what he had said
in response to cables from the Datu Patinggi and the MNU in early 1946
- that Sarawak was not a kebun getah (rubber garden) to be sold off
and that if the Rajah wanted to cede the state, then it should be 
2ceded to him. The Sultan had made similar remarks to Gammans and
Rees-Williams when they met him in May 1946. ’... If the Rajah wants
to give the country away', he told the M.P.s, ’why does he not give it 
3back to me?...'. Interestingly enough, the anti-cessionists seem
never to have considered inviting the Sultan of Brunei to re-assert
4sovereignty over Sarawak. However, it was rumoured in June 1947
that the British government intended to annex Brunei and administer
5Sarawak and Brunei as a single territory.
On 2 April 1947, 338 government servants of whom only three 
were not Malays completed the three months notice which they had given 
when refusing to comply with Circular No. 9.^ While later resignations
1 Anthony Brooke to Kathleen Brooke, 1 March 1947. Letter in 
the possession of Mrs K. Brooke.
2 Interview with Datu Ekhwan Zaini, April 1974.
3 Lord Ogmore MS, p. 37.
4 Interview with Datu Ekhwan Zaini, April 1974.
5 Sunday Times (Singapore), 28 June 1947.
6 The breakdown by department as given by the Sarawak Tribune of 
3 April 1947 was:
76 Education 18 Medical and Health
4 Agriculture 8 Treasury
18 Lands and Surveys 18 Printing
43 Posts and Telegraphs 4 Secretariat
4 Municipal 1 Native Affairs
17 Fire Brigade 5 Resident's and District Court
9 Museum 1 Chinese Secretariat
40 Marine 2 Astana
7 Forestry 13 Constabulary
26 Customs 1 Depot
12 Public Works 1 Legal Adviser
Most of these were from the First Division.
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probably brought the number to over 400,^ all the resigners referred 
to themselves as belonging to the 'tiga tiga lapan' (338). On the 
previous day, all 56 students of the Sarawak Malay Teachers Training
2College had terminated their studies in protest against the circular 
and a further 500 Malays from schools and non-government occupations 
also obtained permission to take leave that day. In the morning there 
was a mass meeting at Darul Kornia. An address was given by Chegu 
Johari bin Bojeng and a group photograph was then taken with the 
resigners forming the figures C9 and NO 9 to symbolize their protest 
against the circular. There was also some discussion of pooling one- 
third of their bonus payments and superannuation for a $50,000 co-
3operative company but it was decided not to have any demonstrations
4until the money had been actually paid by the government.
Although the resignations had not amounted to an effective 
boycott, they nevertheless demonstrated to many observers that the 
anti-cession movement was more than just the handful of Japanese 
collaborators and malcontents of Arden-Clarke’s imagination. For 
the resigners, it was a momentous personal decision as well as an act 
of political commitment because there was almost no prospect of 
obtaining employment of any kind outside government service.
To take one example, in January 1947 two Native Officers 
(Abang Kiprawi who had voted against cession in the Council Negri 
and Abang Zainorrin, son of the late Datu Imam) and four other Malay 
government employees with more than a hundred years of service to 
their credit told Bertram Brooke of the personal cost which their 
action would mean. 'By taking this step...', they wrote, 'we sacrifice 
our means of livings and worldly happiness in order to show that we are 
determined to protest the cession of our country as a Crown Colony and
1 Interview with Mohd. Ma'amon bin Nor,
2 Mohd. Nor to Anne Bryant, 2 April 1946, Brooke Papers, Box
11/1.
3 Sarawak Tribune_, 3 April 1946; Mohd. Nor to Anne Bryant,
21 March 1947, Brooke Papers, Box 11/1.
4 Mohd. Nor to Anne Bryant, 2 April 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 
11/1. The co-operative was subsequently formed but all its 
records were lost in floods. McKay, 'The Kuching Communities...', 
p. iii.
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to defend its Independence under [the] Rajah Brooke dynasty.' Writing
to Anne Bryant on 29 March, Haji Su'aut Tahir also admitted that it
marked the beginning of hard times for some people. However, he added,
it meant 'wider and unrestricted facilities and more time to be devoted
2to our present struggle'. This was something which Arden-Clarke and 
Dawson had not considered. They no doubt imagined that within a few 
weeks most of the resigners would be knocking on the government's door 
asking for their jobs back. And of course there were many who did.
But there was also a core of young MNU members who were determined 
to keep alive the spirit of the 'pergerakan 3381 (338 movement) and 
were to provide the backbone of a political movement which might never 
have developed had it not been for the political commitment brought 
about by Circular No. 9.
The largest single group among the resigners consisted of
Malay school-teachers so that of the 60 employed by the government in
the Kuching district, only two remained in service after February 
31947. Like their counterparts in Malaya who formed much of the 
support for the United Malays National Organization, they saw them­
selves as the guardians of Malay-Muslim culture against a tide of 
alien influence. Their subsequent establishment of sekolah ra'ayat 
(people's schools) in Kuching and Sibu marked their determination to 
keep the anti-cession cause alive among the young and to uplift the 
Malays socially and economically. They were the latest expression of 
the movement towards social change which had first made its presence 
felt through Rakawi bin Yusoff and Fajar Sarawak in the early 1930s.
Although Robert Jitam had worked hard to persuade Iban 
government servants to resign, none of the committee members of the 
SDA had defied the prohibition on politics. 'Hence we have no 
intellectuals to guide us anymore', he told Anne Bryant, 'but... [must]
1 Letter to Bertram Brooke of 11 January 1947 signed by Abang 
Kiprawi, Abang Zainorrin, Aman bin Haji Jenal, Thani bin Sanyuk, 
Appu bin Bodek and Samsudin bin Noor, Brooke Papers, Box 11/2.
2 Haji Mohd. Su'aut bin Haji Mohd. Tahir to Anne Bryant, 29 March 
1947, Brooke Papers, Box 11/1. For a biographical note on Haji 
Su'aut, see Chapter V, p. 202.
3 Singapore Free Press> 17 January 1947. See Plate XIV.
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rely on whatever material we can gather.’^  Recognizing that the SDA
would never again have a voice unless the committee was purged of all
its government servants, he arranged a general meeting on 23 December
at which Alfred Jamuh was elected President, Eliab Bayang as joint
2secretary and himself as joint secretary and treasurer. Suhaily bin
Matlayeir expressed relief at this development. Throughout October
and November he had been trying to counter the influence of Edwin
Howell and to persuade Philip Jitam that he and Charles Mason should
3not 'hold up' their positions anymore but clearly resign. '... I am 
very glad that my labour is not in vain', Suhaily wrote of his efforts 
with the SDA. 'Prior to this we have always to use the name of the
4late Datu Patinggi to sway them but now it is not necessary.'
The MNU Split
Ironically enough, one of the effects of the anti-cession movement's 
new optimism in late 1946 was to make the conservative leaders of the 
MNU even less accommodating towards their young activists and the SDA. 
It seemed to people like Mohd. Nor that now there was some chance 
of restoring Brooke rule, the conservatives were showing all the 
signs of unwillingness to share the fruits of victory. One of the 
first political effects of this tendency was the collapse of what had 
been fairly close co-operation with the SDA since June. '... The 
leaders of the Union seem to disvalue the Dayaks', Mohd. Nor told 
Anne Bryant, '... and besides that [the] S.D.A. had noticed... [they] 
were and still are not acting democratically and justly even to the 
members who had sacrificed most for the benefits of their names'.^ 
Within the MNU itself there were further disagreements as to the
1 Robert Jitam to Anne Bryant, 3 January 1947, Brooke Papers, 
Box 11/1.
2 Sarawak Tribune, 1 January 1947.
3 Suhaily bin Matlayeir to Anne Bryant, 17 January 1947, ibid. 
Jitam and Mason had announced their resignations in June, 
probably as the result of government pressure.
4 Ibid.
5 Mohd. Nor to Anne Bryant, 12 February 1947, Brooke Papers, 
Box 11/2.
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tactics to be used and the establishment of a subsidiary youth 
organization for both Malays and Ibans.
By early January 1947 the conservative leadership had 
replaced the 'inner circle' with a number of more moderate Malays, 
including one of Haji Abdul Rahman's relatives. 'We are entirely 
deprived of any active part in the Union', Suhaily bin Matlayeir told 
Anne Bryant, 'for the conservative felt confident that cession must 
be revoked and they would reap all the harvest.'"^ However, their 
names had been retained on the MNU's official list of office-bearers 
because of their influence and popularity with the MNU membership.
When a meeting of the MNU on 22 January elected Mohd. Nor to act as 
one of the MNU's delegates to discuss the anti-cession movement's 
tactics with Anthony Brooke in Singapore, Haji Abdul Rahman overruled 
the vote and insisted that his own nephew, Edham bin Bojeng, should 
go instead. Consequently, those who were dissatisfied with the 
decision asked Mohd. Nor and Robert Jitam to go to Singapore separately.
Another result of this dissatisfaction was a general meeting 
at Darul Kornia on 29 January to foster co-operation between the MNU 
and the SDA. Attended by 83 school-teachers, students and government 
servants representing about 1,500 young Malays and Ibans in the Kuching 
district, the meeting decided to form the Jasa P.M.S. (MNU Action 
Group) which was to be a 'well and real democratic body' under the 
MNU's aegis. Its objects were broader than those of the MNU, resemb­
ling those of the United Sarawak National Organization which had been
mooted earlier, and its office-bearers (with the exception of one SDA
2member) were all from the MNU's 'inner circle'. 'We really do not
wish to be separated from the Union', Mohd. Nor told Anne Bryant, 'as
I know there is a danger in the separation - Govt, policy of divide
3and rule will be easily worked on.' But short of depriving the 
conservatives of their leadership he could not see how permission for
1 Suhaily bin Matlayeir to Anne Bryant, 17 January 1947, Brooke 
Papers, Box 11/1.
2 Mohd. Nor to Anne Bryant, 12 February 1947, Brooke Papers,
Box 11/2.
3 Ibid.
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affiliation could be obtained from the MNU Committee. Consequently, 
the Jasa would probably have to be formed separately and the MNU 
would lose about 300 of its members. 'I consider', he wrote, 'that 
Jasa P.M.S. is the only way for the Malays to work jointly with 
the Dayaks.'  ^ As he had predicted, however, Haji Abdul Rahman 
completely rejected the idea.
Now possessing no alternative, the 'inner circle' worked 
towards establishing a separate organization and Robert Jitam informed 
Anne Bryant in May that the Barisan Pe-muda Sarawak (Sarawak Youth 
Front) was in the. making. He explained that it had been planned 
as a reaction to 'the very autocratic steps' of the MNU office­
holders whom he described as stifling the wishes of younger members
2and ridiculing their intentions. The new organization was publicly
reported as being open to indigenous youths 'irrespective of race
and religion' and designed to 'develop the social, cultural,
3economical and political welfare of the natives.' At the inaugural 
meeting in June, Mohd. Nor, Sharkawi bin Haji Osman and Johari 
Bojeng were elected vice-presidents with Haji Su'aut Tahir as general 
secretary and Suhaily bin Matlayeir as chairman of political affairs. 
Interestingly enough, however, the 'inner circle' still saw some 
advantage in maintaining links with the traditional elite and 
pressure was brought to bear on Abang Haji Kassim, the Datu Patinggi's 
youngest grandson who had been one of the 338 resigners, to take an
4active part in the BPM and 'replace his grandfather's fighting post.'
Claiming to have 3,000 active members and 2,000 more 
supporters in the First Division, the BPM's first task was to help 
mark the first anniversary of annexation. Consequently on 28 June the 
'Sarawak National Conference' was convened at Darul Kornia. Attended 
by 40 delegates, the meeting was a striking example of how the anti­
cession movement had aroused Malay support in widely dispersed parts 
of Sarawak. In addition to the MNU, BPM and SDA there were representatives
1 Ibid.
2 Robert Jitam to Anne Bryant, 23 May 1947, Brooke Papers, Box 11/1.
3 Sarawak Tribune 3 5 May 1947.
4 Mohod. Nor to Anne Bryant, 16 June 1947, Brooke Papers, Box 11/1; 
interview with Abang Haji Kassim, May 1975.
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of Kaum Ibu MNU, Persekutuan Bumiputra Sarawak, Persekutuan Melayu
Miri, Angkatan Semengat Anaknegri Sarawak, Persekutuan Melayu Limbang,
Perkimpunan Kabajikan Baram, Kersetuan Club Dalat, Sulam Mas Seria,^
PPM (Sibu), Kaum Ibu Sibu and USNA. Also present as observers were 19
tua kampong from the Kuching district. It was subsequently decided
to stage a mass procession on 1 July and to send cables of protest
to the King and Prime Minister Attlee which would be signed by all
2the organizations represented at the Conference.
At the same time, the BPM continued the campaign to
’convert the big bribed state Councillors ’ to the anti-cession side,
its first victory being the Datu Menteri who was persuaded in early
June to visit Anthony Brooke in Singapore. Also on the list for
conversion were the Datus Amar and Hakim and the mufti, Haji Nawawi,
followed by the Datu Pahlawan, Abang Haji Abdulrahim and other members
of the Council Negri whom Mohd. Nor described as ’threatened' by
the rumour that Anthony Brooke's wife, Kathleen, would visit Sarawak
3at the end of June. He believed that since the formation of the 
Barisan, the MNU had 'lost its active services' and the support of 
its women's section.
The Kaum Ibu had formed at an inaugural meeting of more
than 1,000 Malay women on 16 March 1947. Dominating the proceedings
were two schoolteachers who had resigned from government service
4over Circular No.9. Lily Eberwein, headmistress of the Permaisuri
1 Sarawak Natives' Association, Miri Malay Association, Sarawak 
Natives Uplift Movemetit, Limbang Malay Association, Baram 
Welfare Association, Dalat Club, Seria Gold (?).
2 Sarawak Tribune3 30 June 1947.
3 Mohd. Nor to Anne Bryant, 16 June 1947, Brooke Papers,
Box 11/1.
4 A Muslim Eurasian of outstanding ability, 'Chegu' Lily was 47 
when elected chairman. Educated at St Mary's School, Kuching, 
and Raffles Girls' School, Singapore, she was the first head­
mistress of the Permaisuri. During the war she was head of 
the Malay section of the Japanese-sponsored Kaum Ibu. In 
1947 she established her own English school at Satok Road which 
is still functioning.
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Melayu, was elected chairman and her fellow teacher, Ajibah Abol,
2secretary. Similar associations were formed in Sibu and elsewhere 
and were to play an important part not only in the anti-cession 
campaign but in providing Sarawak's Malay women with their first 
opportunity for political expression. In pre-war times, upper-class 
Malay women hardly dared show their faces in public and it must have 
seemed an extraordinary development that they should now be speaking 
on a public platform and taking part in political activity.
Describing the meeting as 'History in the Making', the
editor of the Sarawak Tribune was impressed by the eloquence of the
speakers whose subjects ranged from Malay nationalist movements and
Sarawak history to the backwardness of women in Sarawak and their
demand for rights. 'What a far cry the women of today are from their
grandmothers', he reflected. 'There is no trace of the bashfulness
that so characterized a woman in the old days when making a public
appearance, and the woman of today stands out on just as firm and
equal a ground as that of any man, in full realization of the part
3they have to play in the country.' Like the younger group within the 
MNU, the leadership of the Kaum Ibu represented a movement towards 
social change.
Like the MNU, the Kaum Ibu busied itself in petitioning 
the colonial government, taking part in demonstrations and other 
activities. One of the high points came in August 1947 when 
Kathleen Brooke arrived in Sarawak. During her subsequent tour of 
the state she was accompanied by Lily Eberwein, Haji Su'aut Tahir 
and other MNU members and was given an enthusiastic reception
1 Ajibah Abol, 1929-76, was only 18 when she became secretary, 
a post she retained until 1957. She had been one of Lily 
Eberwein's students and after resigning she taught at one of 
the sekolah ra'ayat. Replacing Lily Eberwein as chairman
of Kaum Ibu in 1960, she was made a member of the Supreme 
Council of the Barisan Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak in 1961 and vice- 
chairman of Parti Bumiputera in 1967. She was elected to the 
Malaysian Parliament in 1963 and when re-elected in 1974 was 
made Minister of State and then Minister for Welfare Services.
She was also a member of the Council Negri, 1970-74.
2 The first president of the Kuam Ibu PMM in Sibu was Sharifah 
Hajjah Sipah, sister of the present Governor of Sarawak.
3 Sarawak Tribune_, 17 March 1946.
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wherever she went by the other kaum ibu which had sprung up since 
March.^ While her visit is beyond the scope of this study, it is 
clear that she and her Malay companions demonstrated exceptional 
courage in the face of the colonial government’s thinly-concealed 
antagonism and the physical trials which such an extensive tour 
demanded. There is no doubt that both as a representative of the 
Brooke family and in her own right she was a source of inspiration 
to the anti-cession movement.^
BY 1 July 1947, the first anniversary of annexation, the anti-cession
movement was reaching its high point. Early that morning members of
16 different anti-cession organizations assembled in the grounds of
Darul Kornia and later marched out four abreast behind their own
brass band. Carrying Sarawak flags of all sizes as well as banners
and posters with such slogans as 'We do not want Cession’, they
followed the prescribed route through the kampong area towards the
3centre of Kuching. As they passed the Brooke Memorial outside the
Court House, flags were raised and slogans shouted in unison. 'It
is only such an occurrence like this', observed the Sarawak Tribunes
'that points out to us just how far the country has developed and
4
progressed in the march of time ...' Its one regret was that the 
incentive had been provided by the cession issue since this inevitably 
threw the people of Sarawak into two opposing camps 'bound to clash in 
opinions in all instances'.“* Without such contradictions, however, 
political development would have been more in keeping with the 
racially-based Malayan pattern. What made Sarawak so different was 
that there were contradictions not only between the different races 
but within the leadership of Malay society itself.
1 See Plate XV.
2 Interviews with Lily Eberwein and Haji Su'aut Tahir, 
April 1974. It is to be hoped that Mrs Brooke will 
write a memoir of her visit.
3 A monument to the first two Rajahs which was unveiled 
in 1924.
4 Sarawak Tribune3 3 July 1947.
5 Ibid.
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The subsequent history of the anti-cession movement 
and its relevance to the current political scene in Sarawak is 
beyond the scope of this study and must be left to another historian 
who can re-create the extremely complicated web of political 
interaction. However, some general observations can be made.
While there was some initial participation by First Division Ibans 
with relatively close links with the Malays, the anti-cession 
movement was from the outset an almost exclusively Malay phenomenon. 
The SDA was unable to extend its influence beyond the First Division 
and the colonial government's policy managed to secure Iban support 
through improved educational facilities and other developments, 
particularly in the Third Division. It was not difficult for the 
colonial government in Iban areas to represent the anti-cession 
movement as being exclusively concerned with the restoration of Malay 
privilege.
The pattern of conflict which emerged within the MNU 
in 1946 was later repeated by the other anti-cession parties in 
Kuching and Sibu. This consisted of the inevitable contradictions 
arising between members of the traditional Malay elite and the young 
educated Malays of non-aristocratic background. The traditional 
elite adopted a conservative attitude towards political action, 
favouring delegations and negotiations and invoking a constitutional 
frame of reference. Their young critics chafed under these 
restrictions and the undemocratic style of men who continued to 
emphasize their class status and authority.
When the colonial government continued to ignore the 
anti-cession movement in the hope that it would simply 'fade away' 
as the Malays lost interest, the conservatives lost ground. In 
Kuching the BPM became the radical force while in Sibu even the 
comparatively radical PPM failed to satisfy its more impatient 
activists. The consequence of this was the establishment in August 
1948 of yet another 'inner circle' - the Rukun Ti-gabetas (Thirteen 
Precepts) dedicated to political action. Led by Awang Rambli, 
this clandestine group planned the assassination of Arden-Clarke's 
successor, Duncan Stewart, at Sibu in early December
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1949. While the assassination was intended to re-open the
whole cession issue again after years of mounting frustration,
Stewart’s death caused a wave of horror through all communities
2which, together with the government's punitive actions, virtually
destroyed the anti-cession movement. Furthermore, the incident
3served to strengthen Iban support for the colonial government
and to lend credence to the government's old argument that Anthony
4
Brooke's presence in Sarawak would result in bloodshed. Nor 
were Awang Rambli, Rosly bin Dobhie and the two other Malays 
hanged for their involvement^ regarded as nationalist heroes by
1 For a description of the incident, see Sarawak Tribune,
5 December 1949. The evidence later adduced by the 
government suggested that the group had intended to 
assassinate a further ten colonial officials including 
the Resident of the Third Division (J.C.H. Barcroft), 
the Assistant Commissioner for National Registration 
in Sibu and the Acting Commissioner for Police in 
Kuching. Straits Times_, 10 January 1950.
2 The PPM and all its branches were immediately 
proscribed, their members questioned and documents 
confiscated. Anti-cession organizations in Kuching 
and elsewhere were similarly harassed. See, e.g.,
Sarawak Tribune, 9 December 1949.
3 When they heard of the assassination, Ibans of the 
Balleh and other tributaries of the Rejang prepared
to descend on Sibu in armed force to 'tolong perentah' 
(lit., to help the government - the standard 
expression used to describe Iban levies against 
'rebels'). Temenggong Koh together with seven penghulus 
and a number of other Ibans in full war regalia were 
present throughout the Sibu trial.
4 Singapore Free Press, 6 December 1949.
5 From all accounts, the Sibu trial of the ten Malays 
accused of complicity in the assassination was a shabby and 
vindictive affair. The men were not allowed to seek 
counsel and were defended by a government officer who
had no legal training. However, they were allowed 
representation in their appeal against the Circuit Court 
sentence in Kuching. Rosly bin Dhobie and Morshidi bin 
Sidek were hanged on 2 March 1950 and Awang Rambli and 
Bujang bin Suntong on 23 March; Abang Han was sentenced to 
15 years imprisonment; Che Osman bin Ahmad, Mornie bin 
Onei and Othman bin Dollah to 10 years; Ahmad bin Haji 
Abu Bakar to seven years and Awang Osman bin Moh
[contd over]
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the Malays until many years later.
Anthony Brooke rightly interpreted the incident as the
inevitable outcome of the colonial government’s refusal to take the
2anti-cession movement seriously. He and the anti-cession parties
vehemently denied the Rajah’s accusation that they were no more than
3a front for subversive activity. However, the increasing
frustration of his position, the dismissal of the Privy Council
appeal and the somewhat hysterical atmosphere of the Cold War caused
him to abandon his six-year struggle against cession in early 1951
4and to advise the anti-cession parties to do the same. The fact 
that they politely rejected his advice"* was the final indication 
that independence rather than the restoration of Brooke rule had 
become the focus of the anti-cession movement. However, it was 
no longer possible to muster the Malay support which had existed 
1946-47.
As far as the colonial government was concerned, 
Stewart’s death was not in vain. It achieved what had proved to 
be the difficult task of bolstering its authority after a very 
shaky beginning. At the same time, the post-war rubber boom had 
ensured favourable economic conditions for all races. Furthermore, 
the government had achieved some success in mustering Iban support 
as a counter-weight to Malay disaffection. The official view was
5 [contd from previous page]
and Wan Zain bin Abdullah to five years. It is interesting 
that until the very end Awang Rambli believed that 
there would be a miraculous intercession by Anthony Brooke. 
Alastair Morrison, ’Fair Wind Sarawak’, typescript, memoir, p.90. 
AwangRambliseems to have been an outstanding personality.
1 See, e.g., S.H. Alattas, Kenapa Rosli Dhoby & 3 Hero 
Sarawak di-hukum Bunuh? Johore Bahru 1975; Sarawak 
Government, Sarawak Maju Sejak Merdeka> Kuching 1973.
2 See Appendix V.
3 For the Rajah's comments and the anti-cessionists’ response, 
see The Times  ^ 17 December 1949, and Malay Mail, 14 
February 1950.
4 See Appendix V.
5 Ibid.
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that the unwelcome incubus of ’politics' had been exorcized 
and it was now possible to get on with the real task of
2developing the state's economy and its social services.
Nevertheless, the schism within Sarawak's Malay community
which had been brought about by cession continued to be a highly
3significant political factor. Parti Negara Sarawak (Sarawak National 
Party) established by the Datu Bandar as the political vehicle 
of the Malays was boycotted by the anti-cessionists who instead 
joined the Barisan Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak (Sarawak Natives' Front - 
BARJASA). With both ex-SDA and ex-MNU membership, BARJASA reflected 
the earlier aims of the MNU 'inner circle' who had abandoned the 
principle of Malay political hegemony in favour of a native alliance. 
It was only in 1967 that the two Malay parties were finally brought 
together to form Parti Bumiputera3 a Malay communal party organized 
along the same lines as the United Malays National Organization and 
reflecting the desire of the Kuala Lumpur Malay leadership that 
Sarawak's political parties should conform with the West Malaysian 
model.^
For many years the antagonisms created within the Malay 
community by the anti-cession campaign made Malay political 
organization along communal lines extremely difficult. The campaign 
had brought the new educated elite and a considerable section of 
the traditional elite together in an uneasy alliance against the 
Datu Bandar, the most senior member of the traditional elite, and 
his supporters. The consequence of this was a political pattern which 
to some extent transcended the loyalties of race and religion and 
was therefore capable of defusing to some extent the inevitable 
conflicts endemic to a multi-racial society.
1 Ironically enough, the colonial authorities' pejorative 
view of politics was similar to that of Mohd. Nor. See 
above, pp. 385-6.
2 This is a view echoed by most contemporary Southeast 
Asian governments.
3 R.S. Milne and K.J. Ratnam, Malaysia - New States in 
a New Nation ..., London 1974, p.89.
4 This is one of the major thems developed in Michael
Leigh, The Rising Moon: Political Change in Sarawak3
Sydney. 1974.
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RETROSPECT
THE history of Sarawak is significant in that it epitomized 
one of the dilemmas of imperialism - how to bring about economic 
development without disrupting the indigenous culture and unleashing 
forces which would eventually bring about political change. In most 
colonies the relentless drive to exploit natural resources and 
consequent socio-economic change rendered this dilemma academic, but 
Sarawak did not seem to possess significant economic potential. While 
the Brookes were determined to prevent the economic exploitation of 
their people by foreign capital, non-exploitation was as much by 
default as by design. Unlike Malaya and even North Borneo, therefore, 
Sarawak was not opened up by mining and planting interests in the early 
twentieth century. It represented a different model of economic 
development whose emphasis was on native smallholding, although the 
interests of smallholders were disregarded in favour of European capital 
when Sarawak joined the rubber restriction scheme in the 1930s.
While it seems harsh to label the Brookes and their officers 
as keepers of an anthropological garden, there was something essentially 
feudal and self-serving about their administration. They were 
instinctively opposed to socio-economic change because they sensed 
that it would undermine their status vis a vis the natives. They 
had a vested interest in perpetuating the system of benign paternalism 
which had existed under Brooke rule: 'the interests of the natives'
required that Europeans should remain indefinitely as their guardians.
In this sense they were all 'white rajahs', or 'little tin gods' as the 
Rajah disparagingly described them in 1946. Their position prevented 
them from conceding anything more than lip service to the 
principle of trusteeship and the ultimate prospect of native 
rule.
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THE cession of Sarawak was both the culmination of a process which 
had begun with the appointment of British Residents in the Malay 
states in the 1870s and the beginning of a post-war consolidation of 
British interests in Southeast Asia. For almost one hundred years 
the Colonial Office was happy for the Brooke family to rule Sarawak. 
There was little interest in acquiring possession of a state with a 
tiny population and limited economic potential whose administration 
would be yet another charge on the British government. As British 
subjects, the Brookes could generally be relied upon to conform with 
imperial policy and to discourage other powers from becoming involved 
in Sarawak. Although there were some doubts about the quality of 
their administration, it was recognized that their authority over 
Sarawak's polyglot population was a unique phenomenon which could only 
serve British interests. The relationship between the two governments 
as defined by the 1888 Treaty effectively precluded the introduction of 
the Malayan Residential system and-made it difficult to bring pressure 
to bear on the Rajah. British intervention was limited to safe­
guarding the rights of British subjects, although there can be little 
doubt that intervention would have been decisive had there been a 
pressing need.
In the late 1930s a number of factors combined to bring 
about a change in Colonial Office policy. Concern about administrative 
standards and Britain's effective international responsibility for 
Sarawak suggested a greater degree of involvement. Sarawak's 
participation in the International Rubber Restriction Scheme and its 
inclusion in British defence planning after 1935 had also begun to 
end the state's isolation. Finally, it was becoming increasingly 
clear that the Rajah was on the point of either divesting himself of 
his sovereignty or of handing over to another member of the family. 
However, there were still difficulties in the way of intervention.
The Rajah was elusive and almost impossible to pin down on specific 
points. Nor did the Colonial Office wish to be seen to take the 
initiative. An opportunity presented itself in early 1939 when 
Anthony Brooke and the Rajah agreed to the appointment of a General 
Adviser whose powers were extremely limited but whose position was
426
regarded by the Colonial Office as providing a foot in the door. There 
was also the feeling that it would be possible to work more easily 
through Anthony than it had been through the Rajah. When the General 
Adviser was not allowed an opportunity to give advice and Anthony 
was demoted by his uncle, the Colonial Office's hopes of gradually 
increasing its influence were frustrated. The surprise announcement 
of a constitution in 1941 provided an opportunity to modify the 1888 
Treaty and replace the General Adviser with a British Representative 
equipped with more substantial powers. But it was the Japanese 
invasion and subsequent Allied military administration which finally 
provided the Colonial Office bureaucrats with a long-awaited 
opportunity to decide Sarawak's future.
External pressure brought Brooke rule to a sudden end, 
but by the 1930s it had run its course. First there were the problems 
endemic to all dynastic regimes which sooner or later produce a weak 
ruler. Vyner Brooke was a more popular Rajah than his father but he 
was indecisive and could not delegate authority effectively. His reign 
displayed all the weaknesses and few of the strengths of personal 
rule. Nor was the arrangement whereby his brother Bertram shared 
responsibility calculated to improve matters. In this political vacuum 
it was inevitable that first MacBryan and then Anthony Brooke should 
compete with the senior bureaucrats of the Committee of Administration 
to exercise the Rajah's power. Like other dynasties, the Brookes were 
also plagued by conspiracies over the succession which had not been 
settled by the time the Japanese arrived. Although it was by no means 
certain that the Rajah would hand over to another member of the family, 
his distrust of Anthony Brooke was an important factor in determining 
Sarawak's future.
A solitary effort was made in the early 1930s to re-think 
Brooke administration with a view to ultimate native self-government.
The Le Gros Clark Report of 1935 was a blueprint for a scheme which 
would have brought more Ibans into government service and vastly improved 
the education system. However, financial problems and the inherent 
conservatism of the administrative officers thwarted this scheme which 
threatened the perpetuation of their status. The only change was in 
the direction of bureaucratic centralization which would have meant
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the eventual dismantling of the Resident system. The gradual 
development of a business-like and centralized bureaucracy had been 
inevitable but it, too, was resisted by the outstation officers who 
saw it as a frontal attack on their position.
With Anthony Brooke as their champion, the outstation 
officers made a counter-attack which secured the dismissal of the 
top bureaucrats in early 1939. But it became clear during Anthony’s 
subsequent term as Officer Administering the Government that his 
solution to Sarawak’s problems consisted of little more than a 
restoration of personal rule and the old administrative system of 
semi-autonomous Residents and District Officers. There was no 
indication that as the fourth Rajah he would do anything more than 
revive what he saw as the traditions of Brooke rule. If he had 
succeeded his uncle after the war, it is difficult to see how he 
could have coped with the significantly altered situation in Sarawak.
In 1945 Vyner Brooke had reached the age of 67 and was 
unwilling to return to the task of rebuilding war-torn Sarawak. His 
brother Bertram, the Tuan Muda, was physically unable to take his 
place and the Rajah was doubtful about his nephew's suitability for 
the position. As early as 1938 and again in 1942 Vyner had been 
prepared to surrender his responsibilities in return for a satisfactory 
financial settlement, but he was now faced with the prospect of having 
to meet the cost of the military administration and post-war 
reconstruction. Although we cannot wholly reconstruct the Rajah's 
reasons for deciding to cede his sovereignty to the British Crown 
in October 1945, material considerations and the problem of the 
succession dispelled whatever residual resistance he may have felt to 
a Colonial Office takeover. At the same time, it is likely that 
he saw no middle way between Brooke rule and rule by the Colonial 
Office.
The Labour government seemed to be committed against the 
restoration of Brooke rule. Nor was the Conservative party prepared 
to make an issue out of Sarawak. On Gammans' advice they declined to 
oppose cession which was subsequently confirmed by annexation without 
any reference to Parliament. But in the final analysis, neither party 
was particularly interested in Sarawak. Cession was a victory for
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Gent and the bureaucrats of the Colonial Office who had been trying 
since the late 1930s to 'tidy up' Sarawak whose standards of 
administration were regarded as inferior to those prevailing in 
British colonies. This policy was strongly supported by Mountbatten 
and the War Office who were concerned to strengthen the defences of 
Britain's Southeast Asian dependencies against the new phenomenon of 
nationalism.
Together with North Borneo, Sarawak became Britain's final 
colonial acquisition. However, it was acquired not so much in a 
spirit of imperial expansion as one of colonial consolidation against 
the insecurities and uncertainties of the post-war world. Britain 
had adopted a 'hands off' attitude towards Sarawak as long as there 
was no serious threat of third-power involvement. But the Japanese 
invasion meant that it could no longer afford the risks involved 
in not having full internal control.
Originating from the same planning office as the Malayan 
Union, cession was executed with similar speed and lack of scruple.
Had it not been for the agitation mounted by Anthony Brooke and the 
anti-cession faction in England through press and Parliament, 
cession might have been managed smoothly enough. Instead, the legal 
documents brought back by MacBryan had to be scrapped and some effort 
made to legitimize the arrangement by obtaining the formal consent of 
Sarawak's Council Negri and Supreme Council. As a sop to press and 
parliamentary opinion, a two-man delegation was despatched to lend 
respectability to what was in reality a carefully stage-managed 
exercise. Even so, a little more attention was paid by the British 
government to 'the natives' than by Anthony Brooke and the anti­
cession faction who were doing battle with the Rajah and the Colonial 
Office in their name. And when in spite of the bribery and intimidation 
of Council Negri members there was still a native majority against 
cession, the Colonial Office did hesitate in its course. In the meantime, 
however, one of those extraordinary accidents of history had made 
cession a fait accompli. Nor was it clear what course the Colonial 
Office could have taken if their ability to manouevre had not been 
so unexpectedly removed. A resumption of negotiations with Anthony 
Brooke and the Provisional Government could only have revived the 
same stalemate which had been reached in early 1945 over the
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application to Sarawak of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act.
Cession was thus the final resolution of the relationship 
between Sarawak and Britain, the consummation of a long drawn- 
out imperial affair. It also spelled the end of a European dynasty 
which had successfully established itself over the diverse peoples of 
north-west Borneo. The ’white rajahs’ had lent a romantic and 
exotic dimension to European imperialism in Southeast Asia but 
history had finally penetrated their isolation. Nevertheless, cession 
was much more than a minor event in imperial history. It was also the 
catalyst of a new train of events which transformed Sarawak from a 
loose confederation of diverse cultures linked by little more than 
loyalty to the Rajah into something much more like a nation-state.
The reactions of Sarawak's different ethnic groups to 
cession provide the best indication of the strengths and weaknesses 
of Brooke rule. Under the Brookes, the Chinese were allowed to engage 
in trade and small farming. However, their prospects for economic 
advancement were limited by the land regulations and their ability to 
become Sarawak citizens was also restricted. For all except some of 
the Sarawak-born who were well established both economically and 
socially, colonial status possessed the attraction of improved 
economic possibilities and citizenship rights along the lines of those 
provided in the Malayan Union constitution.
The general interests of the Malays lay with the perpetuation 
of Brooke rule which had given the traditional elite a position of 
political power and social prestige subordinate only to that of the 
Brookes and their European officers. Consequently it was they who 
provided the initial leadership of the MNU, although even the Datu 
Patinggi had his price for supporting cession and might well have 
done so had it not been for the influence of the young Malay activists. 
This new educated elite saw the continuation of Brooke rule as the 
means of retaining political independence and the ultimate 
achievement of self-government as promised in the 1941 Constitution. 
Unlike the traditional elite, they were even willing to share 
political power with the Ibans whom they saw as allies. In its first 
expression, Sarawak nationalism took the form of a native coalition 
in defence against Chinese assertiveness and British imperialism.
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For most Malays and Ibans, cession posed an extraordinary 
dilemma. The traditional principle of loyalty to the Rajah required 
that they obey his wishes and accept cession. On the other hand, 
loyalty to the Raj required that they should oppose its abolition. 
Brooke rule had in fact done very little for the Ibans in the way 
of educational and economic improvement, nor was there any 
significant political representation for this largest of all Sarawak's 
ethnic groups. There were pockets of resistance to Brooke authority 
in some areas until the late 1930s. Nevertheless, the question of 
loyalty was fundamental for all except those few who could see the 
benefits of education and an end to Malay monopoly of the second level 
of government administration. Only a handful of Kuching and First 
Division Ibans opposed cession and shared the educated Malay elite's 
vision of independence and self-government.
The anti-cession campaign failed for a number of reasons. 
Unlike the Malay rulers who opposed the Malayan Union, the Rajah 
appeared to be the initiator of cession and ignored all appeals from 
his subjects to retain his sovereignty. He could exploit the loyalty 
of the Malays and Ibans as well as counting on the support of the 
Chinese. Unlike Malaya where Malay opposition to the Malayan Union 
was solid, Sarawak's Malay leadership was split by the support which 
Abang Haji Mustapha and the other datus gave to cession. Unlike 
Malaya where the differing attitudes of the Malays and the Chinese 
to the country's political future threatened to boil over into racial 
strife, in Sarawak the main political struggle took place within the 
Malay community. Apart from a small group of educated Ibans in Kuching 
who supported the MNU, the Ibans and the Chinese were onlookers to 
the conflict. However, the support given by the Third Division Ibans 
to the colonial government suggested that physical action by the 
Malays against the government would bring about a dramatic reaction.
At the same time, the anti-cession party in Britain could not match 
the big guns which the opponents of the Malayan Union trained on the 
British government. British commercial interests in Sarawak had 
favoured greater British control in the belief that this would allow 
easier access to Sarawak's resources.
431
Although the anti-cession campaign was unsuccessful 
in reversing cession, it provided Sarawak with its first political 
issue and its first political parties. The political development 
achieved during the immediate post-war years was brought to a halt 
by the assassination of Duncan Stewart and the collapse of the anti­
cession movement. But when political life was resumed in the late 
1950s it was still largely based on the earlier pattern. And since 
Sarawak achieved nominal independence through its membership of the 
Federation of Malaysia, the anti-cession movement has also provided 
the basis of a nationalist tradition and the means of legitimizing the 
power of the educated Malay elite.
432
GLOSSARY
abang title assumed by the sons of datus
adat custom, tradition
adat lama old-established custom
barisan political grouping (orig. military formation)
batang major river
datu non-royal Malay chieftain
hag pilgrimage to Mecca
haji title assumed by those completing the haj
jikeidan vigilante group
kampong Malay/Melanau village
kempeitai Japanese military police
ken sanji prefectural councillor
ken sanjikai prefectural advisory council
kyodohei native militia
mufti state Islamic leader
pemuda political youth
penghulu Iban leader (a Brooke invention)
pengivan title signifying connection with Brunei royalty
perabangan the abang class
pergerakan political movement
perimpun association
persatuan association, union
tua kampong Malay/Melanau village headman
tuai rumah Iban/Dayak headman
tulin taxation rights
PLATE I
Vyner Brooke Sylvia Brooke
PLATE II
Vyner Brooke’s installation as Rajah, July 1918. With him is Sylvia Brooke 
and bringing up the rear are Bertram Brooke (in the military cap) and the 
Datus, (left to right) Temonggong, Bandar, Hakim, Menteri and Imam.
The Raja and Ranee with the datus and Iban penghulus at the 
Astana after the installation. Vyner had been a cadet and 
District Officer in the Second Division for many years be­
fore succeeding to the Raj. He spoke fluent Iban as well as
Malay.
PLATE III
During the Rajah's absences Sarawak was ruled by Bertram Brooke, the 
Tuan Muda, who is pictured here with the members of the Council Negri.
The system of tandem rule meant that the Rajah resided in Sarawak for 
less than half the year. Nor, as this photograph of an official visit 
during the 1920's shows, did he enjoy the ceremony of office. The 
yellow umbrella was a reminder of the Malay ancestry of the Brooke Raj.
PLATE IV
Ong Tiang SweeBertram Brooke, the Tuan Muda
PLATE V
' V *
Lower Rejang river scene in the 1920’s: an Iban family coming to the
bazaar. The man is wearing a red fez which was one of the distinctive 
forms of headgear favoured by the Ibans at the time.
Kuching street scene in the 1920’s: Malay satay seller and peon (office
boy) customer. The Malays, who had made up 70 per cent of the town’s pop­
ulation in 1876, were only 40 per cent by 1939.
PLATE VI
Oil well at Miri, c.1925. By the late 1920’s the Miri field was pro­
ducing 1,000,000 tons a year, providing a substantial boost for gov­
ernment revenue. However, in 1941 the field was estimated as having
a life of only ten more years.
PLATE VII
Vyner Brooke (1874-1963) from a portrait by Margaret Noble. Many 
of the people who knew the Rajah have described his piercing blue 
eyes which ’seemed to look straight through you’. As this portrait 
shows, however, the Rajah had a cast in his left eye which made it 
difficult for him to focus both eyes together. It is a nice quest­
ion whether he exploited the unnerving effect which this had on people.
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PLATE VIII
The centenary of Brooke rule, September 1941. Emerging from the 
Court House are the Rajah, the Ranee and the Chief Secretary, C. D. 
Le Gros Clark. The British navy, upon whom the first Rajah had 
relied so much in order to secure his position, provided the guard
of honour.
PLATE IX
The Sarawak Rangers on parade. Before they were merged with the pol­
ice in 1931 they constituted Sarawak’s only armed force.
The Chief Secretary, C. D. Le Gros Clark, inspecting the 2/15th 
Punjab Regiment at the Kuching padang in late 1941. The British 
government was unable to provide any serious measure of defence 
against the Japanese, although the Miri oil field was effectively
sabotaged.
PLATE X
Wartime Japanese propaganda poster. The Malays were urged to see 
the Japanese army as having saved them from Brooke oppression. Of 
all the ethnic groups, they suffered least during the occupation.
• t O -  ^
l '-«Br fIhIV
W \ «Ml1 1 ... -IvWälV
Japanese soldiers leaving Kuching after the surrender for a concen­
tration camp up-country. They were allowed to keep their rifles as
self-protect ion.
PLATE XI
The Rajah in Australia, 1942 The Ranee in New York, 1943
Gerard MacBryan Anthony Brooke
PLATE • XII
The Australian commander of Kuching Force, Brigadier T.C. Eastick, 
delivers an address at the combined Allied victory and Chinese 
'Double Tenth' (National Day) celebrations, October 1945.
The Datu Patinggi presents the Rajah with the sword of state, sym­
bolizing the restoration of civil government, in April 1946. The 
Ranee looks on and the Datu Patinggi is assisted by his grandson,
Abang Kassim.
PLATE XIII
Abang Haji Abdillah, Datu Patinggi and 17th hereditary chieftain of 
the Sarawak Malays in official Brooke uniform. At his death in Nov­
ember 1946 aged 83 he was the figurehead of the ant i-cession movement.
PLATE XIV
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Malay school teachers who resigned from government service in early 
1947 in protest against Circular No. 9' s prohibition on anti-cession
activity.
Resigners in the grounds of Darul Kornia (the Datu Pat inggi ’ s house) , 
2 April 1946. They are grouped to represent the MNU slogan: ’No
Circular No. 9'.
PLATE XV
Mrs Anthony Brooke's visit to Sarawak in July 1947 came at the 
high point of the anti-cession movement. As an official represent­
ative of the Brooke family she was given an enthusiastic reception 
by the Sarawak Malays wherever she went. In the top photograph she 
is pictured with Lily Eberwein and other members of the Malay Nat­
ional Union Kaum Ibu. In the bottom photograph she is seen with 
members of the Sibu Pergerakan Pemuda Melayu and its Kaum Ibu.
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Appendix I
The International Status of Sawarak
1. Brunei's cession of Sarawak to James Brooke
(i) Transfer by Pangeran Muda Hassim of the Government of 
Sarawak, 1841.
This Agreement made in the year of the Prophet 
one thousand two hundred and fifty-seven at twelve 
o'clock on Wednesday the thirtieth day of the month of 
Rejab showeth that with a pure heart and high intergrity 
PANGERAN MUDA HASSIM son of the late Sultan Muhammad 
hereby transfers to JAMES BROOKE Esquire the Government 
of Sarawak together with the dependencies thereof its 
revenues and all its future responsibilities. Moreover 
he James Brooke Esquire shall be the sole owner of its 
revenues and will be alone responsible for the public 
expenditure necessary for the good of Sarawak.
Moreover James Brooke Esquire acting with the same 
integrity and pureness of heart accepts This Agreement as 
set forth and further undertakes from the date hereof to 
pay to the Sultan of Brunei one thousand dollars to Pangeran 
Muda one thousand dollars to the Pettinggi three hundred 
dollars to the Bandar one hundred and fifty dollars and 
to the Temenggong one hundred dollars.
Moreover James Brooke Esquire undertakes that the 
laws and customs of the Malays of Sarawak shall for ever 
be respected since the country of Sarawak has hitherto 
been subject to the government of the Sultan of Brunei 
the Pangeran Muda and Malayan rajas.
Moreover should intrigues arise either within or 
without the State of Sarawak detrimental to its interests 
whether caused by peoples or princes or rulers who may 
be inimical to Sarawak the Sultan and his brother the 
Pangeran Muda shall uphold James Brooke Esquire as the 
lawfully appointed Ruler of Sarawak subject to no 
interference by any other person.
Moreover the Pangeran Muda and James Brooke Esquire 
do themselves make this Contract and the Pangeran agrees 
to relinguish all further activities in the Government of 
Sarawak except such as may be carried out by the consent 
of James Brooke Esquire and anything which they may 
severally or individually do in regard to the Government 
of Sarawak must be in accordance with the terms of this 
Agreement.
Written in Sarawak on the night of Friday the 
second day of Shaaban 1257 at ten o'clock.
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(ii) Appointment hy Sultan of Brunei of James Brooke to 
Govern as His Representative3 1842.
In the era of the prophet-God grant him peace!—  
the year one thousand two hundred and fifty-eight, the 
year Alip, the twenty-fourth day of Jamadalachir, the 
day being Monday and the time ten o'clock:---
His Highness Sultan Omar Ali Saifu'd-Din son of 
the late Sultan Mahomed Jamalu'1-Alam appoints James 
Brooke Esquire to be his representative and in that 
capacity to govern the province of Sarawak, and James 
Brooke Esquire covenants and undertakes to observe the 
orders, custom, laws and regulations of His Highness 
the Sultan. James Brooke Esquire is responsible for 
all the affairs of the province of Sarawak, and no one 
at all may interfere upon any pretext except on the 
express command of His Highness the Sultan. Regarding 
the affairs of the other districts within our coasts 
James Brooke Esquire is not to exercise authority or 
concern himself in any way, but only within the 
province of Sarawak. So it is agreed between His 
Highness and the Tuan Besar.
And with regard to the province of Sarawak the 
Tuan Besar alone is appointed our representative to 
govern it, and no other European of any nationality may* 
except only after submission to His Highness and Pangeran 
Muda Hassim, and only with their permission.
Regarding the revenues of the province of Sarawak 
the Tuan Besar undertakes to pay as tribute every year 
to His Highness one thousand dollars, to Pangeran Muda 
Hassim one thousand dollars, to the Patinggi three 
hundred dollars to the Bandar one hundred and fifty dollars 
and to the Tumunggong one hundred dollars annually. If 
the trade of the province of Sarawak becomes flourishing 
and the province obtains a large revenue the Tuan Besar 
shall increase the tribute to be paid to His Highness 
and the Pangeran Muda Hassim.
Further with reference to the Sapang and Sambok 
Kongsies which have been working in the province of 
Sarawak taxation is to be in accordance with the size 
of their undertaking whether large or small for this is 
a matter which is excluded from the control of the Tuan 
Besar.
The above is the Agreement between His Highness 
and the Tuan Besar aforesaid and contained in this 
written contract for the province of Sarawak.
* Certain words are missing from the text.
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2. Sarawak’s Treaties with Britain
(i) The Treaty of 1888.
AGREEMENT BETWEEN HER MAJESTY'S 
GOVERNMENT AND CHARLES BROOKE,
SECOND RAJAH OF SARAWAK
WHEREAS Charles Brooke Esquire Rajah and lawful Ruler of 
the State of Sarawak, in the island of Borneo, has 
represented to Her Majesty's Government the desire of 
that State to be placed under the protection of Her 
Majesty the Queen under the conditions hereinafter 
mentioned; it is hereby agreed and declared as 
follows:—
Article 1.
The State of Sarawak shall continue to be governed 
and administered by the said Rajah Brooke and his successors 
as an independent State under the protection of Great 
Britain but such protection shall confer no right on Her 
Majesty's Government to interfere with the internal 
administration of that State further than is herein provided.
Article 2.
In case any question should hereafter arise respecting 
the right of succession to the present or any future Ruler 
of Sarawak, such question shall be referred to Her Majesty's 
Government for decision.
Article 3.
The relations between the State of Sarawak and 
all foreign States including the States of Brunei and 
North Borneo shall be conducted by Her Majesty's Government 
or in accordance with its directions; and if any difference 
should arise between the Government of Sarawak and that of 
any other State, the Government of Sarawak agrees to abide 
by the decision of Her Majesty's Government and to take 
all necessary measures to give effect thereto.
Article 4.
Her Majesty's Government shall have the right to 
establish British Consular Officers in any part of the 
State of Sarawak who shall receive exequaturs in the 
name of the Government of Sarawak. They shall enjoy 
whatever privileges are usually granted to Consular 
Officers and shall be entitled to hoist the British flag 
over their residences and public offices.
Article 5.
British subjects commerce and shipping shall enjoy 
the same rights privileges and advantages as the subjects 
commerce and shipping of the most favoured nation, as 
well as any other rights, privileges and advantages which 
may be enjoyed by the subjects commerce and shipping of 
the State of Sarawak.
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Article 6.
No cession or other alienation of any part of the 
territory of the State of Sarawak shall be made by the 
Rajah or his successors to any foreign State or the 
subjects or citizens thereof, without the consent of Her 
Majesty's Government but this restriction shall not apply 
to ordinary grants or leases of lands or houses to private 
individuals for purposes of residence, agriculture, 
commerce, or other business.
Given under my hand and seal this 14th day of June in 
the year Eighteen hundred and eighty-eight.
Seal. (Signed) C. BROOKE, Rajah.
Seal. (Signed) SALISBURY.
5 September 1888.
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(ii) The Supplementary Agreement of 1941.
AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY’S 
GOVERNMENT AND THE RAJAH IN COUNCIL 
OF THE STATE OF SARAWAK
WHEREAS by an Agreement dated September 5th, 1888, between 
her Majesty’s Government and Charles Brooke, Esquire,
Rajah and lawful Ruler of the State of Sarawak it was, 
inter alia, agreed that the State of Sarawak should 
continue to be administered by the said Rajah Brooke 
under the protection of Great Britain, but that such 
protection should confer no right on Her Majesty's 
Government to interfere with the internal administration 
of the State further than was therein provided:
And Whereas it is the desire of His Majesty's 
Government and of the Rajah in Council of the State of 
Sarawak that further provision should be made regulating 
the relations between His Majesty's Government and the 
State of Sarawak:
Now, therefore, it is agreed between His Majesty's 
Government and His Highness the Rajah in Council of the 
State of Sarawak, as follows:—
1. This agreement is supplementary to the 
above-recited agreement of September 5th,
1888, and the said agreement shall be read 
subject to the provisions of the agreement 
hereinafter appearing.
2. The State of Sarawak will receive and 
provide a suitable residence for a British 
Officer to be called the British Representative 
who shall be accredited to the Court or the 
Rajah, and whose advice must be asked and 
acted upon on all matters affecting the 
relations of the State of Sarawak with foreign 
states or the rights and status of foreign 
nationals and on all matters of defence.
3. The British Representative shall be 
appointed by His Majesty's Government.
4. The services of the British Representative 
shall be available for consultation and he shall 
be entitled to offer his opinion on matters 
touching the general administration of the State.
He shall have access to such State documents
and records as concern matters in respect of 
which his advice is sought under this Clause or 
under Clause 2 of this Agreement. He shall be 
entitled to attend meetings of the Supreme 
Council when such matters are discussed, but he
shall not be entitled to vote therein.
5. His Majesty's Government will at all 
times to the utmost of its power take whatever 
steps may be necessary to protect the territory 
of Sarawak from external hostile attacks.
In Witness Whereof the parties hereto have hereunto 
set their hands this twenty-second day of November, 1941.
Signed by His Excellency 
the Government of the 
Straits Settlements and
High Commissioner for (Sgd.) T.S.W. THOMAS
the Malay States for and
on behalf of His Majesty's
Government in the
presence of:
(Sgd.) G.R.B. DON-FOX
A.D.C.
Signed by His Highness
the Rajah of Sarawak in (Sgd.) C.V. BROOKE
the presence of:
(Sgd.) G.T.M. MacBryan
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3. Opinions on the Legal Status of Sarawak
(i) Opinion of the Colonial Office and Foreign Office3 May 1945 (S.6)
'From the point of view of international law the 
State of Sarawak possesses no personality whatever 
and is simply a territory within the British Empire.
The independence of Sarawak is a purely domestic 
matter with which no foreign state has any concern.
From the point of view of United Kindgom municipal 
law, Sarawak is foeign [sic] in the sense of not 
being British territory; but from the point of 
view of international law, Sarawak is British 
territory and not foreign (vide, for example, the 
use of the word "foreign” in commercial treaties 
in connection with imperial preference). Sarawak 
is simply a British protected state. The Agreements 
between the British Government and the Rajah of 
Sarawak have no existence within the realm of 
international law, but only operate as domestic 
matters within the Empire'.
(ii) Opinion of Wynn Parry and Arnold D. McNair, September 1945.
The main question put to us is whether the statement 
headed 'The International Status of Sarawak' numbered S.6 
and handed by the representatives of the Colonial Office 
to the representatives of the Government of Sarawak as 
being 'the considered opinion of the Colonial Office and 
the Foreign Office' is a fair and correct statement of 
the position.
In our opinion it is not, and we shall endeavour to show why.
(a) The legal personality of a Protected State varies 
according to the degree of dependence upon the 
Protector, and each case must be considered on its 
merits. At one extreme there are protected States 
which are undoubtedly international persons although 
they have entrusted the conduct of their international 
relations to their protector; at the other extreme 
there are States which have lost all their international 
personality, and are for all international purposes a 
part of the protecting state, their relations with it 
being a matter of domestic constitutional law. The 
words 'protection', 'protectorate', have no single 
meaning and cover a multitude of relationships.
(b) It is stated (in S.6 referred to above) that 'The 
Agreements between the British Government and the 
Rajah of Sarawak have no existence within the realm 
of international law, but only operate as domestic 
matters within the Empire'.
We are unable to accept this statement.
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The p r e c i s e  d a t e  a t  which  Sarawak became an i n d e p e n d e n t  S t a t e  
may be d i f f i c u l t  to  f i x .
A c c o rd ing  t o  t h e  Dominions Off ice and Colonial Office L is t  
1940,  ( b e l i e v e d  t o  be  t h e  l a t e s t ) ,  p . 5 4 2 ,  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  r e c o g n i z e d  
Sarawak as  an i n d e p e n d e n t  S t a t e  i n  1864.  There  i s  some e v id e n c e  
t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  America  had  done t h e  same t h i n g  a t  
an e a r l i e r  d a t e .  Then by an Agreement  o f  Sep tem ber  5 ,  1888, 
e x e c u t e d  by Lord S a l i s b u r y ,  t h e n  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  F o r e ig n  
A f f a i r s ,  and R a ja  C h a r l e s  Brooke t h e  S t a t e  o f  Sarawak 'was 
p l a c e d  u n d e r  t h e  P r o t e c t i o n  o f  Her M a je s ty  t h e  Q u e e n ' .
Tha t  Agreement  was u n d o u b t e d l y  made be tw een  two i n d e p e n d e n t  
S t a t e s ,  o p e r a t e s  w i t h i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law and 
d e r i v e s  i t s  e f f i c a c y  from t h a t  s y s te m  o f  law .  I t s  l a n g u a g e  i s  
such  t h a t  no o t h e r  c o n c l u s i o n  i s  p o s s i b l e .  I t  e n v i s a g e s  r e l a t i o n s  
be tw een  t h e  S t a t e  o f  Sarawak and f o r e i g n  S t a t e s  and p r o v i d e s  f o r  
t h e i r  b e i n g  c o n d u c te d  e i t h e r  by His  M a j e s t y ' s  Government  o r  
i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  i t s  d i r e c t i o n s ,  b u t  t h e s e  f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s  
a r e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  S t a t e  o f  Sarawak.  Aga in ,  i t  e n v i s a g e s  
d i f f e r e n c e s  a r i s i n g  b e tw een  t h e  Government  o f  Sarawak and o t h e r  
Governments ,  and o b l i g e s  t h e  Government  o f  Sarawak t o  a b id e  
by t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  His  M a j e s t y ' s  Government  upon such  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  
b u t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  a r e  be tw een  Sarawak and o t h e r  S t a t e s ,  n o t  
be tw een  His  M a j e s t y ' s  Government  and o t h e r  S t a t e s .  Aga in ,  by 
A r t i c l e  IV His  M a j e s t y ' s  Government  r e c e i v e d  t h e  r i g h t  t o  send 
c o n s u l s  who s h a l l  r e c e i v e  e x e q u a t u r s  i n  t h e  name of  t h e  Government  
o f  Sarawak and s h a l l  h o i s t  t h e  B r i t i s h  f l a g  i n  t h e i r  r e s i d e n c e s ,  
and A r t i c l e  V c o n f e r s  upon B r i t i s h  s u b j e c t s  b o t h  n a t i o n a l  and 
m o s t - f a v o u r e d - n a t i o n  t r e a t m e n t .
A r t i c l e  VI r e q u i r e s  t h e  c o n s e n t  o f  His  M a j e s t y ' s  Government  t o  
c e s s i o n s  o f  t e r r i t o r y  by t h e  R a ja  t o  any f o r e i g n  s t a t e .  A l l  
t h e s e  p r o v i s i o n s  p r e s u p p o s e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  S t a t e  o f  Sarawak 
as  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e r s o n ,  and t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  Agreement i s  
t o  modify  i t s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  by making i t  a P r o t e c t e d  
S t a t e .  J u s t  as  t h e  E n g l i s h  Law o f  s t a t u s  r e c o g n i z e s  l e g a l  p e r s o n s  
o f  i n c o m p l e t e  p e r s o n a l i t y  and c a p a c i t y ,  so l i k e w i s e  does 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law r e c o g n i z e  a v a r i e t y  o f  s t a t u s  and p e r s o n a l i t y .
What t h e n  has  happened  s i n c e  1888 t o  c o n v e r t  t h i s  Agreement  and 
t h e  t r e a t y  r e l a t i o n s  r e s u l t i n g  from i t  f rom t h e  f i e l d  of  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law i n t o  ' d o m e s t i c  m a t t e r s  w i t h i n  t h e  E m p i r e ' ?
Owing t o  t h e  m i l i t a r y  o c c u p a t i o n  o f  Sarawak t h e  Government  i s  
s e p a r a t e d  from i t s  r e c o r d s  and i s  n o t  i n  a p o s i t i o n  to  q u o t e  f rom 
i t s  f i l e s .  No i m p o r t a n c e  can be a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  t r a n s f e r e n c e  o f  
Sarawak a f f a i r s  by His  M a j e s t y ' s  Government  f rom t h e  F o r e ig n  
O f f i c e  to  t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  a t  some t i m e ,  so we a r e  t o l d ,  
be tw een  1906 and 1912.  The change c a l l e d  f o r t h  a p r o t e s t  f rom 
t h e  Sarawak Government  and was u l t i m a t e l y  a c q u i e s c e d  i n  by i t  as  a 
m a t t e r  o f  B r i t i s h  d o m e s t i c  c o n v e n ie n c e  on t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  
i t  i n  no way a l t e r e d  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  Sarawak.  S a r a w a k ' s  f o r e i g n  
r e l a t i o n s  a r e  f o r  t h e  most p a r t  c o n f i n e d  t o  h e r  n e a r  n e i g h b o u r s .  
Two Boundary Agreements  were  made i n  1912 and 1920 w i t h  t h e  S t a t e  
o f  B r u n e i  (See M a x w e l l ' s  Treaties and Engagements o f  the Malay
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Statesj pp. 152-154), and it is significant that they are 
signed for Brunei by the British Resident and for Sarawak by 
the Raja's own officer of the appropriate Division. From time 
to time His Majesty's Government in pursuance of the Agreement 
of 1888 has made treaties and agreements with other States 
accepting Sarawak and has previously consulted the Government 
of Sarawak, for instance, a boundary treaty with the Netherlands 
Government in 1928 and an agreement with the same Government as 
to passports in 1926. When such a treaty or agreement requires 
legislation in Sarawak, it is for the Government of Sarawak to 
legislate, as in practice it does.
Finally what is the effect of the Agreement of 22 November, 1941, 
upon the previous state of affairs?
(i) Instead of wiping out the status quo ante and converting 
a relation between the two countries operating within 
the field of international law into a domestic matter 
within the Empire, it proceeds in the first article to 
re-affirm the vitality of the Agreement of September 5,
1888, by expressing the Agreement of 22 November, 1941, 
to be supplemental to it.
(ii) It then provides for a British Representative to be 
'accredited to the Court of the Rajah' and makes it 
necessary that his advice should be 'asked and acted 
upon' upon all external matters, namely, relations of 
the State of Sarawak with foreign States, rights and 
status of foreign nationals (which involve obligations 
towards foreign States) and defence (that is, against 
foreign States). Moreoever, the British Representative 
may offer his opinion 'on matters touching the general 
administration of the State' , may attend the Supreme 
Council for certain purposes without power to vote and 
may attend and address the Council Negri without power 
to vote.
It may well be that after some years of the operations of this 
Agreement the influence of the British Representative might become 
so great that the internal independence of the State of Sarawak 
would, de facto and by acquiescence, some to an end, but within 
about one month of the signature of the Agreement Sarawak came 
under enemy occupation, and it is impossible to say that Sarawak 
vis-a-vis His Majesty's Government no longer possesses internal 
sovereignty and independence. It is hardly necessary to say that 
enemy occupation does not displace sovereignty.
(c) The independent status of Sarawak is accepted in the latest
edition of Anson's Law and Customs of the Consitution_, Vol.II., 
Part II (1935) (by Berriedale Keith) pp.106-108. After stating 
that 'the dependent or protected states may stand in varying 
degrees of dependence upon the government of this country', the 
editor continues:
'The Protectorates or Protected States, in which a 
settled form of government exists - Zanzibar,
Tonga, Brunei, North Borneo, Sarawak and the Malay
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States - possess these features in common, 
that the British Government by treaty exercises 
a control over their foreign relations, and in the 
first three cases* a jurisdication over British 
subjects within their territories. The Malay 
States are practically controlled in their internal 
affairs by the advice of a British Resident, a 
phenomenon formerly exhibited on a large scale 
in the case of Egypt. In these cases it is not 
considered necessary to exercise jurisdiction.
North Borneo and Sarawak are curious examples of 
independent sovereignty exercised by British 
subjects under the protection of the Crown under 
treaties of 1888, but not within the dominions 
of the Crown. In Sarawak foreign relations are 
controlled and questions of succession are 
determined by the British Government, which also 
in the case of North Borneo approves the Governor 
appointed by the Chartered Company. Zanzibar is 
governed by a Sultan advised by a British Resident, 
and has executive and legislative Councils: natives
fall under the Sultan’s Court, Europeans under 
the Resident’s Court. Tonga, a constitutional 
monarchy, has in minor matters jurisdiction over 
Europeans’.
(d) Further evidence of the fact of the State of Sarawak 
being a foreign country is afforded by its position in 
regard to the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, 1890 and 1913. 
These Acts enable the Crown to direct that certain 
British enactments shall extend 'to any foreign country 
in which for the time being His Majesty has jurisdiction'. 
Amongst these enactments has been, since 1913, the 
Colonial Probates Act, 1892. The British Crown appears 
to have been advised in or about the year 1927 that 
it has no power to legislate under the Foreign Jurisdiction 
Acts in respect, amongst other States, of Sarawak, 
because it did not assert jurisdiction over British 
subjects there, and the Colonial Probates (Protected and 
Mandated Territories) Act, 1927, was passed which empowers 
the Crown to apply the Colonial Probates Act, 1892 'to 
any territories being either territories under his 
Majesty's protection or territories in respect of which 
a mandate on behalf of the League of Nations has been 
accepted by His Majesty, to which it cannot be applied 
by virtue of the provisions of the Foreign Jurisdiction 
Acts, 1890 and 1913'.
* The fact that in the other Protected States jurisdiction 
is not asserted necessitated the passing of 17 and 18 Geo 
V.c.43, to allow of the recognition of probates granted 
in such territories. Since 1908 consular jurisdiction is 
not exercised in Brunei, powers having been given to the 
Resident by a local law'.
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(e)  There  a r e  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  which  s u p p o r t  t h e  v iew t h a t  
Sarawak i s  n o t  an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  Empire .
Not on ly  does Sarawak p o s s e s s  i t s  own f l a g  and 
c u r r e n c y  and p o s t a g e  s tamps  ( a s  many S t a t e s  fo rm ing  
p a r t  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  Empire  do) and an armed f o r c e  ( t h e  
Sarawak R a n g e r s ) , which  i n  t h e  words o f  H a i l s h a m ,  Laws 
o f  England^ Vol.  XI ( d a t e d  1 9 3 3 ) ,  S e c t . 351,  ' i s  a f o r c e  
u n d e r  t h e  R a j a h ' s  s o l e  c o n t r o l ' ,  b u t  i t s  i n t e r n a l  
in d e p e n d e n c e  d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  i t  f rom many o r  most  o f  
t h o s e  B r i t i s h  P r o t e c t e d  S t a t e s  which  a r e  r e g a r d e d  as  
p a r t  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  Em pire ,  i n  two r e s p e c t s :  (a)  t h e
a b s e n c e  o f  any r i g h t  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  Crown to  e x e r c i s e  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  Sa rawak ,  t h e  c o n c e s s i o n  o f  which  by 
t h e  Government  o f  Sarawak a p p e a r s  t o  be one o f  t h e
main o b j e c t s  o f  t h e  p e n d in g  n e g o t i a t i o n s  ( s e e  t h e  m inu te s  
o f  t h e  M eet ing  h e l d  on March 20 ,  1945) and (b) t h e  
a b s e n c e  o f  any a p p e a l  f rom Sarawak C our t s  t o  t h e  
P r i v y  C ou n c i l  o r  to  any o t h e r  B r i t i s h  C o u r t .  The 
F o l lo w in g  p a s s a g e  may be q u o te d  from H a i l s h a m ,  Laws 
o f  Englands Vol .  X I . ,  S e c t .  272 ,  w he re ,  a f t e r  r e f e r r i n g  
to  t h e  Agreement o f  1888 and t h e  powers  c o n f e r r e d  
t h e r e b y  upon t h e  B r i t i s h  Government ,  t h e  a u t h o r  
c o n t i n u e s  as  f o l l o w s
' O t h e r w i s e  no i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  
a l l o w e d .  The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  c o n t r o l l e d  by 
t h e  Ra jah  and a Supreme C ou n c i l  composed of  
t h e  h e i r  p r e s u m p t i v e  ( t h e  Tuan Muda) , two 
E u ropeans  and f i v e  Malays .  There  i s  a l a r g e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s t a f f  and a C h ie f  J u s t i c e .
No p r o v i s i o n  i s  made f o r  B r i t i s h  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
o r  even f o r  an a p p e a l  t o  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l ' ,
( such  as  e x i s t s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  F e d e r a t e d  
Malay S t a t e s ,  B r i t i s h  N or th  Borneo and B ru n e i  
( s e e  H a i l s h a m ,  V o l . I X ,  S e c t . 271 ,  n o t e  ( f ) ) . '
In  s h o r t ,  i f  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  made by t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  
t h a t  'S a raw a k  i s  s im p ly  a B r i t i s h  P r o t e c t e d  S t a t e '  
means t h a t  i t  i s  a S t a t e  p r o t e c t e d  by G re a t  B r i t a i n ,  
t h e  c l a i m  can be a c c e p t e d ;  i f  i t  means t h a t  Sarawak 
i s  B r i t i s h ,  i t  goes  to o  f a r .
( f )  The t r e a t m e n t  o f  Sarawak i n  t h e  Dominions O ffic e  and 
C olonia l O ffic e  L is ts  1940,  (which i s  b e l i e v e d  t o  be 
t h e  l a s t  i s s u e )  l e n d s  s u p p o r t  t o  t h e  view t h a t  
Sarawak i s  n o t  r e g a r d e d  as  an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  
B r i t i s h  Em pire .  P a r t  I I  (c)  i s  d e s c r i b e d  as  an H i s t o r i c a l  
and S t a t i s t i c a l  Account  o f  t h e  C o lo n ie s  and o t h e r  
T e r r i t o r i e s  w i t h  which  t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  i s  c o n c e r n e d ' . 
Th is  s e c t i o n  d e a l s  ( i n t e r  a l i a )  w i t h  Malaya which  i t  i s  
s t a t e d  on p .  380, ' c o m p r i s e s  t h e  Colony o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  
S e t t l e m e n t s ,  t h e  F e d e r a t e d  Malay S t a t e s  o f  P e r a k ,  S e l a n g o r ,  
N e g r i  S e m b i l an ,  Pahang and t h e  U n f e d e r a t e d  S t a t e s  o f  
J o h o r e ,  Kedah,  K e l a n t a n ,  T rengganu  and P e r l i s .  Malaya
i s  a l s o  r e g a r d e d  as  i n c l u d i n g  th e  S t a t e  o f  B r u n e i ,  i n
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the island of Borneo, of which the Governor of the 
Straits Settlements is High Commissioner and which, 
like the Malay States in the Peninsula, is in treaty 
relationship with Great Britain’.
It will be noted that two other States in the island 
of Borneo, namely North Borneo and Sarawak are not 
mentioned as comprised with in Malaya.
Later at p.539 there is an Appendix which gives some 
account of North Borneo, Sarawak, Trans Jordan and 
certain miscellaneous British possessions and 
Protectorates which are not included in the main portion 
of the Historical and Statistical portion above. On 
p.542 we are told that in 1864 Great Britain recognized 
Sarawak as an independent State and the Agreement of 
14 June 1888 is summarized.
It is also worthy of note that the members of what 
is called the Malayan Establishment Staff appear in the 
Record of Services of Dominions and Colonial Officers, 
while the members of the Sarawak Service do not. The 
reason is presumably the fact that the members of the 
Malayan Service are British civil servants, while the 
members of the Sarawak service are not and hold 
contracts from the Sarawak Government.
Again on p.XIV the description of the establishment of 
the Colonial Office recognizes the distinction between 
the Malayan States and Sarawak by describing the affairs 
assigned to the Eastern department of the Office as 
follows: ’Hong Kong, Straits Settlements, Malay States,
Mauritius, Seychelles and Ceylon. Business connected 
with the Protected States of Sarawak and North Borneo.'
(g) It is instructive to compare Sarawak with one of the
Unfederated Malay States, Kelantan, in 1924. As a result 
of a Treaty of 10 March 1909 between Great Britain and 
Siam and an Agreement of 22 October 1910 between Great 
Britain and the Raja of Kelantan (see Maxwell’s 
Treaties and Engagements affecting the Malay States and 
Borneo_, p.109) Great Britain exercises (or at any rate 
exercised in 1924) rights of protection over Kelantan 
which may be summarized as follows:
(i) Kelantan undertakes to have no political relations 
or dealings with any foreign power or protectorate 
except through the medium of His Britannic Majesty.
(ii) His Britannic Majesty reserves power to appoint 
officers to be Adviser and Assistant Adviser in 
Kelantan, and the Raja of Kalantan 'undertakes to 
follow and give effect to the advice'.
(iii) Posts, telegraphs and railways are under the control 
of the Raja.
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( i v )  His  B r i t a n n i c  M a je s ty  u n d e r t a k e s  n o t  t o
i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
o f  K a l a n t a n  e x c e p t  as  p r o v i d e d  i n  t h e  Agreement  
so l o n g  as  n o t h i n g  i s  done which  i s  c o n t r a r y  
to  t r e a t y  o b l i g a t i o n s  be tw een  His  B r i t a n n i c  
M a je s ty  and f o r e i g n  Governments  and so long  as  
p e a c e  and o r d e r  and j u s t i c e  a r e  m a i n t a i n e d  
i n  K a l a n t a n .
An e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  Agreements  be tw een  His  B r i t a n n i c  
M a je s ty  and t h e  Rajah  o f  Sarawak of  1888 and 1941 makes 
i t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  Crown i n  t h e  
S t a t e  o f  Sarawak a r e  l e s s  t h a n  t h e y  were  i n  1924 i n  t h e  
S t a t e  o f  K e l a n t a n .
In  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  c e r t i f i c a t e  g iv e n  by t h e  C o l o n i a l  
O f f i c e  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h e  h e a r i n g  o f  t h e  House o f  
Lords  i n  D u f f  D evelopm ent Co. v Government o f  K elan tan  
(1924)  A.C. 797 i t  i s  i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  examine t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
s t a t u s  o f  K e l a n t a n  a t  t h a t  t im e  as  a c c e p t e d  i n  t h e  House o f  
L o r d s .
Upon a summons t o  e n f o r c e  an award a g a i n s t  t h e  Government  
o f  K e l a n t a n ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  C o lo n ie s  was,  
i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  u s u a l  p r a c t i c e ,  r e q u e s t e d  by t h e  
Court  f o r  i n f o r m a t i o n  as  t o  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  K e l a n t a n .  The 
r e p l y  from t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e ,  d a t e d  9 O c to b e r  1922,  i s  
summarized i n  t h e  p a s s a g e  a bou t  t o  be q u o te d  from V is c o u n t  
F i n l a y ' s  s p e e c h .  T ha t  l e t t e r  was enough and i n d e e d  was 
c o n c l u s i v e  upon t h e  C o u r t ,  b u t  i t  e n c l o s e d  c e r t a i n  
documents  which e n a b l e d  t h e  Cour t  t o  examine t h e  background  
o f  t h e  o p i n i o n  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  l e t t e r .
V i s c o u n t  F i n l a y  ( a t  p .8 1 4 )  s a i d
' I t  i s  obv io u s  t h a t  f o r  s o v e r e i g n t y  t h e r e  must  be 
a c e r t a i n  amount  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  b u t  i t  i s  n o t  
i n  t h e  l e a s t  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  f o r  s o v e r e i g n t y  t h e r e  
s h o u ld  b e  com ple te  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  I t  i s  q u i t e  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  s o v e r e i g n t y  t h a t  t h e  s o v e r e i g n  may 
i n  c e r t a i n  r e s p e c t s  be d e p e n d e n t  upon a n o t h e r  Power; 
t h e  c o n t r o l ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  o f  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  may 
be  c o m p l e t e l y  i n  t h e  hands  o f  a p r o t e c t i n g  Power,  
and t h e r e  may be  a g re e m e n t s  o r  t r e a t i e s  which l i m i t  
t h e  power o f  t h e  s o v e r e i g n  even i n  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  
w i t h o u t  e n t a i l i n g  a l o s s  o f  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  a 
s o v e r e i g n  Power.  In  t h e  p r e s e n t  c a s e  i t  i s  obv ious  
t h a t  t h e  S u l t a n  o f  K e l a n t a n  i s  t o  a g r e a t  e x t e n t  
i n  t h e  hands  o f  His  M a j e s t y ' s  Government .  The 
r e p l y  o f  t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  t o  M a s t e r  J e l f  on O c to b e r  
9 ,  1922,  s t a t e s  t h a t  K e l a n t a n  i s  an i n d e p e n d e n t  
S t a t e  i n  t h e  Malay P e n i n s u l a  and t h a t  t h e  S u l t a n  i s  
t h e  s o v e r e i g n  r u l e r ,  t h a t  His  M a j e s t y ' s  Government  
does n o t  e x e r c i s e  o r  c l a i m  any r i g h t s  o f  s o v e r e i g n t y  
o r  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o v e r  K e l a n t a n  and t h a t  t h e  S u l t a n  
makes l a w s ,  d i s p e n s e s  j u s t i c e  t h ro u g h  C o u r t s ,  and ,
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generally speaking, exercises without question the 
usual attributes of sovereignty.'
Viscount Finlay then analysed the Agreement of 22 October 
1910 and considered that 'while there are extensive 
limitations upon its independence, the enclosed 
documents (in the letter from the Colonial Office) do 
not negative the view that there is quite enough independence 
left to support the claim to sovereignty.'
In our opinion this passage is applicable to the State 
of Sarawak. Indeed, Sarawak's is an a fortiori case.
A comparison of the Agreement of 22 October 1910 with 
Kelantan and the Treaty of 5 September 1888 and Agreement 
of 22 November 1941 with the Rajah of Sarawak leaves no 
döubt in our mind that the State of Sarawak possessed 
after the Agreement of 22 November 1941 a larger degree 
of sovereignty than the State of Kelantan did in 1921.
(h) It is also instructive to examine a case affecting what 
is now one of the Unfederated Malay States - Johore - 
Mighell v Sultan of Johore (1894) 1 Q.B.149 (C.A.). By 
a treaty of December 11, 1885, the defendant Sultan 
maintained armed forces and a postal system, dispensed 
justice through properly constituted Courts, conferred 
titles of honour, 'and, generally speaking, exercised 
without question the usual attributes of a sovereign 
ruler'. By a treaty of 1885 the Sultan's territory was 
protected from hostile attack by the British Governor 
of the Straits Settlements and 'the Sultan bound himself 
not to negotiate treaties or to enter into any engagement 
with any foreign State'. In short, the Sultan had 
parted with his external sovereignty but retained his 
internal sovereignty. The Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, when the Court desired to ascertain the status 
of the Sultan, replied that Johore was an independent 
State and territory, that the defendant was the present 
sovereign ruler thereof, and that the relations between 
the Sultan and Her Majesty the Queen were relations of 
alliance and not of suzerainty and dependence. The Court 
of Appeal had no hesitation in holding that the letter 
from the Colonial Office was 'conclusive that the 
defendant was an independent sovereign' and added 'For 
this purpose all sovereigns are equal. The independent 
sovereign of the smallest state stands on the same 
footing as the monarch of the greatest.' Thus in 1894 
the Colonial Office certified that a Protected State the 
external relations of which were conducted by His 
Majesty's Government but which internally possessed 
the usual attributes of a sovereign, was an independent 
State, and it does not appear that the condition of 
Johore then differed greatly from that of Sarawak today. 
Moreover, it is significant that the Court of Appeal 
regarded itself as applying international law and not the 
domestic law of the British Empire.
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(i) Finally, we may say that the remark (contained in
Memorandum S.6) that 'no foreign State has any concern' 
with the independence of Sarawak is not understood.
The British Crown and the Government of Sarawak are 
capable of managing and adjusting their relations 
themselves, and it has not been suggested on behalf 
of the Government of Sarawak that any other State is 
interested in the matter.
We shall now answer the specific questions put to us in our
Instructions.
1. For the reasons stated above we do not consider that 
Memorandum S.6 is an adequate statement of the position.
2. The combined effect of the Agreements of 1888 and 1941 
upon the internal administration of Sarawak is twofold.
(a) The conduct of Sarawak's foreign relations conceded 
to His Majesty's Government by the Agreement of 1888 
and elaborated in the Agreement of 1941 carries with
it the powers necessary to implement these relations 
internally where required, and if the Government of 
Sarawak declined to implement internally a treaty or 
other agreement with another State purporting to affect 
the State of Sarawak, His Majesty's Government would be 
entitled to take the steps necessary for the application 
and enforcement of that Agreements. Moreoever, the 
British representative accredited to the Court of the 
Rajah has access to the relevant Sarawak documents and 
records. (b) In what may be described as purely 
internal affairs, the British Representative has a right 
to offer his opinion upon matters touching the general 
administration of the State. In matters on which his 
advice is sought he has access to Sarawak State 
documents and records. He may attend certain meetings 
of the Supreme Council and all meetings of the Council 
Negri. These rights in themselves do not give His 
Majesty's Government the right to intervene in purely 
internal affairs.
3. In our opinion Sarawak is a Protected State possessing 
incomplete international personality but not an integral 
part of the British Empire.
4. and 5. The statement quoted in this question from the Colonial 
Office's Memorandum S.6 contains a twofold assertion, 
namely that responsibility for the administration of 
Sarawak already rests upon His Majesty's Government 
(a) in fact and (b) in public estimation.
As regards (a) we assume that by the words 'in fact' 
the writer of the memorandum meant 'in law'. For the 
reasons discussed at length above, we are of opinion 
that, as a matter of law the extent of the responsibility 
of His Majesty's Government for the administration of
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the affairs of Sarawak is as follows and no further
(i) His Majesty’s Government is responsible to other 
states for the conduct of the external affairs 
of Sarawak, including the rights of foreign 
nationals and the defence of Sarawak; and
(ii) As regards the internal affairs of Sarawak His 
Majesty's Government is responsible to the 
extent to which the Agreements of 1888 and 1941 
confer rights and impose duties upon His Majesty's 
Government in relation thereto, including by 
necessary implication the right of requiring any 
internal legislation to be passed, which may
be necessary to give effect to action taken by 
His Majesty's Government in the matter of the 
foreign relations of Sarawak.
His Majesty's Government have no further responsibility 
in law (or in fact) for the administration of Sarawak.
As regards (b) on the facts and documents before us we 
find it difficult to appreciate the accuracy of this 
assertion.
In view of the extent of the existing rights of His 
Majesty's Government which have been stated above, the 
assertion under discussion involves the allegation that 
a public opinion exists, of which His Majesty's 
Government ought to take notice, demanding that His 
Majesty's Government should take control or a substantial 
measure of control of the internal affairs of Sarawak.
We know of no circumstances which would justify such a 
public opinion, assuming it to exist; and there is before 
us one fact, which would seem to rob any such opinion of 
any justification, namely the admission of the Colonial 
Office that there exists no ground for complaint as 
regards the manner in which the internal affairs of 
Sarawak were administered before the Japanese occupation.
In view of the extent of the existing rights of His 
Majesty's Government under the existing Agreements and 
in view of this very important admission by the Colonial 
Office, it is difficult to appreciate either that any 
such body of public opinion exists, or, if it does 
exist, that, at the expense of the State of Sarawak, it 
should be heeded by His Majesty's Government, the 
relevant department of which Government has made the 
important admission referred to above. Speaking with 
all respect, if the suggested opinion exists (which we 
doubt), the case would appear to be one calling for the 
education of the public opinion in question, rather than 
one for bringing pressure upon or taking unilateral 
action against a state, with whom His Majesty s Government 
has two existing Agreements and against the administration 
of whose internal affairs no complaint can be made.
In the above circumstances we are of opinion that 
the Government of Sarawak should dispute with the 
Colonial Office the correctness of the view put 
forward in the Memorandum S.6 and the twofold 
assertion made in the Memorandum S.5 and referred 
to at the beginning of this paragraph of our 
Opinion, and in particular should request the 
Colonial Office to justify its assertion that a 
body of public opinion exists, of which His 
Majesty’s Government ought to take official notice, 
holding the view that a case exists for the 
interference of His Majesty’s Government in the 
internal administration of Sarawak.
Appendix II 
The Brooke Succession
(i) The Political Will of James B r o o k e 1867.
I JAMES BROOKE Rajah of Sarawak of Burrator in the 
County of Devon give devise and bequeath all that 
my Sovereignty of Sarawak aforesaid and all the 
rights and privileges whatsoever thereto belonging 
unto my Nephew Charles Johnson Brooke Tuan Muda of 
Sarawak Son of The Reverend Francis Charles 
Johnson and the heirs male of his Body lawfully 
issuing and in default of such issue unto my 
Nephew Stuart Johnson another son of the said 
Francis Charles Johnson and the heirs male of his 
Body lawfully issuing and in default of such issue 
I give devise and bequeath the said Sovereignty and 
Rights and privileges unto Her Majesty the Queen of 
England her heirs and assigns for ever and I appoint 
Miss Angela Georgina Burdett Coutts of Stratton 
Street Piccadilly and Thomas Fairbairn of the City 
of Manchester Esquire and John Abel Smith of 
Chester Square in the County of Middlesex Esquire 
M.P. Trustees of this my Will to see the purposes 
aforesaid carried into effect ...
(ii) The Political Will of Charles B r o o k e 1913.
... In confirmation of the will of my predecessor I 
GIVE DEVISE AND BEQUEATH my sovereignty of Sarawak 
and all the rights and privileges thereto belonging 
in manner following (that is to say) Unto my eldest 
son Vyner and the heirs male of his body with 
remainder to my second son Bertram and the Heirs 
male of his body with remainder to my third son 
Harry and the heirs male of his body with remainder 
to the son of my late younger brother Stuart and 
the heirs made of his body with remainder to H.M. 
the King of England ...
(iii) Vyner Brooke's Accession Oath3 1918.
WE, VYNER BROOKE, herewith take oath upon the 
Bible to establish clearly and honourably our 
attitude concerning the matter set forth in 
the following Articles:—
Article 1.
We undertake to acknowledge and support 
the religion of Islam together with the laws 
and customs pertaining to that religion.
Article 2.
We undertake that such laws and customs 
as affect the Malay race shall follow the 
principles laid down by this Government in 
the past. And no question of any change or 
alteration shall be entertained except such 
as may be in accordance with the opinions 
and deliberations of the members of the 
Council Negri.
Article 3.
We undertake on behalf of ourselves and 
of our successors as Rajahs of Sarawak to 
abide by the conditions expressed in the Will 
of Rajah Sir Charles Brooke.
And we swear to obey and to carry out the 
wishes of the late Ruler, our honoured 
Father, as forming the Constitution of this 
State.
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(iv) Vyner Brooke and Anthony Brooke
REPORTS of Anthony Brooke's term as Rajah Muda and Officer 
Administering the Government in 1939 persuaded Vyner 
Brooke that his nephew was 'as yet unfitted' for such 
responsibility. Sir Shenton Thomas dismissed the 
charges as insubstantial and defended him strongly. 
However, the Rajah's confidence in Anthony was shaken and 
this was one of the factors which ultimately made cession 
possible.
THE general tenor of the complaints about Anthony can be 
found in Boyd's notes on a letter from the Rajah to H.B. 
Crocker, some months after the Rajah's return to Kuching.
The letter listed three principal complaints: about a
circular on officers' debts and Anthony's request to the 
Treasury for $40,000 with which to cover them; that he 
was supercilious and would not take advice; and that he 
judged his officers on the basis of their horoscopes. The 
Rajah reported that Anthony was unpopular and the 
administrative service had threatened to resign en masse 
if he succeeded to the Raj. Some officers had apparently 
told him that they would prefer the British government to 
take over than to have Anthony as Rajah.
The Rajah was given the impression by Archer and others 
that promotion to high office had gone to Anthony's head.
He was supposed to have stood on ceremony and to have 
exploited the trappings of office. This was particularly 
damaging (regardless of whether or not it was well founded) 
because Vyner Brooke detested such behaviour in his officers 
and would have regarded it as doubly reprehensible in his 
nephew and probable successor.
The Crossley case highlighted the fact that most 
administrative officers were substantially in debt. This
1 Notes by Boyd, Boyd Papers.
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was a situation which had become widely accepted in Sarawak 
and was generally welcomed by the Chinese merchants as a 
guarantee of their security. But Anthony, fresh from his 
experiences in the Malayan Civil Service where indebtedness 
was regarded as intolerable, was determined to put an end 
to the practice. On 30 March 1939, with the Rajah's 
agreement, he issued a circular to government officers 
calling on them in the Rajah's name to provide in confidence 
full details of their private financial situation including 
overdrafts and the nature of their security.^ He added that 
it might be necessary for the Rajah to reprimand officers 
who were in serious financial difficulties because of 'undue 
extravagance', but there would be no other disciplinary action. 
When it was revealed that members of the Service were in 
debt to the tune of almost $50,000, Anthony directed that 
the debts be paid with government funds and that the officers 
concerned should repay the government in monthly instalments.
There were mixed reactions to the circular. Some
outstation officers welcomed it as a means of transferring
debts to the State and took the opportunity of making last-
2minute purchases of radios and other appliances. Others 
either resented what they regarded as interference in their 
personal affairs or suspected that the exercise was really 
designed to commute the debts of Anthony's associates, 
including his brother-in-law to be, Donald Hudden. The 
fact that the Rajah had himself authorized the circular before 
his departure was disregarded.
Another factor which probably worked against Anthony 
was the resentment which many senior officers felt about 
his overnight promotion from fledgling District Officer to 
Officer Administering the Government - a position for 
which there were other contenders. He may also have been
1 'Circular signed by Anthony Brooke, Rajah Muda, dated 
30 March 1939', Boyd Papers.
2 Personal communication from Mr E. Banks, 25 November 1975.
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less than tactful in his dealings with Archer who worked 
immediately beneath him and probably took the brunt of 
criticisms which could not be made openly. No doubt there 
was also a certain amount of antagonism towards Anthony's 
close relationship with two or three officers who were 
regarded by some as opportunists clinging to the coat­
tails of power. His position in the Administrative 
Service had always been somewhat anomalous: on the one
hand there was the feeling that he should not be regarded 
as anything more than an ordinary member of the Service 
dependent on his own talents for promotion. On the other 
hand, it could not really be overlooked that he was the 
obvious heir to the Raj and therefore occupied a rather 
special position.
While there is no evidence that during his term as 
Rajah Muda he depended on astrology in his decision-making, 
his appreciation of individual officers may have been 
influenced by their 'stars'. Anthony had always been 
interested in metaphysics, something which he might well 
have imbibed from either parent. In London he consulted 
one of the best-known mediums of the day, Estelle Roberts, 
and met Horace Leaf, another medium and one of the chief 
publicists of spiritualism. In December 1938 he wrote from 
Oxford to his sister Jean who was also interested in 
spiritualism and worried about the possibility of her husband 
being called to active service:
Personally I am much impressed that both 
Astrology and Spiritualism have come to 
the independent conclusions that 1)
Hitler will be dead within 2 years (and 
possibly Mussolini too) 2) That there 
will be no war involving us next year 
or, according to Estelle Roberts for 
many years. Both Estelle Roberts and 
Astrology consider Germany due for an 
internal revolution within the next 18 
months. Unfortunately I have no 
documents handy but you may take it 
that spiritualists are all with one 
accord quite certain that there won't
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be a war  n e x t  y e a r .
He b e l i e v e d  t h a t  i t  was R.H. N a y l o r ' s  ' u n c a n n i l y  a c c u r a t e '  
a s t r o l o g i c a l  f o r e c a s t s  d u r i n g  t h e  Munich c r i s i s  which  were 
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  s l o g a n  o f  Lord B e a v e r b r o o k ' s D aily  
Eocpress t h a t  t h e r e  would  n o t  be war i n  e i t h e r  1938 o r  1939.
What p a s s e d  b e tw een  u n c l e  and nephew d u r i n g  t h e  t e n  
days b e f o r e  Anthony l e f t  Kuching i n  O c tobe r  1939 i s  n o t  
known, b u t  h i s  d e p a r t u r e  was a  few weeks e a r l i e r  t h a n  he 
had  o r i g i n a l l y  p l a n n e d .  W r i t i n g  to  S i r  John  Graham K er r  
more t h a n  tw e lv e  months l a t e r ,  Boyd r e l a t e d  an i n c i d e n t  
wh ich he b e l i e v e d  m igh t  w e l l  have  had s o m e th in g  t o  do w i t h  
A n t h o n y ' s  d o w n f a l l :
The Rajah  go t  ba c k  on O c to b e r  9 and on 
O c to b e r  21 he h e l d  one o f  h i s  r o u l e t t e  
p a r t i e s  a t  t h e  Club.  The R.M. was t h e r e  
and a p p a r e n t l y ,  b e f o r e  t h e  r o u l e t t e  was 
f i n i s h e d ,  began  do in g  some c a rd  t r i c k s  
( a t  wh ich he  i s  p r e t t y  good) w i t h  t h e  
u n f o r t u n a t e  r e s u l t ,  f o r  him,  t h a t  a l l  
t h e  l a d i e s  d e s e r t e d  t h e  r o u l e t t e  and 
began  t o  wa tch  t h e  c o n j u r i n g .  I 'm  
t o l d  t h a t  t h e  Ra jah  l e f t  i n  a h u f f ,  and 
on O c to b e r  23 ( t h e  f i r s t  a v a i l a b l e  s h i p )  
t h e  R.M. l e f t  Sarawak 'o n  two months
ö
l e a v e ' . z
Boyd u n d e r s t o o d  t h a t  t h e r e  had been  ' a  b i t  o f  a r o w ' ,  
b u t  t h a t  Anthony had  n o t  been  in fo rm e d  o f  h i s  d i s m i s s a l  
u n t i l  a f t e r  h i s  wedding .  S h o r t l y  b e f o r e  C h r i s tm a s  t h e  
Ra jah w r o t e  t o  a f r i e n d  o f  B oyd ' s  ( p o s s i b l y  C rocke r )  t h a t  
' P e t e r  found t h e  t i t l e  o f  R.M. too  much f o r  h i m ' ,  b u t  i t  
was n o t  u n t i l  17 J a n u a r y  t h a t  Anthony was d e p r i v e d  o f  h i s  
t i t l e  by P r o c l a m a t i o n .  Boyd was h a r d  p u t  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  
R a j a h ' s  t h r e e  month d e l a y  i n  t a k i n g  a s t e p  which  showered  
Sarawak w i t h  e m b a r r a s s i n g  p u b l i c i t y :
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  and i f  one were d e a l i n g  w i t h  
r e a s o n a b l e  b e i n g s ,  p r o b a b l e ,  t h a t  som e th ing  
s e r i o u s  was found  o u t  be tw een  O c t .  23 and
1 Anthony Brooke t o  J e a n  H a l s e y ,  13 December 1938,  Brooke 
P a p e r s ,  Box 1 0 / 2 .
2 Bod t o  K e r r ,  15 F e b r u a r y  1940,  Boyd P a p e r s .
Jan. 17 but, knowing Sarawak as I do, it is equally 
probable that some small incident (like the roulette) 
was discovered which finally spurred the Rajah to 
action. Again, it is possible that when Peter got 
the news [of his dismissal] in Singapore he said 
something in a letter or telegram that put the 
Rajah’s back up.^
Boyd also believed that the administrative changes made by Anthony 
may have precipitated the trouble. Anthony’s restoration of the 
Fifth Division and his intention of reviving the Residential system 
can hardly have been rejected by the Rajah but the promotions he 
made were seen by some people as expensive and unwise. 'Even if 
it had been sound policy in itself, Boyd wrote, ’it was obviously 
very unwise to do it in the absence of the Rajah when the R.M. 
was only acting in his place, particularly if one knows the Rajah'.
Sir Shenton Thomas ' Letter to the Rajah
Government House 
Singapore 
18th January 1940
I had a talk with Lewis*  yesterday, and afterwards he and 
his wife lunched with us.
I ought to say that Peter and his wife stayed with us 
for a few days before they went home, and he told me 
that you and his father were displeased with him and 
why. We talked it over and, while I was of course quite 
unable to judge how far you would have agreed with what 
he had done. I told him that it is a well-recognised 
rule that one who is appointed to act as he was must be 
guided in his actions by what he believes to be the 
wishes of the person who appoints him.
Lewis gave me a whole list of instances in which you 
consider that Peter has gone wrong, and on nearly all 
of them I feel I cannot offer any useful comment as I 
know so little of Sarawak or what your wishes would be. 
But on two matters I hope you will allow me to write 
a little.
The first is Peter’s action in regard to indebtedness.
He told me that before you went home you had authorised 
the issue of a circular to your officers requiring them
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
* H. Thackwell Lewis, Sarawak’s Judicial Commissioner.
to disclose their debts. The replies came in after you 
had left and showed that the Service was in debt to the 
extent of some 30,000 dollars. Lewis said 50,000 dollars 
but the actual figure is immaterial having regard to the 
large amount that was disclosed. Peter was gravely 
concerned, as was only to be supposed. He transferred 
to the Astana Account from Government funds the sum that 
was owing, and paid the debts, ordering all officers 
concerned to pay it back by monthly instalments. I 
suggested that, if he was not certain of your wishes, he 
could have issued an order that officers must pay off 
their debts direct to the firms concerned by monthly 
instalments, and have taken steps to see that it was 
carried out. His reply was that he hated to think that 
officers in the Sarawak service were so heavily in debt 
to local firms and preferred that they should owe the 
money to the Government.
Now, whether you approve his action or not, there is no 
doubt that he took it in what he conceived to be the 
interests of Sarawak, and I consider that he had a good 
deal of justification for what he did. To have ordered 
the officers concerned to pay their debts direct to the 
local firms would have meant that many months would have 
elapsed before they were cleared off, and in that time more 
debts might have been incurred. We know that here by 
experience. But if an officer knows that the Government 
has stepped in and has taken over his debts, he must be 
a very poor sort of man or very foolhardy if he incurs 
fresh debts before the others are cleared off. I think 
therefore that what Peter did certainly put the Government 
right in the eyes of the firms and would have had a salutary 
effect on the officers concerned. I think, too, that 
the magnitude of the sum must be taken into account. The 
greater the sum the greater the discredit. I should be 
horrified to learn that my officers were in debt to 
anything like the same extent.
We treat debt very seriously here and in the last five 
years I have dismissed a number of officers for it. I 
enclose a copy of our General Orders on the subject. On 
occasions here we have taken over the debts of European 
officers by lending them the money to pay, and in the 
same way we have taken over the debts of at least three 
Sultans, because we prefer that a Sultan should owe money 
to the Government rather than to firms. The money is not 
lost. As it was paid to the Astana account, I suppose 
that technically the officers concerned owe it to you.
That may well be undesirable, but can easily be remedied 
by transferring the debt back to the Government account 
where it will appear as advances.
The other matter on which I feel able to comment is the 
furnishing of the house that Pepys is to occupy. As you 
probably know, Pepys has had a house in Johore which is 
completely furnished. Plate, cutlery, linen, china and
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glass everything is provided. He has nothing of his own.
If he had been required to pay all these things for Sarawak 
he would probably not have accepted the post. Peter’s 
misdeed is that he gave Pepys carte blanche, in other words 
he trusted him. He had met Pepys and had heard about him 
from me. He knew, as I know, that Pepys would not have 
taken advantage of this trust. He would have sought 
authority before spending any sum that might appear excessive. 
I cannot regard Peter’s action as rash in the circumstances.
If you are going to have a really senior officer in Sarawak, 
his house must be furnished decently. If that officer is 
to come from Malaya, where all houses are really well 
furnished, then the furniture in his house in Sarawak must 
be met by the Government.
At the end of my conversation with Lewis I wired to you 
asking you to defer publication of your Proclamation 
cancelling the appointment of Peter as Rajah Muda. While I 
write this I have received your reply that I was too late.
I am more sorry than I can say. You have, of course, a 
perfect right to appoint or demote as you see fit, but not 
to brand a man publicly and to demote him with ignominy 
until, at least, you have heard his side. You have revoked 
Peter’s appointment because he (to quote the Proclamation)
’is not yet fitted to exercise the responsibilities of this 
high position’ and this is being published abroad without 
his being given the slightest chance to defend himself. He 
left Sarawak to meet his bride and while he was away he 
was ordered not to return and is now deprived of his 
position on the ground that he is unfit to hold it. I 
cannot conceive more derogatory treatment.
I have no doubt that what he did while administering the 
Government was not always palatable to some of your officers 
and that since your return every possible grievance against 
him has been raked up, but I beg leave to believe that as 
a whole his actions have been welcomed by the Sarawak Service 
in general. I would remind you, too, that he rendered you 
a very great service in enabling you to get rid of some 
most unworthy officers a year ago, and that without any 
previous experience in responsible posts he was suddenly 
given the rank of Rajah Muda and was appointed to act for 
you in your absence. He was left to do the best he could 
and I say quite definitely that such of his work that came 
before me was extremely well done. I think some gratitude is 
due to him for all this. He may have committed errors of 
judgement, he may have been carried away by his position, 
but how many of us at his age would have done better. And 
whatever he has done has been for the love of Sarawak and he 
does not deserve to be put to shame. In every word he 
has ever spoken to me he has been completely loyal to you 
as Rajah and I am sorry to say that I consider the terms of 
your Proclamation unjust. By some of your officers it may 
be welcomed as a public indication that they have got their 
own back, but by many others it will be deplored. I am 
afraid Peter has lost face irretrievably and, as I have
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telegraphed to you, I think it likely that the Proclamation 
constitutes a libel and that, although you yourself are 
immune from legal proceedings action could be brought 
against the Chief Secretary who signed it, the Government 
Printer who printed it, and perhaps the officer who drafted 
it.
I wish I could have written less frankly, but in a matter 
of this sort the only two courses are to say what is in 
my mind or to say nothing at all. I feel very gravely 
uneasy, partly by reason of the regard which I have for 
you and partly because of the interest which I know that 
you take in the welfare of the natives of Sarawak. I 
cannot believe that, when you signed the Proclamation, you 
realised the deplorable impression that it will create.
In the eyes of the world Peter will lie under an undefined 
stigma, at the mercy of anyone's speculative conclusions.
In the eyes of those who know Sarawak it will be regarded 
as a set back to administrative efficiency. I must tell 
you that it will be quite useless to enlist the services of 
a man like Pepys unless the recognised traditions of the 
Service are observed.
As you say Peter's father agrees with your decision, I 
hope you will see your way to send him a copy of this 
letter.
(Sgd.) T.S.W. THOMAS
The Straits Times Editorial of 6 July 1939
When the Committee of Administration was re-constituted in its 
present form some five years ago, the four Residents of 
Divisions ... were appointed ex-officio members. This was 
excellent in theory but not so good in practice, since three 
of these Residents did not live in the capital and so were 
unable to attend meetings or give opinions on matters discussed. 
The committee was therefore controlled by a strong departmental 
majority, and when two of the Residents retired on pension 
they were not replaced. Finally, when in August last year 
the last active administration member was transferred to an 
outstation, the State began to be governed by a committee 
no single member of which had any personal experience of the 
day-to-day job of running the country outside the capital.
The results of this were inevitable, and soon became apparent. 
Authority was concentrated more and more in the capital, the 
outstations were neglected, and the men on the spot - 
namely, the District Officers, - began to feel that they did 
not possess the confidence of headquarters. Expenditure, too, 
seemed to them to be unfairly distributed, since though the 
most stringent economy was enforced on the outstations - 
often at the cost of social services - there appeared to be 
no lack of money in the capital.
As time went on, it became plain that the Committee of 
Administration - which was controlled to a great extent 
by an "inner cabinet" of two officers - was putting into 
force a policy which, in the view of the administrative 
officers in the district, had little in common with the 
traditional policy of the Brooke family. Although the 
Government under this regime reached a high pitch of 
efficiency, this was too often only "paper efficiency", 
and in some cases it was gained at the expense of human 
values. While the service, as an administrative 
organisation, was functioning with clockwork efficiency, 
the true interests of the people were suffering.
It may be said that the Rajah should have seen this, and 
checked it, but it must be remembered that there are two 
sides to every question, and there was for some time no 
proof that the critics of the policy of the Committee of 
Administration were right. Moreover ... it would have 
been a serious matter for the Rajah to refuse to endorse 
the policy framed after careful consideration by a group 
of his most senior officers. Matters came to a head, 
however, late in March, when the Rajah Muda ... presided 
at a meeting of the Committee of Administration and 
pointed out the divergence between the policy then being 
pursued and the traditional policy of his family.
Since several of the European members of the committee 
(and it should be noted that no Asiatic members had 
attended meetings or had any say on the committee for a 
long time) were unable to agree that their policy was the 
wrong one, their resignations were inevitable and they 
retired from the service on generous terms ...
Sarawak has now reverted to its traditional policy of ’the 
country for the natives', and her critics may rest assured 
that at no time in her history has her administration 
been on a sounder basis. The personal loyalty of both the 
officers of the service and the people to the Rajah and to 
all members of his family is unbounded, since they know 
what, whatever happens, the Brooke family have their 
welfare at heart, and will work for them unceasingly ...
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Appendix III
The Australian Connection
LIEUT. Col. A.A. Conlon,^" head of the Directorate of Research and 
Civil Affairs (DORCA) attached to General Sir Thomas Blarney’s Land 
Forces Headquarters (LHQ) in Melbourne, in February 1943 proposed 
to General V.P.H. Stantke the creation of an 'Australian Administrative 
Corps' which would assume control of the Australian New Guinea 
Administrative Unit (ANGAU) and make plans for the military 
administration of other areas when they were taken by Australian 
troops. The Administrative Corps was not established but Blarney's 
resentment of the Army Department's own efforts to become involved in 
civil affairs meant that the responsibility remained with LHQ and 
effectively with Conlon.
Blarney pre-empted the responsibility for military 
administration in Australian-occupied areas by forestalling an effort 
by the Minister for External Territories, Senator Fraser, to establish 
a departmental organization along the lines of the British planning 
units functioning in London. Professor G.W. Paton of Melbourne 
University had been appointed chairman of a committee to rehabilitate 
Australian Territories in 1943 and after studying British and American
1 Conlon was in many ways an extraordinary man. A medical student 
at Sydney University in the 1930's, he was greatly influenced by 
the libertarian philosopher, Professor John Anderson, and was 
active in student politics. Through his connections as student 
representative on the University Senate, he was appointed manpower 
officer for the university in 1939. This in turn brought him into 
contact with General Stantke, head of the Army's Adjutant-General's 
Branch at LHQ whom he persuaded to establish a research section. 
Impressed with Conlon's work, Blarney had the section upgraded to 
DORCA and placed directly under him in 1943. Its staff was 
also augmented with a number of academics brought together through 
Conlon's influence. DORCA's work involved everything from finding 
an alternative source of quinine to the question of changing 
from a military to a civil administration in Papua New Guinea, 
its most important responsibility. As Peter Coleman noted in 
The Bulletin_, 28 September 1963, there is a crying need for a 
biography of Conlon whose brief but brilliant career as a 
backstage politician reveals a great deal about the nature of 
the Australian political system. He was also an important focus 
and catalyst of the intellectual life of his day. Impressive 
tribute to his influence has been paid by a number of significant 
Australians in the edited transcript of a series of interviews 
conducted by the poet John Thompson and published by the N.S.W. 
Benevolent Society, Alfred Conlon: A Memorial By Some Of His
Friends3 Sydney 1963.
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i d e a s  on m i l i t a r y  government  he p r e s e n t e d  a r e p o r t  i n  J a n u a r y  1944. 
However , Blarney i n s i s t e d  t h a t  b e c a u s e  c o n t r o l  o f  Papua New Guinea would 
rem ain  w i t h  t h e  army f o r  some t i m e ,  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  i t s  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  s h o u ld  be h i s . ^  U n l ik e  B r i t a i n  and Am erica ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
A u s t r a l i a  d i d  n o t  p o s s e s s  i t s  own s p e c i a l i z e d  c i v i l  a f f a i r s  s e c t i o n  
unde r  t h e  c h a rg e  o f  a m i n i s t e r i a l  d e p a r t m e n t .  I n e v i t a b l y ,  t h i s  a l l o w e d  
Conlon a good d e a l  more room f o r  manoeuvre t h a n  was p o s s i b l e  f o r  h i s  
B r i t i s h  c o u n t e r p a r t s .
The q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  Borneo was 
r a i s e d  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t im e  b e tw een  B r i t a i n  and A u s t r a l i a  i n  Apr i l -M ay  1944 
when Blarney, who was i n  London f o r  t h e  I m p e r i a l  C o n f e r e n c e ,  had 
p r e l i m i n a r y  d i s c u s s i o n s  on p rob lem s  o f  m i l i t a r y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  w i t h  
t h e  U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  a t  t h e  War O f f i c e ,  S i r  F r e d e r i c k  Bovenschen .  
The A u s t r a l i a n  m i l i t a r y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i n  London a l s o  had t a l k s  w i t h  
M a jo r - G e n e r a l  Hone o f  t h e  Malayan P l a n n i n g  U n i t .  The c r u c i a l  q u e s t i o n  
a f f e c t i n g  B orneo ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  was who would have t h e  t a s k  o f  m i l i t a r y  
r e o c c u p a t i o n .  G e n e r a l  Douglas  M a c a r t h u r ’s consuming i n t e r e s t  was 
w i t h  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  b u t  i t  seemed p o s s i b l e  a t  f i r s t  t h a t  h i s  f o r c e s  
might  l a t e r  t u r n  s o u t h - w e s t  t ow a rds  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  E a s t  I n d i e s  to  
d e a l  w i t h  t h e  J a p a n e s e  t h e r e .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  migh t  
be g iv e n  to  A u s t r a l i a n  f o r c e s  u n d e r  u l t i m a t e  American  command. The 
on ly  p o s i t i v e  outcome o f  t h e  London t a l k s  was an ag reem en t  t h a t  t h e  
War O f f i c e  would send  a l i a i s o n  m i s s i o n  t o  SWPA h e a d q u a r t e r s .  However , 
when t h e  m i s s i o n  r e a c h e d  Melbourne  i n  December 1944 en r o u t e  f o r  
M a c a r t h u r ’ s h e a d q u a r t e r s  i n  M a n i la  i t  seemed p o s s i b l e  t h a t  Borneo would 
be r e o c c u p i e d  by A u s t r a l i a n  f o r c e s .  Blarney f e l t  t h a t  t h e r e  was no 
need  f o r  t h e  m i s s i o n  t o  go on t o  M an il a  and t h a t  i t  s h o u l d  remain  i n  
M e lbourne ,  r e p o r t i n g  th ro u g h  him to  t h e  War O f f i c e .  But t h e  War 
O f f i c e  was l o a t h  to  abandon t h e  o r i g i n a l  p l a n  and two members o f  t h e  
m i s s i o n  were  s e n t  t o  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  i n  J u l y .
A no the r  c o n t i n g e n c y  d i s c u s s e d  i n  London was t h e  f o r m a t i o n
1 Gavin Long, The F inal Campaigns  ^ C a n b e r r a  1963,  p . 3 9 8 ;  P a u l  
H a s l u c k ,  The Government and the People 1942-1945_, C a n b e r r a  1970,  
p p .6 0 7 - 9 .
P e r s o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  from Mr W. G r a n g e r .2
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of a joint Anglo - Australian military administration for Borneo. This 
was the subject of some correspondence, but no real progress was made 
and it was eventually agreed on Blarney's suggestion that a War Office 
liaison officer should be sent to Blarney's headquarters. Col. L.M. 
Taylor accordingly arrived in Melbourne in December 1944. By this 
time the Borneo Planning Unit was in the process of being placed on an 
operational footing as '50 Civil Affairs Unit' (50 CAU) and both the 
War Office and the Colonial Office were anxious to finalize matters. 
Col. F.E. Stafford, who had been designated Controller of Finance, and 
the Unit's civilian adviser, Dr Percival Dingle, were despatched to 
Melbourne in December to arrange for its accommodation in Australia and 
for the secondment of suitable Australian personnel. An advance party 
under Col. W.R. Rolleston left England in February for Australia and 
was followed by Macaskie and the main party in March. Clearly, the 
intention of the Colonial Office and the War Office was that 50 
CAU should be about 85 per cent British with little more than token 
Australian participation.
Meanwhile, Conlon had been trying to find out what 
Macarthur's plans were for military administration. His second-in- 
command, Captain J. Kerr, was told by an American officer, Brig.
General C.R. Fellers, in Sydney in September 1944 that the military 
administration of Borneo was still an academic question. He believed 
that the British would prefer to launch an attack on the Netherlands 
East Indies from Australia rather than invading Burma and Malaya. 
However, if Borneo was to be an American responsibility, he thought 
that the ANGAU pattern of administration would be employed there. 
According to Fellers, Macarthur did not believe that the elaborate 
plans for civil affairs in Europe were appropriate to SWPA. He would 
not care whether Australian or British arrangements were made and 
would leave it to the two governments to decide between them. For 
his part, Fellers thought that there was no point in having detailed 
discussions with the British until the picture became clearer.
1 'Notes on Conference of Lt. Col. J.R. Kerr with Brig. General 
Fellers and Colonel Silverman. 14 September 1944', AWM A2663, 
376/5/28.
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The problem was that planning was entirely in the hands of 
Macarthur's General Headquarters (GHQ). In mid-1944 it seemed likely 
that Australian forces would assist in the reoccupation of the Philippines, 
after which Macarthur would make a drive south-west to the Netherlands 
East Indies. In October, Blarney was told that the 1st Australian 
Corps would only be involved in attacks on Mindanao and Jolo in March 
and April, followed by advances on Kudat (North Borneo) and Labuan in 
June. However, in early February 1945 Lieut. General F.H. Berryman
passed on the instruction from GHQ that the 9th Division was to secure 
the Jesselton-Brunei Bay-Miri area and arrange paratroop attacks on 
Sandakan and Kuching to release prisoners while the 7th Division was 
engaged on Tarakan.^ The capture of Borneo was Macarthur's sop 
to Curtin and Blarney for Australia's exclusion from the Philippines 
campaign.^
The impact of all this on Conlon's thinking cannot be 
shown but it is a reasonable conjecture that by late 1944 he was 
determined to see an Australian military administration in Borneo.
The British had to be mollified and it may have been for this reason 
that Blarney asked Sir Frederick Bovenschen to send out a civil affairs 
staff officer to assist in liaison with British planning. By the 
time Colonel Taylor arrived in December it was quite clear that Blarney 
favoured an Australian civil affairs authority for Borneo. Blarney 
also made it very clear that the war establishment prepared by the 
War Office for 50 CAU was inappropriate to the operational phase and 
should be revised. After some communication between LHQ Melbourne and 
London in early 1945 it was eventually conceded by the War Office 
that an Australian civil affairs organization for Borneo should be set 
up with an Australian war establishment. For his part, Blarney undertook 
to use as many of the suitable British officers as possible.
Nevertheless, Blarney and Conlon were determined that the projected 
British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit (BBCAU) should be a predominantly 
Australian affair. Although BBCAU was later to be known affectionately
1 Long, The Final Campaignsp.30.
2 J.H. Moore, Morshead ..., Sydney 1976, pp.164-5.
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as 'B Cow', in Conlon's eyes it seems to have been more of a 
Trojan horse: a means of securing the post-war control of the three
Borneo territories for the benefit of Australia's strategic and other 
interests. This is probably why it was so important to Conlon that as 
many Australian officers as possible should be seconded to BBCAU and 
that 50 CAU should be kept out of the picture as long as possible.
One of Conlon's problems was that Macaskie had already been 
designated by the British as Chief Civil Affairs Officer for Borneo 
and he and his senior officers were almost certainly bound to observe 
the policy of the Colonial Office. Consequently he made a determined 
effort to keep them in the wings as long as possible. Some weeks 
before the British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit was authorized by Blarney, 
Lieut. Col. K.C. McMullen, commander of the Islands Region of ANGAU, 
was called back to Australia to raise a civil affairs detachment.
After a conversation with Blarney on 23 April, Conlon wrote to Berryman 
that he envisaged the establishment of four Civil Affairs detachments 
for Borneo with a headquarters for McMullen at corps headquarters. 
McMullen's detachment would be 'predominantly Australian' and it 
would be 'difficult, if not impossible' to use most of the 35 British 
50 CAU officers during the operational phase. He had given 
instructions that they should 'concentrate' at Ingleburn which would
2be 'a sort of rear headquarters until it is prudent to send them in'. 
Conlon had also told Macaskie that the Colonial Office would not be 
recognized as having any authority during the operational phase.
When Blarney announced the formation of BBCAU at the end of 
April 1945 he directed that the best possible use should be made of 
the British officers available but that the Unit was to communicate 
with LHQ and the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) and through Conlon.
A British officer was subsequently made the acting commander of one 
detachment and twelve others joined McMullen's detachment but Conlon 
was still at pains to keep the British component to a minimum. In 
mid-June when the 9th Division had already landed at Brunei Bay most 
of the British personnel were still at Ingleburn and McMullen had to
1 It was also known less affectionately as 'Bludgers, Bastards, 
Cunts and Urgers’. Personal communication from Mr Peter Ryan, 
21 September 1976.
2 Long, The Final Campaigns, p.402.
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appeal to divisional headquarters for Macaskie and 13 other British 
officers with specialized skills to be sent forward. Major-General 
C.F. Wootten, who was then commanding the 9th Division at Labuan, 
agreed that the existing BBCAU headquarters and staff, consisting of 
only one detachment, was 'totally inadequate' but Lieut. General 
Sir Leslie Morshead at Morotai did not receive his message until 24 June. 
Stantke authorized the expansion of BBCAU a few days later and ordered 
Macaskie and five others to Labuan immediately but it was not until 
22 July that Macaskie assumed command, the main body arriving some 
weeks later. Even then, Macaskie was virtually impotent. Unable to 
influence the war establishment drawn up for BBCAU he now found that 
he was unable to post its officers. All matters of this kind had to 
be referred to Conlon who was evidently hoping to direct the Borneo 
civil affairs situation by remote control.
In the meantime, Blarney had written to Morshead explaining
the background of BBCAU. In this letter, which the was historian
Gavin Long believes was drafted by someone in DORCA,^ Blarney said that
there had been 'one or two difficulties' with senior officers and that
there was some delicacy in explaining the situation to the Australian
government, which had been so far disinclined to accept full
responsibility for military administration in Morshead's area of
command. As if to emphasize Australian interest in Borneo, he
mentioned a proposal that an economist from the Department of Post-War
Reconstruction should visit Borneo to make 'an Australian appreciation
of the economic position of the territories for obvious reasons'.
However, he stressed the 'need to proceed with care and circumspection
2in the interests of our relations with the U.K.'. In a further note,
Morshead was warned that some of the civil affairs advisers on whom
he might have to rely (i.e. the British officers of 50 CAU) were not
3of satisfactory quality. However, Morshead was under pressure from 
Wootten to untie Macaskie's hands and ensure that BBCAU was properly
1 Mr Peter Ryan has confirmed this. Personal communication, 
21 September 1976.
2 Long, The Final Campaigns, p.498.
3 Ibid.
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designed to ’fit and suit British Borneo as regards the administration 
of civil affairs'.^ Discussions with Wootten and Macaskie later 
caused Morshead to recommend that Col. Rolleston should be appointed 
Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Adviser under Macaskie.
Although Conlon had failed to prevent Macaskie and Rolleston
from taking effective command of BBCAU, he was not a man who conceded
defeat easily. In mid-October, Macaskie was recalled from Labuan
to Melbourne for ’consultations' at LHQ and, as he told Dingle and
Gent later, it was clear that Conlon was making every effort to
have him removed on the grounds either of inefficiency or physical
2disability and replaced by Col. H.H. Goss, a New Zealander who was
presumably more amenable to Conlon’s way of thinking. Macaskie
survived this threat and Conlon's failure to gain support for his
plan suggests that the power which he had wielded through Blarney
was not always decisive. Nevertheless, the delays brought about
by Conlon caused a good deal of anger and frustration among the
British officers who shortly after their arrival at Inglebum had
heard rumours that Australia intended to have the Borneo territories
for itself. Feelings ran high and on one occasion Conlon, who
3happened to be visiting the camp, was physically assaulted. Although 
the official war histories have been at pains to play down the 
conflict, Gavin Long acknowledged that there was serious friction:
In August some of the British officers were convinced 
that senior officers still in Australia were being 
prevented from going to Borneo, and remarks which had 
been made suggested to them that the Australian 
Government hoped to take over British Borneo. It 
seems that such remarks were made, but that they 
were irresponsible; the fact remains that they were 
believed...^
Since Conlon did not place on record his ideas about the 
future of Borneo, it is difficult to reconstruct the thinking which 
lay behind his efforts to secure a dominant Australian position there
1 Ibid.
2 Macaskie to Dingle, 20 October 1945; Macaskie to Gent, - 
November 1945. Macaskie papers, File 1.
3 Personal information.
4 Long, The Final Campaigns > p.499.
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by means of the military administration. It is clear that he
anticipated independence for Papua New Guinea twenty or thirty
years after the end of the war^ and thought that Australian policy
should be geared accordingly. It is also clear that, like many
other Australians whose thinking had been sharply jolted by the fall
of Singapore, he was sceptical of the ability and the right of the
British and Dutch to re-restablish control over their pre-war
territories in the Malay archipelago. According to Professor Julius
Stone, who worked for DORCA as an adviser on international law,
’Conlon's general view was that the continuance of neither the British
nor the Dutch colonial regimes to our North were in Australia’s medium
2term strategic interests'. Although Australia’s official policy
during the war was to support the restoration of British and Dutch
authority, Conlon was at pains to keep both governments in the dark
about DORCA’s plans. When one of his senior officers met a Dutch
officer for an exchange of information about ANGAU organization,
Conlon threatened to report him to the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
3Dr Evatt’. As far as the Borneo states were concerned, Conlon was 
no doubt aware that their peoples were comparatively innocent of 
nationalist aspirations but he may have been attracted by the idea of 
an Australian mandate over the area, similar to that exercised over 
New Guinea. Another possibility is that he saw Australian control in 
Borneo as a tactical move in anticipation of a post-war carve-up when 
it might be possible for Australia to make an exchange for Dutch New 
Guinea.^
Probably the most useful assessment, however, is by the 
publisher, Peter Ryan, who worked under Conlon in DORCA:
There is no question that Conlon at that time regarded 
British power east of Suez as a spent force, and 
he was anxious lest worse rush in to fill the gap.
His thinking was profoundly anti-colonial, and he 
felt that Australia's interests were so intimately 
affected by events in the Borneo area that we just
1 Ida Leeson in Alfred Conlon_, p.14.
2 Personal communication from Prof. Julius Stone, 9 July 1976.
3 Personal communication from Prof. W.E.H. Stanner, 2 June 1976.
4 According to Prof. Stanner, Conlon at least discussed this 
possibility at one point.
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had to have a major voice there. But my own 
impression is that he had not thought it through to 
the extent of framing firm ideas of the ultimate 
political fate of Borneo etc.^
There is no evidence that Conlon had the support of
Blarney or any of the leading political figures for his ideas about
Borneo. Indeed, Blarney indicated privately during his visit to
London in 1944 that the three Borneo territories would be impossible
to defend,reinforce and supply should they come under Australian 
2control. And while he respected Conlon's general strategic thinking,
he would almost certainly have been unsympathetic to the idea of the
Australian occupying force being used as a means of establishing
Australia in Borneo. Conlon also had access to Prime Minister
John Curtin and to Minister for Territories E.J. Ward but there is no
3indication that they were any more receptive than was Dr Evatt.
Since Conlon either destroyed all records of his more controversial
schemes or (which seems more likely) preferred not to commit them to
paper, it is doubtful that the question can be satisfactorily
settled. What is clear is that Prime Minister Ben Chifley would not
support an Australian mandate and his instructions to Blarney were that
'there was no question of Australia taking over Borneo as she lacked4the manpower'. It is not possible to show that Chifley totally 
rejected the idea. His only stated objection was that, as with Evatt's 
projected Commission for the Indies, Australia would be required to 
provide more troops than was politically possible in a post-war 
atmosphere of 'bring the boys home’. He would also have been loath 
to do anything which could have laid Australia open to the charge of 
neo-imperialism, although Conlon was very far from being a neo­
imperialist. In June 1945 he expressed bitterness that London should 
have suspected his political motives.
1 Personal communication from Mr Peter Ryan, 21 September 1976.
2 Interview with Prof. W.E.H. Stanner, 21 May 1976.
3 Personal communication from Dr J.W. Burton, 17 June 1976.
4 Cited in a personal communication from Mr M.L. Bemacchi,
2 January 1976.
5 Personal communication from Mr M.L. Bernacchi, 4 August 
1976.
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Far from seeking a permanent role in Borneo, the Australian 
government was reluctant to accept any responsibilities there. In 
fact, the establishment of BBCAU was presented by Blarney to the 
War Cabinet as a fait accompli. When the Cabinet approved the 
raising of the Unit on 28 May 1945, it did so in the belief that the 
degree of commitment already reached, together with urgent operational 
considerations, left no other choice. But in a mild reprimand to 
Blarney it recorded the view that 'an important question of policy, such 
as this, should have been submitted to War Cabinet before any 
commitment of this nature was entered into'.^
Three months later the Japanese surrender altered the
picture entirely and in anticipation of the Southwest Pacific Area
passing to British and Australian command, Churchill cabled Chifley
with a number of requests for Australian assistance. Chifley was
asked for 'early agreement' that Australian forces, possibly
assisted by New Zealand, should 'initially be responsible for Borneo
and all Japanese occupied areas to the east thereof including Ocean
2and Nauru Islands'. Britain would undertake to provide a certain
amount of shipping and supplies to maintain Australian forces there.
Advised by the Defence Committee that this might still involve an
obligation to provide food, clothing and hospitalization which was
3beyond Australian resources except in Australian territories, the
War Cabinet indicated its conditional acceptance. The meaning of
'initial responsibility' would have to be clarified immediately,
together with the responsibilities of American and New Zealand forces
in the Celebes, the Halmaheras and Dutch New Guinea. The War Cabinet
was, however, much more interested in Australian participation in
the liberation of Singapore and representation in its own right at
4the Japanese surrender. There was considerable satisfaction in 
Canberra when Mountbatten indicated that he would be able to relieve
1 Minute No.4209, War Cabinet meeting of 28 May 1945, CA A2673, 
Vol.XV.
2 Churchill to Chifley, 13 August 1945, Cable No.290, Appendix 
'C', War Cabinet Agendum 379/1945, CA A2670, PSR48010.
3 Defence Committee Minute No. 351/1945, 16 August 1945, CA 
A2670, PSR48010.
4 Minute No.4350, War Cabinet meeting of 17 August 1945, CA 
A2673, Vol.XV.
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Australian forces in Borneo by the end of October, although more 
pressing commitments in Indo-China and the Netherlands East 
Indies meant that the handover did not take place until January 
1946.
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Appendix IV
The Legalization of Cession
1. MacBryan's Abortive Attempt, January 1946.
(i) MacBryan’s Agreement with the Datu Patinggi3 5 January 1946.
... The following are five requests to which 1 hope
Your Royal Highness will consent:
1. I beg that my title and status of Datu 
Patinggi, and that of my descendants, 
be superior to that of the other datus 
forever.
2. I beg that my descendants will be allowed 
to replace me, holding the same rank and 
with sufficient income.
3. I beg that my eldest grandson, Abang 
Ibrahim, now be made Datu Bandar.
4. I beg to have the country's revenues 
[kehasilan] for the last 100 years and 
for the future.
5. I beg to have the revenues from the turtle 
eggs of Talang Talang Besar, Talang Talang 
Kecil and Pulau Satang as my right and 
that of my heirs forever.
I hope that you will include these requests in the
treaty with the British government as required by
Your Highness' representative ...
Written at Darul Kornia, Your obedient and loyal servant,
Kuching, 4 January 1946. A .H . Abdillah
Datu Patinggi of Sarawak.
Witnessed by Mr G.T.M. 
MacBryan, Special 
Representative of H.H. 
the Rajah
I undertake that these requests shall be submitted to His 
Highness the Rajah for his consideration.
5/1/46 G.T.M. MacBryan, Personal Representative of H.H. 
the Rajah.
[my translation]
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2. The Second Attempt, April-June 1946
(i) Restoration of the 1941 Constitution: The Two Orders
Order No. C-23 (Constitution Re-enactment) 1946
(An Order to remove any doubts as to the continuance 
in force of Order No. C-21 (Constitution) 1941)
WHEREAS at a meeting of members of the Council Negri held 
on the 6th day of January, 1946, an Order (hereinafter 
referred to as 'the Order of 1946') was made entitled 
'An Order whereby to vest in His Highness the Rajah 
absolutely all those powers and prerogatives of sovereignty 
exercised by the Rajah in Council and the Council Negri 
subject to the provisions of Order No. C-21 (Constitution) 
1941' (hereinafter referred to as 'the Order of 1941'), 
whereby the Order of 1941 was repealed:
And whereas doubts exist as to the validity of the 
Order of 1946, but if that Order is valid the sole power 
of making laws for Sarawak is vested in His Highness the 
Raj ah:
And whereas it is expedient that the Order of 1941 
should have the force of law and that, for the removal of 
the aforesaid doubts, provision for that purpose should be 
made:
Now therefore it is hereby enacted by His Highness 
the Rajah as follows:-
1. This Order may be cited as Order No.
C-23 (Constitution Re-enactment) 1946 and 
shall come into operation forthwith.
2. For the removal of doubts it is 
hereby declared that the Order of 1946 shall 
cease to have any effect which it may 
hitherto have had, and the Order of 1941 
shall have the force of law.
Given under Our hand at 
Kuching_, Sarawak_, this 
seventeenth day of 
Aprilj 1946.
C.V. BROOKE,
Rajah of Sarawak.
Order of His Highness the Rajah in Council
(Revocation of Order regarding the Rajah 's 
Prerogatives)
WHEREAS by subsection (ii) of section 4 of Order No. 
C-21 (Constitution) 1941, it is provided that all 
the prerogatives of the Rajah shall be exercised 
by the Rajah in Council and not otherwise except in 
so far as the Rajah in Council may from time to 
time determine:
And whereas at a meeting of the members of the 
Supreme Council held on the 5th day of January, 1946, 
an instrument was executed whereby it was determined 
that, as from the 1st January, 1946, all the 
prerogatives of the Rajah should be exercised by the 
Rajah and not otherwise:
And whereas doubts exist as to the validity of 
the said instrument and it is expedient that the said 
determination (if valid) should be revoked:
Now therefore, by virtue of the powers vested in 
the Rajah in Council by the aforesaid sub-section, the 
Rajah in Council hereby revokes the said instrument 
and determination and determines that all prerogatives 
of the Rajah shall be exercisable by the Rajah in 
Council or as they may hereafter determine.
Given under the hand 
of His Highness the 
Rajah, by and with 
the advice and 
consent of the 
Supreme Councilthis 
24th day of April, 
1946.
C.V. BROOKE,
Rajah of Sarawak.
(ii) The Cession Order of the Council Negri
An Order to authorise the Cession of Sarawak to His 
Majesty the King
WHEREAS it is in the interests of the inhabitants of 
Sarawak that the territory of the State of Sarawak, 
and the full sovereignty and dominion over the State, 
should be ceded to His Majesty the King of Great 
Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the 
Seas, Emperor of India, His Heirs and Successors:
Now therefore it is hereby enacted by His Highness 
the Rajah, acting by and with the advice and consent of 
the Council Negri, as follows:-
1. This Order may be cited as Order No.
C-24 (Cession of Sarawak) 1946.
2. The Rajah-in-Council is hereby authorised 
to cede the territory of the State of Sarawak, 
and the full sovereignty and dominion over the 
State, to His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, 
to the intent that Sarawak shall become part of 
His Majesty's dominions; and on such cession any 
claim, however arising, of any person other than 
His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, to succeed 
to any right of sovereignty in respect of the 
territory of Sarawak shall be barred and of no 
effect.
3. The Rajah-in-Council is hereby authorised 
to do all things necessary for the purpose of 
giving full effect to the cession, and of 
transferring to His Majesty, His Heirs and 
Successors, all property and rights whatsoever
in respect of the State and Government of Sarawak.
4. This Order shall come into force forthwith.
C.V. BROOKE,
Rajah.
Kuching, 18th May, 1946.
(iii) The Instrument of Cession
WHEREAS His Highness Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, G.C.M.G. 
is lawfully Rajah of the State of Sarawak:
And whereas by an Agreement dated the fourteenth 
day of June, 1888, the State of Sarawak was placed 
under the protection of Her late Majesty Queen 
Victoria:
And whereas His Highness the Rajah, acting 
with the advice and consent of the Supreme Council of 
Sarawak, has determined that, in the interests of 
the inhabitants of Sarawak, the State of Sarawak 
should be ceded to His Majesty the King and thereafter 
form part of His Majesty’s dominions, which cession 
has been authorised by an Order dated the eighteenth 
day of May, 1946, enacted by the Rajah with the 
advice and consent of the Council Negri of Sarawak, 
and entitled Order No. C-24 (Cession of Sarawak)
1946:
And whereas Christopher William Dawson Esquire 
has been authorised by His Majesty to accept on his 
behalf the said cession:
NOW THESE PRESENTS WITNESS -
1. The territory of the State of Sarawak, 
and the full sovereignty and dominion over the 
State, are hereby ceded by the Rajah, acting 
with the advice and consent of the Supreme 
Council of Sarawak, to and accepted on behalf 
of His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, as 
from the date on which this Instrument comes 
into operation (hereinafter called the date
of cession), to the intent that the State of 
Sarawak shall thereupon become part of His 
Majesty's dominions.
2. There are hereby transferred to His 
Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, as from 
the date of cession, the rights of the Rajah, 
the Rajah in Council, and the State and 
Government of Sarawak in all lands and 
buildings including the Astana, but subject 
to existing private rights and native 
customary rights, and all the other property 
rights and assets of the State and Government 
of Sarawak, including the funds and securities 
of the Government, whether within or outside 
Sarawak; and all things necessary to give 
effect to such transfer shall be done.
479
3. All persons who immediately before the 
date of cession are employed in the service
of the Government of Sarawak will be continued 
in their employment by His Majesty on terms 
not less favourable than those obtaining before 
the date of cession save that they shall hold 
office at the pleasure of His Majesty; and 
His Majesty accepts liability for the payment 
of any pensions gratuities and other like 
benefits due to be paid after the date of 
cession to any person or to his dependants in 
respect of service with the Government of 
Sarawak.
4. This Instrument shall come into operation 
on such date as by virtue of an Order made by 
His Majesty in Council Sarawak becomes part of 
His Majesty's dominions:
Provided that His Majesty shall from the date 
of execution of this Instrument have full power 
and authority to make provision for the 
government of Sarawak, such provision to take 
effect on or after the date of cession.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF His Highness Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, 
G.C.M.G., Rajah of Sarawak, on his own behalf, and 
Christopher William Dawson Esquire on behalf of His 
Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the 
British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, have 
signed the present instrument and have affixed thereto 
their seals; and the seal of the Supreme Council of 
Sarawak has been affixed thereto, by the authority of the 
Council and in its presence.
Done at Kuching, Sarawak, the twenty-first day of 
May, 1946.
C.V. BROOKE,
Rajah.
C.W. DAWSON.
[SUPREME COUNCIL]
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(iv) The Royal Or der-in-Council
At the Court at Buckingham Palace the 26th day of June, 1946
Present:
THE KING’S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL
WHEREAS by an Instrument of Cession dated the twenty-first 
day of May, 1946, His Highness Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, 
G.C.M.G., Rajah of Sarawak, acting with the advice and 
consent of the Supreme Council of Sarawak, has ceded to 
His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, the territory of 
the State of Sarawak and the full sovereignty and 
dominion over the said State, as from the date on which 
the said Instrument of Cession comes into operation, to 
the intent that the State of Sarawak shall thereupon 
become part of His Majesty's dominions;
And whereas it is provided by the said Instrument of 
Cession that it shall come into operation on such date as, 
by virtue of an Order made by His Majesty in Council, 
Sarawak becomes part of His Majesty’s dominions:
Now, therefore, His Majesty is pleased, by and with 
the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is 
hereby ordered, as follows:-
1. This Order may be cited as the Sarawak 
Cession Order in Council, 1946, and shall 
come into operation on the first day of July,
1946.
2. As from the first day of July, 1946,
Sarawak shall be annexed to, and shall form 
part of, His Majesty’s dominions and shall 
be called the Colony of Sarawak.
3. All persons who on the first day of 
July, 1946, are Sarawak subjects by reason 
of the Sarawak Orders No. N-2 (Sarawak 
Nationality and Naturalization) 1934, and 
N-2A (Sarawak Nationality and Naturalization 
Amendment) 1939, shall on that day become 
British subjects.
4. His Majesty hereby reserves to Himself,
His Heirs and Successors, power to revoke, 
alter, add to, or amend this Order.
E.C.E. LEADBITTER
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Appendix V
Documents Relating to the Anti-Cession Movement
(i) The MRU’s letter to Rees-Williams and Gammons_, 3 May 1946.
Sirs,
As the representatives of the Sarawak Malays we respectfully 
introduce ourselves to you. We sincerely welcome you to our 
country. We understand that your visit is to see that justice 
is carried out and also to question thoroughly the inhabitants 
who have rights in this problem concerning the surrender of 
Sarawak as proposed by His Highness the Rajah.
2. On 20 April 1946 we received a letter from the Chief 
Secretary of Sarawak stating the Rajah's intention of giving 
up Sarawak to the British government. As a consequence of 
this a meeting of the Malay population was held on 2 May 1946 
at the Sekolah Merpati Jepang. The decision of the meeting 
was unanimous, both men and women being opposed to the idea 
of Sarawak being handed over to the British. They asked that 
Sarawak's independent status be perpetuated and the will of 
the late Rajah firmly upheld. They authorized this 
organization to be their voice on the Sarawak problem.
3. Apart from the meeting mentioned above, this organization 
has received a number of letters and telegrams from Malay 
and Melanau leaders representing the inhabitants of the whole 
state stating that they had held meetings where it had been 
decided that Sarawak should not be handed over and that Brooke 
rule should be perpetuated.
4. His Highness the Rajah, Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, G.G.M.G., 
was installed by the people. It is his responsibility to rule 
fairly and justly and to protect the rights of the people as
a trustee. The Malays and Melanaus also know that the 
responsibility of the Council Negri is only to administer the 
state and that it has no power to deal with matters relating 
to the handing over of the state, which would mean the end 
of Sarawak's independent status. Because of this the proposal 
should be abrogated.
5. The Malays and the Malanaus request the British 
government to respect treaties between the British and Sarawak 
governments.
6. Furthermore, Clause III of the Atlantic Charter should
be borne in mind: ’Great Britian and the United States
respect the right of every nation to choose the form of 
government they wish to live under and these two countries 
are determined to see that the rights of sovereignty and 
self-government be returned to those who had been 
forcibly robbed of their rights.1 We believe that if the 
British government accepts this takeover plan, it does 
not value and respect the Atlantic Charter.
7. As an independent people we urge that the independence 
of our country be preserved and our views are as follows:
(i) The handing over of Sarawak is not desired.
(ii) If His Highness the Rajah ... feels too 
old and unable to rule, then the 
government of Sarawak should be handed 
over to his heir, His Highness the Tuan 
Muda, in accordance with the will of 
the late Rajah and the custom of this 
country.
(iii) If it is the Tuan Muda's wish, let His 
Highness the Rajah Muda be installed as 
Rajah of Sarawak.
Yours sincerely,
Abang Haji Zaini, 
MNU President.
[my translation]
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(ii) Letter Presented to Sir Charles Arden-Clarke on his Installation 
as Governor3 29 October 1946.
Your Excellency,
With the greatest respect we, the Datu Patinggi, 
senior Native Chieftain of all the indigenous peoples of 
Sarawak, and the President of the Malay National Union of 
Sarawak on behalf of the Malay and Melanau communities of 
the State, would remind Your Excellency that for the. past 
hundred years, Sarawak has been administered by the 
Brooke family. Each of the three Rajahs has ruled by the 
will and with the consent of the indigenous peoples, and 
their rule has been essentially just and considerate.
They have regarded themselves as exercising a trust on 
behalf of the people of Sarawak to whom the country 
belongs. Rajah Sir Charles Brooke, however, has sought to 
cede Sarawak to the British Crown by employing the 1941 
Constitution to his own advantage. There was no justice 
in this act, which constitutes a breach of faith with 
the people. Furthermore, Sir Charles Vyner Brooke had 
no power whatever to offer cession. The Constitution 
was never devised for such a purpose, but was enacted to 
advance the welfare and progress of the people. The 
acceptance by His Majesty’s Government of such a cession 
from Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, which purports to make 
Sarawak a British colony, is not valid, and such an act 
is not only inconsistent with the Constitution but is 
also a breach of international law. The indigenous 
people throughout the entire country reject this act 
of cession and no matter how many council meetings may 
be held and no matter what other means may be employed, 
the people will remain adamant in their attitude and 
will never agree to cession. The vote of the Native 
communities at the State Council meeting recently held 
to discuss the cession proposal accurately reflected 
the attitude of the people, that is to say, the cession 
was not agreed to by the majority of the people.
We respectfully request Your Excellency to convey 
to His Majesty's Government an expression of the wishes 
of the indigenous people and of their opposition to cession.
We trust His Majesty's Government will give their most 
careful and just consideration to our request and that they 
will bring the matter to the notice of His Majesty the 
King so that he may revoke the cession by the exercise of 
the powers conferred on him by clause 4 of the Sarawak 
Cession Order in Council of 26th June, 1946, and that His 
Majesty will thereby restore to Sarawak the independence it 
has enjoyed hitherto under the protection of the British 
Crown. The right of succession to the Raj of Sarawak, in 
accordance with the wishes of the people of the country 
to whom it indisputably belongs, is vested in the heirs 
of the Brooke family, that is to say, His Highness the
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Tuan Muda, Bertram Brooke, and his son the Rajah Muda, 
Anthony Brooke.
We respectfully sign ourselves.
(Sgd.) Abang Haji Abdillah,
Datu Patinggi
(Sgd.) 
President,
Abang Haji Zaini,
Malay National Union
of Sarawak.
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(iii) Petition to the King from Presidents of the Malay National 
Union and the Sarawak Dayak Association3 10 February 19483 
on behalf of 13 Sarawak associations.
... In the autumn of 1945 our Rajah, Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, 
G.C.M.G., whose status was graciously defined by Your 
Majesty’s illustrious father as that of a subject of Your 
Majesty and the ruler of a friendly State, notified Your 
Majesty’s Government of his proposal that our country, whose 
independence had been internationally recognized, should 
be ceded to Your Majesty, and in the words of Your Majesty's 
Secretary of State for the Colonies on February 6, 1946,
"it was intimated to the Rajah that such a proposal would 
be acceptable to His Majesty’s Government . This preliminary 
offer of cession and its immediate acceptance by Your 
Majesty’s Government resulted from private consultations 
from which representatives of the Sarawak people and our 
Tuan Muda, heir presumptive to the Raj, were excluded.
The public statement made by Your Majesty’s Secretary for 
State for the Colonies on February 6, 1946, was the first 
intimation of such a proposal to the Sarawak people and to 
the Tuan Muda, who had a very special right to be consulted 
in matters of such high importance for Sarawak and its 
people in accordance with the terms of his father s 
political will, which Sir Charles Vyner Brooke on his 
accession in 1917 had solemnly sworn to uphold. In spite 
of much public criticism, and considerable opposition on 
the part of the representatives of the Sarawak people, the 
Cession Bill was duly passed and ratified by the Council 
Negri in May 1946. This result, however, was only obtained 
by including the votes of the European official members 
of the Council, without whose votes the Bill would have been 
decisively rejected. At the time of the cession serious 
allegations of constitutional and ethical impropriety were 
made against Your Majesty’s Government and although these 
charges have been repeated on many occasions during the past 
eighteen months they have neither been the subject of 
inquiry nor have they been officially refuted. In reply to 
repeated protests against the annexation of our country 
Your Majesty’s Government have consistently maintained, 
while avoiding references to the abovementioned charges, 
that the cession was effected "in a proper, legal and 
constitutional manner". Your Majesty's Government have also 
maintained that opposition to cession from within the 
country is not representative of the people as a whole. We 
have respectfully disputed this claim and we now venture to 
affirm that we are without question wholly representative 
of the indigenous people and especially the literate 
classes by whom alone the implications of the cession can be 
clearly understood.
We venture to claim that there is no support for the 
annexation from the indigenous people with the exception of 
certain persons employed in the Government Service and of an 
association of negligible membership whose president is an 
Assistant Commissioner of the Sarawak Constabulary.
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It is because of our vain endeavours over a period of more 
than eighteen months to obtain from Your Majesty’s Government 
recognition for Sarawak of the Atlantic Charter principles 
which Great Britain undertook to honour that we now humbly 
bring to the notice of Your Majesty our just plea for the 
revocation of the cession and for the restoration of our 
country as an independent monarchy under Your Majesty’s 
most gracious protection.
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(iv) Summary of comments received from Governor of Sarawak on the 
aide memoire in relation to Sarawak Affairs prepared by 
direction of His Highness Rayah Brooke
Paragraph 1.
There is ample evidence to show that the Chinese are 
keenly interested in the political issue. They favour 
cession, and, while avoiding active participation in local 
politics, maintain a close watch over all developments.
Paragraph 2.
The importance and extent of the social and religious 
boycott can be exaggerated. There has been no attempt to 
prevent people from using the Mosque. The Moslem members 
of the Constabulary, headed by the band, attend the Mosque 
services in Kuching as usual on Fridays. The attempt at 
social boycott is gradually disappearing. Active steps have 
been, and continue to be, taken to counter the propaganda of 
the anti-cessionists and to contradict false allegations.
Paragraph 4.
At the time of the handover His Highness agreed that, 
as a temporary measure, the Sarawak flag should be flown 
alongside the Union Jack. This arrangement ceased some time 
ago, and the Union Jack is now flying alone wherever it is 
available. Those Sarawak flags which, owing to the shortage 
of Union Jacks, continued to fly alone after the handover, 
are being replaced as fast as possible with Union Jacks as 
supplies of the latter arrive.
Paragraph 7.
In the past the Dyaks of the 2nd Division have been more 
susceptible to the influence of the Malays. This is no longer 
the case. They appear to be as strongly opposed to Malay 
domination as any other Dyaks.
Paragraph 8.
The importance of the Dyaks has not escaped the notice 
of Government. Active measures have been and continue to be 
taken not without success to win and maintain their confidence 
and good-will.
Paragraph 9.
The Indonesian influence that is becoming more and more 
apparent in the anti-cession movement comes from Singapore 
and is not due to the activities of the few Indonesians from 
Pontianak who visit Sarawak.
Paragraphs 11 and 12.
The suggestion that one of the late Datu Patinggi’s 
family should be vested with the title "Datu Patinggi" is not 
favoured. The late Datu Patinggi was unaffectedly glad to 
see the Japanese and to put his services unreservedly at their 
disposal. It is understood that His Highness himself refused 
the late Datu Patinggi’s request to have his grandson made a
488
(v) Anthony Bvoohe's statement on the assassination of Duncan Stewavt.
Although investigations into the attempted assassination ... 
are still taking place, and not a single press report from 
Sarawak itself has reached this country, official statements 
from Singapore — 500 miles away — interpret the crime as a 
political act.
I am bound in fairness to the Sarawak anti—cession organizations, 
who look to me to represent their views here, to answer these 
charges.
For three years, since the annexation of Sarawak in 1946, the 
anti-cession associations have tried to emulate western 
democratic practices in the expression of legitimate grievances 
by lawful means.
Their aim is the revocation of the so-called "cession" and 
the restoration of Sarawak as an independent state under 
British protection.
They have shown exemplary patience in the teeth of attempts 
by the authorities, in a series of improper and unjust acts, 
to frustrate their lawful aims and to belittle their cause.
In these three years not a single illegal or improper act has 
been laid at their door, but the authorities have ruthlessly 
refused either to answer or to investigate the repeated charges 
of bribery, intimidation and misrepresentation in connection 
with the expression of grievances of those opposed to it.
Now when an impetuous and misguided youth, reverting to the 
traditional and atrocious resort of eastern - and western - 
peoples denied a constitutional outlet, plunges a knife into 
the innocent Englishman who represents in his eyes these 
injustices, the authorities try to use the incident to justify 
their own illegalities and to absolve themselves from 
responsibility for the situation they have created.
But for the policy they have pursued there would have been no 
crime. The implication that peaceful and law-abiding 
associations, by daring to criticise this policy, are responsible 
for its outcome seems to me outrageous.
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Datu. It is felt that such an appointment would be an affront 
to many people in Sarawak who remained loyal and particularly 
to the two new Datus, appointed by the Governor on the occasion 
of the King's birthday, in recognition of their integrity, 
loyalty and good service. Very active measures have been and 
continue to be taken to counter the anti-cession activities 
and propaganda organised by Mr. Anthony Brooke.
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(vi) The End of the Anti-Cession Campaign
Anthony Brooke's message to the anti-cessionists, 3 February 1951.
The gravity of the international situation impels me to urge 
you all to cease your activities against the Cession of Sarawak 
to Britain, as I myself am resolved to do. I have never been 
in doubt that your welfare lies with Britain and within the 
great British Commonwealth. In recognition of your acceptance 
of British Commonwealth aims, I invite you to discontinue 
henceforth the practice of demonstrating on Cession Day (July 
1st) and to celebrate instead H.M. the King’s official birthday 
which falls this year on June 7. I should like Sarawak to 
witness on that day a really magnificent demonstration of 
loyalty, and I appeal to you in all sincerity to forget past 
grievances and in the interests of all the peoples of Sarawak 
to co-operate wholeheartedly with the Sarawak Government.
By so doing, you will, I feel convinced,earn the lasting 
gratitude of future generations of your people for the 
services you will have rendered to the great cause of unity 
and peace within Sarawak.
Report of Anthony Brooke's speech to the Moral Rearmament 
World Assembly, Caix (Switzerland), September 1951.
Describing the five year deadlock after the war between the 
Sarawak nationalists and the British Government, Mr Brooke said 
that this had resulted in division and disunity in the entire 
country which had split many families, and members of an 
illegal association who had broken off from the constitutional 
movement had assassinated a British Governor. The issue was 
the question of the status of Sarawak in the British Commonwealth 
... and he had previously felt that any compromise on his 
part might be interpreted as betraying the cause of the 
Sarawak nationalists. He admitted that frequent appeals to 
induce him to change his mind had left him cold, but "contact 
with Moral Rearmament made me realise that it would be wrong 
to continue and be a party to a growing state of disunity in 
Sarawak ... I saw that by a change of attitude on my part I 
might help heal the divisions. One morning a clear plan came to 
me. I went to the Commissioner General, Mr Malcolm MacDonald, 
and offered to do all possible to get unity in Sarawak. I 
cabled the Sarawak nationalists that their cause was just but 
that there was a bigger cause on which they could unite with 
the British authorities and help save humanity from catastrophe. 
They agreed to do this and also cabled the British Prime 
Minister asking for an assurance that when the present threat 
to the British Commonwealth ended the Sarawak people would be 
consulted about their future." Mr Brooke expressed appreciation 
of the attitude the Prime Minister Mr Attlee and Mr Malcolm 
MacDonald and the Colonial Office had taken. He declared that 
this had helped to unite the parties in the dispute and on 
an effective basis of co-operation and the conviction that "by
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infusing our way of life with inspired and dynamic moral 
rearmament standards, Moral Rearmament provides the only 
ideology in these times which can answer the materialistic 
challenge of our day and break deadlocks everywhere 
throughout the world and bring unity and peace to mankind."
The anti-cessionists' reply, 6 February 1951.
We have received your Highness’s decision to withdraw from the 
Sarawak Cession controversy with deep regret, inasmuch as we 
sincerely believe that the cause of a united Sarawak now and 
in future years can best be served by the recognition on the 
part of His Majesty’s Government that we do not want to be a 
colony but an independent state under the constitutional rule 
of Brooke Rajahs within the British Commonwealth of Nations.
We regret we do not feel able to accede to your request to 
abandon these aims, but with this reservation we shall most 
willingly do everything within our power to play an active and 
constructive role in co-operation with the Sarawak Government 
and all communities in the country to ensure that no element 
of doubt exists with regard to the unfaltering attitude of 
all our people towards the growing menance of aggressive World 
Communism. To this end we have already held consultations 
aimed at the formation of a non-political association whose 
main object will be to support British Commonwealth ideals 
and to assist in safeguarding our peoples from subersive 
and foreign propagandists. It is our firm intention that the 
United Sarawak Association shall play leading part in giving 
effect to the keenly felt desire of all our peoples to demonstrate 
their loyalty to the person of the King by widescale celebrations 
throughout Sarawak on the occasion of His Majesty’s birthday, 
and also to show, on that occasion, our pride, our gratitude 
and our appreciation of all he means to us as our protector in 
international affairs and as the highest symbol of unity within 
the British Commonwealth, upon the maintenance of which depends 
the fate not only of ourselves but of all mankind.
Malay National Union of Sarawak 
Sarawak Dayak Association 
Sarawak National Youth Movement 
Sarawak Nationalist Party 
United Malay Association
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Message from the Malay National Union,Sarawak Dayak Association, 
Sarawak Nationalist Party, Sarawak Nationalist Youth Movement 
and United Malay Association of Sarawak to Prime Minister 
Attlee, 4 February 1951.
We shall be grateful if His Majesty’s Government will be good 
enough to give us a firm declaration that when the present 
grave threat to Commonwealth interests no longer exists the 
Sarawak people will be encouraged constitutionally to form 
and express their opinion as to the kind of self-government 
they would prefer to achieve, and that this should not preclude 
should the peoples of Sarawak as a whole desire it, a 
constitutional monarchy with Brooke Rajahs within the British 
Commonwealth.
Attlee's reply, 18 February 1951.
His Majesty's Government are glad to have this opportunity of 
confirming their unqualified determination to guide and assist 
the people of Sarawak in their progress towards self-government 
within the British Commonwealth. In the future, as in the 
past, it will be freely open to all in Sarawak to express 
in a constitutional manner their views regarding the way in 
which progress towards self-government is to be realised, and 
any views expressed by bodies substantially representative 
of the people of Sarawak would receive the fullest consideration 
of His Majesty's Government. The constitutional form which 
progress towards self-government in the British Commonwealth 
should take could only be settled in the circumstances at 
the time.
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B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Unpublished Primary Sources
Great Britain
A The Public Record Office
Colonial Office records:
CO 531 Borneo Correspondence, Parts 26-32, 1936-46
CO 938 Part 1, 1946
War Office records:
WO 203 Correspondence 1944-46
War Cabinet records:
CAB 98/41 War Cabinet Committee on Malaya and Borneo, 1944
B Rhodes House Library, Oxford
A general listing including Sarawak material held at Rhodes 
House can be found in Louis B. Frewer, Manuscript Collections 
(Excluding Africana) in Rhodes House Library3 Oxford3 Oxford 
1970. However, there have been a number of very important 
Sarawak acquisitions since that time, in particular, a 
collection of Brooke family papers and the papers of the 
Chief Justice of Sarawak, 1930-39, T. Stirling Boyd. Since 
the Brooke collection, which covers the period 1841-1971, 
amounts to 14 boxes and the Boyd collection to seven boxes, 
there is no point in my listing even the principal items which 
I have used. Besides, catalogues are now available from the 
Oxford University Colonial Records Project: Papers of the
Brookes of Sarawak3 Oxford 1974; Papers of T. Stirling Boyd3 
Oxford 1976. Collections and items listed below are under 
restriction if no shelf number is given.
Brooke Family Papers 
T. Stirling Boyd Papers
MSS Pac.s.83
MSS Pac.s.86
E.C.G. Barrett Diary
This diary is a record of the various meetings held in 
Sarawak by D.R. Rees-Williams, M.P., and L.D. Gammans, 
M.P., to consult local opinion on the cession.
G.E. Bettison Diary MSS Pac.s.56
This typescript diary is the personal record of a 
customs officer 1939-41. It is of limited usefulness.
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W.C.S. Corry
Transcript of tape-recorded reminiscences.
C.W. Dawson Diary
This diary is the personal record of C.W. Dawson’s 
experiences in Sarawak April-August 1946, first as 
British Representative and then as Chief Secretary.
K. H. Digby Papers
Unpublished autobiography: 'Lawyer in the Wilderness'.
Typescript, c.1951.
File on a libel suit brought by Anthony Brooke in 1947.
Memorandum entitled: ’Note on meeting held in Mr. Dale s
room at the Colonial Office on the 5th April [1946]
Poems etc. connected with his time as editor of the
Sarawak Gazette.
E.H. Elam Papers MSS Pac.s.65
Letters and cables home 1939- 
Photographs 
Press cuttings
L. D. Gammans Papers
Correspondence March—July 1946 between Gammans and the 
Colonial Office and related papers.
Itinerary of official mission to Sarawak; typescript 
memoranda about Sarawak.
Two letters from Anthony Brooke to Gammans (13 and 22 March 
1946); copies of press cuttings and notes on Sarawak and 
its relations with the British government; extracts from 
correspondence between Bertram Brooke and the Secretary of 
State for Colonies.
Copies of four typescript memoranda on Sarawak and its 
administration and G.T.M. MacBryan.
Letter from Bertram Brooke to Gammans (26 April 1946) 
about the latter's forthcoming visit to Sarawak.
Typescript memorandum entitled 'Administration of Sarawak , 
probably by T. Stirling Boyd.
Typescript article by Gammans entitled ’The Cession of 
Sarawak’; typescript for an address on the end of Brooke 
rule.
’Parliamentary Mission to Sarawak’. Gammans’ personal 
record of his visit to Sarawak, probably written for the 
Secretary of State for Colonies or for Oliver Stanley. 
Typescript.
’Record of the Visit of Lt. Col. Rees-Williams, M.P., and 
Capt. Gammans, M.P., to Sarawak’. Semi-official report 
made to the Secretary of State for Colonies, based on the 
diary notes of E.C.G. Barrett. Typescript.
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Printed address given by Garamans and Rees-Williams to 
the Colonial Affairs Study Group.
Press cuttings.
C.F.C. Macaskie Papers
Seven uncatalogued files of correspondence from his time 
as Chief Civil Affairs Officer, British Borneo Civil 
Affairs Unit and British Military Administration (British 
Borneo).
Unpublished autobiography: 'End of An Era: Borneo
Reminiscences'. Typescript, c.1963.
J.L. Noakes Papers MSS Pac.s.62
'Report upon defence measures adopted in Sarawak from 
June 1941 to the occupation in Dec. 1941 by imperial 
Japanese forces'. Typescript 1946. The report has been 
annotated in a useful way by one of Noakes' contemporaries, 
probably J.C. Swayne.
M.P. O'Connor Papers MSS Pac.s.58
Correspondence with the Rajah, 1940, on medical and health 
administration.
A.J.N. Richards Papers MSS Ind.Ocn.s.213
Letters home 1938-42, 1946-50, including copies of 
official minutes and memorandum entitled 'The Search 
for a Policy in Sarawak, 1939'.
Photographs.
Sir Shenton Thomas Papers 
Diary 1940-45
C Royal Commonwealth Institute Library 
Sir George Maxwell Papers
D Archives of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
Reports of the Bishop of Labuan and Sarawak, 1930-39
E Private Collections
Mrs K.M. Brooke Papers
Letters from Anthony Brooke, 1942-48.
Diary of her visit to Sarawak, July 1947 - February 1948
Press cuttings
Photographs
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Mrs Evelyn Hussey Papers
Legal documents connected with G.T.M. MacBryan s visit 
to Sarawak, December 1945 - January 1946.
Proclamation by the Rajah dated 1 November 1945 appointing 
the King as his successor.
Two files (Nos. 53 and 66735) formerly from the Sarawak 
Government Office, Millbank, and containing correspondence 
relating to negotiations between the Provisional Government 
and the Colonial Office 1944-45; the dismissal of the 
Provisional Government; visitis to Sarawak in early 1946 
by the Rajah, Bertram Brooke, F.H. Pollard and J.R. Combe; 
cables between members of the Malay National Union and 
Sarawak Dayak Association and Bertram and Anthony Brooke; 
letters from G.T.M. MacBryan to the Rajah and J.A. Smith 
relating to the Sarawak State Trust fund and other matters.
Three letters from G.T.M. MacBryan to Mrs Hussey.
Collection of press cuttings and three letters from the 
Ranee Margaret to Charles Willes Johnson concerning Esca 
Daykin, 1927.
Memorandum: ’Summary of comments received from Governor
of Sarawak on the aide memoire in relation to Sarawak 
Affairs prepared by direction of His Highness the Rajah . 
Typescript, c.1947.
Mrs Hilary Waddington (Papers of F.H. Pollard)
Memorandum dated 5 November 1944 relating to his 
resignation from the Borneo Planning Unit.
Memorandum dated 8 July 1944 addressed to J.J. Paskin by 
Sarawak officers seconded to the Borneo Planning Unit.
Letters home 1932-45.
Memorandum: ’Some Notes on Social Welfare in Sarawak .
Typescript, March 1945.
Memorandum: ’Administration in Sarawak'. Typescript,
January 1944.
Memorandum: 'Long Term Policy'. Typescript, c.1944.
Sarawak
A Eliab Bayang Papers
Files of correspondence, memoranda etc. mostly relating to 
his pre-war position in the Junior Administrative Service, 
the United Sea Dayak Co-operative and his position during 
the Japanese occupation; some correspondence relating to 
his post-war political activity.
B Philip Jitam Papers
Files of correspondence and documents mostly relating to 
his position during the Japanese occupation and to the 
Perimpun Dayak; some correspondence relating to his post­
war political activity.
Australia
A Australian Archives
A2670 War Cabinet Agenda, 1944-45
A2674 War Cabinet Minutes - Index Books, 1944-45
A2673 War Cabinet Minutes, 1944-45
B Australian War Memorial
A2663 (British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit;
9th Division Diary; Kuching Force Diary)
C Mitchell Library
Mark Morrison Papers ML MSS 863
D Private Collections 
J.R. Black Papers
Documents relating to his time with the British Borneo 
Civil Affairs Unit at Miri.
Sir Thomas Eastick Papers
Correspondence, reports, newspapers, photographs and 
other materials from his time as Commander of Kuching 
Force, September-December 1945.
R.H. Morris Papers
Reports from his time with the British Borneo Civil 
Affairs Unit and the British Military Administration 
(British Borneo).
Japan
Nishijima Collection, Waseda University
NB 9 Nada Shudan (Nada group). Kita Boruneo Gunsei
Gaiyo (Status of the Military Administration 
in North Borneo). September 1st, 1944.
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’The Sarawak Crisis, April 1939'. Typescript 
[1939]. Private copy.
Bridges, W.F.N. 'A Report on Rubber Regulation in Sarawak’, 16th March, 1937. Typescript. Library of 
Malaysian Rubber Research Institute, Kuala 
Lumpur.
Hammond, R.W. 'Report on Education in Sarawak'. Typescript 
1937. Sarawak Museum.
Ho Cheah Min 'Jih-chih shih-ch'i ti hui-i’ (Memoirs of the Japanese Occupation). MS written for 
Sarawak History Week, 1975. Private copy.
MacBryan, Mrs Eva MS memorandum [1947?]. Private copy.
Morris, R.H. MS memoir of 1945-46 events. 1976. Private 
copy.
Morrison, A. 'Fair Land Sarawak'. Typescript 1976. Private 
copy.
Noakes, J.L. 'The Principles and Objects of Land Adminis­tration in Sarawak'. Typescript, 1946. 
Private copy.
Ogmore, Lord Typescript memoirs. Private copy.
Sandin, Benedict 'Traditional History of the Iban of Borneo . 
Typescript. Universiti Sains Malaysia, 
Penang.
Suzuki, Shoichiro MS memoirs, 1976. Private copy.
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15 July 1946.
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Hepburn, B.A. St.J., The Handbook of Sarawak. Singapore 1949.
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Kuching 1950.
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State Orders Issued by His Highness the Rayah of Sarawak or with 
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Madam Barbara Bay (Kuching)
Mr Sumping Bayang (Kuching) 
Abang Boeing (Miri)
Mr Harry Brody (Kuching)
Mr Harry Buxton (Bintulu) 
Chegu Lily Eberwein (Kuching) 
Dato Ekhwan Zaini (Kuching)
Archdeacon P.P.H. Howes 
(Limbang)
Mr Harold Jitam 
Mr Ramsay Jitam 
Mr Andrew Jika Landau 
Abang Haji Mohd. Kassim Taha 
(Kuching)
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Mr Dennis Law (Kuching)
Temenggong Datuk Muif (Miri)
Dato Stephen Ningkan
Encik Mohd. Ma'amon bin Nor (Kuching)
The late Mr Ong Hap Leong (Kuching)
Encik Osman bin Mohammad (Bintulu)
Encik Senawi bin Suleiman (Kuching)
Haji Mohd. Su'aut bin Haji Mohd. Tahir (Kuching) 
Encik Sulhi bin Idin (Miri)
Bishop Basil Temenggong (Kuching)
Brunei (1974):
Dato I. Talog-Davies 
Mr Robert Nicholl 
Mr John North
Australia (1975-76):
Mr R.H. Morris 
Alastair and Hedda Morrison 
Professor W.E.H. Stanner 
Sir Victor Windeyer
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